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The main object of this thesis is to 3tudy the impact of the 
West on Arab nationalism during the period 1952-1958. The year 1952 
saw the coup dietat of th* Free officers in Egypt -  an event which 
marked the intensification of the struggle for irab unity. The struggle 
reached its culmination in 1958 with the creation of the Waited Arab 
Republic, The choice of this particular period is Justified, on the 
one hand, by the maturity of Arab nationalism as compared with its pre­
vious phases and, on th* other, ty the ©pen, far-reaching conflicts be­
tween the Arabs and the West.
Bat the period «in not be properly appreciated, either in its
■ ' ‘ ~ ‘ * ' . m
contribution to Arab nationalism or in its bearing on the Arab-West 
relationship,if sufficient account is  not taken of its background. The 
more so since what we try -to differentiate and assess is  not a straight 
chain of events but a tangled web of ideas. Thus, to make ©or background 
studv adequata to the complexity of the subject in hand, we have had to 
discuss at great length (in nearly one third of the thesis) themajor 
movements of Arab thought in the ntneteeneh and beginning of the twentieth 
century.
The Western impact has made itse lf fe lt  both at the theoretical 
and practical levels of Arab nationalism. To gauge its implications we 
have had to scrutinize Arab nationalism in its three different aspects} 
as a theory, as a historical phenomenon and as a political movement. The
i l l
thesis tries t t e  how, m the theoretical plane, Arab nationalism has 
conducted Its flnht against the West mainly vlth weaoonn which it ha3 
borrowed from the West, And It al*n tries to ihov how this ironical 
situation has resuItad in multiple contradictions within both Arab poli­
tical thought and practice* The attempts of Arab religious circles at 
removing these contradiction# and inconsistencies by an out-and-out 
identification of Arab nationalists with lalar. have been studied at s o »  
length.
But the thesis, la discussing the^e issues, tries also to serve 
another purpose* to csr*y a stage forward the analyses already made by 
other writers of the basic postulate# and principlea of Arab nationali*» 
in its in itial pi»#*#, «id to f i l l  a gap in tha Western political liter­
ature on the Arabs,
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The letter ta aarbufah la transliterated by ’•ah", except in the cose 
of the word m m  which seems to be jlbre common in huropean sources than 
the form unmh.
H a lig .
The sign (* ) is also used after a ta marbufrah followed ty a word begin­
ning with a vowel sound in which caaen the ta. martiutah is  transliterated’ 
by Htw.
1.
There are feature• in Arab nationalism which grow out of genuine 
Arab life* which stem, that is, from political, econoraio and social 
conditions prevailing in the most advanced of the Arab countties, as 
well as from the teachings of the Kora® and great Islamic philosophers. 
Mt there also are features in Arab nationalism which derive fro® the 
impact of Western modes of thought and life  on the Arab world. It  is 
the object of this thesis to assess the nature and extent of this latter
tm
impact.
Sea» western s t a t e « »  have made the mistake of interpreting Arab 
nationalism as a static factor, with unalterable and tangible character­
istics and, this being their assumption, whatever policy they have 
adopted towards Arab nationalism, whether trying to appease or tooopcse 
i t ,  consequently was wrong. Throughout the history of the interaction 
of the Arabs and the West the Aral®, perhaps because of their natural 
adaptability, have been better at improvising policies while the West 
has relied much more on long-accepted ideas end principles. In our
changing world of today i t  is  with improvisation rather than otherwise
1
that the advantages have lain.
In order, therefore, tomake as correct as possible an assessment
However. a modern Arab writer denounces improvisation (in Arabic 
lrtljfali as one of the causes of the present "crisis of Arab thought", 
(Dr. Is^Iq liusa. $usainl, gamut* al flier a l*a rab l. dar bairut, Beirut, . 
1954, P. 17.)
2.
of the impact of the ’Jest, we shall haw to view Arab nationalisa both 
in its dynamic and in its static aspects* As a dynamic phenomenal,®, 
as an idea-in-becoming , Arab nationalisa is a composite of three factors 
in recent'Arab history* First, the urge far progress with a ll its pre­
requisites of self-determination and democratic government; this has 
been the result of Arab contact with the modern, i.e . Western, world, 
Second, the striving for unity; this has been the outgrowth of the 
Muslims' reformism at the end of the nineteenth century. Third and 
last is their consciousness, or knowledge, of belonging to a oomiaon 
homeland; this has been consequent upon the adoption of the Western 
concept of patrie« Arab nationalism thus represents the confluence of 
three streams of Arab thought* l )  Westernization, 2) Islamic re­
vivalism, 3) Patriotism. As a persisting phenomenon, i.e , a pheno­
menon viewed in the context of the present age, Arab nationalism com­
prises three features* a) the growing dominance of religion, b) the 
upsurge of militarism and, c) neutrality. These feature« w ill need also 
to be studied to complete our assessment. '
V
' One needs to notice that the Western impact has been in part non- 
deliberate and eve® unconscious, in part deliberate and conscious. In - 
its non-deliberate aspect It has made itse lf fe lt  through voluntary and » 
non-official contacts between the Europeans and Arabs, through the 1®- ' ' 
personal, untrammelled and sweeping flow of Western science, culture and 
art, ; Where deliberate, it  has taken the fora of definite political and 
economic policies as well of organised, sophisticated cultural and re- '
3lig i™ * mia?ions, Lik® m aany ©tfecr dlstincticns thla m a # totv*en 
thè ss tm  klaé# of la i» et, 1» bau« very often to beo#» Uan*«d* -Bai 
tbo élstinction is both necesaary «né reti* An illnstratlon v i l i  s®*"*® 
to &artfy. th® polat, asraely, • thè introducili» of tfea concept of é«*®- 
cracy, «né late li» iato th» Arali oountvios* . ; ■ ■ ■ ■ . •
Tha Introduci!®« of th© coneept.of ée>«ocracy lato thè Àrab - 
countrles ha# nat be«a èst# to th® ¿«liberato achleveraant of parti- 
colar Woatovn governnent» Whcn thè Idea of sottlag upparlt«sents and _
©tber ¿«»©«rati« bodte# to mmtm thè rights of thè peopi® w »  w  » « -
• i .■ «* '
UfKtlon# of offici»!««« ' tNk camaad '. <*'.*» vteàa m i ecnactonao» ©f ; ,7 
!**rr*««ilOo «né cnllghtcned 'Araba tot* ita» m t through thè effort# « f  .
»neh and «neh 4  WSfcB* 'or «e li  m i mesh a ifcaoofcWarf»^
ary, %  Ih» c^ntrary, tbispo ver» caaea la  vhich both Brltlsh «ad French 
fama of coloniallsn oppone« th© grovrth ©f any politicai practio® vhLcb . 
righi fesi#r thè interestof thè pcoplo in th« affair# of their cctmtry
' ......   ^ , V
'•né therety Indi® them to ii^tp«aéeae«.# ' B«fc kiti®«#*-' th© tool« p i » -  - - 
alito of éonoeroay m m  f a l l a r  ‘to' tha.'lMfea»' thasks t® th« Forarli c in-. 
3« r t i « » f «tó to tho.totovioir « f t o © f i « ? © « p Celiph»*1 tfca&rfeaftteg
*Xn bis short tot masterly taaay cntitleé *Sol«ooòt ' ps*fH8«»sy «■*. X*i«a* * 
taaagia Katìtr, th© conteaporajy IaftUo Mutilo * h W © '* t*Al«*to* tho . 
6asoor«tl« sabotano© «sé tesser if.tlw  Xaleni© tooaMJlC1*®- HI« aFfweitt# 
m  ttó# polnt a?« rattor. @©riii®»#it «Ito thè prtaoiil*# of X©*- •
lm  tto» vitti Ita hlat©*y* Ha'«torto off to è*#fiÌMÌ| tto ttooo basic ■ 
eanaapt* cosoMfRg/toa gpowtfc of 'atlaooof tfcaao aro th» anlftooltr of 
thè uni verse, ih® ;u^lv#r#alj.tr « f  th» toanrflf nature anfi thè va ino .«  
th® individuai instane«* ' lo thè» goea on to prove that «eiacracy 1® tot 
th« application of these three principi©» to tbo social llfe  of hufsaa toinct;
(cent,)
4.
minds case to Imbibe these principles mainly through the study of the 
works of Western proponents of democracy and equality, especially those 
®f the French pre—te volution and of liiglish liberalism, through personal 
observations «ad experiences la  the Western countries and through the 
free-lance efforts of those liberal Europe ana who took an active Interest' 
in the s©dal, economic and political coalitions of the Arabs, addressing 
some of their works to them.
(cent.)
»From the homogeneity rad unity of toe world,» he says, "follows the 
universal application of-»oral rad'political laws. From the uniformity . 
of the laws of nature fellows the equality of a ll before the Ira. From 
toe emphasis on the partioular instance follows the recognition of the 
dignity of the Individual human being,» (p. 11), Having adumbrated these 
pfndlltiis, to demonstrate their "remarkable simi­
larity" with the basic concepts of Islam, fha first  pre-supposition of 
both science rad democracy is the existence of a unitary world) Islam 
expresses its belief in this unitary world ly  emphasizing the unity of 
the Godhead in "a manner which tots been rarely squalled by any ether re~- 
ligion", Islam accedes to the second principle of science rad democracy,., 
namely, the universality of the taw, by balding that, "as a religion valid 
for a ll times, i t  must reveal the eternal nature ef truth , , ,  rad that
- since God is one and reason seeks to express His nature, to® taws of rea- 
son cannot but be the same for a ll" . But mors interesting and original' 
is  toe writer*s argument on Islam's position as regards the third prin­
ciple, i.e . reverence for too individual. By denying tbs distinction 
between the phenomenal and the transcendent, Muslim religious thought 
values nature rat as a symbol #f  something hidden but for its own sake. 
When the reality of the empirical is recognised, the particular comes to 
its own, for the empirical is  always relieved in particular as the human 
personality. On this basis many_philosophical schools in Islam, in -
- eluding the \adml and the shuhudl.have emphasised that the individual
cannot be regarded as a mere element in a universal system but i t  has an 
independent status ef its «mu. "The over-riding unity of God," concludes 
toe writer, "seems to be ehalleneged (in Islam) ty the uniqueness of the 
individual»" (Htraayun KabTr, Science, nomocracy and Islam, rad ether, 
essays, George Allen and %win, London, 1955#) ■ • ■ • : - :
5.
Laicisa, In the sense of recognition of the divorce between state 
and religion,1 being a logical conclusion of the Western concept of demo­
cracy, provides also another example in this respect.
-. For these, reasons, the, adaption of the concept of democracy and 
a laic system of government (in a ll but name) by the Arab countries should 
be regarded as aspects @f- the West's unconscious "impact”.
But running parallel,!® the above development there have been the 
conscious, organised and deliberate efforts of the West to acquire and .......
-It® political and eoonomic inf 1 wince in these countries, , To en- • ,; 
sure the survival of its influence the West has tried, among otter things, 
to .ralee pmMrfastas1»  states»«» to power. and even to promote anti-demo- 
oratlci, wqpnmám * •# * »• « ' ruthless their crushing of any opposition 
to the Western concessions and privileges in their countries. This second 
development has often countered and neutralised the firs t , leading ta sev­
ere setbacks for.the cause of democracy and laldsm. In the field of 
foreign policy, it  has alienated the Arab nationalists, forcing then to 
pursue a peculiar brand of the policy of neutrality,
XIn__English, laieism is  often used in the sense of non-ecclesiastical, r
although the term itse lf, especially in view @f it® origin (the Green- 
lalkcs. people) allows for a much wider meaning, i,e , non-religious or 
"rationalist". The term adopted in English political writing for this 
second meaning is secularism, while the French authors us#
Remaining loyal to the French tradition, which is  s t i l l  prevailing « * « *  
most Persian and Arab theorists, the present writer, in speaking a_ 
the relationship between state and religion in the Arab countries, has 
preferred la id  am to secularism.
6.
The present'thesis w ill he, in fact, composed of two parts* In 
Part I , entitled ’’The Origins", there w ill he studied the origins of Arab 
nationalism with stress on those movements of thought which brought about 
the Arab awakening In the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuiyj this w ill be dene in the chapters entitled "The Birth
ef the Umma" and "Awakening".
Then w ill fellow Part n  ©f the thesis, entitled "Baity": this 
part wnsists first ef a survey of the principles and ideas ef Arab nation- 
a ll« »  as propounded ty modem Arab political thinkers and theorists. This 
survey w ill not only give on insight into relevant changes which occurred
. r'
in Arab political thought under the impact of the west, but also throw 
light on how contemporary Arab intellectuals see the general problems ef 
their community in the present day verld. This w ill be dor» in the section 
called "The Ideas of Arab nationalism" and w ill constitute the theoretical 
part of our study.
The final chapters of Part I I  w ill be devoted te the three main 
features of Arab nationalism, viz., "Religion", "Militarism" and "Neutral­
ity", in the sections so headed. These sections w ill show us, on the one 
hand, how democracy and laicism, the two most positive achievements of 
Western influence in the Arab countries, are being abandoned, giving place 
to military rule and religious revival (not reformation) and, on the other 
hand, how that partisanship in world affairs, which was one of the funda­
mental traditions in Islam, is being replaced ty neutrality. This w ill
7.
constitute our study of the practical aspect ©f Arab nationalism.
Finally, a word ©a the claim to the "originality” of the thesis.
It  is  in** that the survey here presented ©f the works of various Arab 
thinkers and leaders may not be called "original” in the sense that there 
las not previously been any such analysis ©r mention of these works. But 
It  can, with a show ©f justice, bo claimed that a ll the ideas and move­
ments analysed or criticised in this thesis are considered from a view­
point which has so far received litt le  attention* the extent to which the 
Impact of the West has affected «id moulded those ideas and movements.
I  9 I  H 0
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, We shall start here with & historical study In brood outlines 
of the significant changes which, since the .beginning of Islam, hare • 
marked Arab political thinking as regards the idea ef nationhood. Such 
a study Is essential to any serious assessment'of the strength and/or 
weakness ef Arab political thought today. •
- - „/The Arabic word for nation la norma. 1 Originally this word was 
used of any group of people for 'Whoa a prophet had been assign«!, em- :; 
lNMtolac both those who’accepted and -tbsst who rejected the prophet's ’ , -
But politically, «  achieved its fu ll  significance with Muhammad's 
annon.ncement of his apostolic mission. One of the acknowledged, prin­
cipal alms of Islam, as It  was presented to the Arab bedouins and town- -
whose main characteristic was submission to ^ Muhammad* s interpretation___ _
of -thr divineplan-of •alwstlo«»r‘n M iiA «i-first v«t4 the word ted a dls-
2
dwellers, was their unlflestlea Into sfe'.orgsadsod community, or
1iJtyraolDgically, tko word Is believed to be a d 
(Louis Massl#n@a, "l'tfama et ses Synonymes* la  
U ,  15 (D# Paris, 1940*^i, p. 152.) Oomparo 
void nation (from nat -  ppl. stem of n a i l , to be bow). •
^Sylvia Haim, "Islam and Arab Nationalism" in SleWelt das Islams. N.S.4.,
1955-56, p. 131.
9.
tlnetly religious connotation*- and, especially during the first period 
ef MHfoanaad1 a prophetic activity, it  was exclusively applied to the 
closest community of his followers. After he had finally  broken off 
relations with the pagans of Mecca and migrated with his followers to 
Medina, he created a new community. In Medina, the term umaa went be­
yond the circle of Muslims proper and Included those citizens of Medina 
who had not yet hooded his religious appeal. The Constitution of the Com­
munity of Medina, which gave a concrete expression to the unification of 
the lnhabltimti, "expressly states that, the citizens of the town, in­
cluding the ¿Tows, famed an uaaa". Politically this was a step forward; 
M i linguistically i t  involved a setback; contrary to its original con­
notation, uroa n*» iMMSfamiMI «ppliei, in addition to Muslims only,
to those non-Muslim Arabs who were maintaining peaceful relations with 
2the believers.
The predominantly political" character of this new name was however 
only makeshift. A® soon as Muhammad fe lt  himself firmly established,
’hn»-Ks*an9 with'©»® or Mo exceptions, always uses the word mmm as .
referring to ethnical, linguistic or religious bodies ©f people who 
are the objects of tho divine clan of salvation. According to the 
Koran, God has sent to each pmma a messenger (sura v i. 42; x, 4$! 
xxiii | 29; xvi, 3S, #5; ao&ll, 46; xs&x." 17; x l, 5) ©r adainistrator 
(sura xxv, 22, 40) to guide them on the right paths. Sometimes the term 
is also applied to companies of the righteous' among the «hi- » 1-VItab
(sura ill#  103 ot.mm v, 70; xti, 159| cf. 11, 128, 135; v ii, 167»
180; xi, 50). (a. P«ret, *2s§" lu JM.JgBfflra&apedU of Islam. Leiden,
1932.)
%hnManfir, Lisin al * .arsis’ Beirut, 1956, XII, p, 28.
and had defeated the pagan Meccans, he vas able to exclude from his 
politico-religious co;:munity those Media©»«, especially the Jews, who 
had not yet adapted hi® religLonj consequently, the uiaiaa again came to 
be applied to Muslims proper, : When the power of Islam began .to expand 
and to oeaprlee various nationalities, the word last its previous ex­
clusively Arab character, The essential thing about this new version 
of umma was s t il l  its religious foundation.'*’
R, Paret «ays2 that the final result ©f this evolution of a closed 
Arab oomnunity into an ©pen, vast cosmopolitan one was . “fundamentally _ 
different from tea starting point*. This, apart from its obvious his­
torical' ionalailos, Bight be taken to mean that Muhammad’s original idea 
was to-create m mile! .Arab natton, _ .father than a cosmopolitan commun­
i s *  Asides there is  also the widely-held view,3 especially among 
some past and present Arab writers,^ that, whan creating this co«a- 
politan comnnnity, Islam assigned Its leadership and place of honour 
exclusively to the Arabs. To substantiate their view, such writers 
quote a number of verse# ' ( ¡a h ) from the Koran, claiming special privl-
tomUmlUm the origin*! meaning of the imm. can be said to 
belong to the category of S».iiHscl»ft.| or the''consciously planned groups, 
as opposed to Stmtesohaft. or the natuml, unplanned groups. ' (See " 
Ferdinand Tonnina, jjgftglmohaft and Gesellachaft. Leipsig, 1887, 3rd ed, 
Berlin 1916), . • - • , ... . ,
p, 1015.
^T®r Andrae, Muhammad, The Man and His Faith (translated by Theophil Mansil), 
George Allen lc Unwin Lid,,  London, 1^56, p, 163,
M^uhammad larawzah, al wa^dat *al *arablyah, al maktab ai t ija r l, Beirut, 
1957, pp. A3, 111 e l seq. . ~yk.
11.
leges for the Araba among the Muslims, "^ Without entering Into the mate 
of over««elaborate esegetica on this point we can say this much with cerw 
taintyt that the Islamic message was meant for the whole of humanity and,
therefore, urana was hound to have a cosmopolitan and egalitarian character.
This egalitarianism Is of the very essence of Islam. U t  are not 
few In the Koran reminding Man of his htsnble origin, of the trifling  
nature of the stuff of which he is  made. Such warnings are clearly aimed
2
.Sallowing are- the I f fA  which are often jquoted fxem the Koran to demon­
strate the predominant position assigned to the Arabs for implementing
the Islamic rules*
1) “For truly to thee and to thy peoole it  Is an admonition* and you
shall have an account to reader for i t  at lest." (XLIII, 44)
2) "Thus we have made you a central people, that y»e may be witnesses
la regard to austkiitd and the apostle may bo a witness in regard to 
you." (I I ,  137)
3) "And do valiantly in the cause of God as It  behoveth you to do for
him. He hath elected you, and hath not laid on you any hardship 
-  in religion, the Faith of your father Abraham, lie hath named you... 
the Muslims. Heretofore and in this Book, that the apostles may 
be a witness against you, and that^w may be witnesses against tho 
rest of mankind." (E S I, 78) ■
4) "God hath premised to those of you who believe and do the things
that are right, that Ho w ill cause them to succeed others in th# 
land, as 1»  gave succession to these who were before them, and that 
he w ill establish for them that religion which they dolight la and 
- that after their fears he w ill give them security In exchange."
5)
6)
ODttf, 55)•And that .tflfcer* may b®. ament you a —  - „ \ . 'v ' ~ ’ ' 7  . ~
God and enjoin the Just, and vP®opl®) who invite to tho
whom it  shall be well."* ( n j f ’Jg? the These are they vlth
■ S l S T t t a l i r  2 ? I~ h?t S *  * ■ »  -P » U M - -  r M  .
■ 3 '  " *  **  f,rbl<' th8 « % . « * > •  W iM fc u  m . l m
LO T fonT j.SSnt^ons* 1953*7 ' tSkeB **“  M'  tefiweU'*  translation,
^©uis Masslgnon, on. c it ., pp, 153-154.
at precluding any illusion about what today might be called a Ferrenvolk. 
and thereby repudiating any eventual claim by a group of people, litolim 
or non-Muslim, to special privileges, vh ther ethnical, social or poli­
tical, In respect to others,^ The real distinction in Islam is not that 
between those among whom Islam originated, i.e . the Arabs, and those who 
only later learned of God*a last message through the Arabs) the distinct- 
ion is  rather between those who accepted, and lived up to, the Islamic 
injunctions, and those who did not. Otherwise, there would have been 
litt le  ground, i f  any at a ll, for Islam's pride in having avoided the
so
parochial prejudice of earlier religions, inter a lia , the religion of the 
Jews, who regaided themselves as uniquely the object of divine salvation.
12,
L"Now of fine clay have we mad® the man: then we placed him, a moist 
germ, in a cafe abode* then made we the moist germ a do t of blood; 
then made the dotted blood into a pieo# ©f flesh; then made the piece 
of flesh into bones: and we dethed the bones with flesh: then brought- 
forth man of yet another make.* (XXXIII, 10)
"0 Abazari Rais# your head and then look; and then real!*« that you 
are not superior to the red (people) among them, nor to the negroes; you 
are mperler to them only ^reason of your acts," (A w i t h  from Muh­




his i l .mm ath thawrwlrsfe-llll
>5 , p, 106,)
2,,0 menj verily we have created you of a male and a femde; and we have 
divided you into peoples and tribes that ye might have knowledge one of 
another. Truly, the most worthy of honour in the sight of God is he who 
fearest Him most,* (XLIX, 13) .  in  the footnote to this evah, Rodwell 
writes: . "That is, not the most nobly bom, like the Koreisch,* (The 
Koran, op.,..clt,.t 1953, p. £70.)
X3.
7he inodeone cy ©3* ©11 attempted chr©©el©gic al delimitations ®f 
spiritual nevweents In himm history is today accented even ty these 
who hold to the- Aristotelean conception of fixed and detcwdrtd cate- ■ 
furies in the field of teiawledga. We can fix  a begin»!«?: and an end for 
an episode or an event, Rot m for ideas and thoughts« haphasard as 
their mmwmm* *my he and protean m their character definitely 1».
In the narrative of henan Idea© and thought©« period'» an  not separated 
frea on« «other i f  sharp and distinct line«} rather« each period ha* 
its origin© in its preceding period while carrying in its vassb .the ele­
ments ©f the eoee«edl*jg asa. With tMLm reservation in mind« one can how­
ever discern, so far as the Mo* of Arab unity Is concerned, four d if-  
fcrent ocriods in the history of Arab peoples.
Iho flr.ft.rPfgip<| coTsaences with the Thssayada cooing to pawsr U.B. 
€»33) and ends with the Ahhasida9 accession (JUtJ. 750 5,
The ,5ts « j..attUA «vers the history of the AbbasI«!», beginning
• "  *. ■ • •' i  . . . . ... * . i
with the revolution of th* Eastern part of the Xslaaie iaplr* and ending 
With the fa ll of Baghdad in 125«..
%s JBlZS-SElM»aAs the eclipse of th* Arabs » t i l  roughly th« 
Kapolsonic expedition to Egypt in 177«,
The |ag^.„SSll2|l « « »  » I d  to have run f i t »  1795 tip to the 
present,'' ...... " ■ ........ .~ * :.......”
•-.In identifying m& differentiating these period« we mot mke fu ll 
allowance for inevitable overlappings -  not only In regard to the chrono-
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logical order of events, but also to the interplay of thoughts.
The first period (i.e . the Tferasyads’ rule from 633 to 75r0 has 
been rightly described as marking the rise of Arab national feelings.
It  is to be recalled that simultaneously vlth the extension of the mean­
ing of urama to include non-Arab Muslims, an opposite development of equal 
importance took place in the minds.of the Arabs, resulting in a situation 
fu ll of striking contradictions. While Muhammad’ s call to the worship 
of one Cod had enabled the scattered Arabs to achieve their unity, the 
Arabs’ coming into contact with'fereiga peoples in the course of their 
large-scale wars of expansion under tbs TJnwsyads heightened their own 
special national consciousness. In other words, while on the theoretical 
plane the concept of the unma as a cosmopolitan community of Muslims with 
equal rights and duties was being recognised and to some extent propa­
gated by the Arabs, a parallel process of Arab predominance was also be­
ing initiated and promoted on the practical plane.
%  establishing a kind ef kingship (mnlk) and arrogating to them­
selves all the key positions in the Islamic hierarchy# the Uimnayada de­
veloped what might be called an Arab aristocracy at the expense of the 
conquered nations. As Professor Lewis puts it*
1Pdchard Hartmann, Islam .and, Natlonallsmua. Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 
1943, p, 9 ........ . „ .... . .......... .......  -... . - ....•'
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"The sovereignty exercised by Kn*®rlya (the firs t  of the 
TJteayyad-?) was essentially Arab. No longer religious, but 
not yet' ronarchic, It  was a recurrtloo and extension of 
tí» authority of the pre-I alarde Sayyid."*“
To bel«tor up this authority, the Uaayyado emphasised and ex­
aggerated the Arabs' spiritual and cultural superiority over their sub­
jects ató, as a necessary corollary to this, tbsy suppressed those cul­
tures which tod survived the Arabs* invasion. The upshot was the emer­
gence of a new dlaas within the Ialaaic iüaplre, -that of tto Hawaii. or 
ron-Arab (Persians, iigppilan*, Arañeana and Berbers) converts to Islam. 
Tto tarant of the Dmayrado* chauvinism, or un-Islamlc Arabian, was dir­
ected against tto Persians who, being the inheritors and holders of a 
s t i l l  more advanced culture and civilisation, fe l l  victims to tto TSnay- 
jrads' well-hidden spiritual inferlestly coteplex. The Persian converts, 
pore than other mmûX, were subject to a ll  vanner of humiliations, 
ranging from the physical to tto social. All this helped to account 
for that active Persian participation in tto anti-Cmayyad raovecent which 
culminated in the HasMmite revolt of A.B. 746 and tto raising of the 
black flags ©f tto Abbasids in Torasan, eastern Persia, And this brings
.4»- « > ^ _ ,
us to our aoaond period.- - - ^  ^ ,
During tto Abbaslds* regiae, the process of Arabisation was to a
.. ■»
great extent checked, and relatively «p ie  opportunities were offered 
to the conquered peoples to display their genius, political or otherwise, 
in running the affairs of tto ùapir*. This vat especially in evidonoa
^Professor Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History, Arrow Books, London,
1958, p. 65.
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In regard to the Persians. Pot only vas the Persian, or anyway non- 
Arab, Barmecide family allowed to bold the office of the w j^rs in the 
Abbas ids* administration, bit in ak&tfen to Has the Persian forms of govern­
ment were openly adopted, . Again as Professor Lewis says»
w. . .  The influence of the old Persian order of the 
r.assanids became increasingly strong (in  the Abbasid 
administration) and much Abbasid practice Is a delib­
erate imitation of iassanid habits which were now be­
coming known from Persia« officials and from surviving 
Saasanid literature. The Abbasid administration was no 
longer baaed on racial discrimination and exclusiveness. ■
Its extensive scribal class was recruited to an increased i  
- extent from the Hawaii and enjoyed a high social standing.**
There was, however, a departure from this egalitarianism 'under tfarun 
ar Rashid (786-809)# symbolised by such events as the expulsion of tho 
Barmecide house from-the ^rtn lstratio«^ Late  on in the period, with / - 
the emergence of autonomous or independent states and dynasties and the \? 
disintegration of the Empire, the caliphate further stiffened its atti­
tude towards those peoples who were s t i l l  under its domination. But gen­
erally the political and economic weakness of tho Empire had robbed Arab­
ia» of a ll its momentum and dynamism, thus excluding the possibility of 
any revival of Arab predominance in the Islamic world. . True# the Crusades 
could have been used as eat occasion for achieving such a purpose, but the 
fact that the prestige of Islam in those agonising days was saved, not 
by the Aral«, bit by m  Armenian Kurd (SaiaSj al tin al Ayyubl) must have 
dealt a further blow to any schemes for Arab domination. 1
1Professor Bernard Lewis, s i^ d t . . p. 84.
Th« moat sign ifican t outgrowth of Islamic egalitarianism  in the 
earlier part of this period was a flourishing of Islamic culture to
which the intellectual genius of a ll the conquered peoples, through the 
common medium of Arabic language, made weighty contributions. A loosen» 
lag of the old lightly centralised Arab rule in the concluding phase ®f 
the period was also responsible for this.
There is not much that can be said, within the 3cope of our pur­
pose in this chapter, about the third period, tvm the thirteenth century, 
when the Mongol cataclysm engulfed the Muslim world, up to the collapse
m »
of the Ottoman itatre, This period formed a long interregnum in the his-
t°*y mi Arab o m m Lo iunim » rariLtLag from Arab decline and demise. With 
the ascendancy * f  the MLJtfni tmA the Ottomans, the Arabs faded into <ms-
plete insignificance. During this p ried , in the words of B&sla Kuselbeh,
Arab nationality nlsy dormant for many centuries under the enervating 
weight of ignorance end stagnation”,1
W# aost* however, note that although t i»  prlod in question was
thus characterized by Arab eclipse, i t  was the scene of three non-Arab
Islamic developments of deep imprt to the subsequent spirttual t ra d «  ■
among the Arabs. First was the spread of Sufism.
"The Sufi,” writes Professor Smith, "er systi« inter­
pretation of Islam, g®ea lack to, and even through the 
classical priod. let at that tlm  i t  ms the treasure 
of a small minerlty,.,. As the Arab perted began to weaken,
^ a t la  Zaki Nuaeibeh, The Ideas of Arab Rationalism. Cornell University 
frees, New Y0sfc, 1956, p. 34.
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sore and more in Muslin society turned to this somewhat 
precious version of f a i t h ,
The second development was the Conquerors’ , i.e , the Mongols’ conversion
to Islam, . . . .  ■ • > •
within fifty  years the Mongol dynasty that had subju­
gated so much of the Islamic world,».» it✓ self took ®n 
the role of chamnlon of the Islamic cause. The new rulers 
undertook with conviction, energy and brilliance to pro- 
mote again the very enterprise that they had recently seemed 
to overthrow.*®
The third development was the complete ascendancy of the non-Arab elements 
in the new wave of military and spiritual expansion which carried the world 
of Islam northward in i» Asia Minor, the Balkans and Central Asia, southward 
into negro Africa and eastward ifcto Indonesia. The Turks under the Otto- 
»«att, tle.-feraiiM maior the Safavids, and the Indian Muslims tinder the 
Mughuls were the main initiators of this new expansive movement.
We have jm t said that these three developments were of a deep'im­
port to the subsequent spiritual trends among the Arabs, We must add 
here that this Import was ef a negative rather than a positive nature* 
in other words, the stirrings which became evident among «10 Arabs from . 
the nineteenth century onwards were in reality, and in their inception, 
hostile reactions provoked, rather than movements inspired, by the afore­
mentioned developments. An instance which Is, in fact, unique in its
v  • - ........
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam In Modern History. Princeton Uaiverslty
~**>*•» Princeton, 1957, p. % , . .......  -
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importance can bo singled « it  I f  way ©f Illustration, The wahhablyah. 
the greatest reformist movement of the period, founded by llu^ ammad ITm 
*Abd al Wahliab^  (1703-1787), was at once a revolt against the iurmnentism 
of the Sufis end the extravagance ©f latitudinarian,medieval empires.
*Abd al Wahhal’s spirit of rebellion against the then institutionalized 
Islam sometimes verged on a total disassociation from the Islamic history 
of his time, He spoke of Islam in a time as nostalgic as i f  it  were, 
not a persisting fact of history, but rather a departed glory for the re­
turn of which a ll the resources of the faithful should be mobilized, 
w^ $ru«7 Islam today,* he said, "is a thing unknown (gharfb). Most people 
do not know toe difference between it and unbelief.*2 But this ’’unknown­
ness was, in his ©yes, rather a source of strength, since it  should new 
be possible for the faithful tointroduce toe original, untarnished form 
of Islam to mankind, "Islam started unknown," ran a prophetic tradition, 
"end shall return unknown," 3 It  was this attempt at a return to the pris­
tine law of Islam that forged the. association between wahhablyah and the ...
♦a**w* }  w«hhab* s career, in its range and variety, is somewhat analogous 
I? of the later reformists in Islam, especially Afghani. After 
el« « 08 Medina, he spent many years of his life  in travel. He lived 
sour years in Bafra, five years in Baghdad, a year in Kurdistan, two 
^ara  in Haaadhan and four years in I f f  alien. He isade a thorough study 
«  a ll the main sects and schools of law in Islam and, after returning 
v® r,U1£aina 'h i9 birthplace) publicly preached his new doctrine, (Article 
Kargolieuth In the Encyclopedia of l id .» .  IV, part 2, pp. lOS6- -
2«tt^*®ad Ibn »Abd a l WahhSb, mukhtlsar s lrat* 
M^ammadlyah, Cairo, 137571956, p.
3iM * *  r. 13.- - ■ v ' "  -
Ma$ba* at* as
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Ilaabalt outlook of the Saudi rulers. The rejection of a ll  innovation 
is the gist of the Vlahhabx doctrine* "Innovation", says 'Abd al Wahhab, 
"is a factor making for unbelief, al bid*sqfeab nl .knfr<,.
From our standpoint the significance of the Wahhabi movement lay 
in the fact that, by ascribing the decline of »real Islam» to the as­
cendancy of non-Arab Muslins, it  awakened the Arabs, after centuries of 
slumber, to their share of the Islamic heritage. The assumption now 
prevalent among many Hrat nationalists that Islam stands and fa lls  with 
Arabian, owes a great deal to the *puritani sm* of * Abd al Wahhab.
It  is  not thus surprising that the first  attempt atvlndicating 
the Arab distinctness within the Ottoman Empire should have come from
the Wahhabis, who tried in the eighteenth century and the beginning ©f
2
the nineteenth century to threw off the Ottoman domination.
It  becomes clear from the above account that when the Western ideas 
bdgan to infiltrate the Muslim world at the end of the eighteenth century 
®nd the beginning of the nineteenth century, the concept of nationhood 
was already familiar to the Arabs -  thanks to their association with the 
But compared with the Western concept of nation, mama had on#
^Kltab at Tawhld« Manuscript in the British Museum, CR. A529, p. 157.
2Zeine K, Zeine, Arab-Turkiah Relationa and the Eaergence of Ag*b Rfi&lfSiar 
lüg. Khayat’ s, Beirut, 1958, p. 37. Er. Hasan Saab, The Agab.Fc.dotaag.il 
gff the Qttoman Rnrdre. Djambatan, Amsterdam, 1953, p. 152 gft Jgfl« al®°
P. 252.
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notable difficlency: because of i t 3 religious character as well as its 
universalistic application it  lacked the geographical differentia of its 
T"^3tern equivalent and, therefore, involved no sense of territorial alle­
giance, In other words, while nationalism was not alien to the Arab mind, 
patriotism represented for it a completely new loyalty. We are going t© 
see in the following chapters how the Arabs gradually came to integrate 
this new loyalty into their system of political values.
Chapter 1«.
22.
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We now eslmi'k on the analysis of our fourth period *f Arab om** 
sciousness, From the viewpoint of our study* this is  the most important 
phase in that train of thoughts and ideas which finally launched the Aral» 
on their striving for unity. Although constituting only a transient chap­
ter In th® general narrative of Arab political history* this period pro­
vides the main backgreund te modern Arab nationalism and, i f  for that rea­
son ally, is deserving of ®m close attention.
i: • • ■■tho:'|MBPiod[ of temper and unconsciousness in tbs Arab political mind
ended gradually with a series of cardinal events and developments that e f- j
fected deep changes in the relationship between the Arabs and outside powers.-
•»
■namely,.the Ottoman rulers and the Western intruders -  and served as the 
motivating influence behind a number of reformist, paroeblallst and nation- 
alist movements among the Arab peoples throughout the nineteenth and in the 
early part of the twentieth century. Th® Napoleonic invasion * f  Egypt ** 
17%, fe n  owed by F»w»h occupation ef Algeria (1330) and Tunisia (1331),
• ' - * - ‘v
British occupation ef Egypt in 1882, the I®u»g Turk Revolution of 1908,
French eccupation of Morocco (1911), Italian occupation ef Tripolitaaia 
(1912) and the Arab Revolt ef 1916 are th® major highlights ef this period. 
The heterogeneity presented by this period in its multiform pattern of sodo-
23»
political developments, as well as in conflicting movements of Arab 
thought , seem to have been outweighed by ®ae particular unifying factor. t
vhi^j invested a ll these developments and movements with a compelling sense 
of coherence* This was the Arab awakening, ted this had both its social 
811(5 tts Political connotations) the Arabs of this period were growing 
®s*e and more conscious not only of their identity, status and past achieve­
ments, but also ©f their political rights and the prerequisites of their 
progress «ad prosperity, la  spit® of their manifold diffects and implica­
tions, a ll  the aforementioned cataclysms were united by their joint con», 
trifcutlons to the ongoing and cumulative process of Arab awakening. $he 
significance of the period did not’ only arise from the vital part which 
this awakening - played in the subsequent movement for unity)’ ' it  lay fur­
ther in the fact that awakening was regarded per ee as a desideratum to 
which the postulated and accomplished unity of the urna was only a fortunate 
corollary. As w© know, the Arabs were already united under the Ottoman 
rule) i t  was not, therefere, neeemsasy for them to clamour for unity. In 
the words of Fayes A.S^fegh* ' v  '
unity was only implicitly, and as 
Moms present in the thoughts and aspira- . . ,
£ * 2  £  S !  re! f rs ef the Arab wvival . . .  may be a ttri- 
was orím*t^ i « faCÍÍrS* n r s t , the movement (of awakening) 
f líe  ?UlturaI> not political) and, there-
"ottoaalist themes were only infrequently 
*?<**«*>  as far as the arénate which the 
Wxf taking shape were concerned, political and
-----®iT~ni8trative unity was already a reality under Ottoman
-  * a»d therefore it  was generally taken for granted,
- to these two factors, the concept of Arab unity was "
oni^ implicit, and the impulse for unification only pot-
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entlally present in the awakening of the Arab peoples..."
The jg§gy| bad thus lost bit one of Its attributes, i.e . HsLx# ®r  
consciousness. And it  was t® the restoration of this consciousness that 
the most resourceful and the nest dynamic members ©f the Arab intelligent** 
sia now proceeded to devote themselves. Hot that the theme of unity was 
totally absent from the thoughts and deeds of the Arab revivalists; but 
by contrast with the later period of tho Arabs’ nationalist movement It  
did not constitute the pivotal factor in their political life .
Generally speaking, there were three distinct but inter**related 
trends which contributed to Arab awakening. These were* (a ) Westernisation,
(b) Islamic revivalism, (c) Egyptian patriotism.
A* far as the nineteenth century was concerned, it  was the Western­
ization trend which occurred firs t  In the chronological order to give birth 
almost imperceptibly to the other two trends. In the beginning, the three 
trends were irrecegnisable from me another, a ll presenting a confluence 
ef three varied streams. This is  why we find some of the Arab writers 
and thinkers of the early and middle nineteenth century as champions of 
a blending ef Westernism, Islamic revivalism and patriotism. But as the 
nineteenth century wore en the three trends branched off en their separate 
ways, each with its distinct Individuality and definite representatives.
One dominant factor ley at the rest ef a ll these and ether heart-
1
^Fsyea A. Sayegh, Ari^ fe Unity. He levin Adair Company, Hew York, 1953» 
PP. 7-8. . ' „
searching movements among the Arabs, and Muslims is general. This was 
the gmeral decline ®f the Muslim world which had started in the nineteenth 
century> and, as its  inevitable consequence, the growing disintegration of 
traditional Muslim social fibre. "There was/ says Prefeseer Smith in 
referring to that period of docline, "a disintegration of military and 
political power. There was eafeeblement of commercial and other economic 
life . Intellectual effort stagnated. An effete decadence infected a&t. 
Religious vitality ebbed... The Muslim world seemed to have lest the caoa- 
eity to order its life  effectively! Muslim society was losing its once 
firm, proud grip on the world.*1
It  was in response to this distressing state that lively and am­
bitious minds among Muslima started to resort to various devices and 
panaceas in remedying the internal m»laleo ef their community.
1 This chapter is  devoted to a scrutiny of each of the above-mentioned 
trends in an endeavour to conaldor the present stirring® of Arab national­
ism in their right perspective,"' - ' - \ : ;' ' .' ' .
: ~ . .  *  : m y  - • ' \ .
Opinions may differ an te the particular event which should be held 
responsible for tho laltiotion of tho process, of Weetef*l*attem in the Arab 
werld. But there seems te be a general concensus that the Hapoleonio in­
vasion of Egypt in 1798 should' occupy a e®mapi*iasits p i « »  amongst the ; ■ ' ;
Mmmm 11» tear. p. 38.
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„ultlpl. alolmltuclaa which aoy he ™-reat»« aa a poaclhle atartlas-paDrt 
, f  thi. f t  us survey the csr».quteoes'.f that «.«ntoua ereat
la the history ©f modern Egypt.
There ere ter© reasons for our concentration ©n Egypt, rather than on 
ary other Arab countxy. First, as compared with ©ther Arab countries, Egypt 
was enjoying In the nineteenth ’century a fa ir measure of cultural develop­
ment and, more Important, had a considerable influence «1 intelligentsia 
©f .the Muslim world through the agency ef-A l Ashar University. Seo©nd,
Egypt was the' first country to establish contact with the Vest in the xmkfi 
ef the Napoleonic expedition and her experiment, besides being of great value 
to 4te-«tbsr Arab peeves in their subsequent awakening, constituted in fact 
much of the background t© the later Arab-West Interaction.
The Napoleonic invasion set going & twofold evolution in Egypt* 
firs t , by introducing the printing press,2 slang with other Western devices
■ ■ . ’ - ‘ • r’3’ xfcA _ oftfh s f which."There were twenty-five rtyaos In Al Ashar during thl^p6tg  ^ . The Allowing '
vs* dew ted to a separate nationality or g*m«P ® «^tlon * the
natimelitlee represented at the tT* lv e r«ltr  1^  wj hr th0 Aryans (fro®
Kurds, the Turks, the Iraqis, the Somali»# t h e " f ”  *£* Afghanis and the
Mecca and Medina). the Javmese, the North African # £  t  Tide cation
U . f c j A r t W « ,  l . J u  > ' ' '  . Tl
*11. Preach brought two aeta ef priatlag press te hppt» nlaced*cm^er tha •
by Napoleon from tho Collogo of Propagmda in ^ i/ ^ x ie a t t o n s ,  e ll in 
directorship of ,T. I. Marcel, turned out about twenty P ^ ^  h boW ,  
French, «mostly for tho ueo of the French*» the ether, ^
published the firs t  issues ef Courier de l 1 Egypt«. As a ^ j  
remarked by Heyworth-Punne, these publications ffi03tly either
bad any Immediate effect on Egyptian culture j they . r^^maire
hooks' on the Arabic grammar ( Exercise do Lecture Arab—iss—S4»
(cent.)
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and technique®, It  precipitated the Arab awakening through a revival «f 
Arab classicsj second, it  released that torrential current of Western 
ideas on the Arab world which has been going on unabated in intensity or 
range up to this day.1 But i t  wart at once be added that the In itial and 
Immediate reaction of a considerable number ef educated Egyptians and other 
Muslin©, when they firs t  came into contact with Western civilisation, «a® 
one of open admiration «nd unreserved envy• We w ill have to recall
(coat.)
etc.) or different editions of the Casatitution® ©f the 
French Repubilc. (Heyworth-Bunne, en .d t«. p. 99) I t  wa® only afterwards 
that tte printing press became an invaluable instrument in the westemisa- 
X S L IL 3 S ? 1“ * nnd thereby Arab, culture. Between 1822 and 1842, «d a r  
Z I K r 3 X 3 w®« printed in Egypt, most ef them for the new
ammala. »«* « a n « « « ,  fm*Waw, I-<Wirts ----  _ iw .iRik. In
^Keyworth-Bunna, en .cit.. p. 105, 
2-rhi!T Ì8 statement dota net, ef oeurse, hold f®#d la  regard to saoh tr^ itloa^  
aliata a® thè prominent historian *Abd ar Ra^an al Jabartt ( 1756- 1822)
«ho* liviag through thè Kapeleonic occupaUon of Egypt» maintained a 
wsically contemptuous attltude tewards thè Frenoh. Kevertheleas, «ven 
J a^ r««®  ohreniole® are not laekiag in occasionai wmtmtlm  o r  thè French., 
{$m  ‘ Abd ar R te** *  R lfi‘I ,  ia lite  al harikaVal c«*£y«h , maktabat a® 
» ^ ^ t  al mifxiyah, Cairo,. 1955, f«urth ^ it lo B , _ pp. W Ì . )  __ v. . ...... ....
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paiat when, later on, we study the Arab reactions ef restiveness and de- 
precation in regard te the West under » r e  or less similar conditions.
As we knew, shortly after the Napoleonic invasion, numerous student missions 
were sent to Europe as part ef the Egyptian drive for modernisation. I t  
was under Muhammad ‘A ll that the dispatch ef these missions started, Muham­
mad ‘A ll's  policy in this respect went through two periods. In the first  
period, covering the years 1809 to 1822, he dispatched his missions mainly 
to Italy. “Ita ly  was probably chosen," says Heyvorth-Dunne, "mainly for 
the reason that It  was s t ill no more than a geographical expression and 
consequently there was no fear of political influence, but on the other 
hand the reasons may have been purely technical.“1
The 8ecand PWl®«» from 1826 to 1844, witnessed a significant change 
of policy, with moat ef the students being new seat 1» France* out ef a 
total ef one hindred and eight students sent abroad, sixty-one were seat 
to that country. It  is  noteworthy that the vestiges e f  resentment natur- 
eliy generated ty the French occupation of the country, and especially the.
i  — ------------------------------------- :--------------------------— -------- 1------- :---------
fw • P^*®*88 waa reversed after the British oceupatlon of Egypt in 1882. 
roil** vp! 57;footls*t®^ a lte rs  have, however, questioned ths
*w__ _ tween the Napoleonic invasion and the changes in the social'— w , »«pwxeonic invasion an« 
frame of Ifeypt in the nineteenth century*
Shafik Qhorbal, «that the French occupation •f —* “
"It  does not • writes
produced a general change
ef eutleek. .ft» rule e f France was tm  shert, the 
i t  was exercise* were toe adverse, « » r  It  to pew&me_ ^nange
(Shafik SboAal, The Btgji«ii*s> ef the i n W y  ,n7 ,Ftho
Hehmet M l. Eoutledge, London, 1923, p. * »M  -it *** ^  • *  01 XDe a  
ef ths present chapter te preve the contrary.
ims
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dogged memories of Napoleon's high-handedness twards the Egyptian people, 
did not prevent the Egyptian leaders from choosing France as the main 
destination of these missions. This presents a singularly interesting 
case in the psychology of International relations, A ll the colonised 
peoples the world over have been, to various degrees, under the cultural 
influence of their metropolitan rulersj from this viewpoint the Egyptian 
enthralment by French culture might s©®» quite natural. Bit what is  i  
deed singular In their case la that this enthralment came into effect 
only after the heads of French politlcal^hegemony had been broken -  a l- 
, though French economic predominance, as well as back-stage pressures and 
M rtpas, ©«tinned for a long time thereafter, ■
But why did the Egyptian modernisers choose France as their education­
al and cultural preceptor1? To say that France was chosen because she was
1
multiple outbreaks of riot and disorder on the part 
aasaiwfJ1*?8 the brief period of French rule, culminating in the
« ¡ m ! ?  0n Jujae *4» 1800, of General J, B. Kleber, the French com.
ceonle ,nihi*7ery Vsrai®f of Napoleon's famous proclamation to the Egyptian 
,y*after thB faH  ef Alexandria, on July 2, with a ll Its pro-
veal* f  friendship for the Egyptians and reverence for Islam, re~ 
a »hr««* contempt for the conquered. Of special significance is
tho i* *1 proclamation which threatens to bum down any village in  
WWJld revolt against the French Army, Remarks a con- 
thoae wiTih*8^ *r i«a •*  this paint* "(Napoleon*a) threat to set fire  on 
do©« »1* i f S 8 which raised the banner of rebellion against French troops 
no threie0* ? ^  the standards of humanity in the trentnent of nations* 
I c o u l d  be found in Napoleon’s proclamations to the
_ _  to it f
haps h® intended to conceal from the reader te r  emeunt nhras«.*
regard of the rules of civilisation and humanity Implied in P 
(Abd ar Radian rfnfi*!, tirlkh al baA^ml cawmiyah, P. * » , )
30.
a great cower seems too obvious and facile a Justification. After a ll, 
Britain was also a groat power, enjoying more or less the same sort of 
position as France in the Middle Eastern rivalries; and in industrial Mid  ^
technical field a it  was Germany that exercised greater attractions than 
any other power. And yet, even under such pro-British, anti-French rulers
as *Abbas 1 (1S49-1B54) and, to a lesser extent, after the British occu-
' - * • • ” : ' • ' - -
PatIon of Egypt (1S82) me process of Frenehifteation of the Egyptian 
culture seems ts have continued, ; ' 1
Two factor# can be said to have motivated the Egyptian orientation 
toward France. First there was the fam iliar Inferiority complex developed 
#f the Egyptian rulers as a result of the French occupation; this 
complex, coupled later hgr Muhammad A ll's  determination to defeat his oppo- 
nents and rivals, gave rise to the policy of adopting military refom as
the main aim of a ll their educational measures.^ This was the old error* . . ... .>.*.• •
of mistaking the effect for the cause -  conceiving military excellence as 
the secret of progress in otter fields, and not the otter way round. The 
second factor was the pressure of the French themselves, vhojuaed every 
possible means for disseminating their language, art and culture among 
the Egyptians* ...............  '
■ ’’Ba France,« writes M, Sabry, «envoya en Egypt# une pleiad# ' 
d hommes remirquahie tela que 1*3 Sive, les Clot, les Cerlsy* 
les LInant, lea Costs, lea Rousset et bien d*autre encore qui
^Jeyworth-Dunne, fflkrfAu PP* 159, 197, ®3 and %€,
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travaillèrent avec zèle et dévouement a 1’ Introduction 
des arts et de civilization en Egypt,”1 . .
The British attitude, i f  contrast, was characterised fro® this angle 
by an astoundng passivity. Explaining the reasons for Britain*s peer cul­
tural achievements in Egypt under Cromer, lord Lloyd writes»
"In the first place the general polity of His Majesty*a 
Government precluded any direct attempt to establish the 
influence ef British culture. In the second place, even 
had the polity been different, financial difficulties 
would have proved too much for him (Cromor), Aa he h i»- 
self pointed out, it  was not until 1904. that any funds 
oould be made available for education, . By that time the 
policy of making the best of thing# as they existed lad 
 ^ & foothold to be dislodged,., French oulture
and French language had been allowed to imbed themselves 
■r®*y firmly in I®-pt,»*
^  this remark were true at the time of the British occupation of Egypt,
it  hid been far truer before that period when Britain had not yet secured
any foothold In that country.
The Italian and German attempts were negligible, and the Russians
.were aoa-exlstent on the some, .
One final point, which was also important in tipping the balaa 




J-Vju y » ,  also Cf. A,â.Fat«B, 
Trubmer & Co,, London, 1870, p. 249,
Lord Lltyd, Sevat Sines Cramer. Maemillan & Co,, London, 1933, P* 159. ; 
Also writes aotfaority en the subject of Emm--
PSan attempts at establishing scheols in Egypt» "Great Britain, i t  must 
b® admitted, has done 'very lit t le  for Egypt in the way ef voluntary 
school«^ (Alfred miner, w u * *  1« Efto»*. B3ward' Arnold, London, 1894,.
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back to Egypt from the middle of the nineteenth century onward3, these 
who had studied in France mostly came to occupy high positions in the 
administration of the country,* whereas those with Italian, English, Gen­
oa® ®r Austrian education were appointed to much lower posts in the tech- 
Rical and engineering fields.
For a ll these reasons, French culture achieved ascendancy over its 
European rivals in setting the pace of Westernisation in Egypt.
But parallel to the movement of sending student missions abroad
ran two other developments of ^ telling significance. First was 
the growth ©f fciropean schools in Egypt* between 1863 and 1879 nearly 
seventy-eight French, American, English, Greek, Italian and German mission­
ary schools were opened in Egypt., As the percentage of tho Egyptian stur- 
° f  these sohools in 1878 has been given as 52 per cent, one is  bound 
to afford them special prominence in an assessment of tho educational life  
of the country during this period. The second, and a much more important 
development, was the weakening of A1 Ashar's hold over the Egyptian system 
®£ higher education. This process had already b eg « under Muhammad ‘A ll - 
vho, by confiscating the aaaf (pious foundation) fonds and properties,
®H a mortal blw -to mosque education as a whole. But the opening of
IV
a«w Training School, called Dir al *Uium,' in September 1872, with its  
®sphasia ©a mode» learning and its offer of material advantages la  the 
Way ®f  f *®d* cI®thing, and pay, as well as instruction, brought matters to 
ad. Although the Aaharitea continued to play an active fart under 
reigns of Mujjammad * AH and his successor«, as a consequence af the above!
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raeaflures, a l  Ashar lest Its. p r « i - , » s  position la  the socia l frame.
What was the effect of these ».«m eats « 4  ae«l.,*c,n t- eh the 
social and political conscience of th. E gyptl«.! How did the Egyptian 
intelligentsia and literate public react to their firs t  direct encounter 
with western civilisation! To answer these question, we h a « to make a 
close study of the works of soma of the most prominent lean 
Westernisation of Egyptian thought. As we h a « already point 
these leader, should not be e » lu s l « ly  o s s if ie d  «  «e st.m l.c r., since 
we find their works equally expressive o f strong Impulses or patriotism 
and of a compelling wish for the reformation of Islam. But in so far 
thOT art«* - »  pioneers of «form , their as,.elation with Westernisation
should be regarded as the dominant fact 1® their careers*
The works of Rlfi* at the Igyptis» educationalist
of the early nineteenth century, provide instructive evidence
f l r 3t reactions ©f the mere enlightened and ambitious ¿gy^tiaaa
period to the challenge ef the West, As an educationalist,
jo u«* +<■« 'jyfter serving
had great Influence aa the younger generatien ef his * 
aa a teacher ef the University e f Al Azhar and aa ©a I » « 1 *** pre& 
to one of Ku^amad * A ll’s regiments, he was sent t© Fr^ce 6» 
firs t  student miesien ever te v isit that ceuntxyf there he specialised in 
the art ©f translation, and he read Voltaire, Rousseau, Kentesquieu and
^Heyworth-Dunne, _ pp, 15-4,. 375-381, 395-405*
-aclne, vas, f tor an Egyptian point of vie-w,l the moat successful 
of that firs t  batch ©f students. On hla return to Egypt he was appointed 
chief translator In the School of Medicine and later in the Milltey School 
et Tur®, where he translated several hook3 ©n military science and engin­
eering, S® I8 3 6  he set up, under Muhammad 4 A ll's  sponsorship, the School 
cf Trsmiatton, later renamed the School of Language s, which, by teaching 
Eurorcan languages, history and French and Islamic laws, did a great deal . 
to Westernise the content ©f Egyptian higher education. Be was for sows 
tiiw the editor of vaqa’ i* a l misrlyah, the o ffic ia l Egyptian newspaper,2 
?he lis t  ©f tchtawl's students contains tho names of an impressive array
c£ writers, poets, translators and lawyers.^
_^»fbre appreciation is  o ffe rs  of ^ahfSwT's two important books -
important, that is , from our standpoint hero -  there is a general remark
to be made about his work* considering that Xahtawl began his career as
* WX'**er shortly  after there had been naked aggression ty a Western power,
«specially when compared with Arab reactLoiM to various later Western
®croachraenta (o f which more in the subsequent chapters), the cool and
latively detached description that he gives of Western excellences is
®3t impressive, ¿.van when voicing indignation against Western material-
l l  • ~~ :----- - -------------------------:-----— !-------------
^Heyworth-Dunne, a u attoj P. 167,
sC • • *
P ^ L o S ^ *  m  nahdgt a l a ir a l h ili l ,  Cairo, 1956.
pp. ast-as,. : .
Or-5»
ana hedonism his language is  distinctly reticent* In contrast to some
•f the Arab nationalists, and even reformists, of only a decade later, h®
is  not afraid to impress upon his reader the revitalising effect which a 
knowledge ®f Western achievements could exert upon the Islamic world. "I
implore Almighty God," h® writes in the introduction t®
on his visit to Paris, "that this beck mar awaken all
the Muslim peoples, Arab ®r non-Arabs, from their slumber ®f ttnavareness".
He lashes cut at these Islamic thinkers who would regard i t  as shameful
for the Muslim peoples t® struggi® t® keep abreast ®f Western scientific 
and technical advances and weald, therefore, ccndemn Kt^ amaad *A lB i
%**&&& ®f Westernisation!
”Tii® Beaefaot®r (referring t® Mu^ anubd ‘ A ll) has hastened 
t® develop hla country, by calling in as many W eft«» 
scientists as he has been able t®, and by dispatching as 
»any (students) t® the Western countries as he has found 
■ possible, since Western scientists are superior to their ■ 
counterparts in ether lands in the field of knowledge****
•Take the pearl from the sea' said Ptolemy the Second 
•merfuae from musk, gold from stane and wisdom fra » I »  
who declares i t . ’ - 'AM a prenhotic tradition says* *5eek " c  
knowledge, ev®a i f  it  is  in China*. As evidently the
Chine3« are idolaters, the tradition merely intends t® ..........
exhort people t® travel in pursuit e f kmowleege.#1
This is  a straightforward call for the abandoning of a ll prejudice
®»d diffidence in learning from the West. But since JahfswT was well
that such pleadings could touch a® responsive cuora» **» wot
- ( if
of Muslims s® l«®g as the Muslims were a prey, to self-complacency, ho
\ i f t
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set out, with commendable courage, to highlight the Muslims' backward­
ness as compared with Europeans. This he did ia takhlls either by an ex­
press ®r implied Juxtaposing of the Egyptian and French ways of life  -
1 2  3
ever a wide field ranging fro® bodily cleanliness, eating, drinking, 
recreationhomosexuality** to government^ 1 and the sciences  ^ -  or, what 
is more significant-.and interesting, through his most telling allusions 
to Islam's shrinking stature. By poking fun at those who, having at one 
time claimed that the palm tree could only be found in Muslim lands,had 
then be«» discredited .ty the'discovery of America the writer is concerning 
himself to shake the conservatives* belief in the in fallibility.of Muslim
«Hhedexy. :7. .  \7'.; 7 ’ _7 ' :.77 7  ; ' '
are all aware of the anomalous status of the term *ulema* in the 
language of the Arabs and other Muslim peoples, liter ally the term means 
learned men* and can therefore be equally applicable to all people possess­
ing a h%h degree of knowledge. But up 1» the end ef the nineteenth century 
the sclence3 the Muslim countries fe ll within the purview of religion -
n. M . : • ,v,: * -
% S . ,  p, 34,- . - , -
p. 91. ■ - -
4IM4.» p. 34. , • - " .
^ k a */ 'p ."56. ' 7  ' ' . ■ •
P. 71, et.sea,,
p, 102, .t  Mo»
*044.. s. « .
t
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caii5 the term 'ulama* came, therefore, to be applied exclusively to the i!
Muslim priesthood. Jahfawl conveys a sharp criticism of this anomaly
ty pointing to the laicized condition of science in France,
"Do not think," he says, "that the French scientists are 
priests, as the priests are only the religious doctors, 
and there are some priests who are also scientists; (there) 
the term scientist is  applied to people who have knowledge 
of ratlon&)(*anllvah) science; and the scientists know indeed 
very litt le  about the details of Cfaristian_Jufisprudence. So 
when somebo<$r is  said to be a scientist (*lltia) in France, he 
is  taken to bo, not as a man with religious knowledge, but as 
somebody who is well-versed in other branches of sclent». And 
there becomes evident to you the reason for the Christians' 
excellence over others in the field  of knowledge and thus you 
realize the reason for our countries' poverty in tho sciences.
(The reason is that) tho University of al Azfasr in Cairo, tho 
University of Ban! Urranayak in Syria, tho Ihiversity of Za^unan 
in Tunisia etc. are a ll thriving on the transmitted sciences 
(naollvahl and some rational sciences such as tbs Arabic studies, 
logic and so forth."1 ■ - "  - *
XahtavX’s responsiveness tonearlyall aspects of French life  and 
culture, except where in flagrant contradiction to Islamic rulings, seems 
to have been total. It was in fact his reputation as an apostle of French 
culture that gave occasion for his exile to Khartoum under *Abbas I (1849- 
54), as part of tho latter's campaign of-'purging' tho Egyptian cultural 
and educational system of French influence, ait ha always took care to 
justify his Francophile leasimga by insisting on the superiority of the  ^
French to other Christian peoples, . Lvea when speaking about French wine­
drinking habits he sounds an apologetic note in stressing the limitations
huh*!“! ,  PfcSVU. P.133, 
h u e .  k  52 .\; .
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within which the French have indulged in them and ty reminding his possible 
Muslim critics that there are fever words for wine in French than in 
Arabic.^ Nevertheless, what '¡Uh^ awT is pleading for is  not an outright 
’•’«'itemization in the sense of a clean break with Muslim tradition.
SflkhllLa is packed with nostaHc references to the glorious days of Is­
lamic predominance  ^ and with expressions of the writer's strong religious 
convictions;^ to avert the accusations and anathemas ©f the heresy- 
hunter's the book accompanies its appeal for Mestemization with the sig­
nificant suggestion that the Christians* ascendancy in the world is due, 
a®t to their being Christians’*, but to their advances in the sciences/* 
^hat he therefore is envisaging la  the grafting of M eat«» values on to 
Ihe trunk of Muslim traditions and Muslim life .
Jh his more serious but less original manahll a l albab el »iiriyah f l  
, «I  adab a l *affrforah. which was published ■ twenty years after the
■ one detects in the w riter's thought a growing movement towards
leicism, although no explicit plea for this can be anywhere found in the
P. 92.
oasa«, o. 8. Amore eloquent evidence of
is provided, besides his distinguished career at Al Aahar bot * -  ^
dent and a teacher, by his voluminous history^of the people •£ , J *
-rtiar.t’ a h S .  f l  A tA uU * a  h u l« < « • « * *
milkiyah, C ai re,1874/ with speoial reference te the life  •* ___ .
.the rise ef Islam.
% iter aliai the 'writer's singular classification of the continents of 
ifie according to which the place o f  each continent is determ j
'W its  associati« with, or contribution to Islam, tan be yef f p<3e^ a 
m  indication of his religious feelings, i f  not ns a s o p  t o  the critics 
of his pro-Western and, in fact, pre-French, views. He holds ta jt *  
should come at the tip ef a ll continents, thanks to its cultivation «  
Islam, while America should go right to the tot tom as "Islam has been 
totally absent from there», (ib id .. p. 19.)
ta u u » p. 8,
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■book. Contrary to takhll«, which deals mainly, I f  not wholly, with'"' ' 
the onward manifestations of Wtstern advances, man«hii. apart from the *--■ 
account ^t gives of the growth of civilization, is concerned with such 
fundamental and general lost»a as the rights of the individual as such 
ead the machinery of government; ' in analysing such a Vestem institution 
as constitutional' monarchy he commonly treats It not specifically as an 
achievement of Western culture, but simply as such a general humane ideal 
as is aspired to by every nation which is striving for progress and 
Prosperity, Thus ho maintains that'the necessity of dividing the people 
tnto ruler and ruled ■'aid" of distinguishing between the legislative, Judi-
r .1. V" ; i  l ■> . i’.'i vi Vv L.:'J 4 }rT ,  \
cial and executive cowers of the state’' are merely*"the dictates of re ll-  
gion*% Be la perhaps the first Arab writer of his period to supply the
w - “ ■' '■ •■■■■'.*■ : ■ -  ^ 1.^- i i. rv£: *'X,,.» -i - - £'*,+■ -■ :t. C ■., - * a ■ j : -
educated reader with a resume of I’ontesquleu^s ideas on the system^  of 
' government. Two points of criticism have, however, to he madet firs t ,
v,u t-v V v-:-
e does not trouble to explain away the contradiction existing between. l~;s V? -  • \T
these ideas and the principles of Islamic rule; second, in keeping with 
Ms humanist interpretation of Western values, he does net, in speaking 
about the separation of powers, so much as mention the name of Montesquieu, 
It is almost as i f  this idea had represented bis own discovery of a
X
political panacea for the Muslimat plight,1 \ r„ 3r-iro,
controversy1Thia silence assume# some significance in the context of the 
over fahfiwl*s translation from Montesquieu, Shaiyal, a contemporary 
biographer of fah f»»I, writes that he read 1* Fsprit des bolft ^nii . 
was staying in France, But, contrary to other chroniclers aid biogr p i 
he does not think that ’Jah^awl had translated any of Montesquieu , * 
although he admits that maaahl^  was deeply affected by } V .sprit de» i&L.* 
The origin of the controversy seems to have been a verse by ‘Jan-Jawi. in 
which he names Ipntesquieu aid Malte B m  as witnesses to his translation <
(cont.)
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He pate the political education of the individual on a par with 
his religious instruction in necessity and importance — a view which, to 
»any a conservative mind of hie tine, must have sounded as the product .
of a "breath-taking audacity!
I \
" It  Is customary,".be says, "in the Muslin countries to 
teach the Koran to children before (instructing them in 
professions (or industries. Sana1 1) . There is  no harm 
in doing this ty itse lf ( la  t f » a m  f l  haddl zatlh).
But these countries neglect # 1« teaching of the prin- 
dples of state c lit ic s , which constitute (the basis of) 
public sovereignty. The instruction of these principles 
is  consonant with public interests,- It  would not be d if-  ^
flcult to appoint in each town a teacher who should in­
struct the children, after their completion of the Koran , 
and the rudiments of the Arabic language, In the princi­
ples of political and administrative affairs, and apprise 
them of the benefits which good policy and good admini­
stration can acorns to the whole of the population,"
What further exemplifies the laicised and Westerniae^ quality of
th® writer’s thought, apart from his detailed accounts of some of the 
P®rt®da of European history^ ©r his repeated quoting of Kapoleon on 
■Egypt's vast natural resources,-* is  his appeal fo r the suppressing of
'3| « | | y  *3..i f  iBabahl^adlb al «agrlyah, Cairo, 1869?
1" :
ha the tetemdattlMi' of manahll^ahtawl admits that he 
the bulk of the chapters on European history from the French
_ ■ ' •. ... «. 
pp. 149 end 190, *
rallgittBs'pnjodic« md ' « 4 ' « «wi oy of lnnorittm
teal. of o li pragTeaa/' Kls' pla'a on'this U st print ha 
Tolagataa to tho' ®d. o'f th. W , '  parhapiao aa to 1 « *  «  » »  ondorlo«
"on the mind of the read**“«
invention of our age? ke vf i t®8»
noble31 products of (human) id.nda vh i° <♦ to the sue-  ^ ksMltdRi frw  each other and p re i^ t^  i t  to the sue
ceeding generation in a form nor® - • J ^ S ^ X e 1 w r ypreee^rj one,' \Te should not therefore deprecate every
M ^«nk »a it  U  ttoro oftenthannot J ff* “** r «:-*r ^  ;
Hia plea In favour of bid* ahla connected, wltl^his admission ® ,? / -
in Islamic fiob (jurisprudence) in regard to mat^ra of 
especially oomteroai
. "The (contents of the) books of religious law t 1 ->•
"'=■ ■'u With tb»' «feet* end develop®««*8
., { . but they do not do ao In practice as they should,
. r intermingling and transactions between European trad rs 
and the Lastern peoplea have therefore led to now i  g 
lationa and the emergence of no» courts which try to 
nettle the disputes between the'citisens and foreigner!» 
mostly on the basis of European lavs.*
>. i 5 - ?:>
H__
m ______ _
*y*b$m*l applie« -tha famous Koranic verse • i —r-Jv* + ¿'nly to tw» 
fealy.the faithful are brethren -  Keren, irrespective of -
^«Ums of Egypt but to the whole off ter. \  religious pre-
religious differences, (Ib id ., pp.66-67.} He^regaraa ^
• *» » -
, ^  S. ( i .. . 6 - .) sK« re®
Judies as the cause of national disunity 269).
¿b|d,, p, 23*. (5ne should not underestimate Yahjaw^s courageous, 
exhaustive, approach to the problem of fcjdlkh e s p e d a l l y I L *  
the sinister echo which the »ere ter» invokes in the mind of the orthodo • 
As Cantwell Smith writes, bid*akis  the Kuslims* counterpart to the 
Christians* intellectual 'concept of ♦heresy* (Aslant In Made» HlatffgZ»
P» 20)»
.. Ilgialiy. Is perhaps the first printed book which sets out to. 
fandliarlsso its  readers with such Western notions as homeland (wajan) 
and patriotism (watarjyahl.1 And patriotism seems in fact tobeone  
of the main messages of ^ah^awl for the younger generation of his time.
fah^awl should undoubtedly be regarded as the foremost Arab champion 
of the cause of Westernisation in its most progressive cultural, edu­
cational and administrative aspects. * .Although his modernising .-seal was 
tempered with a strong devotion to Egyptian, rather than to Arab nation- 
alism, he made a «eighty contribution toward the Arab awakening draw­
ing the attention of his AraVMuslim public to their appalling material 
end spiritual stagnation in contrast to the growing prosperity of the 
West, fha«, It  is  not surprising that he should have _incurred the host- 
i l i V  of sem Asharite dogmatists,^.. . . . . .  - , t < •! •
... - V/ ' T V--* '‘It ' R
' Whether following tn fah$awl»s footsteps or merely spurred by their 
mm observations of the social and political institutions of the West,,a^
18aAUh., 85. Also p. 118 ftjejf. > - . cfssW*
‘,«.%.Rifa<ahmay have been opposed by certain bigoted shaikhs of el A?hax
who probably considered that he was trespassing on their domain in t
- teaching of religious law m6 theology.......Delatre, who visited tho
school administered ty Rif a* Sunder Said, states that his colleagues 0« 
-.tested him." : (Heyworth Ikuine, oo .c lt.. p. 297,) . . . . . . .  . : <• tt-’
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number of ether outstanding Egyptian and Syrian Intellectuals new took
up the call for Westernization as part of their patriotic struggle 
against Internal oppression and external menace* In this task they 
were indirectly aided by Western expanaioni«a. The increasingly ir ­
resistible pressure of French and British imperialists from the reign 
of Mpfcammad Said Pasha (1854) onwards, marked by the granting in 1856 
to Ferdinand do Lesseps ©f a oonoession for the construction of the Suea
Canal and of oth er loss i^ rtan t concessions to the British (the Eastern 
telegraph Company and the Bank of Egypt) -  accentuated by the activlti 
of various European inquiry commissions culminating in the ®Plt 
patios of Egypt in IMS -  served to'produce in Egypt-two current 
thought* firstly, by quickening the pace of Westernisation,
under Isma‘11 fhsha (1863-1879)» and thereby facilitating contact be­
tween Egyptians and Europeans, it  made for the increased sofhi 
of the literate elitej secondly, by enraging the ponulac ag 
"Christian oppressors", it  prepared the ground for the em rge  ^
antl-Wcatemlsm as one of the salient characteristics of Egyptian aat 0 
¿List Ideology. In fact/ the first current gave rise to the secend, 
providing it with means of self-expression. I f  the French aggresslo  ^
half a century earlier had not occasioned so articulate and con 
movement' against the West, this was because the patriotic re s «  
which it  generated was of an amorphous nature and had no opportun ty 
declare Itself,"-►This situation’was different_lh the midland_late_..
f  . . : ' j ■ ;  ■* _ , wa9 api« to censureteenth century, when a sizeable Intelligentsia in E&fP*
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tha West In the languages of Rousseau, Voltaire and M ill. At that 
embryonic stage anti-Westernism was, however, naturally concentrated 
against Britain, as the power whose encroachments were the moat recent 
in nationalist memory! France escaped, both because of the pro-French 
leanings of the nationalist leaders and because of the diplomatic
«* ''* • - ■
strategy of playing her off against Britain.
The rise of journalism as, in this period, the most effective means
ef Egyptian self-expression, seems to have^been one of the chief by­
product a ©f the Westernising process. Acting as a major contributory 
fader towards Its emergence was the encouragement Isnâ*ïl Pasha gave 
to opposition and criticism under his reign in the hone of being able
-■f *
financiers.
M a bargdatiig counter in his dealings with thé Western ‘ 
Of no less significance*was thé beginning of "the invasion
ef Egypt by Christian Syrians’» ,l  mostly writers and intellectuals who had 
escaped Ottoman censorship/ Who gave an unprecedented impulse to Egyptian 
journalism! this «Invasion*, which reached its height' towards the end 
ef the nineteenth century, was paradoxically the climax to the growth 
of am enlightened «id Westernised elite in Syria. But,©f this Syrian 
awakening, more later.
There 1«  perhaps no better representative ef Westernised Journalisa 
this etifs.thsn the Jewish Xa*q3b it® Rafail §amiu‘ , known'as James _  *
****tt» Hartmann,- — r
See ala» Richard ------
Berlin 194*» PP. 29-30.
jteJ gg id  l^ps Busac, London, 10?9 , p . '3.
~ - aaa* llla a  und Nationalismes. Akademie-Verleg,
§ania, who. lived during one of the most impressionable phases In the 
history of modern Egyptian thought.'** Although reckoned as a publicist 
and a wsecondary figure In the nationalist hierarchy” he made, through 
his lectures, articles, pleya and especially through his famous journal 
Abu .Haraarift (na^dira), a profound impression .on the disgruntled strata . 
ef the middle class. Being the son of an Lallan  mother, and having .... 
made his at dies in Egypt and Italy ana having been brought up in both 
Jewish mû Muslim traditions, he developed a deep appreciation ef French
culture and a steadfast attachment to Muslim traditions. His two secret
societies, Amis de la  S a i«w  and Le Cercle des Progressif teg, did a 
great deal in propagating new ideas among the army officers, the I gJ-fUL 
and tte;stag*nts of the University of Aahar. Be was among the initiators 
ef that saving, Western-styled tradition which enabled,the Egyptian
masses to translate thfiir vague, inarticulate disgruntlement inte con­
creto, straightforward demands.
In 1ST®, after publishing a series of articles aimed against the 
corrupt administration and the growing British interference in Egyptian , 
affairs, he was sent into exile, whereupon tee went to Paris where he re­
gained ^ until the year of his death, ■ Joanna* * s activities in Paris are a ll
^The contribution of the Egyptian Jews to the political and social develop 
®«nt of Egypt Is one of the interesting aspects of Arab-Jewish relations, 
Ary generalisations, however, should bs avoided In d iscu^sing this con- 
tributlon. It  was mainly under the liberal rule of the Fatimlds pov-llv  
that the Jews attained the highest government posts', while retaining 
their religion, (S, D. Ooiteln, Jews end Arabs., Schocken Books Inc., 
fork ,. 1955, p. m . ,  also p, 70.) ”  , ‘ ' ■ v ; *  : ‘
^ »n e  L, Gendzier,"James §anua and Egyptian Katlonallsa? in The Kiddle 
last Journal, Washington, Winter 1% 1 , p. 17.
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marked by a passionate admiration for Franoe, even to the point of , ■- 
his supporting her colonial policy. Fart ©f thia admiration could no . 
doubt be explained away. as. the compliment paid by a respected alien to . 
the country whose hospitality he was enjoying. But part should also b© 
ascribed to his genuine belief in French philanthropism. In an endeavour 
to contribute to the understanding between the Muslims and the French he 
delivered in Paris a number of lectures outlining the traditional ties, 
of friendship between their countries, ^orth rusting is the following re­
port ty Figaro on his lectures (quoted in one of his journals in Paris 
«•lied  1*Alaonaef M  *n s if )t  - -* - - ■ .. „• ■- - * -
"be ehoi|di Ab©j*4îaddara a fa it  hier au Trocsdéro, une 
rnmtémm.ce «  Imgtm arabe sur l'h istoire de France et 
; •*»- M&tfce tAÎMiij&r» pour les nations orientales* ■ I l ... r  
a parle des relations cordiales entre Charlemagne et
Haroun^al-lachid, Francois I er et Bajaget, Napoléon I I I j  
et Abd-al-ilajid et le  President de la  République fran~ 
mlm  et le  Sultan Abdul Hamid,«#. l ’auditoire . . .  a ......
chaleureusement applaudi le conférencier et la  musique 
■ *•* IMatre d'Egypte a joué * la  Marseillaise arabe » au 
, mlUeSidea crl-s à« 'vivent la  France and ses colonies'.'
_Iu  §aarfi«»a other journal in Paris, called l'Attawadod (at t«wa*dud.
■ '■ ^  appeared before al smnslf. the same pro-Frenoh fee l»
? *®f 3*ec*s<** - A drawing appearing under the title-heading of the
a Kuslim, presumably an Egyptian, shaking hands with a French- 
. .. published both in French and Arabicj on the third ■
” . •••*• S 4 " * !*_ ■' '' • P *-■ V- - * If
^  July 1900. "I was delighted,* he said in one of his Paris 
lectures on his v isit toHorth Africa, "to know that a ll French colonies
v.
page there was always a column In Persian derated to the Persian problem
'.all./ V - r .  tO V - - V. ' ’‘’ i ' " 1
and fa ll ©f the praises of Kaoir-ia-Bln, the then Shah of Persia. This* I * i t r: -
column was Intended to* reflect!the paper’ s concern with the^whole of the
Islamic world.
final* *s lore for the French was matched by hi3 abhorrence of 
British imperialism.* This, abhorrence was excited especially by the 
British occupation of Egypt in 1882. 'In  order to give greater scope to 
t i» lr  denouncing of British imperial!a», fannies’ journals in Paris con­
cerned themselves not only with issues of Anglo-£gyptlan relations, but 
also with such crises as tho Boer War.^ ' It  is  noteworthy that one of 
these journals , a l watanl al mlgri (The Egyptian Patriot) i two issues 
only of which appeared in Paris shortly after the British!occupation of 
carries also an ihgliah translation of some of the articles, k 
letter published In this journal, addressed to him by a * secret patriotic 
society« i n Egypt, throws some light an fanriuMs departure from his usual 
practice of publishing his journals in Arabic and French. * v;
1 . 1
'••fc ' A-tswaddnd. June 20, 1900.
2„ ■ • .
e f October 15, 1900, the cartoon strip of ¿ m m fif, 20 
\h® tTm% Page of an undated issue of M_
'•• « » »  m m * ,  i—  *  »  « lh t S  
SL2S »»nm h  wa gala al maarah f l  a igr. Cairo. 1953. P.
3 : . .. . ,-v • , . . .. t _■ , J ’' „ , ; 1 • ;
el wunpjf. November 20. 1900-
"Our overwhelming plight,® so ^  Shoves you
totally unknown to * •  S S I »  ^  ^
therefore to publish a . p o lit i^ . content a. The
lish  translation of lta nt t0 explain our pest-
English translation wouia be many a leveVef
British."
But 1  U r  * .  —  -  -  M V h.
©f course, the only things Sanriu* vas able to offer te hi® lie n e e . ,
v «  .  staunch »PP.H.T «  «11 *1 »« This »  d »  >  » •  -
piped. Jewleh-Christlan-Areb teckgreund) -  •<f>^ *®alre(1 **
and the Blue. Quuiu* vee pertap* ®n< , {  the Clrst pI* t*8*
• r Mn  earlier lectures in Paris# 
unity, "My lev©»" ha said in ©necf bi®
in *ons of the m§g$&£»ei 
a ll ef you is  one in my heart, Becau*© al
, ,  v<rrnt ef Syria ©re presumably
> ' Algeria, ef Tunisia, of Tripolltanla, e f ESTPt ^
united by the Arabic language, thus forming one. r»bie na
- • These appeals fer unity, vhen set against hit ideas g
liberalism# oathelle Islamism, ©nd .oriental brotherhood, Prm
”  w ill be adumbrated 1 ~
the prototypes ©f that self-contradiction widen#
«e  the characteristics®
in the consequent chapters, was t© become on
modern Arab political thought.
The.British occupation of Egypt in 18S2 completed a prec®
was referred to abeve^a» — ** -
 ^ . ««,«■>+* The. occupation
main ‘characterlattes ef.:nationalist.td^olecf -;  ^• •„‘ s
■ ■ ■: :;'>L : h -- ■ ■ * i ej w  the crushing
was a ll the mere resented in Egypt as being acconpam u*
*feuan al isharah, p, 5»
of the nationalist revolt of Ahmad *Arabi Pasha (1879-1882), a revolt 
which had as its  alas the self-assertion of tbs Egyptians against foreign 
Intervention, the establishment ©f a democratic fora of government and 
the curtailment of the powers of corrupt and Irresponsible rulers. The
symnoj-ic asP°ct ef that particular episode was even more significant than'
- * ?- ’■ 1 ' ,'r ■'> .“"f"  ^ 'i -<■ 1 ■ ■ ‘‘ v *” <-■ -■ '
its immediate concrete implications* Britain was, for the firs t  time, 
identified in the nationalist mind with a ll the obstacles that beset the 
way of the national salvation.^ *
Hone the leas, at the purely spiritual level of Egyptian life , the’ 
British occupation had a definitely positive effect -  it  emboldened the 
Western!sera, after a short period ef retreat in the face of Afghani,
Abduh and others, t® intensify their efforts bothindisseknating the 
pecifically Western modes of thought and in fighting against the dog- 
ffiatlsm of the traditionalists.
A rmarkable representative of that audacious spirit of Wootomi-* 
action -  in the scientific field  -  was Dr, Shlbll ash Shumayil,-, a 3yrian 
w^ a is closely identified ty many critics with the .journal. ■ al »«i»a ta fvv ' ;
*  the leading organs of laio thought in Egypt at the beginning of 
the twentieth century,3 uhder the leadtr^ip of la* ¿ b  f a r ^  (185^-192^)
t rv,, \
‘•John Marlowe, -  
Jean et Slmonne Lacouture,
(1800-1953)» op.cit,, pp,-112-13. -  
on bbuvement. Edition du Souil, Paris,
zJ«hn Itertewe, W latt.'. 'p. 128,
P. «52.
*Hler « Damoin. Editions du Seuil, Paris, i960.
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He also founded in 1886 the monthly journal ash shlfa*. a periodical 
ef medicine, surgery, science and practice.1 The Journal which, in fact, 
migrated from Beirut to Cairo in 1889, concerned Its e lf mainly with the 
technical aspect o f modernity -  a position somewhat opposite, to that e f 
Zaidan»s ■al.hl.l^l». which largely concentrated on Its literary orientation, 
'-'hu&syil published a collection of his principal articles in 1915, and' '' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ' ■ •  * ' - . w- -,
shock?a the Egyptian e lite  «  not by what ^acques Berque calls his enthu-
«S&ISBftJLqlentlsle.et nasltivista -  hat rather, ly  his open denunciation
religion, Ms poem jag. rolhgu enjoins Man to Integrate himself in  ter- s 
a t r ia l  Nature, He finishes the poem on an optimistic note o f la ic 
modernism, "Compare the religious centuries with ours* th y  were far
W «W * TW. ' ' ........  ^ ‘ ' 'JRis was a revolutionary position, not only with regard to the
'**** ^  Ashar, hut also to the tenets of that "bourgeois liberalism of
Jhe honest man*, recipient of the West but loyal to the East, represented 
eV6r ®lnce tha* time ty  such people as A£»d ZakI, Afcaad b a tfl As Soyid, 
^msain, Tawfiq a l $akTm and many others*,^ Another collection of 
^■A 8 Wtrk®» published in 1912 unfer the t it le  of Vues du Dr, Chlbll 
reveals an outlook based on Spencerian Organiciaa, Every are- ■ ■
. Eton, he says, is  a social phenomenon and, like every ether social phe­
nomenon, Is  open toobservation and criticism. _A vertiginous evolution
vHtartlA Hartmann, IN 37. Jamal Muhammad Ahmed,Oxford University 1*ess»
In
>nd®n> l c.
, ■ eiviAt,.» ■ p. 252.
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haa aagaUad .U  tta. Arab couniri.a. Ibis «aalatlan «has triumph.d «
(th. tlaW . of) th. abstract, of .r a t *y  m i «  th. Im * *m r . But i f  
we want to appnaolat. the p r.gr.,a a « « M  1» « •  < * » « • *  ' ' r*r U )> VB 
mat .quip ouracl.es with th. m icr..o.p.*. « *  “ “ “ “  thB
in theaoieacas to »th . im p . * « * »  r f =» l>
, . ®nd erudite referencato thopast*'-
against a ll- humanism based on a pious and «ruu
a. ah* M««**thodOX* VieWS Which pr©»pt®d
It  vaa such * unorthodox even to the uno
Shunayil* a adapted sen. GSbri.1 Bulad. a f t «  th. l a t t « - .  daath in 1 9 «. 
to offer hiaeolf as 'the expiatory victim* „»f tt* ***r*lM *  **
assumed I f  his father*s soul*
a 1 ... a *tr »U t  and ~ r .  ^ h . t i c  attitude w d .  a®darnlsm « •  
le ft t . b. obu.pi.ned » d  d *ln .a t.d  *  1 »  * « -  —
t. . .. reformer and probably the leading
Fbical and most aggressive educational re
. 2 . After ffpwp'feHpg M s prl»s*y
scholar „ litterateur of the Arab werld •
’^ i o n ' i n  .  aehMl in Bppar *  « * —  « *  ^
«e ra  his lndop.ni.nc. of mind a .m «i »  him th. « * «  . f  th. A ^ l t .  .
„ „„ . w .  the tJnlvertrf.tr** 8* then •«-»
leaders, who eventually expelled hia t * »»
t « d  th. „.w Egyptian B h lv .r.1 * w * «  *  «mdar ’
th. Italian Orimtniiet. « a d » »  und.r -th .c -in .n t Oamo «h .U r » .  '
Pr«faaaor to n  U t t n . . f  rSblng.n. » 4  i x . f . . « r  S w tlU n i«. in « « « “
nltlm  cf U .  brilliant n th  h. wa. ..n t te B rm c, » * « .  b . studied thre.
. ;-3,
xMm m P 'm Z A k l • iNtff •
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years In the Sorbonre, attended the lectures of Casanova In the College 
d® France and was awarded his doctorate*1
^usain’ s numerous books £©<3 articles reflect his two-pronged re­
formism! fierce opposition to orthodox dogmatism, especially' in the 'liter»
* Jr as represented by hia highly controversial book ftt*l adab al 1
(1926) on the Arabic poetry of the pre-Islamic period,^ and his peiv 
sisttet call for thorough Westernization of the Egyptian educational system, 
a® propounded in his book mustagbal ate thaoafah ft  alar (1937) »a the 
future 0f  culture in Egypt? I t  is  the latter book which most concerns us1
here, in that it  rats forward a novel argument in defence of Westernisation 
This argument is that Egypt should adopt Western »odes cf 
^hsugiit and living, not became she needs them -  as previous writers had 
contended -  but because she is part of Europe,
* As explained by £usain himself," it  was the Anglo-Egyptian treaty
‘ ■■-I».- i. V ■> •*  ^ y'i  ^ .■ ... - f • - ....
®f alliance of 1936, guaranteeing Egypt*« independence, and the convention 
®f ^ontreu* (l937), abolishing the capitulations, which prompted him to 
writ® the teak* He had been equally inspired ty his attending the Confer-
■* •» v
mm o f the Rational Committee for Intellectual Ccopcration In Bails la  1936,
¿ «la g  which he went to classes and lectures, each of them dealing with
•me aspect of culture. What he saw and heard "stimulated a flow of ideas,
g* and ho~es that slmnly had to be recorded**^ One of the most !n -
---------------— ----------------------------------------- 1---------:---------- '
in Baypt. Oxford University ^ress, London,
ul ma* arif U  riisr, Cairo, 1927# see especially
I l j p y !" T r l r ' 111 Call., 1917, Pc6 .
» a ,  8o m .c iP S iS K !  S ^ . H ^ a i W T i ^ w a .la
terestlng features ©f the book is its discussion of the position of *
Egrpt between the East and tha West* "la Egypt," ha asks at the beginning 
®f the book, "of the Bast or of the Vest?"1 Aid, of course, la speaking 
®f East and West he la using these terms in their cultural, rather than 
geographical, senses. "The,contacts betwean ancient Egypt," he replies, 
m  to Egypt*s position with regard to the East, "and the lands of the East 
scarcely vent beyond Palestine, %*la aid Mesopotamia, that is, the East 
that falls In the Mediterranean basin,'but there is no doubt that they.. 
v®**e end continuous and that they exerted an influence: on the in­
tellectual, political and economic life  of a ll tho countries concerned".2 
As regards Egypt* a relatlondiip with the West, he . sounds more convinced
*&f-righte®usi
+ '*
"It would be a waste of time and effort to set forth in 
*1 « t a i l  the ties binding Egypt to the ancient Graeco- 
Aegean civilisation. School children know that Greek 
colonies were established in Egypt by the Pharaohs be«» * 
fore the first milleaiffli B.C. They also know that an 
Eastern nation, Persia, successfully invaded our country 
at the end of the sixth century B .C .«3
t vdth the help of the Greek volunteers ¡ad tbs Greek cities the Egypt­
ians repelled the Persian invasion. The point of these ©boerviftana is 
ihiSi, ^ ^ ^ rp tian  mind had n® slgnifleant ties with the Par East and  ^
with Persia its relations were those of hostility. _ Its real ties were * _
and with the Greeks, In so far as the Egyptian
JteiaaM . p. is.;
2W£*> p. u .  -i.
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Bind was affected by *«y outside Influence at a ll, this Influence v a r
l  . ,
Mediterranean. Therefore, continues the writer, the fact that acme
Egyptians regard thws Solve® "a« beInn closer to the Hindus, Chinese and 
Japanese than to' the Greeks, Italians and French»»" seems to him "a : 1
•^k ing mifconceptIon*. ?aba fusaln then ties to elucidate arother
»P e t  of Egypt's affinity with Europe ly eophaslaing the distinction
- -4 i ■ ' . • * '  * .  -
HhOIm , like I«rsp®««,sir«w between state and religion -  a
follow-up of the argument• forcefully left Incomplete ly *Ahd.ar Raalq,^
. *Fin» eerlie it tints/, b# fays, "Euslias haw been well 
, «ware ©f tbs lm> wd?erfal3|’ «eknewladged principle that 
a political system and a religion «re different things....
. Thie la definitely applicable to the luropeana who, when 
. relieved of the burden# of tin Kiddle Agee, erganlaed their 
respective governments In accordance with temporal consldejv 
■ ■ aliens..not Chrlatlan «nlty or linguistic ©r racial simil­
arity.14 ' 1"'-'
bid Egypt*o adoption of Islam sake her m  Eastern nation? •Mi, not at
¿11*3 j^ipiles. Europe did net beeesw East#» nor did th# nature of
the Snumpem mind change because Christianity, which originated in the
East, flooded Europe and absorbed the other religions. Besides, there
Is a® fwxJamental difference between Islam and Christianity as both "were
tufftt in the geographical East» both issued from one noble source and were
inspired ty the one God In whom Easterners and Westerners alike believe!*^
, p. 16»
aj m „ -p .  w .
%>. 'M im *  p.  U9 t .mu.
p. a .




Islam and Christianity came to resemble each other in another way* 
Christianity Influenced, and was influenced by, Greek philosophy before 
tne rise or -islam. milosopiy became Christian and Christianity became 
philosophical. The same thing happened when Islam came into contact with 
Greek philosophy,, Philosophy became Muslim and Islam became philsophical, 1 
Therefore;
"We Egyptians," says JahS Husain, "must not assume the 
existence of Intellectual differences, weak or strong 
between the European and ourselves.or infer that.the East 
mentioned by Kipling in his famous verse *Eaat is  East and 
West is  West,!and neverjhe twain shall meet', applies to .
1»  or our country; Ism ail's  (1863-1379) statement that 
Egypt is a part of Europe should not.be regarded as some,., 
kind of boast or exaggeration, 'since our country has a l­
ways been a part of.Europe as far as.intellectual and ...... 0
cultural life  is concerned, in a ll Its forms and branches.* 4
Tk* «Piter goes' further ’ than'thisJ by; stating' that * the elements "of the ” 
European mind are the "same as those of the Islamic mind, Paul Valery has 
distinguished three' elements'in the European mind;
• v ^  ±  \
^Greek civilisation with its  literature, philosophy and 
art, Roman civilisation with its,po litical institutions 
and jiffisprudence, and Christianity with its 'appeal for 
charity, and its exhortation to good works",-3
An analysis of .the Muslin mind in Egypt w ill yield comparable results;
». • ' r- = - ' j * •' - • ' - * • - ‘ ■ ■ ' \ '
a literary»,phileaophical and,artistic component essentially related to
p, 35.
2ibid. , p, asr.
3Ibid,, p. 39.,
**;!.,** U.l .1 J  4 . '
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Greek civil!sation and a politico-jurlsdicial conjponent very much ekln to 
the Heaan system. As regards Islam, it has already hem» stated that there 
is a great deal in corns»» between'this religion and Christianity.
falsa Husain then sets eut to explain the impact of the West en the 
■fmma aspects of the Egyptian life  -  «  her spiritual activities, govern-, 
neat, system of communication and economy. But that Is not enough. Th© 
Egyptians Pust became equelpartners In civilisation with the Europeans, 
"•hit share with the« the present civilisation, with all its pleasant and 
unpleasant sides«,1 and’mre important,'should unequivocally express their 
respect for the Western civilisation. «If we genuinely respect the Euro­
peans,« he writes, "why do we not reconcile our words with o«r actions«.
°»e departaent of the I&yotian life  in partlcul^, says the writer, has so 
far escaped the Western impact*' this is the Asbar diversity which «has 
^en in a serious condition since before the tine of laaa‘I l"  • f?usain 
•eiaos on every opportunity te censure the'stubbornness ef the Asharites 
to adapt themselves to the changing circumstances, whether it  he hia ob­
jection to the Azhar'.s refusal to subject its institution to the government 
supervision,  ^ its monopoly for teaching the Arabic language,  ^or its oppo­




coontiy.^ It  is noteworthy that, since -the publication of Mnstagbal» 
although-^atain I » «  retreated f » a • some• of ■ Ids;previous opinions, including 
tha concept of Egypt as essentially of the West, in favour of viewing her 
rather as a link between &ast and West,^ he has invariably remained criti­
cal towards the traditionalists.; In one of his recent hooks, naod va ifiah ,
•  *
a collection of, essays on criticism and reform, he attacks the Aaharite 
shaikhs and recommends the unification of religious and laic ferns ef edu­
cation in Egypt as complementary to the unification of the country*s legal
3
system through the abolition of the religious courts.
• " ? Although, ^ uaain is so solidly for the Westernisation of Egypt, he 
i *  opposed toher heing i ndependent on tho culture of any particular country 
•f the W est/H e especially deprecates the Anglidsation of the Egyptian 
culture, attempted ever since the British Occupation, through sending more 
and more students te Britain and activities ef such cultural propaganda 
organisations as tha B r it ts  Institute. 5 v By contrast, his repeated refer- 
eaoe 9s the various French cultural, educational and administrative ex- i -
P* 77 et
dar al * a »  u> l; Mali*In, Beirut, ■ 1956,et ieq*
It'S
.# P. 199 et seq.
5fm m 1919#'while' 231 students were sent to England, only ^  *M»t'to.fr«is*..it^ tw«n W m  and 1936, the simeratlo was itoostr® with 1,000 students being sent to England, and 229 to France. .
* * * * *  >  jaBMtffi In te llco tu e llo
lisanlm* Gueire. Maafliplo. Keaton fc Co. Paris, I960, p. 83. )
cellencea Indicate Ms Francophile leanings -  a contradiction to Ms •
desire to have Egypt imbibing West«® culture as a whole, rather than
*
falling under the spell of « rnritrnilisr Western culture, ’ "
;
It  can be fairly  said that, as far as the contemporary history of "
Egypt is  eonce»ad#‘'l|5lfi. fusaln haa;>al&the',last word about the basic
problems raided hf M r country* s relationsMp with the Vlest, yusain*a -Y
on Egypt1 a clese tics with Europe, rather than with the Orient,'
have found their echo in the works of a number of Egyptian intellectuals
•M writers such as Saioma Kusi and lawflq al Hakim, The former, while
• •»ertljig ■ that’ Egypt 'belongs" be -Europe,'', goes so far as to regretthe Y"--
tm% that «Asiatic blood« should run in the veins of the Egyptians, The
1
^tter glorifies Ms nation as ie sc «iid «rts  ®f *^rwiM-bMlders«, t
- *- , y ' ?- ■ * r ''
Me cannot close this chapter without alluding to another important 
aspeet of Westernisation in the Arab werldi the movement for the 
patien of women. - The main leader of this movement in.Egypt»' QaMm A*aLn» 
has been thoroughly Introduced to Western students,2 te l
Hialther Eraune,
R. Hartmann and iichee]
m  £ L m *.
op
fjfc» p*-231 The Intellectual Origins
7“*» PP. 56, 87, ¿7-51, Amin's main book 
i±*aylr al Mar*ah* Cairo. 1899) has also, been
■ * —* -  « 1-Mart? ah
5® Mancipation of WfimL« /.'? ~
t m m u m ,  into German \ J T  ir^L ** tta3>fah‘ Gatra ‘ ia" )  has ali 
Stuttgart, 1928, Wf • ^ TO°ert; tjaairc'emln. tahrlr el-mar*al
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is the poet JanSl'$LAqX-az Eahawi, the initiator of the movement in Iraq 
and "one of the great renovators that Islam has ever known during recent 
centuries for his greatness and scandal* In spite of his pious family 
background -  his father was a Mufti -  his early life  was spent mostly in 
the merry-makings of the, learned"ffretries doctes) , in • ceremonies and "  - ■ 
receptions. Ke' achieved great Popularity thanks to his marvellous memory 
ted his sense of poetical - Improvisation. He was elected as a deputy to 
*kbdul IJamld'a parliament where he became one of the first  protagonists 
° f  Arabisra. His visit to Egypt brought him into contact with modernist 
iiota. This inspired him,"after his return to Baghdad, to launch a vigor-' 
®h* campaign for the establishment of a girls* school in Baghdad, He had
hew become a professor of the Baghdad faculty of law. Despito the govern- 
•** a atteaots at hindering"4 this project by drawing on the antl-fesdnism 
of the Ottomans,‘ZahSwi * a efforts succeeded and the first girls* school'
was founded In Iraq in 1899« Other communities (Christians, Jews etc.) 
•eoa took up* the idea, and within Zahlwi's lifetime, six to seven girls*
schools were set up in Baghdad, in Koss-il and In Ba§ra. 2alawl*s next 
«eve was the publication, in 1905, of a book entitled al faJr a? gadlq 
fl- lih tit  '» I  khesinq. vhlfth' a virulent attack on VahhaW-sa in
general and onthe rigorous formalism of the Hanbalite sect in particular.
iU'~ '■ 1 '  *i,
Jacques Serquef 1 e . e.^I&2.-, - r ■
l^outia viassignon/ Presse Arabi» ' ^«'Question dn Voile* in du Vton&S.
i, Paris, XI!» XI, 1910, p. 466.
6o.
But the orthodox end conservative circles, who had hcen caught
*-- • - . •.*.
somewhat unawares by Zaimwl’s offensive cn behalf of feminism, soon found 
an opportunity to empty their vial» of wrath on his head. The occasion 
was provided for them by the publication of a letter by ZehävT in the 
Egyptian journal al anaarvad.- in it  a issue of July 1910. The article, which 
' was entitled *In Defence of Woman”, touched ©f a storm of controvery both 
to Egypt and Iraq, and brought a prompt reaction from the enraged f.ut-TTäL 
■ ef Bagdad who to a-body denounced Zahecwl as a stodla (atheist) and a 
juba.  ^ ad ■ damm (one whose killing is prescribed by law). Thereupon Zahawl 
'»as deprived of a ll his official positions. Several unsuccessful attempts 
Were also made «1 his life .
<i The central theme of Zahawl’s controversial article is  the repu- ,
diation of the yel1(fajjab)a s  a social institution. But there is indeed 
to the * article than that1 - Sahawl makes a sharp criticism, not some­
times without a tinge of sarcasm, of a number of Koranic injunctions on 
woman •  although he does not mention the Koran ty name anywhere in the 
•artic le ., ■* ■• • -•: *• .r . . . . -  ..v,,
Muslim woman,” he says, «suffers multiple oppression 
* . and to justice. She is oppre seed be cause the rightjt® divorce
tolls exclusively within the power of the hustend. I wonder 
Why they require the consent of woman for her marriage while 
they..do.not,wk for it for her divorce, which merely restores 
ter previous Isolation, She is oppressed because in the herl- 
of 'ter: father and ’aether do«f not receive more than-.-..
* teir the share ©f her brother,2 She is oDprcssed because she
ls w?rth tolf. a »an and ter tegtimonyhalf that of a man.-5 She
^Cf. toe Koran, IV* 39,
2° f « 2&A», IV* 13.
I Ä t . »  H ,  282.
la oppressed because her husband can many three more 
wives, whereas she can have only Jtla. She le oppressed 
because she Is buried alive u»1er ‘a thick veil which de­
prives her of the pleasure of sensing the perfume of the 
breeze and of freely mingling with her likes in order to 
educate herself together with them in the great school
of l i fe , "2
.... Finding himself completely isolated after being. "excommunicated” ... 
the f ulama*. Zahawf went to Beirut, where he was accorded a triumphant
welcome, , The daughter of the Mayor of Beirut, Julia fU'rai, an ardent
3
feminist and the editor of La g* took
advantage of 2ahawl*a presence to intensify her campaign. Cairo *s welcome 
v®s no less enthusiastic, ; Controversy over ZahS-rl was raging until quite 
recently, t A contemporary Iraqi writer, Kahdi Abbas a l fAblrl, has accused 
ki» of plagiarizing from the works of past masters, both Eastern and Western 
such as Abel, .-*Ala. al Mu* arr a, on the hand hand, «ad Spinoza (1633-1677), 
Nicolas da Kalebranehe (1633-1715) ^  Thomas Hardy (1840-1923) and Gustave 
be Bon,(1341-1931)5 on the other. , The fact that Zahswl did not know any
foreign languages does not, in this critic’ s view, dismiss the charge ??
plagiarism, since Zabawl could gain access to Western literary aM phllo- 
• • *
*Cf f , The Koran, IV* 4, ,.
Mi otvclt.. p, 463,
^tusuf As* ad Pa#3i r ,  
I I ,  Beirut, 1956, p S i ü l L i
äir&mt *al adabfyah, Matibi* Lubnsri Vol,
^ » ^ « l 'A l M ,  kaqîqat’a» a r iM . Matba*atV Rashid, Baghdad, -
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sophical works through their Turkish translations.
3he feminist movement was, however, given a powerful impulse 
throughout the Arab countries during the first  decade of the twentieth
centsuy, The movement sometimes took on a strong literary and poetical 
colouring and ' carried the modernization of Arab soul and society a step 
further. I t  was thanks to ZabiwI that the first  organisation of women 
was created in the. Arab world. His sister ‘Xflmah founded in 1924 the 
nabdat’an niaitÆrah (The Association of the Female Renais­
sance) » Since then the Arab women have held numerous congresses* in * 
Aley (1929) ,  in Damascus (1930) and in Baghdad (1932), Thé most import^ 
ant of a ll seems to have been the Arab Women’s Congress of Palestine^ held 
on October 26, 1922 in Jerusalem. The main emphasis of the resolution ; 
of the Congress was placed on Arab rights in Palestine but, ty its  de­
nunciation of the "deliberate violation of a ll the pledges given to the 
Arabs before and after the Armistice /of 191^7” as well as t y it s r e fe r -  
ence to the sacrifices of the Arabs in general, the Jerusalem Congress
V- >
should be regarded as the first  contribution made by Arab women' towards 
the Arab nationalist movement. The feminist movement was thus turned 
from an "agitation fier the emancipation of women Into a weapon in the 
service of Arab unity«
^Mattel E, T, Mogannam, The Arab Vfaaum. Herbert Joseph Limited, I^mdon, 
1937* p* 69 .et.ma* r
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IMtil approximately the French occupation of Syria (1920) which 
put an end -  at least temporarily -  to a ll  Arab Illusions of an outside- 
i.e , Western, support for Arab unity, the concepts of modernity and 
Westernization gig not represent abstract ideal3 for the Arab elite.
These concepts were »ostlyidentifled with the concrete power and d r i l l -  
zation of a particular Western country which was therefore recognised,
h y  ^ V-*
end admired, as the preceptor in the national drive for pro press, As 
was noted in the foregoing pages -  and w ill be further noted in the sub­
sequent chapters -  »m V  particular Western country was, for moat Arabs, 
France. We shall see later tow this somewhat 'utilitarian* attitude to- 
wards modernity gave place to an abstract attitude -  an attitude which
■ t * ; .' ... j,. its- . - ■. - ■ v ’ •. v • • ' ; *1 .
was based on the pep.'¡ration of the concept of modernity from its actual,
v' ■ ; !. . /< > i v
concrete instances.
We have also noticed how in the past a number of brilliant Arab 
minds not only attempted to introduce the most advanced concepts of 
Western civilization into their countries, but also how courageously -  
and in certain cases consistently -'advocated the necessity of Western'!-"
zation. The significance of such attempts becomes a ll  the »ore evident
. .. < • ., . *• . r.: ■ - :-.i ■’ r -  * • • '
when they are contrasted with the attitude of tho latterv^ay Wcstemizers,
a massive adoption of Westernism without any effort at self-justification.
Vi
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The movement which 1. do.lgnated rewlT^l®. ^
which occurred towards the and of the nineteenth century con >
on the one hand, of the struggle for the unity of Muslin peopl 
struggle which Is usually referred to as Pan-Ialaalss1 -  and on the 
other hand, of the Islamic ref ormatlon mainly In the sense of a pie 
for the retu » to the pure form of Islam as eotabllBhed hr the Scran 
end sound prophetic traditions. Both in auhstsnoe end form, this re 
vlvallsm affords ample evidence of profound Western Impress. Asa 
Positive force It was, In certain respects, reminiscent of Protestant!
In medieval Europe. I f  «  aoo.pt Professor Glhb's remark that "the er- 
Pwislon of Western civilisation lnto^ Eastern Europe and Asia took placa 
during th. ago of'the'¡omantlo revival-,2 and I f  w. accept that the liberty 
of individual thought and imagination, l.e . the eeaence of Eurcpem f l » -  
«Uclam , was to a conelderahl. emtent Inspired *  the Prcteetent defence
Tha term -Pan»Islavism-1 was firs t  coined !y  certain adverse V:* stern
observers in. defining the "agitation'1 among ^uali® peoples for unity and 
independence. In view of the connotation of fanaticism understood from 
‘ i«** »  a amber of Western sympathisers of the Muslims at firs t  re-*
&lv® currency to the term and even doubted the existence of 
this agitation.■ Thus Professor G, Browne once described Fan-Islamisa 
as a mare’ s nest discovered by the Vienna correspondent of The Times** 
nut later on, with the Muslima« struggle assuming conspicuously violent,-.
® caa® tobelieve that in view of the inevitability of this struggle
'<vya »w .  i f  we choose, apeak of a pan-• AS A
.forms, he me li   i  i  r n  l ib uAiic, ----
leading to «a certain solidarity*, ”we may, I f  we choose, speak of a pan- 
* «a » le  movement«. ( I ,  G. Browne, ft# Persian Revolution. Cambridge, 1910,
P» 1.) . /'
^Modern trends In Islam. The University of Chicago Press,
V.
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of the “conception of liberty" and "the right pf private judgment”,1 then 
this claim about the ’Protestant* character of the Muslims’ movement at 
the end of the nineteenth century should not b© taken as an exaggeration. 
As a negative force, Islamic revivalism was called into being when, the
Western assault on Muslim countries seemed to Jeopardize the very exist-
1 "*..... ; *■ t . .. * , •» ■ • ‘
encu of Islam as" a religion, .
Co much for the'substance,- As to the form, Islamic revivalism, even 
in the works of such original leaders of the movement as Afghani, * Abduh 
and Eawlkibl, manifested’ Itself i a >  recognlsably Western pattern.
Prior to offering an appreciation of the works of.these protagonists 
of Islamic revivalism we may underline two characteristics of their, period 
as far as the Arab-West relationship is concerned. EtattL» the Franco­
phile end Aaglephoba trends in Arab thought continued in this period to 
colour the bulk of Arab mental activities; .love for France persisted for 
exactly the same reasons as previously stated, and the abhox^nce of the 
British was s t i l l  further intensified by the occupation of Egypt and its 
implications. Evidence on this w ill be produced later, Secondly, in 
spite of the lingering feelings"of sympathy and admiration for France, 
there prevailed a deep disillusionment with the standards of French cul­
ture.and education as introduced by Muhammad ‘ A ll ««1 his successors.,
Addison, "Protestant Episcopal Church" in The F.noyclo- 
«brldfce, m i,-?ol.- xxn, p. 474. • • --r-
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Lloyd gives U3 & clear pi ©tore of the main ©guise of this disillusionment
"The educational system," he writes, "which existed la  
Egypt at the commencement of the Occupation was . . .  in 
• • & ohaoti© condition*' -The .indigenous Mahoaedan system, 
entirely religious in character, had reacted a stage of 
lifeless stagnancy, and nothing short of a rigorous re- • -
naissance could restore it* No such revival had been 
"■ attempted, but side tgr side and in competition with this 
system had been introduced a French system of education,
'■' -Tteir wiseacres had seen the electric light in. the West, 
and had clamoured blindly for it. Under Egyptian manege- 
sent and upon Egyptian to il ¿-they expected the new in­
stallation to function as brilliantly as upon French soils 
■' r' hut the expectation wtis'tgr a® means fu lfilled . .The re-'. 
suit of the new venture was merely to postpone indefinitely 
■ the essential reform of the native system." 1 .;'■■■■■■■ - ■ -  '■ ■ ■
With these two points In mind we now proceed to view Islamic revival-
i«a mainly in these fields where it  has unmistakably drawn inspiration from
West,' The analyses effected by C, C. Adams in his study of I slam and
and H.A.R.Gibb In his Modem 'Trends in Islam make it  unnecessary
for m  to go into any details, especially In regard to ‘ Abduhj we w ill
therefore concentrate on those Arab-Muslta thinkers whose works have so
far been subjected to a less searching scrutiny in the West.
The principal protagonists of Pan-Islamlsm were As Sayid Sam i ad 
H  A eg *t! a l .HusainI'and'his pupil, Muhammad ‘ Abduh. * While, as w ill  





$@« scholars of the life  and doctrine of *Abduh, Afghani has, very 
surprisingly, received less attention1 -  though .hardly has any account ....
®f-the contemporary movements of Muslim countries appeared without con- " 
taining repeated mention of,.his name, whether this has been due to Af­
ghani’s'meagre literary output or to the la« regard in which he has been 
held, as compared with ‘Abduh and Iqbal, by some Western critics, is not 
clear. But there is no doubt that without some tmderataading of his ideas, 
a® set out in his scattered articles, lectures and reported conversations, f 
nttch of • the present tenets in Arab nationalism, especially those in re- 
gard to the West, cannot be fully understood, . In fact, to paraphrase w,c, 
Smith, "there is litt le  in twentieth-century Arab nationalism not fore- 
shadowed;in Afghani, Thus, for instance, in attacking Western imperial­
ism, modem exponents of-Arab nationalism borrow their weapons from Af- - 
s t t ’ i  armoury of religiopolltical anathemas against Britain, Or, to 
••»tion either, instance, m©3t of. the ..arguments put forward today in fav­
our of Arab unity are but facsimiles:; of his pleadings for Muslim unity.'
In view of the obscurity shrouding Afghani’s earlier l i fe , h® has
s*»timei been regarded as .being of Persian origin. His birthplace, which
X.. ■' A v^ JT i9 still awaited.” W.C.Smith,■ "AavafttqpuAe etw^r ©f Afgbwai is  8
list»?. p. 4?» '<i  ^ _est
2",.,Jamal ad-bin’s sol® published indieates? lH.A.H.Gibb,man of such intellectual capacity as Xquai
^dem trends in Islam, P* & •>
V.
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is  generally known to be As*ad It»d , in Kanar'(Afghanistan), bas been 
reported ty bis Persian biographers as Asad Ibad, near Hsmadan, in Persia.
others, tiifia ul Isla® -i-K ii«n l, in bis History of the Avakenlng...of 
A ». Biraftaa*-* and Lu^f Ullah Khan-i-Asad Abadi, in his short biography • 
^ M ,2 havi in a i«W  on his Persian nationality. Lu^f Ullih limn 
Malms to be Afghani*s nephew and prorides us in bis took with a nunber
of genealogical evidences, not of a very convincing nature, on Afghani’ s 
Persian descent.-* A recent Persian biographer, KaÀ^a Muddaràal CVShardahl, 
■'has,'however, silently dropped ih® issa®' in bis book entitled
rhilwophr of t n i i  t m i x  .a v U  U < «S a J '
Whichever Ms nationality the effects of Afghani’ s teachings were
already fe lt during bis lifetiao in practieally every part of thè Musila 
worldj In Lgypt, for instane«, thè ’ Aiiibl revolt of 1882 and thè rise of
modernism are closely identified with his name. When Ada« likens Egypt­
ian modernism to the flow of the Kile, "taking its rise 'from a source be­
yond Hie confines of the country" , 5 he is in fact alluding to the se lf-
^  ♦-r Tvh -i-v ,Ta .ri-t-W ..g ,tP.rcl.n t .r t ) ,
.. |ehran,_ 1953. (Second edition) p, 66 &i, jaa®... <
p* u  i i j a a *  ’ - ; : ' ■
MuddarisI ChàhirdaM, elsdigml . i it t i i f lm .A fa r^ l"S g ld ,  Im H  
*% (Persian text), -qbal, Tehran, 1955.
Adaas* I f  lea and Modernism In Ifgn?t, p. |B.
70
s«j« pervasive influence of Afghani« Equally, instrumental was Me in­
fluence in the agitations which led t© the Persian Cenatitutlonal Re­
volution 0f  1906,
: Afghani wa» horn in 1833. • After studying the whole range of Muslim
sciences, i.e, Arabic grassier, philology, rhetoric, theology, Sufism,
logic ,,philosophy , , physics, metaphysics and mathematics, he wont to
India wfaei-e he remained for a year and so».months “during which time ho
1
learned something of the European sciences and their methods“, Be made 
a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1857j on his way there and. bade from that sacred 
city, he. seems to have made a thorough study of the conditions of various • 
Muslim people®. - laving returned to Afghanistan, he;bee«»» actively in­
volved in the intrigues and •ewftMNdataigaaa «T. the nOftaff circles* for 
some 'time he aided Dust Muhammad Khan, the Amir of Afghanistan, mainly • 
through the giving of advice and mo ml support*. upon the Jgilr,s death 
and the outbreak of the civil war betveen3hlr ‘ A ll, the saw ruler, «id 
his three brothers, Afghani threw in his lot with Muhammad A* fan, earn of 
the three brothers who, after varying for times, became Amir and appointed 
Afghani as Prime Minister, The civil war was, however, soon resumed «id . 
a i r  ‘ A ll, through British support, defeated Muhammad A* jam and caused 
Mm to flee the country. Soon after, in 1869, Afghani left for India,


































who saw in his encouragement'of tho'study of philosophy a threat to 
orthodoxy and, on the otter, with the British position in Egypt which 
was being endangered alarmingly by hia political agitation. The combined 
forces of the fanatic lilsp i» and the British Consul-General led to Af­
ghani’s expulsion from W  I* Septeitl*®* llT f. ‘ Thoreiipoa he vmt to '/ , *
India and took up his abode-at Pydarabad in the Deccan ,‘ where he found - 
opportunity to learn ao&e IngUsh and to write, in Persian, his only . 
lengthy work, «ftLbar nalehyriyyh. or f t »  BlftrtaMboa of the Krtsrielirtm.
Me«atlar the nationalist s^Liwtogs in Kgrpt, to which Afghani had •• 
Bade sueh a great contribution, eulnitnated in tha *ArIbI *w c lt  of lSfl2
•' and the subsequent occupation* *fk Rgypt by 6»«%  «rltafe# 71» ¿MUn 
Government,’ at the behest- of fh® sfctttsb*. plpied Jy%f»s§i . « t o  survell-
i r
lance in Calcutta until the nationalist movement' was completely crushed. 
Then he " was allowed to leave India, Afghani went to toaia», wmmtomti 
there for a few days and then left fm  Paris,” where he stayed for t§«P» 
'years# Having learned some French, he soon 'estaMisbetl -ecutaft with the 
french public through publishing political articles in the flench 1ms,
^Afghani'is*« Hot'-see* to have master«« either french or a g i ! * ,  although 
some of Ms Arab and Persian admirers claim the opposite. (See, among
. l i t t l «  -Irtttfi Afjihiot SCttld-road in these two languages, bat 
; could never speak them faultlessly, (Article by M ira Husain Khan Danish 
- Iffa ta «!, in 'ta ff Oiish M n * «  |haifr 1 hal. pp.. 89-90.)'
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whioh "were read and received the closest attention ©f those - ¿uropean 
Government a which had political interests 3» Muslim countries, especially 
Gr®at Britain" . 1 , Bat his most outstanding achievement during his day  
in Paris was the publication of m  Arabic weekly called si. •
■. The first  ; issue of the weekly appeared on March 13, -1834, and 
the'last in September of the same year. In spite of this short life  span 
and its limited circulation the laciaah took possession of the stiada and 
hearts of the Muslim intelligentsia t® a.deg»# tuner obtained by a single 
Arable Journal during the. whole of,the -nlnettsnfh ceatuiy. It  is cm in­
dication of the- far-reaching influence of thla jaw »»! - sw ig , the Muslin 
meases .that its closure was mainly due to the macktiiCilew» of alarmed Brit­
ish authorities with «he french* ■ Tbs** ufc»;f§t -held of its numbers made
; i 2
a point of making manuscript copies of them fer ftpther distribution.i*-.
Afghani*s main collaborator in publishing the iawih was i  *Abduh.
This fact, together with the high standard and owe style of -the *an#«h»a 
Arabic, which in the view of some critics is incongruous with Afghani’s 
Perstenieed style,^ has led ne less • authority than Adams to s t h a t  a ll 
the «»t id e s  which appeared in the journal were written by *Abduh.  ^ This 
do*» hot »M*'ts"Gi «KKUy true.“ Altteu^i #Abduh,~ as editor-in-chief,...
*
% f l i  IJusain Khan ,^alsh% .«r*»*» t e eing» i  Hal, p. 96. 
■^Adarns, p. ?* " ' ; _” ^ p iw — — '
must have been ultimately responsible for the presentet ion of many 
, articles, the. fact remains that the contents of most ©f the articles 
■ arr eaaittsivsiy characteristic of Afghani, and not of * Abduh. The re­
volutionary stand «€ lanta|’<3«  -tht ways and means of liberating Muslim „
. peoples,its: rabid attacks on the British mk its impatience with the 
. pacifists and conservatives., are quite out. of keeping with tho general 
, outlook of * Abduh who, in the words of Man«, "va3 a reformer" depending, 
."more upon methods of, reform snd; oduentiontban upon .saltation and revolu­
tion" ,1 Some of fee Arab biographers of Afghani have, therefore, speei-
2
, fically aso^^bed a numb®?^  of «gfiaiii arttdta & if¿StiS* ■ ■ fbe aim .®f• - 
‘ nrwah. as explained in the first is®««, ,wm two^ffldl. . t# delve into .
, the causes of backwardness of the S&starnpeoples in general_and of Mus-w - * \ ' - - t ■
11» «  in particular, and to fight against the sp r it  of defeatism prevall-
3 .
ing among the Muslims*. -.Besides, the "urwah coined numerous Arabic ®qui- 
valents for words, phrases and ides« connected with the Western institution« 
• and thus transformed and enriched Arab political t«»4a*l»gp*^;._ ThfcJUn» 




% •* «ac al Kakhapl*s M sjlx jt, ¿PxjUa P. 292 ,
*Abd «1 fatti^i1«  ashhar mashahlr udaba* ash sharq, al maktabata 
al’migrlyah, vol. I I ,  Cairo (no date), pp. 52-SO«
iqi*a%' So. 68, dar
%*®aX ad. iXn 'al S *p n l  al and
€ «£ r ai
„<«& ma‘ arif, Cairo), pp, 1
75.
' After the el»sore ©f *urwah. AfgiSnl »ad« a short visit ts London 
***£ then to Moscow, There is much confusion in the accounts ©f Afghani1 s 
Liogranhers on the next stage of his life ,
• According to Goldsiehr* Afghani visited Persia in response to a tele-
2
graphic invitation from tko Shah early in 1886, Brown© does not store
this view and reports his first official visit to Persia as having token
place in 1389, In that year, while in Munich, on his way to Hajd, accord*.
ing to one account, or to the Paris Exhibition, according to another ao- .
count Afghani »et füfirwtVDln, toe Shah of Persia, who invited hi» to
become Printe Minister of Persia, He accepted this invitation and, after 
5
visiting Russia, went to Persia, not to take up the post of premier but 
te give: edvice to the Shah on »mgr a political, legal « 3  administrative 
problem. In-view of Afghani's growing influence with different classes 
of people, the Shah soon became alanned at the prospect of this influence
1Jrtltle entitled "BJsmal el Din al Afghani", in flit, jscutotodl* « f  
London, 1913, p. 1009.
^ ra la n  Evolution, pp. 9-3X5.
%u$f Bllah KhSn, shark 1 t i l ,  p. 39.
mis
-in support of this.
, p. 55. Adams says (Islam 
was In Munich "on a confidential' 
ersla", but there does not seem to to any evidence
^According to a letter which »t&BkH later wrote to the Shah of Persia, his 
 ^stay in Russia was largely devoted to attempts at removing the causes of 
: ^ eo-Pertian strained relations. The letter, which is  fully quoted in 
< Ji^to^*Mdai€-l*.irani'M. (p. 65 St seg) might be regarded from a radical 
-'«Lewpiini as one of the weak points of Afghani's revolutionary career, 
packed as it  is  with flattering compliments to the Shah,
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oad^ialning his position, ^hereupon, Afghani’ s relations with the Shah 
Rapidly deteriorated. Sensing Ms imminent fa ll, he again asked for 
perniosion to leave Persia, but was refused with discourtesy. Whereupon 
h© sought sanctuary at the shrine of Shah 1 Abd al * Ajsim, near Teheran, 
oad embarked upon a vigorous anti-Shah campaign. This insulted in his 
expulsion from Persia. After staying for a short while in Bafra, he made 
his vay to London, mainly to discredit the Shah in the eyes of the British,* 
and then returned to Constantinople, where he spent the rest of his life . 
Enjoying the high favour of Sul jin * Abdul g«K&Vhe devoted most of his 
time to the cauce ©f Muslim unity, communicating with the various organi­
sations and personalities of Muslim countries apparently in preparation 
for an Inter-Aialim conference to be hold in Constantinople^ -  a fact 
which’has induced a number of historians to regard Pan-Islamism at this 
stag© as but a means of buttressing the Ottoman empire.^ Be could not 
go very far in accomplishing this task as 1m was attacked by cancer of 
the jaw, which finally caused Ms death on March 9, 1397.
There are three points in Afghani's thought which should be of in­
terest to us, both because of their subsequent effect on Arab nationalist 
movement and their own significance as illustrating the Western impact 
on the reformist currents in Islam. Those are* Ms profound aversion
Iftifcaramad Sillam Kadkur, ,
lllsrlyafa f l ’ sh sharg. Ca
gA eb... 1 hal. p, 55 et.-f.eu»' "
^aas Kohn, A BUtanr wf....%ll_tia.l|m.ln. the Bast. London, 1929, p. 33 ct sag, .
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t® the British, his seemingly contradictory defence of racial and religious
tolerance, «ad his idea for strengthening religious faith with the, aid ,, 
of reason, .
deference thas already he#» made to the personal and emotional aid# 
of IfgtSril's opposition to the British. It meat be not«4 here that thl. 
opposition vae aleo tooked, m a 'J u ^ lo d , iy '.on. ooiiorato Coots of poll. 
tlool U fe , , Ihe height of, IfghinI's career oo’e poliueal end religions 
leader coincided with one of tile darkest periods’ of the history of British
, . . * . r,~ • , • v
colonialism. In every m m m  of the' Muslim"world the British were coping
with a growingly^^ressive^nationalist^' f e 'l^ V t h s  crushing
of the^lS|7 Mtttiay and in Afghan iatan «ha k a t ^ L U i « a t  the
expens« of *& m it  h a d > V
of frustration end., e r e ^ c r  r -o n g ^  W t e *  ¿ ¿ i ^ u *  w W lM 1  
to British pressor, led.to the 1333 uprising end the iobsei-nt British 
ooonpation of ths’ .couit.y. In indon/ W  (WsS rerolt h » d * u 't i  manner
of a Itjjjfl. against the British ru lew ith  fjw^ea^tog r«f»f©*»ilons through­
out the Muslim world* Sven Persia," which 'was free" from British hegemony, 
also ted her share of anti-British hatreds . the Angi#«l^rsiia« war of W§& 
over Rerat, reaulting in Pensile defeat, ted uMwrfdad .the re la t ia^ ip  
between the two countries, making the Persian* ««»taly s«tpl«i®iia f f  Brit­
ain* s intention in the. teat, .
It  was one of the ehitf_ achievements of Afghani that he translated- 
these feelings of frustration, hatred and revengefulness into a definite
and consistent shape, sanctioned ty the lofty ideas of Islamic unity and
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progress. His prime concern was to fight the popular fear of the British 
power by demonstrating Britain’s eventual helplessness in the faoe of a 
united Muslim front. As an allusion to this he ©no« published the follow­
ing fabl® In me of the Isa »#  #£ 'qrw»ht
"Once u p « a time there was a huge tempi# on the out»- ■ 
skirts of Istakhr which had struck deep t e r r «  in tbs 
hearts of its inhabitants, beeau»® the tale-tellers bad ' '  
spread the belief that those who tried to enter it had 
a ll met a fearful death, Finally a man who had no mere 
hope in life  decided to undergo the risk and gain access 
to the secrets of the tempi®. Despite the strong die- : 
suasion of his friends, h© entered the temple. Horri­
fying voices welcomed Mb and a voice said* ’We now come 
to smash your bones'. 'Gome forward,* shouted back the 
man, 'as I am fed up with I l f  el» ' ®m3 y had 1»  »«id this 
when a deafening noise shook the temple at once the walls 
collapsed, pouring forth their hidden treasure add aalufc 
Those who carae on the following morning to take the nan's 
dead body found him very wish a lii»  aad'.jgMlaat, adkteg' ■ 
them to bring containers for carrying the geld and silver 
’ away . . .  Great Britain is such a huge tempi* in wM,oh ana* 
misguided people occasionally take refuge when frightened 
by political darkness and then meet their death there 
through hallucinations. Many of those who have died within 
its walls, have been mm of weak ehefsete*. I fear.that 
one day a strong-willed man might be driven ly despair in­
to this temple, and then, by his desperate ihouttiif» «t*se 
the collapse of its walls and the break-up of-this big ■' ••
talisman.* i
These words, wrMt» in U&t, l.e . twoyears after the British occu­
pation of Egypt and at the tla* of the M idi uprising, well Illustrate 
the depth of Afghani's conviction of the rightness of his struggle and 
the ©stately of final victory. In aU  Ms articles, lectures and harangues, 
he vehemently-contemned Britain, not only as an imperialist power, bit
1 i  —i l  «urwVal wuthqa. cp,cU., pp. 223- 224.
also as a power determined to destroy Islam. "The B-ltish Government", 
ha announced, "Is the arch-enemy of the Muslims . . .  Its utmost pleasure , 
is to see the Muslims prostrate and subdued, wielding no control over : 
their own uffairs" . 1 *3. His haired against the British sometimes induced 
him to call openly upon the French «ad Russians to stand ty their "righto"
*
in the Hast and t&e up the British challenge. This was completely in tuna
with his advocacy of power politics, at which we have airea#- hinted. It
is  noteworthy that, after the British occupation of Egypt, Afghani, along
with most of the Egyptian nationalists, pinned all his hopes on France t@
bring about mi . early evacuation of that mm&w* ■ *»• espnesstng these topea,
Afghani even went to the length of conceding .«o n  risita far the French in
Egypt and for the Russians la Central Asia -  a poster®-which, i f  not viewed
in co«ju»ctt°n with his belief in Baal—it tit, would seem contradictory to
his ideal, of complete freedom of a ll Muslim peoples. /. - :
. "The French Government", he reported sympathetically, "is  
determined to demand Britain to restore French influence 
(sic) in Egypt as it  exits ted priorto the (dual) mbAm I» ,, 
and the French Press is unanimous in its exposition of the 2 
. harm of the British policy and Britain’s i l l  intentions.... .. .
On . •
"France is caught up between- the equivocations of Britain . 
and the tricks of Bismark. Her previous rights,ln Egypt 
have been jeopardised ty British intervention, ■ _
1al Vigwat’Awttthftl. p. 334 ®t seq., also pp.S|5-57.
^ U U u  p. 255. - . . ■
3Ibid.. p. 299.
His hopes of French vigorous action against the British over Egypt 
Here, however, soon to he frustrated. Although up to twenty years'after 
the British occupation, Fernem adopted a hostile attitude towards Britain’s 
policies in Egypt, this hostility -  as far as Egypt was concerned -  ; never 
went h®y«d a hatüe of wer«. ‘ Afg&f of course did not live' long enough 
to- see the Anglo-French ent-ante mi I904.1 '
^ ^ a n l expressed deep disanpointaent at French passivity which, in 
his view, deprived France ¿f "a llh e r H"hts in %ypf* and' '»recognised the 
British overlordahip in that country*.2 ' '
Ev«i' UhLc dlHppQtafeMttt never eoahieid Af^blhl' to' change ids friendly 
attitude towards France, hot one word of condemnation can be found in any 
of the issues ®t fjgaai «teto'tftaMtofftfi » » i i l i i t ’ policy in Korth Africa 
or South East Asia. He regarded the French encroachments on those areas 
»•re ly  as. a direct result of British expansionist policy in the"'Ä s t .3 i t  
is also interesting to note that when I»'defines'the ill*» th» tfostwrn 
powers in Asia and Africa, he denounces the British, Auitftsh and Russian 
iscttfS* as "greed* ( fhjgahl • ¿ad "avarice" (pmn*) , whereas the French schemes 
are referred to merely as "aspirations» CmäpA  
' ‘•-•A logical result of Afghani’s hatred for the British was a develop­
ment of a ’militant’ conception of the spirit ®f Islam, and especially of
8iL !,g y il!M .äaaai» pp* 326-7.
3Ibld.. p, 243. 
p. 3^5.
t ! »  Id** o f l U fifl« ' In the .tm* o f n-p®w«r vhich waa, ln  hla eyaa, baut 
m  th« extermlnation o f Islam, he saw m  et her ehdce for the Muslima 
l » l  to take up arras. He b itte r ly  aitajgfeid a ll those religtoua leadera 
1”  nmUm countries «1 » wer» « « * « * • «  with the Islamic Injunctions ly  .. 
t l » i r  p s e ifiit  ieashlag#* b e lie f-ia  »  m ilitant Islam i »  also anpereat 
twmk t ft »: praalnMMMi wMsb he has given to th« M«%dl upriaing in the_pagee 
# f l i S Ä  ' *■ preettoaHy 1m m  o f  .the iMpwr.tkart is  slthsr a r e - (
P°r<fc •* tb® d er®lopmenta o f the StüiBaae Preisleader laudatory remarka an 
the hrarery nf the rebele, ,-©y aome »iy lo e  aa-tcKtoe contribut Ions that 
et her Mm U »  im the vorld ein «ahs tew »ri» the ■ to ta l ******* o f the v*-.., 
b ellion . ' "
Misten ff. he wrot« «rtlel»i#eftoeftaf to the.
demonstrationa among the Indian Maslto» i »  favour aM g»| il, *he not a .,<.•
lü iiiU  8hoald -toliara that he ia  so, aa thia b e lie f might render . - ■ 
th «* unanlmoua ia  their deraand ffcr ttbeawUe* f M  «to  B rittto  J flrtto ia ««.2 
' '' ' ir in £s 08 another ia a t*® « o f liMMtoatoKugr la  :#€#|pil,a . - 
tlsmghta. Whereas I »  aupperted Mahdi‘a « p totog cven to th« fe in t « f  . ,
hla !toe»«laa le« ^  * ,  « « «  «ÄprtliJ* h l» fellow  Müsli«» .
to perl#* th eir minds « f  helle# la  «i* fw r«tiii8 » and «» « in t  cu lt\  
He toewgtii t o i«  purlflcatioa to  be w aNM qr« eepM feUr ■ b«««S»e toe b e lie f
%ee espeetelly pp# 219-20 , 225-48, 231 «ad 243.









































































'He who call* for prejudice Is net from
Bat vbereas religious prejudice ts to a pertain extent '■ permissible «a a
native for defending the dignity of Islam (especially In me face o f '
people like Oltfctoac who braaHiei tie spirit of religious prejudice2),
racial prejudice la ceii#«miiaa« frea every standpoint.
»Sway rational principle», he said, «which la invoked 
la ascribing .glory and pride exclusively to racial pre­
judice, and in maintaining this prejudice as one of the 
. highest virtue« ##t is faulty and should therefore be . . .
dismissed.**
■ finally, a few words cast be s«M on &fg&I*a attitude toward«'
(
Western culture asid the Muslims* «AoptLaa' of Vsctwta educational mittieds. 
Afghani never concealed his appreciation of We«f#rft chiton* A s  book'
**mM bar abounds in references tail citing his unfailing con­
tact with the currents of Western thought, irrespective cf their vices 
and virtues, In the past as well as in his time. These references rang© 
from the criticism ©f materlalistle thought in «sclent Greeo©* to that 
ef the Mormons in the Halted States.^ A number of mistaken ststeasmts in the 
bock, however, especially those on the history of Greek thought, show that 
Afghani did not always us© first-hand sources in his studies of Msgi»® cuLiuret
2n t a . .  p. e .  
h s m . . " » . « .
»p. d,*. . p. 63 gAjafl» 
si m . .  p. 1» .  .
he takes, for instance, {U m  M l) is haw been the disciple
of Muienes tbf OyMl*  ’inst#«i o f• Mogeiiea .the LaSrtius. 1
Ris far-f#t*h®d OQmsnts an Luorftlis* conception of - the evolution of Man^
« d  mm® of "Ms isapiffate from fisPfin,3 are
rSfafis t i i  Kslias* adoption of Western culture, as was stated 
4t thi'tUftaMni M  thl# chapter, the experiments of Egyptians and Turks 
in Imitating Western methods of education ended in the third quarter «£ 
the nliieteeffiJi ’century -  in a complete fiasco. ' This prompted the Muslim
refarwisM to lisle. elsewhere for the «eases of WU^JL spiritual plight*«, 1*1
'This search lei' is* the belief that iV'¿«’'tibs general iefitee ' and ata*- 
nation »f'ttkim  M.,a wi&slcaa ¿tat Ye tM 'fiYaM f^  eaose«^ Hence the 
’efforts, such as thoae of Afghani, to ref one I slant so as to adapt it to 
the conditions of the modem world, ,
While Afghani admits the wisdom of benefitiing from the Western ad- 
ranees in the modem sciences, he is against transplanting Western edu?*
%©ieht»i, . p. i f .
*M& *t p« » .
W  m, - -—
A. H*'GlUfe»'far reasons which he does not sufficiently adumbrate to 
p ,  believes that the failure of the reformists came chronologically 
■before 'their'recourse to Western educational methods in the nineteenth 
«anbury fitter Golancz, London, 1932, p. &&£%)»
so far as the nlnattenih Oiatury is concerned, the chronological order 
of„the above treads m m » to ha-tier reveres of .this. . We need not men­
tion any reasons for this, other than the fact that the efforts of such 
rulers as Muhammad *All in westernising Egypt procesded those of Afghani 
end ‘ Abduh In «»demising Islam.
m.
catirmal institatious ln Muslim countries,
"Th. O tto »«. md ügyotlB,,«, h. »ay», "founded a number
! t  U b  ;  «  1* «  »oam, pattem, ma .ont group.
@r their ■ staccate w  tac Kttropsam countries to M *
vhat w s  roqftln *  of industries
and telles-leitrcs tot-t a » » '* »  * M i w i  « d  O tto««« 
reaped any « M t v g »  Ö t »  fes** offerts* Have t M r  e d i ­
tions beco«* tette* fiali wkirt they were tufferò
to this new iw ièet5«1* ■ "
H. think, not. tihat 1. then to bo donoî j Urt a. tfc. early H u .ll« , ho 
repUe., beg« to loma the mdloln. of Hlppoer.t,. and 0.1en, th. goo- 
notry nf Euclid, th. «trono»y of Ptole»y « a  th. phllomphly r f  pu t. 
md Aristotle only after they hud con.olid.tod the ba.0.  of I aim, «
must th® present-day Ä s a » »  «turf ter y j.%
ter putting ttoir otfe houae i a order, 2 This,-»* imt,! -i*-tte e3Sence 
of Afghani’s view m  the Musit*»* ' rotante«‘*u mTffnr||lm^
Afghani was «  man of striking eoatemdictlCR#, both in Ms ordinary, 
daily demeanour^  and in his suhlt*» atettact ■■Ideal#, ■ Xt'l^tfcouoffcm 
futile , as has teen noted by V?, C«'MLtk* to search in him for the • 
systematising ' totaler which seas of AfgAsDs Mograpiisrs^ hold ttm to
2IM â*, » .  a . > / ; .
%uÿ«®«d Makhzôœî, fehltirat, p. 45«
4Cf. Hurtaba MuddsrasI Cha bardai, and Makhzuaï,
te. The significance of Ms achievements lay la Ms practical efforts
towards the Muslim «»atoning, ■
"With his ebullient rhetoric and tireless repetition», 
cent Inns a SMth, «Afgt&£ fired audiences in one Muslim 
country after mother t# a reawakened consciousness of 
h«f th^ had once b*o® mlghtr, hut now were weak .,.,
His vivid evocationsjelicited a spirited response that 
ha® since ramified". ' •
We can afford' 'to to toiefer on Afghani’s most outstanding disci pio 
Ash Shaikh Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), whose biography and doctrines 
h^ve been surveyed in great dotali fcy 0, o, Aft«*» "Abaft*# significance 
lay in his effort* to turn Afjghgail*# obstructive* eritioitm* * f  Muait# 
l ife , at least within the fiwsewerls of Egyptian «telai fahrlo, into a 
positive, revitalizing force. Thanks to Ms prolific llteraiy output, 
we are well equi-'ned with illuminating evidence to study M i thought*.
From our viewpoint, on® of the most important features of ‘AMA** doc­
trines seems to to a certain obsession with the necessity ef toeping 
abreast of the modern sciences. This obsession was «ndouhtefiy due to 
his frequent visits to Europe, which enabled him to acquire a grasp of 
Western culture,
»So simulating», says Ad «as, "and toluable did to himself 
find his travels in Europe which circumstances not of his 
own planning tod made possible the first t i »  /ï.e. Ms 
expulsion from Egypt in 1882*7 that in later yearshe re-
*• ^ t h ,  M s U s J ^ m  Sfalsa» p«5°*
turned to Europe 
need, as he said,
again « 4 . «gel», whenever.ho fe lt the-. 
«of renewing his soul*.
Muhammad Rashid Ei|% #Abdulh greatest disciple and biographer, has
discerned three stages in his »aster1# educational career. ' Curing tbs 
firs t  stage «Abduh was occupied la the Azhar with barren controversies 
over the phrases of past authors a«! in the perusal of textbooks with
comment3, annotations and explanations» During the second period h® was 
released fra® the bond of blind imitail an ttaolfdV of the past thinkers
by Afghani and elevated to the heights of true mysticism and rationalism»^ 
The third, and the aost significant, stage started vithUbdih’s acquaint-
anee with European sciences, especially social studies, history «ad philo- 
sopby* He aanagod, daring ka  W t s  to'^wpa, t o ' f r e n c h  and 
thereby read a number of Preach books on the above subjects»
«In this age", he is reported ty i las hid HjJ& to have said,
' "H® who does not know on« of the I *  mk,
regarded among the learned^ yhat increased my interest 
in learning French was my realisation that nobody can lay 
claim to any degree of knowledge with which he could serve 
Ms nation and defend its interests unless he know# «  Euro- 
■pe«n language somehow «.other# -• The inters*«« of Muslims 
have become entwined iitmahtoh«v^  With those of Luropeans 
in a ll p»«ta of the world. Is it , tharsfl»**, for
anybody who dot* not know *wy « f  European languages to 
benefit from their (Europeans*) good and protect himself 
against their ^ evils?
■^Adaras, .on.«ei.1L... p. 67. 
f jiu s m m . 1950 (?oi. v i i i ) ,  p. m .
c-.\ . ,  * f !
^?btd.. pp, 395-60.
it .
Amongst '¿«stem philosophers, Herbert Spencer and Tolstoi parti- 
« ! « *% . invoked hi«' admiration, ifit visited Spencer in Brighton on August 
10, 1903 and in- this ^ooavejpatteii, as related by Rashid Ri4% Spencer de­
precated the growth of R*tosd*g&0ii in'to® West and the Europeans1 admiration 
.of power as the: basis of power. 1 The evolutionist character of Spencerian 
philosophy, especially in its social aspect, must have proved highly at-', 
tractive to *Abduh. T *Abduh translated Spencer’s book entitled KducaMaiJ’. 
IntellectaA. Honfl,.... and Physical (1861) from a French version Into '"Amble . 
only 63 *  exercise in toe art ® f translation2 but s t ill he is said to
• r •
have based his proposed. '.ayst«« fcr-toe, state*-«eliaela
views. 3 As regards toletot, it* was hto,»piiHto«l»t*.ftnpr«Mh4» religion * « 
and his ’ pacifist* preachings on to«; me®» and ways cf affecting social - 
reforms that fired *Abduh's imagination. He wrote a laudatory letter to ■ : 
Tolstoi on the occasion of the latter's excommunication -tm* toe Russian  ^
Church.
"You have enlightened*, - he wrote to him, '"our, horiicnSv 
with your opinions and have forged a unity between you» 
soul and the souls of wise men.. . .  You have blown* a w r ’- 
the veil of blind imitation (taolld) and thereby gained 
access to toe tooth of the Unity of Gad.“? *..= •• ; ’ ■
^tarikh. I ,  ip* 868-69. ..
%Md.. I .  m 1034.
Quoted fromal rounajdr (published ln~San Paulo) in tarikh, III, p . 'l ^ .  
^tarlkh. II,'"ppV 623-21. '
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Sat a European thinker who had, ty a ll accounts,’ made a deep im­
pression ®n Ms mind was Francois Pierre Guillaume Guizot (1787-1379)
vhose IM If tetri.d*t,.la OiTiliaaUoft m  Europe (1828) was translated by
ftmain Ni* »at* Allah in Alexandria in 1877.1 The book had also attracted 
Afghani’s attention, as can be gathered from a paragraph of his radd bar 
naioherlyfh. 2 A summary of the main idea«'of this book seems, therefore, 
to be in place hare. In order to be better able to assess the impact of 
Guizot’s book on *Abduh and his fellow thinkers, wa ©hoose its Arable 
translation for the sake of our reference.
' e*
Although in his political career, ©specially towards the « 3  of his 
life , Guizot was a diehard conservative, his book should be regarded ratter 
as an ftpolegia of liberalism. Being a staunch Protestant, Guizot devotes
\ i
a substantial part of his book to the conflicts between the Catholic Church 
and forces of reform in the Middle Ages as one of the determining factors
V ■ ■' /
of European history. He extols the endeavours of people like Johannes 
Scotus Erigena (830-880), Rosoellinius (C. 1050-C, 1122) and Rsrter Abelard 
(1079- 1142) who, by giving the pride of place in their theological systems 
to reason and by affording a rational expression to the accepted eccle­
siastical doctrine, initiated the movement of reformation in Europe.
*If we probe” says the writer, “into the causes of that
movement, we clearly see that it'did not bring about «ay
*Ada»g, op.e ft .. pp. 39-44. «1 am ir. August 1905, (Vol. VJII), p. 404.
%oiohon, op.fcClt..» p. 1 (6 ,
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c»éii§É. ia the -frtMiplM « f  the p U ie  religion, . -
nor did it  negate that religion. They (the rationalist 
thinkers) merely appealed-#a behalf ©f r e a l»  fer restoring ... ^
its rirht of say.ni
In another chapter the writer gires a detailed account of the Micas, 
natore and results of the European -%fowatlon in the sixteenth century. 
After denouncing the suppre salve measure adopted by the medieval Church 
towards its critics and describing the abuses and disadvantages result-
-- : : V - *<- r ' • ‘ • . y : ■ •„ • - :
ing from the headship of the Bishop of Home, he regards the causes of 
Reformation to bei (a ) the general awakening of human conscience which 
gave an impetus to the demand for progress «id emancipation; (b) the 
stagnancy «ad ■ decline of the spiritual authorities which exercised pester 
over the minds of their followers. But ha emphasises that the main force 
behind the Reformation was an Intense craving for freedom and that the
principal outcome of the Reformation was the emancipation of the human 
mind from the bondage of absolutism in a ll its forms.-7 In other words,
h \  1 7  ;  1 "J '  7 * ;  ■ r (  -  • -  '  : '  ; > . . ;  * .... '  * ■ , .
his view seems to be in accord with the assertion of the modern students
. ?
of Church history who "dismiss the religious changes incident to the Re­
formation with the remark that they were not the object sought, bit the 
means for attaining the object*.
______ _
ál®*É*tdrla, 1877, p. 210. 
PP. 356-68.
*
3M á **  pp«
ch tamaddun al mamallk al urublyiyih,. 
R f i i u a a w i - A
m.
Finally, Guizot trftM to « * e . < w « ï i l  appratite of tbe ^formation 
«ma fina3 ita veak point in «hs mental confusion and rudderlessness of • ' 
tfc» Kafomlst l*aénv ma their excessive m@ of frsedom. 1 '
Tfee spirit of «AM A»« «fc&otMMft vite regard to Islande wvtvte- 
1«  «ppeara te te stngiitenly M in a tü  Ir -tiw te® main oonelusians of 
©t*i«®t*s mawmwmmt of tte Reforma tiani ■ «ht «TfWÎt ®f fWIflW
of individuai thought, and the degirability of temporanee in tsereistng 
ttet fre#*>». fta*, wtele - "ht «efInni ' «ht " purpom of ht» B f*  tt Urlng"'
teen to free tho Musila alad f mm ■ fis ste»KL#i ®f indiscriminate otedienœ 
to tradition»,2 te dld not aiopt »as d û  t»i «tttetelites, a «hoUy ratlon- 
alist and nateralfatioteeiirvof ■ teltgidn1*.3 Int & X - 'M Ê » iaaot'te ittftest
that te vas «te lly  at tte mmr of WompÈm sp iriti»! HtflÉMU*» A# htt
' ¿
teen shovn ty Marna mâ Mohammad «»a d , in fottiing tes iooitenifll -«yate», 
*Abduh succesafully reconciled tte teactenga of tte «afly MteHa tteatete 
llke al Ghazzsll (1059-1111) and Ite Taimiyah (d. 1328) vite tte '♦«ssiaiids
#4» » >of modera progress*.  ^ > "
In respe««« te thè se "demanda of frogre#»» *âbMb tmmMU tes U fe ,
espeoltely after t te  statisvfag «iieet of **rlte*s faillite (1882) te tes




^G.G.Adama. on. c i t . . pp. 202-204 and Ateed's The In tellsotoal Or jalas.
» .  42-43.
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serl-re volutionaxy politl**! ideas and Ms final, mmmmmmibmwith '• - 
tte Khedive-Abbas I I  (1393*1914)» *e lim&wtiac tee spirit ©f modern! aa 
t#te the educational and social Institution of %rpt» • How far - he was • - • 
®*1« to achieve this In Mm- «AmiltoatiL-XUli after. Mo «ppoUitaaHt to’1 
its  Administrative Cm m U. 'Cliff)  is. not known, : Hth JM ld  Rif* and 
Adams give to* detailed accounts of the aiMMsteative Improvements» o f - " . 
feoted In the Aahar » 1 « .  ‘Abduh,1 but neither of them is promts*'eft fete 
reform of the Azhar's» auvi«Atah ■ BariSi AflfS mkmi seme vagus 
to *Abdah*s pressure behind the tetredwtlea late the Amber*• «txmAmolm 
of elements of arittMstie and algehr* ns eempoisetir, «Ml. tee- testery, of 
Islam, element« of gmgm§tw *b& composition as'Optional 'modern* subjects. 2 
equally vague is J. - Joater ipt hf,*.. artMtei on A1 Azh&r -ter the msar edition
• i 3
of the EbgrnlpnMrilft ,flf_XjiUBu. : But it  is not clear whether/tees«-sub»* 
jects were considered 'modern* because of their first appearance in the - 
curriculum of the Azhar, or because of the modernist outlook underlying 
the textbook concerned. •. Only at one point tees Kashld R lfl refer to . 
'Abduh's adoption of Guizot's above-mentioned book as tee basis of his 
lectures m political science, which must have been a definitely aodten» 
istic improvement! but RifI adds Immediately that "I do not krow whether ,
iSrflch. PP. 425-423. Adams, l,gj|fi, ,MB03flga&Wh PP. 70-78.
449-451.' '
^Article entitled "al azhar" in The EnqgolopsidU of Islam >New edition), 
London, 1953, 13, p. 818.
hs completed ¿Bis lector«^ or not*.1 to view of aU  this, and especially 
considering K. Vollers* ratter gloongr picture of the attempted reforms of 
the Azhar in tbs nineteenth and his reference te “tte ^ te ^ te  and
Insufficient textbooks* used for _ the "ratfeaal sciences* .in the A|t|ar,2 
it  would be fa ir to uym * that *Ab#»h*s. attempts did apt much affect tte 
content of the Azharite education. v far mm. successful were ‘ AbduVs ef- 
farta in the social field. It  was in hia position as the Mufti of Ippt^  
(1339-1905) that he .gave _thq^»lr«isgtai iapatu* ta atadexaistl,*' tenancies ■ 
among idyptian Muslims* , WhUe *a*«t of hie predecessors in.this office , 
had considered thenMlves to fct jw t*®*p»#te tc'.t|s depw^at#  
Government only, and gave m  decisions «Mjspt.an jMfttll? m
'ey these departments" 3 his fatwaa. «*. legal opJ«iS«i% were, final a #  ■
: \
authoritative, a ll being character!zed ty a spirit .of U tn aU tr
deair# to render the religion Af Islam entirely adaptable to t|p refutse- 
meats of modern civilization*,^
. ,, ‘ Abduh's feelings towards Britain and France a* .two Powers
might to add to be • quite the reverse of Afghani's, PoMtiieHy he w e * ' 
pro-British and mti-Fren*. True, before hie eipolsloa from
August 1 9 0 5 , (Voi. v m ),  p. 4 0 4. 
Ma iettende haa been omitted.
____  entitled »ad
, pp. 533-».
>, j f l i b 'P «  7?.
£,•, p* •
.?.53jg»,> W U ,
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1883, wad even for some time after that, he stored Afghani» 3 anti-
British stand and took an active part in all kinds of agitations, ope»
or secret, against the Brltiahj bet after his «tern to Egrpt (USS) ha
developed a more and mm  friendly attitude towards Britain and forged
an implicit alliance with the Cccapatisit, ^t 1# thus not surprising that
Lord Cromer should have spoken of hi* as a «an of »broad and enlightened
views ••• who reee§nised the necessity e£ European assistance in refer«*»1
‘Abduh's biographers, past and present, have been at some pains te justify
this asseciati«» between a foreign eeec^ing pewer and a leading Egyptian
patriot.. Dr. Muhammad A1 Bahajr, ffefesaer of Zdorf* philosophy at the
University of al Asher* ft»r instance, is of the opt»!»» ttot <AMdh e»~ .
tered. into friendly relations with the British mainly te pMt««t hlnself
2against the Khedive. To counteract the then growing mommMm of <Abdah*s
«^ «p lie ity* with-the British Rashid Rlfa alse made aw »«»»*  potations
3f rom bin in denunciation of the British occupation. It «*•* tow- 
ever,' - a sign of *Abduh*s gradual withdrawal from the general anti- 
British campaign that his political as isolation with A fg& l is  said te 
have grown increasingly cool towards the so! of the latter's l i f e /  This
*X.ord Cromer, 'op.cli,., pp,. 179-31.
^tagfkh. I ,  pp. 921-24. 
T^iutommad Ahaed, o r .c lt .»  P*
t 1
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m m a to be in keeping with his penchant for the evolutionism of Spencer 
and the pacifism of Tolstoi,
contrast, as can be gathered from Rashid Riga's accounts, ‘ Abdoh
adopted a definitely hostile attitude towards franca.- "No nation**, he
Is reported to have said, "hates the Muslim because- of his being a Muslim
-  except the french". "Whenever", he said on another occasion, " I  haw
a conversation with a Frenchman on the conditions of the Eastern peoples,
1 feel disgusted, and the whole of my body begins to tremble".^ Rashid
Ri$a regards this hostility as a reaction, on the one hand, against the.
"raging hatred" evinced by French Catholics towards Islam and, »ft the
other, against the general policy of the French, as opposed to the British,
in disregarding "the opinions, and the social iad aetmtlflo capabilities
2
of those over whom they mle". These considerations «ppsrenflr did not 
undermine ‘Abduh*s ad ml rati chi and appreciation of French CtfLtifff. as 
can be inferred from his sealous efforts in learning the French language 
and imbibing the thoughts of some of the French writers of his time.
■ tarlkh. I ,  p. 925. Ri$a quotes a letter addressed by Gustave Le Bon to 
•AW ¿L GhShi E^endl, dated April 3, 1921, in which he writes* "Our in- 





The teachings of Afghani and *Abduh combined t® produce In Egypt 
and other »'luslim countries a succession of bus Id in writers and thinkers 
with an entirely m w  approach to the pro ideas facing I sisa In the codera 
world« Prominent among these writers and thinkers were those usually 
aw  referred 1# as tho aahflg croon headed ly ‘ Abduh’s disciple and Mo- 
grarher, Muhammad KastíCd Ri$i, to whoa reference has already be« cade.
Hie monthly periodical «1.mmx. which appenrod for ths first tics on
March 17, 1398, tried to cany the doctrines of Afghani to their logical 
conclusions by fighting tho bigotry of the différant schools of ahaiiiih 
(Canon Law), promoting general education, encouraging progress in the 
sciences and arts and arousing the Muslim nations to coapet* with stbsr 
nations in a ll matters which are essential to national pr*»|p*epi* Of
- . if •.
notable Importai ce was his formation of ths Society of Propaganda sad
Guidance ( .1am *Iyât'ad da*wah wa*l lrshâd) In 1909, the idea of which
first suggested itself to h±3 mind when he frequented tho booJpJiaf of.
the American missionaries in Tripoli. ïho main aim of tip A'Clstf’ ;
to counteract the activities of Christian missions in Muslim lands through
giving religious training tsyouth and educating the future proiieii®rs and./
2teachers of Muslims. Apart from this effort, which was discontinued «
A^dams, op^ clt«..., PP» 2J0-181.
21M¿L. pp. 196-97« .. -
tw  outbreak of tha first World War, 'lifl*a  other schemes do not seen -
A t
to have been particularly successful, either because of their impracti-
■ • x ■ «
oaMllty or because of the opposition of the Nationalist Party of ggypt' 
(a l bi*b al wafaaDas fcrt'lr Maf|a<l A d i ,  • It  must be recalled that" ' 
Rl|i»s pursuit, in the foot steps of Afglmil and *Abduh, of aeoramon' Is­
lamic brotherhood transcending a ll national lines oast© Into a te a l* «  
collision with Kamilas advocacy of a nationalism "in which religion and;- 
language-/mis/ not tho;aetomiidBc:''fturti^>2-:'''' ' : '
Rl^S definitely represents the last of a generation-of itiisli« ■ ■ ■
•>
thinkers who without'yielding too •uA"'in'-their■ pysteiMi of thae*i»t 1»  
Europe«! influences and without touching- upon' the tMte-'^aeiples of 
Xslam tried to adept their religion to tie etgencteS of twde*»ia».'
Ri^a was a Syrian 'V  nationality; but ia view ©f hie eloee *at*» 
elation with ‘Abduh as well as hie involvement with Egyptian affairs he 
-has been ranked among the %yplian protagonists of Islamic revivalism. '■ 
Another Syrian living during *Abduh1s lifetime, who made no lets a weighty 
contribution to that revivalism in his own right, was *Abd ar Ralunan ibn 
Ahmad ai xawakibl. A cursory review of the Westernisation of Syria is
^E#g, his proposal to the Cairo Congress on the Caliphate in Kay 1926, 
for the founding of a school for the training of candidates for the 
GallPhfrte- (Adams, ■ o.a,ctt,> P. - 2 6 6 .).............. ....... ...... ......  .
' %bld. . p. 184. - ■
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necessary befsre discussing Kavakibl’ s contribution to I alaude revival­
's 11* . Roughly frm the »iddio et the nineteenth oentury onwards, Syria 
started to liberate herself from the crippling.and obscurantist isolation 
imposed on ter by the Ottmttn Äoir©* Tb* occupation of Syria by Ibrahim 
(1831-1840), who«« faster l^pmad ‘All was the first to establish 
©«tacts with the West, followed by the sstabliabmant of the Jaerlom * .
Pres» in Beirut in 1834# of the Protestant Church in 1848, of the Sarta».. 
tri.®.OatteldM«. of the Jesuits la 1853. atei et the ^ r i «  Pini tesimi College
(now American lìd ver si ty et Beirut) ia  UK£,.kmc«  the saia dipinti which « -
1
opened wide the Syrian doer for Went©*» cultural isttxmm» ■? : J^ omt .©f, the 
Syrian intellectuals thrown up by this «**© of enlightenment, such as 
Jurjl Zaidan (founder of al filial) and the Taqla brothers (founders of 
ml ahrwg), sooner or later found in rgypt a more congenial atmosphere for 
their activities since, ©»pared with the rigorous o«im»hip.»4atadn«d ; 
ty ‘ Abdul $aald• s agents in Syria, they could enjoy ample freedem 1» t b  : 
British Occupied I&ypt.
. In Syria, as In Lgypt, French cultural influence was soon t© dominate
the spiritual l ife , but mainly for historical reasons. The French con- ■ 
neetlon with Syria atei Lein®#» dates batìc to the Crusades -  not te speak of 
the earlier days of Charlemagne’ s dispatch of letters and presents to Urn - 
Abbaaid Caliph Harun a i Rashid to obtain the custody of the Christi« Holy 
places. Crusaders, who were mainly organized by the French kings, priest,
1 
1?hllip ' K, Hitti, Hlctcty of ittla. Macmillan, London, 1957, p. 701.
1 \
loo.
nobles «id inights, left their mart: upon Syria In the castles and 
ohnrches which they built and of which the ruins s t ill exist. The 
modern French connection with Syria started with the Franco-Ottoman 
agreement of 1535, serving as the basis for the first ’capitulation* 
as well as for the French protection of Catholic interests In the Levant, 
From that year onwards we we a succession of French attempts at consoli­
dating their interests in Hyria and Lebanon, marked by the renewal of the 
capitulations in 1673, Napoleon's invasion of Syria (1799), military in­
tervention In the Lebanon following the disturbances of I860 *»d the Treaty
of Berlin (1878) giving formal international recognition to the French
1
Protectorate over the Catholics in the Holy Flaw«
KawakibI was a dominant figure of the Syria of the late nineteenth 
century. He was born in Aleppo on July 9, 1854., Ms father was Ash Shaikh 
Baha'i ibn Muhammad ltn Mas'ud, a man of wide knowledge and affable 
character, Ms ©other, As Sayfdah *Afifah,vas the daughter of the Mufti of 
Antioch, of a well-tc*$de family. Because of the death of his ©otter only five 
years later, his early life  was accompanied by much suffering «id deprivation. 
Bereft of maternal care, ‘ Abd ar fta|?raan was sent by his father to Antioch to 
be placed In the care of his aunt, As Sayidah $aflyah. He showed a keen
*A. H, Hourani, ayri* and Leteaea. R.I.I.A., Oxford University 
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S i l t «  and its adveoaey ©f the political rights of tha ^¡nri«s «lamed 
A® Turkish Governor of Aleppo, KJpii f£sha QubrusI, who hastened to 
©lose down th© paper after it  lad append for only fifteen issues.
Another newspaper initiated 1y KmtikUal In 1379 ©ailed 1* tidal, in Amhio 
« d  Turkish, was also oleaed down ty the Turkish authorities in view of 
its nationalist clamourings. This ended the first phase of Eawakibl‘s 
experience in journalism -  a phase during which he established his f a »  
as the founder of the Arable Press of Syria. 1 Th« started a period of 
an intense and, at times, brilliant administrative career in Kavaklbl's 
life . After serving as the sinecure member of th© li*i@att*» « d  Finance 
Committees, he was made SLreutsr of the official psintiflg house and member 
o f . the Commercial Court. In a ll these offices he did his utmost in serving 
th® people as well as in reforming the organisations mde* his charge, his 
outspoken manner and revolutionary methods further frightened the govern­
ing authorities who already knew that a ll  th© lnflamatesy iftleles in the 
newspapers of Ceos taut inepl© and Beirut» condemning the Ottos« despotism, 
were flowing from the pen of Kavaklbl. Wmm'xmm dstMtlvus were thereupon 
charged with keeping oaMtart wriMh on his MMMNtB« Exasperated by this, 
Kawakibl resigned a ll his positions at the end of 1336, and established a 
barrister*a office in which he gave legal advlee to a ll those who f e l l " - 
victim to the rulers* tyranny, helping.in the preparation of petitions
^  Abd ar Rahman al KsWSm Mji P*
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sgalnst thè oppressore. An atter.pt «  thè lif® ®f thè Turklsh Covemor 
®f Àl®opo in '1886 %  m gmo ti»® «oihentiee a len i*.
^alteó excuse to arrest U n ta t i, with a «aitar of %rian dignitari®a. • . 
But after a serica of legai iisialea* h® ma released irosa priaon, hia .v 
prestige enhanced boti* v it i H»e pipai«®« «n| thè m lers.. le ' te! no» ' ;,
aehieved such fame that he vas appointed ih® Ksyor of Aleppo in l i « .  ■. 
l i  wa® in thls post «»«1 he d«mmtt**ted hit «eferoist zeal ty hringtng 
«hoat fajvreaching 'et*aa*es I»  thè «w it ip «! ’ àfstai et Aleopo. ' l i *  fucsia®- 
ir# positlons were thè M  «# tic OhmÉbmrvt Ctmmrm (1832), thè fflftaff", 
Secretary to thè Uellgiott® Court of ttepp«'|Mf4)’'MÌ tihttimrrf :t l»  ’ 
Commlttee for thè Sai® * f  stato Lani«»r '"la *tt ■ ee—é tyAaiitiaée tu»’ IH  - te 
stand up agaLnst th® grewlng •ppMttiaa'sf' ite Ottcttn' «fpMMMM *«8 ‘ 
Syrian exploiters. It may be because he «eflpgfcred « f  oecModaf'tfcU op* 
p o s it i«  to hia refozmistio schenes that he left %rlà for Egypt #»■§»•*• 
ember 6, 1899, at thè ag» of ferty-seren. It  vas only naturai that Ma 
choice ahould fa l l  on Egypt." Aa oentloned hefore, 2 thè tntwi'slHfèlltlial 
and rellgioas agltationa rampant in that cornitiy, asder ih®' leadertóip et 
Afghani ani *Abdoh, #ff«rsÉ.c'p|fif coiigeiiial atmosphere for thè ifmmio - 
charact®r et f e r i t a t i . "  ' " >■ - ■ ‘ -•t' -v, ■ '
_  ' In Cairo, soon established contact vith influential intel-
H^uhajBEaad Khalaf Allàh. al Kavlklbl. havatuhu va à iia l», Kaktabat'al 
‘ Arab, Cairo, 1956, pp, 15-Ìb,
P» 9$•* : ' .
«  \
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loctual circles. Be contributed articles to al a a w r f . and completed ' ■ 
hi« two major works, tobi1!* el tottbdlfl and mm «1 onrifa1 Be was in 
close touch with hie caspaftrlotff» who had escaped Ottoman .tyiwmQr earlier* 
Every evening he *tt each -oMtstaMULst' oiwqriMMMi of Arab freed»» as Rashid 
Ri^a, Ife^ aamad Kurd ’A ll, fShlr *1 Zafai«^. is  ■ the Splendid® Bar**- ..-fa '2901, 
while on a mission from the Khedive, tkWSm I I ,  t© calls«* the eignata»«' 
of Arab shaikhs and Aslr» t® a petition appealing for the Khedive to* be 
proclaimed the Caliph^ he made t® the heart •£■■ the AraMss ■ penin­
sula, the Yemen, the Sudan and ZanaMMr#- «*>• aftorwaris vtsttod Abyssinia, 
Karachi and Bombay'.- As a result ©f. the®«-. toum# he obtained first-hand
knowledge of th© social, political mmmmiM condJ&S*Mr«f.''MtftidhM*-'
fc „ 2
After, his re tom to SorfV hi t«MKid sftaMlr • *• » m « * r  is©!»#»* ■ 
publication of tabi'i* al i s t iy i i  and mm al tati M  W ’M U U I i M  - 
his fame in Egypt as an eminent revivalist., tmk d®fcth atdMMtyr •©•rtwfc 
him in a Cairo cafe; on June ■ 14# 1902. J
. Thanks to his two major books we have a clear pietos* «r-.Xtfrafcfclff*» • 
ideas on a wide rang© of subjects affecting the Muslim vqy of ..life, M i » ! *  
aj igtjMZd ya »aaasi* al litl*bjd mm originally a series of articles ap­
pearing-in Ql-wnwrrad dealing with t h e d e s p o i l ® » »  which v m  
collected and published in b®@k f@rm to 1900. The book has been lauded by
^ahhah, sati&3e> P* 3°* Se* 8180 Jm^LSMSb P» 151.
- %®rbert Tapiero*, lea ’Xdf.fJ RefonsistOJ. Las Editions
Arab«*, 195% P. 4«
t© lie89» Arab critica as "unique in its kind" .1 The uniqueness seems 
in the content rather than la the style. It  is the first Arable bsek 
which la entirely «id consistently devoted to a purely political subject. 
Arab authors, up to the t i l»  o f Xaw&dSft, treated politics not as an In­
dependent subject but as a subil*a*y discipline la their treatises on 
serais, literature and history, fata»!* is  a beM and exhaustive approach 
t© cm  of the major political Issues of the Arab world at the end of the 
nineteenth century, i.e , Ottoman despot!«». I s & l i ' g  long career of 
public service had familiarized Ms with the nature and mechanism of a 
despotic regime -  a fact which lends such an engaging vigour and topicality 
to the book. KawakibI analyses in detail the h s M  effects of despotisn 
m  the religion, 2 prosperity,^ morals ©du«iti®n,s and social prepress6 
of the nation, ; But, as Tapiare points out, it  is  erroneous to consider 
jfcaim* 1* mercLy as a negative effort, towards the elimination of a social 
plight, Kawakibl leaves m doubt in this book as to his ideal alternative 
to despotism» -  constitutional democracy. He tries to establish democracy
1Zeid«9, basalt an nah&at*al *arat»%yah, p, 98.
2*»v£M‘ «1 istlbdad was masarl* al latibdid, matba‘ at'1  ma'arif, Cairo,
1m, P.1? i c « .
%Má*» p* 68 si m *
Ah M ;  P. 87 e l ^ .
% M d,r n. 110 et iia. -
P. 1^8 sXJSSt* .
*• thè best poasible forni «f g»v«rngMMt^eoai|»ttU»-viili 'thè taschini
of IsIam.^ He not cmly condemns despoti»*, bttt 'P»p©wda-th« wqt» '*ad ■
mma of aproeting lt*^ .
' ' T® w*»t e^tent m a  Kawlettl tafltìancet In Me treatment of dtipttts»
IT Western notions of state « d  democracy? . M «  fta «aonrtMt diffic-tlt «a
§i»e«*» '■ Taplero urite» that lamklìt • pxpbably t e «  French/ «M ia .DaWflM^  ‘
an<3 A^sad A»fné believe that "he t e »  so ' Europea» langoagaa, y*t ve - f is i ’.
numero»« reference» in 1»  ‘ £s*ap>igi .©venta, Snatltutioi»» and devel-
7opmenta such a» thè areyfaa 'and Panama 'affai*», -fvandi ani Rnaetaa despot- 
l i » ,8 honatng in Ingland,9 Gladati*«*» rMT«al«r^) ané'Aaatvtw 'mé-àtmU» 
can esperimenta In politicai unity. 11 Babhàn previde» an eipl«n«tl»m'.fir 
th isty  rominding u» that Xaw5kibl*a teatf&M0» af -fiiteliii anaMbai 'li* t§ • 
atudy uuropean thought and histoiy through thè Turklsh translatiane of
Habl»!* t p. 63*
2n id .; p. 74.
3ibld. , ■ p. M i at...an|é
feea Idfi»> p. 13* ; ■ •
p* 43*
^  A  «a* «¡S ^a l lalah f l * l  *aar al badlth, maktabat* an nahéat* al
* apabiyah, Cairo, l^JS, pp, 254- 284,« * - ,  • » • • - ... ‘
7t g S i l »  *
p. i f .  —
9I èM*, * * * ;  ’ s ■
Ifllbld.. p. 77.
1 1Ibld. . p. 143.
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European sources. 1 A reference la falsa»!« t® Victor Alfieri, the Italian 
poet (1743-1803), has lea Asia to believe that the book is aa adaptation 
of an essay by Alfieri on despotism. 2 Taplere, m the other hand, dis­
cerns a close similarity between falg*i« and Montesquieu's 1 'Ksarit dea
in *®' ** the subjects @f despotism art constitutional government
are concerned.^ 'fhe..twp view» are not contradictory since Alfieri, despite 
his hatred of the French, drank deeply free the springs of "French thought.
Kswakibl'a other book, tana al nnrj. is *mmh none serious work and 
contains his principal views en such pertinent issues as-«be causes of 
Islam's decline, its position "la the ao4«va'«*»:ii 'uni-the methods of amel­
iorating the - let of Muslims ■ mS ■ achieving wsliyv'’ Sler his* .«• aW P»***^  
the account of the proceedings '«£ «rlMgttftsp supposedly held
by an Islamic Hefom party la Mecca In 1898. On reading the book one 
first  gets the impression that such a ‘ congress has, in **0t , 't « i* t  place 
and that-it ssurt have been'an unmitigated auccess for its chief organiser, 
As f-ayid al Furatl (Kavakibl's pen-name). Sterne out at ending scholars such 
as Lothrep de Stoi#«!*! and Carra #e Vaux have «bus a^r®ssed';*«#WiS^ fc»(i 1 »:
the reality of this which acoordtng 1m de vaux is  called 'The
• '  ' ; 1
•^«Abd ar Ragman, p, 45*
2ra' ara* .~p«~ 254** Thd ®assy 1a question is  probably Alfieri* s pe_ Ip 
Tvrannie which was published In French in 1802 and, according to fc&fflggla 
peedia Prltannlca (eleventh edition, Vol, I ,  p. 581), Is an imitation of 
the works of MachlaveUi. ,
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Congrega of thè toatening of IdL« " , * 1 Tacere giws f ^ r  reasona la 
rcfutation of th^s bellefj. they can be eummariaed as f«il©wst ■ ■
,a ) ; The unanlBity observed in thè deliberatloaa ©f thè : 
Congress, vlth Ita tyettty-thr©« delegatesi vas «s i  pese» . 
iU e  la thè oonditlons of thè Umààa w»»ìd et th© end of ; ; 
thè nlneteenth eentury,
b) . Such a unanlmity ©a thè part ©f a naraber ©f ea&nent ’ : •
Musila thlnkcrs and iute1 lectuals must bete had vide- ■ ■ • 
spregi repercussiona at thè ih® MusUm.world. No
evidenee of such repercussiona la, hav«r©i  ^amilaMe* •.
.©) Owing t© tt« parnfdl s m M m w  ©f ottoman "
auch a congress would n©t ha©© bte» sllsved'te tuAi/pla*« 
in thè y@ar 1898.
: d) Finally, a contemporary ©f Kawikibl, àA ShsUAi^ti -
. al Boleri, . aa Egyptiaa w iie r  ©f standing, haa attested t®
2
thè lraaginery nature ©f thè Congress.
m  night add a fifth reason t© thè above listi Aere are nany aen- 
tences and passages in mrn al mira which have bsan tatara stasai rerbatln 
fra « Thu», PP. 30 , 31, 34 , 35, 36 and U9 ef | j & X  cerreapond
---- -------- ----- ~ r ............ * ’ *... . 3
©xactly with pp, 28, 29^38 and 129 ef ara al .eBaou '
1 ............. ..............'
Maltei* p«
i  pp* 8, 9 and 10. -
%hes© àr©‘ passages discussing such tapiss ss th® 'saint-cult', soientifio
asti ©ipsilon la thè Keran, etc.
» »
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' But thia very fictitiousnesa of orna al qwrl la a credi! t# Kawà- - 
genius. It  eatabUsfaea bis fame as one of thè first Arab thlnkers 
lntrodueed thè eenception et an*tosar (con^resa) as a colleetive . 
deliberative inatitution int» ite Arab vorld -  aa inatitatioa vhieh vas* 
aa v i l i  ba presently aeen, aeon te enjoy gre«! mgm w&m thè Kualims in 
generai.
tftim a l bari ahould be regsrded as thè mesi concrete end iaagtnatlve
schema put forv'.rd by any Musila thitìker in thè seeond.half of thè nine-
teenth owtnqr for lsylng thè beala ef MuUa » 1%-. . Ttre0#i, tha vlews .
expressed by varioua delegatea thè «atta», tlres t» approach thè probleia ef
t i»  Musila vorld fnm a ll poasible angle«, . fm  toetanoe, «bile one
dalmate holda internai eonflieta te be thè ©ause ef I alando decline,1 a :
2
secend deprecate# thè ebecurantlaa ef thè rulera as another cause, while 
a third refer# te thè lack of freedom smong Musllma,  ^ and ih»' fMrfch lam­
enta thè aheence effany leader^lp,^ and so forth,
■ lAhe tata*!*. twi al mx* reveals numerous ina tancea ef thè in- 
flueace ef Veste» thought on Kawakib!,a outleek. Mest important ef aH
- x
la his admlratlon fer Protestanti». Just as Prete stanti sa saved Christ-
1onaB a l taira, p, 20. 
- *&&£., P. 21. 
32 M *>  P. 22.
13X5.
ianityfrom the shackle® of Mind imitation and bigotry If- cleansing that
rallgian from harmful accretions, and raftering Its arlgiaal simplicity,
•• must the modernist Muslims strive far the ascendancy ©f the pure and
untarnished image of *slam ty fighting against superstition and innovations
Of special significance are ala® Ms euloglcal remarks ©a auch prominent
2 ahuropean figures as Peter the Great, Bonaparte, Bismarck and Garibaldi 
in preaching the necessity of the rulers* leniency towards their subjects 
and the value ©f leadership In securing national unity.
■, ' Umm al our a . has lent plausibility t© a «¡»bur of interpretations 
about Kawakibl's "Pan~Arabi3t" timintdts. Georg# Antonias,^ Rivard Hart­
mann,  ^ Rasem Zaki Ruselbeh^ and Stelae^  have M l ivtsrprstad in this light 
Kawakitl's admiration far the Arab#*' rale In the i&rtexy ©f ^lam, as well 
as his scheme for the abolition of the Sultan's title to the Caliphate and 
the setting up of a Qaralsb-born Arab as Caliph In Mecca. Sylvia G. Halm 
has also seized on a phrase In fatS'l* defining the term umma to demonstrate 
Kavakitl's "racial theory of nationality" .* 8 All these interpretation#,
99. . See also Mu|aswad Khalaf Allah, ..en^clt.. p. 19 f l . . .  sea.
2___ i'— .  ' i *  "
.....
Hsmiah Hamilton, London, 1933, pp. 93-99.
Akademie Verlag,
p. 48.
Berlin, 1943, p. 31.
this respect'without any
lelotions, p. 60. Zotne, who generally adepts a critical 
»at of Antonins' conclusions, has quoted his remarks in




however, seem to be exaggerated. True, KavakibI has repeatedly asserted 
the Arabs» dominant place in' Islam ( Inna*! *arab nll-p-'ai an*
their Innate qualities of solidarity and pride, qualities which, in his 
opinion, make the Arabs qualified for regaining the position of the Caliph­
ate. Bit a fact which has often been ignored by Kawakibl's biographers 
is  that he has emphasised his n.-m-political alas in appealing for the trans­
fe r of the Caliphate to the Arabs. Ho wants the Arabs in his Utopian 
cociety to preoccupy theiiiselve# only with religious affairs,^ On the other 
hand, Haim*s haphazard selection of a single phrase in fat»* 1*, in which 
"community of ancestry" has been mentioned as'©a® of the determinants of 
nationality,^ does not at a ll warrant her aasosiamat that xaw5klt& was 
a propounder of the racial theory of Arab nationalism. iawa&tbl has no­
where else raised the problem of nationality in a. serious manner, and It
/•does seem unfair to interpret the views of a writer on a given subject on 
the basis of a passing remark which he has casually made thereon. More­
over, even i f  we do consider this particular phrase as an indication of 
Kavakibl’a racialist outlook, there are also other phrases in ura al nura 





appeal far ref raining from religious and ethnical pre ¿«dice.
*1 ta* aggub ad.dial wa1!  Jlftit) _ - art Ms general plea far equality between
races and national solidarity.
However, a ll this does not invalidate the statement that Kavakitl*a 
. Ean-Islaffllst arguments had a markedly pr#-Ar«b character, and that ho 
advocated Arab unity hut mainly as a preliminary step towards I si ami o 
unity. His appreciation of Western institutions is reflected alee in
- • t
his repeated advocacy of parliamentarism, and in his proposal that tbs Asso­
ciation for Muslim unity should be modelled after the European acadialaa2 
whose enlightened organisations and administrations ensure their survival.
Although KawakibI has b e «  closely identified ty ®i®y Arab critics 
with the Pan-Islamism of Afghani^ -  his part in that moeemant being de­
scribed by Tapiere as merely secondary  ^-  '«hi may yet find an pie evidence 
of originality in his system of thought. Ha ptrW company with Afghani • 
on many a point of principle in the dries towards Islamic unity, first ly , 
unlike Afghani, he denounced the adoption of fierce me^ods in achieving 
this unity. While Afghani again and again emphasised the militant aspect 
of the idea of .IlfcSd as a necessary weapon in the fight for unity,' Kaw»» . ■ 
m 2  was at pains to interpret JH&I in pacifist terms. = .
P. U6.
Xi t H r ' P. U .
%orJ(I Zaykin, bunat m nrfiiat al.arablyah, p. 99.
4&S&JM£> P« 2.
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»1® on«*, he says, «amongst the ‘ Ulema* ®f Islam has 
confined the meaning ®f jihad merely to the fight 
against non-Muslima. Evexy arduous effort usefttl to 
the religions and temporal life , even practising busi­
ness for the/ake of family (life ), is called
He also cite® fro® the Koran the verses 2^56, 16/126 and 88/122 on the
necessity of «folding violence in farthering the cause of Islam. 2 Secondly.
he made a strong ease in favour of the separation of stato and church,
whereas Afghani either remained silent on the subject or, ty defending the
caliphate, countenanced the blending of the two powers. This, of («urge,
was in addition to Kawskibl*s advocacy of the separation of the Judicial,
legislative and executive powers of the state, which, as noted ty Tapiero,
was due to the influence of Montesquieu. In mm «1 earn, after the report
of the proceedings of the conference, there is the account of m. Interview
accorded by an Amir, "a noble man and a politician*,^ to an Indian orinee,
in which the Amir sets out in detail the duties, rights and qualities ef
the ideal Caliph of Muslims,
"The Caliph*, he says among other things, ’’should not 
Interfere with any of the political and administrative 
affairs.”
Apart from theso two points, there is much in common between Af­
ghani and Kawakibl. Like Afghani, KawakitI was a stout champion of parliamentary
P. 173. KLm PP- 19 * d 71*
2IMd.|c pp, 71 «ad 173.
3iM d ., p. 159.
*IMd. , p, 168.
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institutions but his approach to this problem was definitely more 
elaborate than that of Afghani, as can be gathered fm* the detailed 
scheme for Muslim unity which he proposes In mm »1 nnr«. Like Afghani 
1» was against• a ll manner of blind imitation2 and »saint cult' in Islam. 3 
Disappointed in . 14» results of transplanting European educational in- . 
etitutiona into Muslim countrie e, he was ecpdlj averse to unquestioning 
imitation of European ways of life  and thought,^ Finally, like Afghani, 
he made a southing attack on Western colonialism,- and warned Muslims 
gainst its »numerous tricks and chicaneries' in subduing the Eastern 
nations.^
• Although Fan-Islamism, as a political scheme and as one main as­
pect of the teachings of Afghani and ‘ Abduh, became a dead letter with
6
the collapse ©f the Ottoman empire and the abolition of the Caliphate 
(March 1924), the other aspect of these teachings, i.e . Islamic revival­
ism, continued to cause considerable ferment and activity within the Arab- 
Musllm world. The beginning of the Twentieth Century was marked by a
1taba,l , t p. 27.
. al csmS. p. 102.
39. • .
‘ *£&&•, P. 128. 
hrt& k4,. PP. 144-43.
%or a brief exposition of the causes of the failure of F&n-Islamism, 
sea Gibb's Whither Islam?, op.clt. . p. 41 et sen.
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spectacular growth of Islamic feelings and aspirations In Egypt, Arabia, 
Iraq,. Palestine «ad Syria. . fhs "vioinily of these countries", "the 
development of the communication" and v"the activity of the Press" have 
been recognized as the main factors in,the spread of these spiritual move­
ments. We must hew make special mention ®f. a movement which was origin­
ated in Egypt and over a long period constituted the best illustration of 
the state of mind prevailing, not only in Egypt hit in a large part of the 
Arabic-speaking world as well, . This was the lan *fm.t 'aafa. MhaMaan al 
auitllaln or "The Association of Muslim Youth", established in Cairo in 
1927, closely following the precedent of the Young Men's Christian.,Asso­
ciation founded at Cairo in January 1923. - The purpose of this, new organi- 
zation was to spread "Islamic hmanlffttlon and powCU", .to work against . 
"dissensions and abuses ar ong the Islamic parties .and group»" and (moat 
important of. a ll), to take from the cultures of tbs East and the West "All
that l i  g o A  sad .t9_.ro Jeot ,alL ,thit_ia « o r  .tho fm to*-
ohip of suoh eminent personalities as Dr,*Abdul fauild Boy Ea‘ld , an active 
Egyptian nationalist and a member of the %yptlaa Parliament, and Mufcibb , 
«3 rln al Khatlb, an outstanding religious figure later to..beets» -
•ditor-in-bhief of aatallat 'a l  Asfear.3 the Association mmmUA to mobil- 
iaing a sizeable section of the Egyptian youth in the service of Islami«'
H , Kampffacyer, "Egypt and Western Asia" in Mfe.ljgS.IjMl P»
2Ib ld ,. p. 10A.
p* SoZ .
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Through holding two inter-Muslim congresses, on® at 
^affa in April 1923 and the other at Cairo in 1930, the Association 
landed its activities beyond Egypt and created similar associations 
in Palestine, Iraq Syria, mid played an active part in awakening 
Pnhllc opinion In these countries with regard to such important Issues 
the Islamic world as the Caliphate and missionary activities. It 
is interesting to note that the Association, in accordance with Article 
3 of its Regulations, never re la »d  its efforts in familiarising its 
aembership with the brilliant aspects of Western thought, ' "foe Review 
°P the Association contains articles on the lives and activities of men 
like Benjamin Franklin, Abraham Lincoln, Faraday, Edison, Carnegie and 
Henry Ford, Thera .is a special essay by Dr, Iahya ad Cardiff, the editor- 
ljv*ehlaf @f the Review and a graduate of the Geneva University, in the 
second issue of the Review, on Robert Owen, in support of the author1# 
appeal for the creation of co-operative societies, especially agricultural,
in Egypt. 1
Another illustration of the glowing «Islamic feelings and aspira­
tions* in this period was the holding of three inter-Muslim congresses,
®ee at Cairo in 1926, another at Mecca in the same year and the third 
at Jerusalem in ' December 1931, The object of the Cairo Congress of 1926 ■ 
to determine the future of the Caliphate, which had bee#*® a biwing ' 
Issue in the Islamic world ever since it had been decided at the Turkish
113-119
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G«W# National Assembly, on th« 31st Mareh 1924» to abolish it . ' That 
decision threw the whole of the Islamic world into a state of profound 
confusion and depression. Messages of pretest were addressed ty ■ the
Egypt and Caliphate Committee of India to Mustafa Kami • ■* *
Pasha» and feelings ran high against th* Turkish Government in both ■ 
countries and in favour of the deposed Caliph» ‘ Abdul Majid/ I®*» of 
these was of any avail, • The Cairo Congress, which marked th# culmination 
of pre-Cali phate agitations in various Muslim countries» ia spit# of. its 
shortcomings and atbacks, at least gave an impulse to the movement of 
solidarity between these count*!®*,’ '
The Mecca Ccagre«® in the same year embraced *  great«? Mriur of ~ 
Muslim countries. Its object was priiM ily Hutted and tangible. . It was 
to determine the status of §ijas and its sanctuaries in the face of ary 
anarchy resulting from th# struggle between *Abd al *A*Is ibn Sa*ud md 
King Husain, the Sharif of Mecca. As, in the lnterla, list Sa*ud pro- ■ 
claimed himself King of the pjiss, the proceedings of the «aigreas re- . 
solved themselves into a diplomatic duel between the representative* of 
Kajd and f i j la  and the f#rel§«#i*gat#s who expressed cone*» a t . the poor 
sanitary conditions of the country. * 2 SSvertbeless, the Geagress also ■ 
revealed numerous point# of agreement between the delegates on a variety
W  da Meade Musulman. Vol. LXIV. (Paris, 1926), p. 3. ■
2IMd., p, 166 ft  » « ,  Al«® Gibb's p. 356.
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Hf subjects touching upon the Muslim life , and thus laid a basis of 
common action* >
Th# Jerusalem Congress of 1931 marked a distinot advance upon 
its predecessors be«*»# of the inclusion of a great number of "unofficial'' 
representatives irwii wirlMS Muslim and non-Muslim countries. The large 
iM * l participation was another interesting feafett* of the Congress, The 
Congress achieved a very substantial measure of success through its de- ■ • 
clslont a) on establishing a central fcurwapt at Jerusalem t® direct the '■ 
work of Islamic propaganda, with local bureaus in the different countries; 
■(b) a setose of oeHecttehs f or the Ikitversity of _ Jbimsalem mA for the. 
defence of t h e . R o l y < « J '  tto -«f. m  Arabagitoultoral
. h a* in fUlest&se and .(d) . Hie «rattan of m  'iatenastloa^ l Amb Aeadeay -. 
;in Egypt*
: i ^
two general remarks eaa.be made about these e®i*g*o«s«i.. - firstly. 
in a ll  these congresses, the majority of the members was made '«p of Arab 
delegates, a fact which naturally readied in the concentration of Con­
gress on the. problems of Arab-ltaillm world, rather « a «  an .those of „the ■,
• Muslim world in general* • Secondly, in a ll the three Congresses, speda! 
care was exercised to set cultural objects in the fo repart and ..bo avoid 
-interference in political issues. This was apnarently simed at pre­
venting «ety-rift between the Muslim peoples and their governments, - -®ut • 
on a fgvt although important, occasions, this unwritten rule was dis­
regarded. At tbo Cairo Congress of 1926 X  resolution was passed against 
the French b«bar#Bf*»i- of Daraasuua and at the Mecca Congress o f. the same
119,
year another protest against the annexation ©f *Aqabahan<5 Ha*an to Trans­
jordan was made;' A third enaiBple was tha anti-Zienist lias taken at tha
- 1 Jerusalem Congress of 1931.
S© much fe* H»'pnMttML:!«apa«l of the aftermath © f t »  iiaas 
propounded by Afghani, *Abc?uh «id %s#lfe4fel. ■ As for tha movements of 
thought inspired by those Ideas, one can say « 1th certainly that throughout 
tha period starting with the death of ‘ Abdrti (1993) up to the second World 
War there has be«* .©sly ©as outstanding figure ®f an Islamic thlriker and 
reformist worthy of serious -«isMerfffcai * ‘ All *Abd ar itaziq, ’ The con­
troversy and furor. caused ty his well known beak Islam'and the Mjwlttles 
of 'hale, d a »  V .  u^i.„iguteiB)» sr© ©omparafcle to those aroused by 
Afghani’s agitations in Goasiaititnepi© «id dhIMi« C. C. Adams, G. Kampff- ■ 
meyer and Muhammad Jamil Ahmed give us a'fairly comprehensive account of • 
iSslq’s life  and ideas. Here we concern ourselves wife a mufti©* of facts 
in Idsiq’ s life , and especially a few points about Mis fa»®«» book, which 
are of »me interest from our viewpoint.
itaad.q was bam in a village of Middle ia  the year 1833. He
entered the Azhar University when he was about ten y e «  of age. Accord­
ing to Adams, Saaiq** relations with * Abduh at the Azhar %©ul# probably 
haveheen slight, because of. his youth and WLs status as a beginner, had 
not the friendship which existed between his father rad ,‘ Abduh . . . .  secured •
T^ftdLthsr.HU«?-» P» $&% ' - - ' '' '*
%ee Mars* I «lam and ^ «E n im ln g r a * , PP. 259-69, .Altfaer 1 1 1 »!, 
p. 142.
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6Ppsrtunities for personal acquaintance which he would otherwise not have 
enJpycd",l in 1900 h© attended lectures, for a year or two, In the new 
%nstian University,
Meat important ««tig  tee lectures attended were those ®f Professor 
^QHind, on the history of AimMc literature, and those nf Professor San- 
^•Hlana on the history of philosophy. ■ After obtaining his final certifi- 
c®te frea the Azhar in 1911, he lectured in the Azhar on rhetoric and the 
history 0f  its development as an Arabic science, ■ In 1912 he went to iJig- 
a^nd to study for a-degree in Economics and political science at Oxford 
diversity. This provided him with m  opportunity to make a closer stu<$y 
of the theories of fef«miMWt a* well as of the Ideas of a number of Eng- 
^eh political thinkers -  m mm 'he gathered twom hi a above-mentioned book, 
ftis studies in Ebglaad were interrupted ty ths Croat War, whereupon he re­
turned to Egypt, In 1915 he was appointed a lodge in the Shari* ah Courts, 
^kls prompted him, as he himself says, to delve into the history of re li-  
«toos Judicature,
»»at judicature,* he says, "in a ll its verities, is a 
branch of government, «id its histoiy is closely linked 
up with the history of f»vama«st, The mllfftMS Judi­
cature is  likewise one of the departments of toe Islamic 
government. It ■ is therefor# inevitable for he who studies 
the history of this {religious) Judicature to scrutinize 
its superior organ, i.e , government in Islam."* '
*illaa and HadarttU». p. 260.
2
A  Islam *wa uaul al hukm, Second Edition, ®a$ba‘ ah aifr, Cairo, 1925,
a*r,1!---- : .“
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This was how the Idea of writing Islam vra nyul al frotan came Into his 
mind. The hook, which was first  published In 1925, i s 'm indictment
against the Caliphate which the author condemns as an anti-Islaaic in-. *
stltution. It also draws a sharp distinction between the religious and 
political functions of Mufcamraad. "It was only," he says, "with regard 
to the religious functions that Muhammad acted as the prophet." The miin 
conclusion of the book is that it is necessary to separate 'State* from 
»Church* in Muslim countries* The concluding sentence of the book mir­
rors the forward-looking ideolo.gr of the author and his impatience with 
the present conditions of the Muslims»t - - - *
"There is nothing in the religion (of Islam) which pre­
vents the Muslims fro® competing with other nations for 
social and political science and.from tearing down that 
antiquated f* attic)* ordor to which they have been sub­
jugated and under which they have teen humbled, and to 
build up their state and government on the basis of the 
most recent achievements of minds of men and the most 
solid experiences of the nations as to the best founda­
tions of government.”*
It was in fact this sentence which »fas taken ty most of Piaziq's critics
as evidence of his opposition to Islam,
"The author (Raziq)", »«•ote Shaikh Muhammad Bakhlt, in 
his volwainous book refuting ILaziq's ideas, "thus says 
clearly that the system on which the^government of Aim 
Bakr and later of the Patriarchal (ftashidln) Caliphs was 
based is an inefficient and antiquated system because of
-----  its disconnection »fith social and political sciences,
and that the achievement of minds of men are more elab- * 
orate and better than it. This amounts to the author's
^Adams' translation» "Ancient", op.o i l . . p. 265. 
2lsíam *wa usul al fruka, p. 103.
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negation of the fundamentals of Islamic Government 
and of what was set up by the Prophet of Gted 
compared with which nothing can bo better and more  ^
elaborate, emanating as it  is from the light of God."
The Court of tip Azhar *ulaii9* even vent so far - as to announce
that the system ©f government for which Rasdq was pleading was, in fact,
nothing other than Bolshevi*n, -
"In addition",'declared tip Court, "to t i»  denouncing 
of the religious foundation of the Muslim (system of 
government) and tip revolting against their repeated 
collective consent (J J iD  with regard to their fora 
of government, he takes the posit ion'of warranting , ■ 
their setting up of a Bolshevist State."2 
N •
"It is clear", con dudes the Court, "that the funda­
mental ©r government and sources of legislation with 
the Muslims are the Book of Cod, the Tradition of the 
Rronhet and the collective consent of the Muslims. Par 
the Muslims, there can be nothing better than these (fun­
damentals and origins). a * ik  ‘A ll (Raziq) wants the Mus­
lima to tear down what is based on those fundamentals.
The reaction of the* ulama* of the Azhar University demonstrated with
painful clarity that i f  they were slow and diffident in adapting their
institutions to the demands of the age, they could be quite prompt and
ruthless instead in supressing any challenge to the orthodoxy. Acting
on the basis of Law Mo. 10 of 1911, which makes it  inctaabent on the Azhar
University to censure "a ll the * ulema* of Egypt for any behaviour not
Shaikh Muhammad Bakhlt, haqXqat al Islam *wa ugul al' hukm, matba*at as 
. Sa^flyah, Cairo, 1926, p7X4o.
halVah kitiSr al.* ulama* i f  k ltjb d , Islam *wa ugTUalkdm. mataba* at
.ialaflyah, Cairo, 1925, p. 29. '
. p. 30.
becoming their dignity as ‘ ulema*. a court consisting of twenty-four of
the leading ‘ alama* of th® Azhar decided, on August 12, 1925, to deprive
1
Raziq of his degree and his position as a Judge.
That Raaiq was Inspired in his reformistic thoughts In the Islamic
government partly ty the Ideas of a number of V e st«» authors seems to be
beyond any doubt. There are passing remarks In the Islam *wa uful on the
ideas ef Hobbes and Locke about the origins of the authority of givernment.
He also refers the reader at one point to study Sir Thomas Arnold's The
Caliphate for a fuller study of the nature of the Caliphate,^ Last but
not least, as has been noted by Adams,
"the Influence of West#» scholarship is  seen in his 
critical methods and in his impatience with the methods 
ef Islamic historians and biographers. In his attempt 
to treat his sources In a critical and scholarly manner, 
and in the concessions which he Is willing to make to 
modern conditions, be shows his affinity with the more 
radical groups of M o d e r n i s t s . , '
Before closing this chapter, it would be worth our while, es- 
pecially from the general viewpoint ef this thesis, to attempt to answer 
an important question* ~What was the position of the Islamic revivalists
feukm hatyah klbar al ‘ ularni*, p, 31«
2lil«a'wa ugul al hukro, p, 11,
%MI.# P. 15.
^Ialjnn mad Modernism, p, 268, tiasiq has applied the same critical methods 
in his ether useful, but rather academic, work on religious consensus 
called al llaSt* fl*sh sharl*at1 al UlSmlurah, dar al filer al *arabl, Cairo, 
19-47, p. 112.
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wth regard to nationalism, both la Its particular (Egyptian or Syrian) 
and general (Arab) variants? Thera does not seem to be a uniformed 
policy on the part of the revivalists in regard to thi3 problem. We 
have already seen Afghanis opposition to a ll kinds of parochial and 
racial prejudice and his ideal of Islamic unity which stood in direct 
contradiction to any brands of narrow-minded nationalism. But *Abduh's 
association with the ‘Aralal Revolt (which in view of* Abduh’ s Egyptian 
nationality^ should not be regarded in the same light as Afghani's asso­
ciation with it ) has led «lost critics to describe him as a patriot. Be- 
sides, in an oft-quoted paragraph in Ms fce.-has recom-
mended the love of fatherland. Elsewhere he defines the conespt of 
watan in the following terns*
«Linguistically, watan means, without exception, the 
place where the person Hvesj it  is synonymous with ; 
the word sakam to say lstautana al-qaum harihlhl al-- 
ard wa tawattaaSha is thi • « m ' as' saying •f tii«y'five •' .. 
made' It  t f i i r  abode’ . The^vord as mod ty those who 
study politics (ahl ai-siyli.a) means the place after 
which you are called, where your right is safeguarded, 
and the claim of which on you is known, where you are 
secure in yourself, your kin and your possessions. It  
has been said* ’There is no watan without freedom’ .
La Bruyere, the French philosep&sr said* - ’There is . 
no wafan ■ properly speaking, compatible with tyranny, -  
but"""bnly private interests, personal glorification ¿ : 
and exalted places* watan was defined by the ancient 
Homans as the place wEere the person has rights and 
political dtaties.
This latter Roman definition does not contradict the
saying that there is no watan without freedom. They
ilichard Hartmann, Islam und Hatlonallreus, p. 23.
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are indeed Identical. Freedom is the right to fu l f i l  
the known duty, and i f  it  does not exist there can be 
no yatan, since there are no rights. When political 
duties” exist, then they imply the sdstenoe of both 
- right and duty, which are the motto of a ll the varans 
to which lives and possessions are sacrificed, and 
' which are put before kin and friendsf in generous / • 
souls, the love of watan reaches the height of adora­
tion end passion. .
But the abode where the dweller has no rights, and where 
he is secure neither in his life  nor in his possessions,
Is, in s o r t ,  the resort of the powerless, and the abode 
of him who can find no way to another} I f  it  grows big- 
: , ger, there is no ease, and i f  smaller, then life  in it - 
cannot be cane worse. La Bruyere,mentioned above, said:
•What Is it  to me that my yatan be largo and great, i f  
I am sad and lowly in it , living in humility and misery, 
a prisoner and afraid*. But to belong to a certain wa|an 
means that a connexion links the watan to toe person who 
dwells in it , a connexion based on personal honour; so 
that he w ill be jealous for i t  and w ill defend i t  as he 
defends his father after whom ho is called, even i f  he 
is a bad-tempered and strict father. This is wlar it  has _  
been said that the relational ending * i# in Mlari^ Ingllzi, 
FransiwT, is of a kind which Inspires regard and jealousy 
in the heart of the Egyptian for Egy^t, of the Frenchman 
for France, and of the Englishman for England, This tod 
been denied by some people, but this was no doubt due i 
either to misuzderstanding or to unclear exposition.
The conclusion of toe matter is that there are three things 
in a vatan which compel low , solicitude and vigilance for 
it .  fheyare as follows* First, watan is the abode where 
there is food, projection, kin and oniTdren; Second, it 
l is the place of rights and duties, which are the focal points . 
of political life  and the importance of which is obvious; 
Third» it  is the place with which one is associated and 
through which man is  exalted and honoured, or cast down and 
humbled; and this is purely spiritual. 1
1Quoted.in Sylvia Haim, Islam and Arab Nationalism, op.clt. . pp. 132-33.
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As the patriot!e movements in the Muslim countries in the 1 
nineteenth century were largely superseded by Pan-Islamism, no consider­
able conflict could have’occured at that stage between the adherents of 
the two schools. The situation was different in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century, which witnessed a rapid g*owth of patriotism 
la those countries.’ This was tho catwe of the resounding clash which 
occurred between people like Rashid Riga, representing the ‘Islamic’
school, and Muffafa Kamil and Muhammad ^usain'Baikal, representing the 
• >■ - ■_ ' ■ • - » ' '  ■ ' - ■
Egyptian patriotism. In an article entitled "The Propaganda of the
. . .  1 .. jk'l . . .v • -: \ ¿ ' ‘ ;
Heresy in Egypt* in al manar. Ri<|a vehemently denounced those -
“Egyptian heretics who propagate nationalism, in its 
modern social meaning, which consists in distinguishing 
. peoples and nations from one another and their being
(divided by virtue of) limited homelands without taking 
into consideration far more comprehensive determining 
«id rallying factors, such as religion and language.,..
(The heretics) count a Muslim and an Arab as foreigner 
i f  he is not related by kinship to Egypt. Thus the Cher*
’ rtf of the EiJfSz or of^Syrla is equal in their eyes with 
a heathen from China."
It must be noted, however, that Riga’ s opposition to Egyptian 
patriotism did not deter him from clamouring for the greater ideal of 
Arab unity. This he seems to have done not so much In his career as a 
writer and reformist as in his active life , especially,through his mem­
bership 'of the blab al lamarimsfyat1 al idarlyat* al uthmanl, a party 1
1j i Jm k ., May, 1926.
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founded In Cain® In 1912 with the ala of securing the decentralization......... - j? • ' ;
©f the ottoman Empire** . ,,
But a Bore spirited and erguaented censuring of the nationalists
was effected by Raziq, Contrary to ‘ Abduh and Riga, raziq rejects a ll ,,
f© »9  of nationalism -  whether Arab or Egyptian. Firstly, fcs refutes
the claim» later revived by theorists of Arab nationalism, that Islam
is a religion destined to be glorified exclusively by lb© Arabs,
"Islam*, he writes, "is a noble call made by Cod for
the good of humanity, easterner and westerner, Arab
and non-Arab, man and woman, poor and rich, learned
and ignorant. It represents a religious unity, which
was intended by God to bind a ll human beings -together,
and to embrace a ll the corners of the earth. Islam was _
not an Arab appeal, nor (did it  represent) an Arab unity."
Secondly, in keepln6 with his method of distinguishing between the re­
ligious and political components of Islamic history, he maintains that 
the unity engendered among the Arabs by Islam was of a religious and 
not a political character.
"The Arab unity", he says, "existing at the time of the 
Prophet was not a political unity whatsoever,... It was 
a unity of the faith and religion."’
The main result of this belief i *  to divorce Arab nationalism from its
^George Antonius, ep.clt». p. 109. See also pp. 159-160. . Richard 
Hartmann, Islam und, ^atlonalirous.p. 35 and Arabische ,politlagl» 
Gesellschaften bis 19U. ln Be-itrage Zur Arabiatik. Semltlstlk und 
Islamwissenschaft. p* A54.
O  mm mm^islaa fwa ugul al frukm, p. 81,
3Ib ld .. p. 83.
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religious element, thus depriving it of one of its moat vital and dynamic 
forces. Raziq* s assertion is therefore a blunt negation of the idea of 
Arab predominance,
• As w ill be seen in a subsequent chapter, most cf the modern theory 
lots of Arab nationalism, both ty design and by the force of circumstance?, 
have adopted a line diametrically opposed to the essence of Uaziq's argu­
ments; they have forged an indissoluble unity between Islam and Arab 
nationalism -  a unity which ha3been strengthened and justified by the 
pressures of the We3t.
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Although Egyptian patriotism, In Its narrow sense (and Indeed 
any kind of local patriotism in the Arab world) goes against the grain 
of Arab nationalism, the fact remains that its emergence as a concrete 
political movement at the end ©f the nineteenth century made a great 
contribution, both in political thought and practice, to the present 
Jahase o f Arab nationalism. Besides, the idea of the Arab wa^an (homeland) 
as the gographical manifestation of the ideal of Arab oawmErah (nation­
alism) is no more than an extension of the narrower notion of the Egyptian 
watan. At least in so far as Arab consciousness is concerned Egyptian 
patriot! an has thus added a new dimension to Arab political thought. No 
wonder that the memory of one of the chief leaders of Egyptian patriotism 
at the end of the nineteenth century, Mu^afa tfamil, s t i l l  remains a 
source of inspiration for many an Egyptian follower of Arab nationalism*
-  although Kamil's ideas (as w ill be seen in the following pages) stand 
in sharp contradiction to tho tenets of Arab nationalism.
If  the quickened tempo of Westernization in both the material and 
spiritual lives of the Egyptians was one result of the British Occupation,
\lohanimed Ndguib, Egypt's Destiny. Victor Collancs, London, 1955, p. ¿3.
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the opposite process of the formation of an anti-British patriotic 
spirit was another result. The main components of such a spirit were 
a ll obtaining even before the Occupation. Reference has also been made 
to the emergence of a sophisticated, anti-British feeling immediately 
before and after the British Occupation, We have already noted Jah^awl1s
message of patriotism for the Egyptian I°uth. But most Important of a ll
• *■
was the introduction of the European concept of 'nation* into the Arab 
mind. From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards the Arabic word 
wajan started to assume the meaning of oatrie throughout the Islamic vorld. 
The first Egyptian thinker who seems to have used the word with conscious­
ness of its social and political senses was *Abd Allah HadTir. (1343-1896) t 
one of the outstanding figures of the Egyptian cultural life  in the nine­
teenth century, and the "Tyrtaeus of the *arablat movement"."*’ Sasaarco
speaks of him as an excellent "organizer of patriotic group?, and an ex-
2
tremely energetic and resourceful man". Being one of the active leaders 
of the * Arab! Revolt he was exiled to Constantinople, where he stayed t i l l  
the end of his life . An aocoont of his life  is given by his brother *Abd 
al Fatta^ Nadlm in the introduction to the book aulaf&t an nadla f l  
mnntakhabat as savid *wbd aliah nadim, published in Cairo in 1901, vhioh
'Hr.A.R.Gibl?, «ctudies in Contemporary Arabic Literature" in Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental studies, Vol. IV, 1926-28, p. 755.
/
^Angelo Raamarco, «tolre de l'Kgrute Moderne. l'Institut Francais 
d'Aroheologie Orientale, Vol* XII, Cairo, 1937, p. 318*
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contains* long extracts from Nadlm‘s writings. One of his articles on
the Arabic language, appearing in his j-urnal at tanklt wa*l tabiclt on
June 6, 1331, identifies the idea of patrle (watan) with the language.
He who loses his language, would also lose his watanTyah, nationality,
and religious beliefs -  such is.the gist of his teachings,
, "It is imperative", he aid, "th&t the nation (uraa) 
should found numerous schools and associations , , ,  
to te¡ch the Arabic language and the lore of watan.111
Nedflm also wrote a play entitled al waian, which consists of a discussion
between a reformist and.a traditionalist, Watan is, in fact, the name
of the main character in the play, , .
"The reform," says a character to Wa^ an, "signifies ;
the opening of schools, the diffusion of knowledge, 
the teaching of the sciences and arts which w ill bring 
prosperity, and w ill secure the power of the nation,"*
Sammarco refers to the influence which the patriot Turkish writer, Kamlk 
Kemal (134.0-1830), had made on Nadira's nationalism, Kemal wrote a play 
called watan (a work of much higher theatrical value and poetical in­
spiration than Nadlm’s al watan) , the performance of which in Constantin-
' v ' *
ople in 1876 was marked by «1 upsurge of Turkish patriotic feelifc.
Another author of the same period. Shaikh l^usain al KargafI 
(d, 1889), professor of the Azhar University and later lecturer in the
dammarco, op,..cit,... p. 319.
2Xbld,. p, 320,
^Richard Hartmann, Islam und natlonallflmus. p, 22, also pp. 30-36,
Arabic language at dar al ‘ ulum, wrote a treatise entitled al kallm ath 
thaaan. devoted to the definitions of eipht, novel tcrrn3 In Egyptian 
political terminology, which ere niama (nation), va+an (j^trie ), huktmah 
(government). *adl (justice), gulm (injustice), sisssh (politico), 
hnrriyah (liberty), tarblah (education). The writer takes cognisance, 
not only of the linguistic meanings of these terc3, but also of their 
philosophical, religious and social connotations. Ha describes watan 
as the duelling-place of the nation^“ -  a designation identical with 
that suggested by the classic writers. But his description of the term 
umaa highlights his modernist outlook and approach. Dana is  a community 
(taro<T,rah) unified by the language ( llsan). locale (makan) and religion 
(din). It  is  also to be noted that MarfiafI regards such notions as
2
justice and morals as prerequisites for the salvation of the watan.
Until the tin» of the British Occupation (1332), however, contem­
plations such as those of hadlm and liarsafl remained in the real» of 
pure thought, never able to affect the patterns of political action in 
?.gypt. It  was Kufjefa iSmil who turned these lofty Ideals of the Western 
civilisation into the motivating force# of a truly nationalist movement 
in its Western sense. This was made possible by the shock administered
^Sylvia G, Haim, "Islam and the Theory of Arab Nati^nalisra,'’ in Me Welt 
des Islams. p, 132.- •
^"Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism”, op.clt. , p. 322.
to the Egyptian mind bf British occupation. Although, as has been 
rightly noted by Fritz Stoppât, Kamil was "a politician, and a propa­
gandist'* but "no theoretician, no thinker” (e-in Polltlker und Propagandist, 
keln Theoretlker, keln D e n k e r ) his ideals vere nevertheless instrumental 
perhaps more than those of the ’‘theoreticians and thinkers'*, in mobilising 
most of the nationalist agitations and demonstrations in hgypt at the end 
of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, 
as w ill he seen presently, the nature and evolution of Kamil*8 ideas cuiv 
ioüsly epitomise most of the characteristics of the Arab nationalism of 
today. Kamil was born in Cairo on August 14, 1874. He often spoke proudly 
of his ’noble fa lüh  blood*. His grandfather, As Sayid Muhammad ibn 'A ll,  
was a rich grain dealer. His father 'A ll  Efendi Muhammad (1316-1886) be­
longed to that generation of middle class Egyptian youth who enjoyed the 
benefits of Muhammad 'A l l ’s drive for modern education} 'A ll Efendl, 
after some preliminary studies in Islamic theology, pursued and completed 
his studies in the field of civil engineering, Kamil’s mother, Çaflffc^, 
was the daughter of Captain Muhammad Fahml, a spyldah. a deaeendant of the 
Prophet. The whole family thus contained both the spirit of modem edu­
cation of the Egyptian renaissance ( an nahgat*al migrlyah)and the Islamic 
tradition,^ Faving completed his primary studies, Kâmil entered the
^Fritz Eteppat, NatLonalismus und i slam bei Muf^afa Kamil, die Welt des 
Islam». IV, Leiden, 1956» P* 2$5, ' • ' • " •”
2Ibld. . p. 243.
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Secondary School where he sh-wed a keen Interest in .mathematic* and the 
natural sciences. In 1091 he obtained his secondary school diploma and 
entered the State School of Law (madrasnt* al fruquq): after successfully 
passing the examinations of the first  year, he joined the French School of 
Law ('cole de Prolt) .  which had just (1092) been established as a branch 
of the Raris University in Cairo.
One of the main formative factors of Kamil's social and political 
outlook vas his association with 4 Abdallah lîâdim, to whom we have just 
referred. This association enabled him to acquire first-hand knowledge 
of the ‘ Arab! Revolt (with which ^adlm was closely identified) and the 
causes of its failure. ITe drew three conclusions from Nndîm's account 
of the Revolt: In the first place, the army should not have been used 
as an instrument of political act ion; a patri otic movement should rather 
rely on the power of public opinion, on patriotism and moral education 
( at tarhiaf ?, al wntanlyah wa*l akhlaoiyah) for consolidating the basés 
of liberty and democracy. Secondly, British 'intrigues' constituted one 
of the major hurdles in the way of Fgypt’ s progress towards emancipation,
' i .
and the only way of overcoming these was a sustained and implacable re­
sistance to the Occupation. Thirdly, since the clash between the 4Arab- 
ltes and the Khedive (TawfTq 1079-1092) was one of the main causes of 
the failure of the Revolt, the nationalists should always try to forge 
understanding, and establish co-operation with the ruling Khedive,^
*^Abd ar Kafcmân ar iiêtfl4ï ,  Mu§$afa Kamil, bâ4ith al harakat* alvwafanîyah, 
ran^ba'at'ash 3hdrq, Cairo, 1939, pp. 3rjk-31. Also «i'âtionallgrous un<3 ïsïams. 
OP.o it», p. 245.
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Bat thero was also another factor in iGanil’s intellectual life  which 
was of far greater importance. According to the regulations of tho Paris 
University, the examinations of the Cairo School of Law were to ba held 
in Paris at the end of each year. Kamil thu3 visited Paris three times 
to talco these examinations. His first visit, was in the summer of 1393 
(from June 23 to July 29) and his second in the following summer of 1394., 
during which he successfully passed the examinations of the firs t  and 
second years. He went to Pari3 for the third time in October of the 
same year to take the third year examinations, but was not allowed to 
do so as the regulations of the University prohibited the taking of two 
examinations within the same year. Therefore Kamil went to Toulouse 
and finally succeeded in obtaining his Licence en Droit in November.
These visits broadened Kamil*s mind and
^taught him of the affairs of the nation* and societies 
what he would not have known, familiarized him with 
circles of which he would not have had any idea, and 
brought him into contact with personalities whom he would 
not have met had ha stayed in Egypt. His tour in Europe 
enhanced his status in the field of the nationalist cam*- 
paign, won him international repute and enabled him to 
render the greatest services to the Egyptian cause . . .
There is no doubt that his connection with the French 
professors and journalists greatly benefited him from 
the scientific and spiritual standpoints, since French 
nationalism is the indisputable leader of the peoples 
who fight to revive (their) freedom and grandeur,
The effect of those visits on Kamil's mind was decisive, Kamil re­
turned to Egypt in Pecerrber 1894 ’’determined to devote a ll his life  to
■^* Abd bT Ragman ar Rafi*I, oo.cit.. p. 32.
136
the struggle for his country", . He practised as a lawyer for a while 
during which time he spent most of his time in meditating on and study­
ing books on the Egyptian problem and international politics. The year 
1895 marked the beginning of Tamil's serious political activities. The 
account of an interview, published in al ahran of ^anuary 23, between 
Kamil and Colonel Baring, Lord Cromer’s brother, the latter denouncing 
and the former praising the Occupation, caused quite a sensation in 
patriotic circles. Another article ty him in al ahr~m of J'Virch 4, cri- 
tisizing Cromer's decision to set up special courts for dealing with 
those Egyptians committing crimes against the airy of Occuoation, was 
instrumental In rallying a ll the anti-British circles. In the same 
month (March 1395) ho visited Francois Deloncle, a deputy of the French 
Notional Assembly, who had come to Ifeypt on a fact-finding mission.
The meeting was turned into an occasion for arousing pro-French feelings 
in Alexandria and Cairo, and adding oil to the flame of the hatred against 
the British, In May Kamil went to -Paris to inform the French public 
further about the situation in Egypt, and to win its support and sympathy 
for his country's grievances. In this task he enjoyed the assistance 
of a number of French personalities, among whom the most helpful was . 
undoubtedly the writer Madam Juliette Lamber-Adam, a colleague of Oam- 
betta and the founder of ^ouvoile Revue, Inter to be known, according to
Abd ar Ragman.ar R afi'I, op.clt. , p, 33.
^Ibld. . p. 42. Fritz Cteppat, op.clt.» P* 248.
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Steppat, as Kamil*a beloved "mother'’ ( rellebte "maman").^
In Toulouse and Paris Kamil made a number of speeches in French
which were a ll highly laudatory of the French, revealin'- the great
- hopes which the Egyptian nationalists pinned on France at the time in
their anti-British struggle,
"..Te firmly hope”, he said in his speech in Toulouse on 
July 4» 1895» "that France, who has nourished ua with 
her sciences and her literature, w ill remein our loyal 
Interprets by proving to the whole of Europe that we 
are capable of governing ourselves,"*
There were times when ho identified the Interests of Egypt with those
of France,
"In the public a3 veil as private life  (of Egypt)", he 
said in his speech of December 11th, 1895 in Paris,.
’’whoever comes from France or has anything to do with 
France is (in the British eyes) an enemy, against whom 
everything is permissible, Burfice it  to say that the 
Egyptian patriots who work for the liberation of their 
country are called ’The French Party* by the British, 
and that the patriotic press is branded ’the Franco­
phile press’ . These designations are dear to us, al­
though they have been given to us by our enemies, I’hey 
bring us this consoling certainty that the British then- 
selves confess that we and the French have a common
cause,”3
But, as we shall presently see, his hopes in France were soon to be
^ystl^nalls-n* tend ^slam. p, 243. Mustafa Kamil, p. 55 et eeq.
^Mostafa Kamel Pacha, Egypt!ens et Anglais (with an introduction ty 




shattered by the Anglo-French entente of 1904.
tfsnil made other visits to P^ris, Vienna, Berlin end Budapest 
in the following years, everywhere setting ~ut his country’ s case before 
the European press and politicians. In January 1900 he founded the daily 
newspaper al llwa^The Standard) which was soon to assume the leadership 
of the anti-British Campaign in the country, This was supplemented in 
February by a monthly review called naJallat*al live/ In 1905 he estab­
lished a weekly an gasine called al *alam al Islam! (The Islamic World) 
devoted to covering the events and developments in the i-uslim countries, 
and especially to translating the articles which appeared in the r.uropean 
newspapers and Journals on the problems of the Islamic world.
But his most important contribution to the growth of nationalist 
sentiment wa3 undoubtedly the creation of frisb al wajanl (The Nationalist 
Party) in October 1907, This was not a oarty in the Western sense with 
a definite ideological stand and a distinct class background, although
the '’idea of creating a party on the model of the European political
2parties” had caught his imagination as early as 1902, In view of it« . ' .  
”litt le  attention to economic matters” and its complete apathy to social 
problems  ^ high al wa^anl was rather a front, a centre for rallying a ll
Baft* 1« qn.clt,. p, 145.
%Md, . p, 262,
Vacob Landau, Parliamentary and Political Parties in "gypt. 1866-1924, 
(thesis), University of London, June, 1949, pp.213-214.
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those who fought far ending the Occupation -  so much so that it was : 
often referred-to as high el ja la * (the Evacuation Party),^ The first
congress of the Party held.in Pc center 1707 was attended ty the repres­
entatives of a ll classes of•the nation -  *the notables, farcers, dignl-
2
taries, lawyers, physicians, engineers, industrialists etc,'* A3 Oteppat .„ 
polnt3 out, despite.the nationalist. Party’ s claim to be the genuine spokes­
man of Egyptian 'njionalica, it was merely one of the many political or­
ganizations, such a3 Shaikh All lusuf’s Constitutional Reform Party (hlzb 
al lglah * ala llabadl ad duaturlyg*) and Fas an *Atd ar Hazlq’s People’s 
Party (high til urma) t w lch a ll pursued more or loss similar ains.^ But 
Kamil’s party was undoubtedly the moot efficient of e ll in expressing the 
notionalists’ demands. Two months after the creation of the Nationalist 
Furty, on February 10, 1903, Kamil died of intestinal tuberculosis.
It  is now time to turn to Kamil’s basic ideas, fritz.Steppat has . 
analysed the t© ideas under three main headings which ve shall also retain 
in our survey here*-
^Raf i*I, on.cit,. p. 263.
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* f .  Landau, ou.cit,. p. 2C7a.
^Fat’ ^altsaas pad I glea. p, 250.
1. The Concepts of Fatherland and Nation. Kamil calls his ideology 
vataniyah (patriotism), which la love for one’ s fatherland (wa-fran). 
Fatherland for Kamil is Egypt. This is not a 'elf-cvidcnt fact, since 
Muhammad * A ll’s ambition of "carving nut an Arab empire from the (Ottoman) 
Sultan's dominion"' had created among hi3 subjects a national spirit which 
was not necessarily confined to the borders of Egypt. In Syria he even 
tried to initiate, through his son Ibrahim Pasha, a movement in favour, t ■,  ^ s i „ ••f • ' ‘ . «f «
of Arab nationalism, based on the comical history and language of the Arab 
peoples. The movement spread to Egypt, but died out as a result of 
Muhammad A ll’s failure to realise hia political schemes. It  was super­
seded by the emerging movement towards preserving Egypt’ s individuality 
within the Ottoman Empire. The British occupation acted as "the cata- 
lyst of a specifically Egyptian fatherland-consciousness" represented 
by such men as NadTm, Mar^afi, and now, Kamil,
Although praising the value of the Arab heritage and even acknow­
ledging a racial community ( ta.1 annus) between the Egyptians, Syrians and
. . . . . .  . . .  _ v j - i
Ilijazites, Kamil regards the unity of the inhabitants of the Egyptian
fatherland to be a fact of prime importance. He uses the term "Arab
nation" only to designate the people living under the Jaliphs of the 
- ■ ■ ‘ 3 '■■■ ■'■ i
early Arab-Islamic empire. For him such a nation no longer exists,
George Antonius, op.clt,. p, 23.
^"Katalysator eines Spezifiäih ägyptischen Vaterlands bewussteins."
(Nationalismus und Islam, p. 252.)
•’ ip-yotlens et Anglais, p. 196.
Also significant is hi «application of the word "Arab", only to the 
nomads of Egypt.^ ,
A logical consequence of fatherland-consclouones3 Is national 
 ^ * 
consciousness. But contrary to the concept of fatherland, the concept
of nation Involves Kamil in a number of difficulties. His dilemma can 
be stated in the following terms: I f  the religion, i.e , Islam, is 
taken to be the main criterion of nationhood, he must then leave the 
Copts outside his definition of "the Egyptian nation". But i f  the con­
cept of fatherland is maintained to be the determining factor of nation­
hood f this yould then bring him into conflict with the mass of the Muslim 
inhabitants of the fatherland. In solving this dilemma, Kamil first calls 
to his aid Fichte’s organic theory of the State and then tries to estab­
lish the complete compatibility between patriotism and religion. The
human society, he says, is divided into groups of people (shu*ub. plu-* •
ral of sha* b) between which there prevails a permanent struggle for 
power, Vhen a group of people achieves its aim and acquires power, it  
is turned in the process, on the basis of common interest ( al ranfa* at 
al mushtarakafo)between its members, into a nation (w a ) . Each nation 
should he viewed as a body in which the salvation of each member is  de­
pendant uron that of the other. The existence of a nation is placed in 
Jeopardy whenever one of it3 sections fills victim to "the motive of
1 ^
;?gyrtiens et Analals. p. 73,
M2.
ethnical divergence" (da^I taha*ud al jins! ) But i f  we accept that
individual interests can he best secured through safe-guarding the com­
mon interests of a ll, then we must avoid a ll ethnical prejudice (a^ 
ta* aggub al JlnsI) . ^  Kamil proves his sincere belief in thi s nrlndpie 
when he comes to touch upon the national problem in its more concrete 
aspects. Who can be regarded as Egyptian? In answer to this question 
he first Invokes the theory that nationality is an outgrowth of the geo­
graphical milieu. This, as Steppat te lls us, is reminiscent of ^udwig 
Feuerbach's (1804-1S72) materialistic thesis that the human spirit is 
a product of the material conditions of its environment  ^ ( "Per Hensch 
1st was er ’ 1st" ) .  People who come to settle in a foreign land do not 
always remain there as foreigners. They become assimilated after a few 
generations. There is no prerequisite for their being regarded as 
"nationals" other than staying’ in the land for a long time. On the basis 
of this "geographical criterion" of nationality,’ Kimil rejects, on the 
one hand, the Copts' claims to be the genuine Egyptians because of being 
the direct descendants of the Fharoahs,^ and on the' other,'the Muslims*
attitude in excluding the ethnical and religious minorities from the
- ‘ ‘ . • - - ': ‘ r - •
^Cteppat’ s translation* "Pas Hotly den Ge&enseltlcren abstossnng der 
Volkstumerw(p. 255)
2"Per Fanatlsmus der Ptnlschen Orunpen" (Ibid. . p. 255.)
J .pyotlcns et Anglais, p. 294»
^Tbld.. n. 166.
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penumbra of the traaa. He therefore deprecates ‘ Arable campaign against 
the Circassian officers who, in his view, should be regarded as Egyptians 
because of their long sojourn in Egypt.
Kan 11 excepts one group of the inhabitants of Egypt fro® this com­
prehensive theory of nationality: these are vhat he calls cnkhala’
( singulars daMtH.!). or intruders.* He applies this term especially to 
that group of Syrian Journalists who, as we have seen before,'*' had chosen 
Egypt as a refuge against the tyrannical obscurantism of the Ottomans..v •
His opposition to the dikhala7 seems to have arisen fro® the pro-British 
policy of some of these refugees. in.J^gypt, among others Xaqub Sam-f , 
the founder of al moqtata®, which was set up in 1839 in Cairo with 
British subeidy.^ Kamil often leabed out at the drikhala7and tbs trait- 
ors to national Interests in the same breath.^ However, al ah-wm, 
founded by the Syrian Taqla brothers, enjoyed his support and co-opera­
tion be cause of its Francophile line. But his opposition t® Muslim 
Syrians like Muhammad Rashid Ri<Ja (other dukhala were mainly Christian) 
is understandable only in the general context of his attitude towards 
Islam, although iU<Ja accused him of deliberately waging a war against the 
Syrians in Kgypt.^
p.93.  -
%atlanalis«tta trod I »lam, p. 259.
^Egyptians et Anglais, pp. 93, 163, 184* 187, ZDQ and 202.
^al manar. VI, p. 200 and IX, p. 69 e_t_sga.
.2* : .MlaMo»*.t»..' Hat toHttw. On
the tads of the above analysis, Kamil saw m  conflict between a man’s
h**
religious and patriotic loyalties.■ - ■ \ ■ ■ ■ p
"We in Egypt", .he said, "form a united nation Imam, an eh» 
■tara^ahl. Come of us are Copts, «id a treater number are 
. Muslima. We have tee great duties, ease religious and one 
patriotic. The religious duty requires the Copts to guard 
, and strengthen their beliefs. They should not be blamed 
i f  they sympathize with their religious brothers. The Kuo- 
lims are required by, virtue of their religion« duty to re- 
turn to the correct principles of ¿slam, observe both its  
instructions and proM-Httons, end preserve their unity.
They should not be blamed either i f  they express sympathy 
with their brothers of faith in the other parts of the 
vorld."
But i f  the Muslims and Copts have different religious duties, they are 
bound by only one patriotic duty, which is to serve the "beloved father­
land and struggle for its independence and freedom".* "’.amil thus be­
lieves in a dual loyalty* one towards religion and the other towards 
fatherland. This does not imply his advocacy of lalclsm. On the con­
trary, he appeals for the closest possible association between religion 
and state in T-gypt, Re justifies this appeal on the grounds that the
West has acquired its present power only through upholding its religious 
2
beliefs. But there Is no doubt that Islam for him is merely an instru­
ment in the service of nationalise. His own religious feelings, as 
Gteppat points out, had a superficial character. Against ^ father*a
p, 267, See also, Landau, osucit. . p. 213.
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wish he refused to renusie his studies at the Azhar, a3 the modernist, 
I'estcrnized way of education had proved for him much more attractive.
He did not, however, turn out to be an agnostic or, like the Turkish , 
modernist Zia GokalJI a religious sceptic. . His utilitarian,* 2 rather 
than doctrinal, approach to religion is  especially borne out ty his atti­
tude towards the Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt. Kamil invokes the prin­
ciple of Islamic solidarity mainly to vindicate that sovereignty which was, 
in his opinion, a counter-poise td the British presence in Egypt and there-  
fore offered chances of his country’ s emancipation. . ■
It  is noteworthy that Kamil never allowed the spirit of Islamic 
solidarity to interfere with the issue of Egyotian national unity. That 
is why, on some occasions, he speaks of religion in general. Point 5 of 
the Prorramms of his Nationalist Party calls for "propagation of sound 
principles of religion"^ -  without any qualification. It was thanks to 
this broadminded approach that he made the greatest achievement of his
lifetime -  the removal of the religious obstacles in the way of the unity
5
of the Egyptian people.
Put despite his aooeal for sound religious principles and his West­
ernised outlook, Kamil was engaged in a fierce disoute with the Islamic
^Katlonallsroxs und Islam, p. 269.
2Ibid., p. 271.
•^ Bgyptlens et Arrlals. p. 180 et sec., n. 247. Muf^afa Kamil, p. 339 et seq, 
^Landau, op.clt.. p. 411.
^Natl^nalismus und Islam, p. 274. Landau, op.clt.. pp. 217-218.
revivalists. The dispute was partly due to.the doctrinal conflict be­
tween the nationalists and Pan-Islamists, as referred to elsewhere.^
But it  was partly due also'to Kamil’s personal opposition to such revival­
ists as *Abduh, who had adopted a pacifist’attitude towards the Occuoation, 
and concentrated on the reform of *slam. This opposition led him so far 
as to cause him to take a reactionary stand against the movement for the 
abolition of the veil, merely because it was initiated ty Qasim Amin, one 
of *Abduh*s disciples.
3.', Attitude towards Western Civilisation.. So far as Kamil’ s.attitude 
towards Western civilisation is concerned, we might discern tw© distinct 
periods in his life . The first  period dates from the beginning of his 
active political life  (1895) up to the conclusion of Anglo-French entente 
of 1904 and the second, from 1904 up to the end of his life  (February 
1908). It must be noted that in both periods the central point in Kamil's 
thoughts on the West is, as w ill be presently seen, the British Occupation 
of Egypt. Turing the first period, Kamil should be considered as one of 
the firm protagonists of the Westernisation of Egypt. France, as has 
been hinted before, is for him the standard-bearer of Western civiliza­
tion, In his first letter to his brother from Paris, he writes*
" I  wish youwere with me here in this land of knowledge 
to see the comfort of the people and their way of living.




He calls upon the Egyptian pea trie to struggle hard so that they may 
enjoy the-same culture» the same strength and the sane civilization 
as the Western nations. Kamil regards patriotism and nationalism as 
two instances of "the useful knowledge" which Europe has taught him.
He expresses passionate admiration for such Western heroes of patriot­
ism as Jeanne d'Arc, Franklin and Washington, Garibaldi and Cavour, 
and Kossuth.V It  is interesting to note that Kamil justifies most of
his Ideals by referring to Western civilization. Patriotism is a noble
2
duty beoauae Pasteur admired it; Muslima should show solidarity, be-
3cause the Christians in Europe do so. , Parliamentary government is the
only remedy for Egypt's i l ls ,  because his friends in Paris are of this
opinion.^1 • Finally, throughout this period, Kamil is at pains to impress
upon the Egyptians that the misdeeds of the British in Egypt should not
5
be put down to Western civilization. He does this through emphasizing 
the support and sympathy which other European nations, especially France 
and Russia, express for the Egyptians. Hoping that France and Russia 




Aqflate* 296« ■ -
3Ibld.^ p . 180.
^yatlonallamua.' p. 330.
5ibid .. p ..3 o i..
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"The whole of Europe stands by our side,«
"The whole of Europe is judge in Our case? »ay Si» 
announce finally her supreme judgment I It  is hound 
" to be in our favour,*^ ^
The Anglo-French entente of 1904 wrought deep changes in Kamil's
thoughts. Under this agreement France, already humiliated by the
Fashoda affair (fecember 1898), abandoned her interests in Egypt. This
was a shattering blow to the high hopes of Klmil and, in fact, to a ll
tbs Egyptian patriots. Disillusioned by the defection of France, be
lost his trust in the "whole of Europe" and his optimism in the under-
lying concepts of Western civilisation. Kamil used to say once that*
"Without Europe, Egypt can not exist.
Now he said: ' ' r ' '
"We cannot count on Europe,
"Until today we thought that the aim of the Euro- ^
pean civilisation is real equality and genuine 
justice , ,•• For a hundred years we respected and 
extolled the Europeans, imbibed their sciences and 
wisdom with the utmost willingness,,,. But we have ' —
been betrayed, and robbed of the greater part of 
our power and prestige. There is no course now open 
for us but to learn from the past and thereby pre­
pare ourselves for the future,"*
^Nationallamus. p. 302.
- /
et Anglais> p, 78, also pp. 153-173. 
3Nation^iKnus, p . 305.
4Ibld.. p. 306.
''’ibid. , p. 306. See also Magjafa Kamil, pp. 174-5*
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Worse than mastrust in the West was Kamil's coming round to the 
iPan-IslaraistsI position to view th# East-West tension mainly as a ' 
»symptom of the conflict between Islam and .Christianity. He now main­
tained that the unjust and inhuman policy of the West towards the Oriental 
countries emanated from its anti-Islamic fanaticism, "Jarope”, he de­
clared in unison with Calan 4Abdul pmldi "is waging a Crusade in power 
„politics against us",1 I t  was not surprising that as a consequence of 
this pessimism, Kamil should now even denigrate the material achievements 
of '.'estern civilisation, and empress preference for tbs moral and spirit­
ual progresa of man as the basis ©f the real civilization -  a condition
• o
which ho found missing in the Western world, : 1 '
Nonetheless, as Steppat remarks, Kamil did not allow his anti-
Western irruption to go very far. Ho warned the Egyptian people even
at the height of his disappointment, against holding the Europeans and
Christians residing in Egypt responsible for European politics, and
advises them strongly against entertaining ary idea of isolation from -
3
the outside world. . _ . ’ J • 1 ' -
- Kamil's patriotism was in complete unison with the chief tenor of 
European nationalism in the nineteenth century which was, as remarked ty
r *
p* 3io. ..
%gyptlens e.t.Anglais, pp. 215, 315-317, •_ ■
3lbid,, p. 3U .
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H. G. Wells, "the legitimate claim of every nation to complete sovereign­
ty, the claim ©f every nation to : manage a ll its affairs within its own
‘ .......  1 !- ' V!
terrltoiy, regardleee of any other nation"• .
. ; Thanks to Kugfafa Kamil, patriotism in Igypt was turned from the
apanage of, a small, sophisticated elite into the common conviction of the 
masses« The nationalist movement which swept over Egypt in less than two■ -T . -t .
decades after Kamil*s death (1918» the year of the formation of the Wafd 
Party) unmistakably carried the stamp of Kamil* s thoughts in so far as 
the struggle for self-determination and the efforts towards promoting • 
national consciousness were concerned.
Since Kamil's death there have been a number of sen in Egypt who
have tried to further the Egyptian patriotic consciousness through a "
‘ • •  ^ • - » , ,
much more elaborate and thoughtful way than the mere arousing of emotions. 
Perhaps their best representative has been Afcmad Luffl as Sgytd (1872 - ¡^>5)
once the editor of the paper al .laritdah (1907-1915) and the ex-Chancellor
• • ' ■ ^ r-m ' - - ■' • -
of the University of Cal re,-’ His endeavours to educate an enlightened
generation of Egrptian patriotic youth have won him the title  of the
New York, 1920, I I ,  p. 435.
,% «lter Z, Laqpear, Communism and Nationalism In the Middle East. 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1957, p. 88, also pp. 32-33.
Jamal Muhanmad Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins, p. #5 et sea., where a 
fu ll account of Luffi *s l i fe  and. works "haul been given;
3
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wteacher of the §encration”.^ ' But, unfortunately, this very emphasis 
on education and the nollcv of "the gradual development of new habits 
of thought and new qualities of character” has made Lutfi and men like 
him have litt le  bearing on the coarse'of events and movements in their 
country and in the Arab’’«rid in general; This, of course, is  not to 
deny its eventual and enduring impact on the creation of national con-
* i *• ..
sclousness.
SaastoSUB
, The foregoing chapter has tried to show how the Arabs,,in their 
search for a nw frame to replace that of their old disintegrating society, 
resorted to the various formulas provided by the West in the nineteenth 
century. First they tried to adopt the Western ways of l i fe  in toto. Then 
they turned inwards and attempted to revive and revitalise the principles 
of their religion. Finally they sought the selution to their problem 
in patriotism -  and as w ill be seen in the following chapter -  in a 
comprehensive unity.
Vie have analysed this impact of .the V.'est on Arab thought through 
studying the three major trends*. -  e f Westernisation, Islamic revivalism
Jamal Muhammad Ahmed, oo.clt. . p. 86, 
2Ibid..  p. 96.
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' and Egyptian patriotism. These three trend» converged upon one another 
T during the first two decades of the twentieth century to launch the move­
ment of Arab unity. In propounding the idea of Arab unity, its advocates 
fe l l  back on the precepts of those three trends; for them, everything 
i associated with the upheavals, convulsions and evolutions of the old 
society ~ from the educationallsm of fahtyiwl, through the Pan-Islamism of 
Afghani to the feminism of Amin and Zabawl -  offered immense help. From 
the Westernizers they borrowed the basic notions and principles of social 
and political reform; from the Islamic revivalists they adopted the 
moulds into which their "syncretive” arguments were to be cast; and 
through the Egyptian patriots they became familiar with the notion of 
natrle. l .e . ,  the sense of territorial allegiance as a necessary pre­
requisite to their nationalism.
It  can be said that Arab nationalism is thus a synthesis of a ll  
the above trends* But we must at once add two important riders. Firstly, 
that this synthesis Is far fro® being consummate as the struggle between 
its constituting thesis and antithesis is s t i l l  being carried out. This 
fact undoubtedly" accounts for the state of relentless crisis which has 
beset the Arab mind in the past, as well as at present. Secondly, in 
the synthesis thus emerging, the antithetical elements have sometimes 
as much positive effect as the congenial ones. The views, for instance,
m •of Taha Husain, maintaining that Egypt t'As part of Europe rather than^f 
the Orient, helped the Arab nationalists through weakening the Muslim 
traditionalists (the bigoted Asharltes) and the revivalists (Rashid Riga)
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whs were ©nee united tgr their opposition to any specifically Arab move­
ment.
Nor does the emergence of this synthesis mean that the trends of 
Westernisation, Islamic revivalism and patriotism have lost their in­
dividuality in the vertex of Arab nationalism. On the contrary, they 
have continued to retain, though in varying degrees, their respective 
grounds <nd contributed to Arab nationalism, directly and indirectly, on 
the emotional and doctrinal levels.
Although, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the concept 
ef Arab unity was never absent from the thinking of the leaders of the 
Arab awakening (we saw its examples in the works of JahJaw!, §annu* and 
Kawakifcl) the fact remains that it was often stated and advocated, not 
as a distinct ideal, but rather as part of a more general desideratum. 
From the Young Turk Revolution of 1903 onwards, Arab unity started to 
manifest itself independently ef a ll the ether contemporaneous movements 
and ideals. But i f  the idea and philosophy of unity had its intellectual 
origins in Fgypt, its emergence as a political movement was to take place 
in another Arab country -  in Syria.
Ü S I T Ï
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-Chapter Three
* i -v - . ,
.T O
In a sense, Arab nationalism represents just another Arab attempt 
at finding a solation'to the overwhelming problem*raided ty the dis­
solution of th® traditional society, to which reference was made in the 
previous chapter.. By the,first decade of the Twentieth Century a ll the 
solutions presenting themselves to the lively, forward-looking Arab mind 
had proved to be of no avail} Westernization had precipitated, rather 
then prevented, the Inner, social dislocation* Islamic revivalism had 
transpired to be only a means of buttressing the Ottoman tyranny and, 
finally, local patriotism had proved to be impotent in the face of host- 
ile  Western powers. The very danger that hacljoriginally motivated the 
recourse to these solutions now appeared to be more imminent and more , 
crushing than even »the danger of the complete destruction of the . 
principles of loyalty upon which .the traditional society had rested* .
membership of the family, the tribe and the religious community, respect
forjthe past, the habit of obedience to the suzerain*,
*It was to avoid this danger," says Albert Hourani,
"• ••-.■-•.“that the nationalists endeavoured to arouse a-con-."- 
-  ■ sdousness of the common heritage of language,-hl ot- 
tJ ;'-i-, orieal memories and customs shared ty the Arabs* - and 
to make that consciousness the basis of political 
action and ultimately of government,■■•... 7. . . 7 .
1§yrla and Lebanon. p. 99.
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The call for Arab unity as a political ideal came originally
1 • V ... , ,
from Syria during the first decade of the Twentieth Century. Author­
it ie s  differ as to the factors which made Syria the cradle of the Arab
* *- ** ? ‘ . * i. . ■ ■ r - i v f.
nationalist movement. Some authors/among them Faye z Sayegh, have -
sought these factors in what we may call the* rrstirrae of Syrian history.
’’ "Many factors,” says Sayegh, "contributed to this 
phenomenon. Some were immediate, others, deep rooted 
in the distant past.*
"In the Fertile Crescent, the process of Arabisation 
, , has gone further than elsewhere in the Arab World.
Semitic migration from the Arabian peninsula has ren- ■ 
dered the association between the peninsula «ad the Fer­
tile Crescent since the dawn of history more intimate - '
and vital than the association between the peninsula 
and any other sector of the Arab world.... In addition 
to having had this long and vital- demographic assoel- 
J ation with the Arabian peninsula, the Fertile crescent 
had also been the seat of the Arab Caliphate in its  
height. . . . * * 2
Other authors take a less abstract line and ascribe the emergence 
of nationalist movement in Syria to specific political and social con­
ditions prevailing in the Arab parts of the Ottoman Hapire at the begin­
ning of the Twentieth Century. The most salient of these conditions m
- ^Except where otherwise stated, the term Syria in this chapter Is applied 
: to what has been referred to by the Arab geographers as "ash shim. i . « # 
the area comprising those lands which came to be later known as Pales­





First and foremost was the "Turanian Chauvinism'1* of the Young 
Turks from the time of the 1908 Revolution onwards, Evidently, of a ll 
the Arab lands, it  was Syria who was subjected to the fu ll blast of that 
Chauvinismj Egypt maintained merely nominal bond3 with Constantinople 
and, moreover, the British Occupation had predialed ary Ottoman inter­
ference, So long as the Arab and Turkish intellectuals were suffering 
equally from the "Hamidian despotism* -  a fact which resulted in their co- 
operation within the Committee of Union and Progress -  that despotism 
co'ild not have evoked a specifically Arab reaction. But when, to the dia- 
appointment of the Arab sympathisers of the •Committee of Union and Pro­
gress’ , the ‘Young Turks Revolution* of 1908 served only to temper Turkish 
despotism with a blatant, deliberate anti-Arabism,^ then the opposition to* . • • v 4. : ■
; • - •• - • ‘ >  -*
the regime was bound to shrink within the Arab -  i.e , Syrian -  sections 
©f the empire,
"As a result,n says Zeine, "of the Young Turks* Tur- 
klfying program,, the Arab le&ders* objective of. gain- 
* ing fu ll rational independence received a great stimu­
lus which consolidated it. As far as Arab political
"nationalism is concerned, i t  can safely be asserted
1Z®ine, Arab-Turklgh jelatlong, p. 73 gj.JSa«
^Antonius, on. clt. . o. 61 et .afta.
%bld. .  p. 101 ft  seq.
^Richard Hartmann, "Arabische Politisch© Gesellschaften bis 1914" in 
fr l trage,..mar Arablstlk, P^c it., p. A54.
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that It  was the national and racial policy of the 
Young Turks which fanned Its flames. " 1 *3
This Arab reaction to Turanian chauvinism would have been less 
passionate and articulate than it was had it  not Veen for two factors; 
the gradual Syrian awakening*to their Arab identity among the Ottoman 
citizens and the double plight of the Christians consisting of their 
inferior legal 3tatus within the Ottoman society together with embroil- 
ment* in religious differences, differences among themselves and with the
r...........2
Muslims. The ideal of Arab unity offered the Christians »the only way 
■ 3
of escape'’ from both these predicaments. Reference was made in the pre- 
ceding chapter to the enlightening functions of the first Western in­
stitutions created in Syria mainly through American and French efforts. 
Taking advantage of the favourable material and spiritual conditions 
created by such efforts, two societies were set up in Beirut, one in 18^ 7 
under the name or the Society of Arts' and Sciences.*the other in 1857 called 
the Syrian Scientific Society ( al Jam*Iyatyal *llmlyat7as sirlvaK). both
1  -  *< • * '  - - '  v - * ;  *  ' *  - ,  'C V  / .
The Arab Turkish Relations, pp. 79-80, ; It is interesting to note that 
one of the numerous Arab nationalist groups which sprang up after the - 
Young Turk Evolution was called al qahj,aniyah-  from the name 
one of the legendary ancestors of the Arab racet a reference to the de­
sire for Arab return to pre-Islamlc origins, analogous to the return of 
the Turkish nationalists to pre-Islamic common ancestors like Turan, (Dr, 
Saab, The Arab Federalist a. p. 250. For a fu ll analysis of the Arab nation­
alist societies during the first decade of the Twentieth Century see Ant—* 
onlua* The &ra.b Awakening, pp, 101-125 and Dr. Saab’s above ■mentioned, book 
p. 225 et sea,) . . . ,
O  '  ♦  •• • s ’  - - r -  > , i
^Cf.'Richard Hartmann. Islam ttnd Nationallsmus. op.clt.. p, 21.
3 / it
A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, p. 104.
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with the declared aim of "promoting-knowledge by an organized collective
effort",^ The main personalties behind these societies were Ibrahimm '
Yazijl (1800-1871) and Butrus Bustanl (1819-1884), both Christian Arabs
2
and eminent literary figures* Both societies, besides spreading educa­
tion, brought a great number of Syrian intellectuals into contact with
Western' culture. Both did a great deal to foster national feelings ©nong
3
the Arabs, By concentrating their efforts on promoting the Arabic lan­
guage, the leaders of these societies had indeed attacked the problem of 
Arab sociopolitical decline from the right angle,^
Between the rise of Mi^ ammad ‘ All in Egypt (l805) and the British 
Occupation of that country (1882), the movement of ideas in both Egypt
and Syria, "so far as the Arabic cultural revival and the birth of Arab
5national consciousness went", marched hand in hand. From the Occupation
Antonlus. o^.clt.. p, 52.
^IMd,, pp. 45-51^ BuEtanl has been identified by same writers with the 
beginnings of W W  nationalism, "Under the influence of European 
and American missionaries," writes Dr, Saab, "and the impact of the ■ 
Christian general hostility to the Empire, the Christian Arabs of Lebanon, 
and Beirut indeed have a clearer concept of Arab nationalism. This appears 
in a lecture given by the Lebanese author Butrus el-Bustani in Beirut in 
1839« The lecture was about Arabic literature, and to designate Arabs 
as distinct from non-Arabs, el-Bustani used the common term ‘sons of Arabs’ 
( ahca el arab) .  After drawing a parallel between the greatness of the 
Arabs and the decadence of their sons, el-Bu3tani rebuked the sons for 
theirjraliance on what their Arab ancestors achieved..,,. He asked for more 
borrowing from foreign cultures and assailed those who pretended that the 
Aral« have everthing they need In their own culture." ( The Arab Federal­
ists of the Ottoman Empire, p, 201.)
^Ibid. , p. 54.
^See below.
^Antonius. op.clt.. pp. 99-300.
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onwards, divergent po litica l interests between the two peoples gradually 
weakened these co llatera l movements. To stand up to the British pressure, 
the Egyptian leaders adopted two lines o f'po licy . Externally they con» ~ 
tlnued, as we saw in the case of Mugr$afa Kamil, to express loyalty to the 
Ottoman Caliph in the ñas» o f Pan-Islam ism. This was no doubt a tactical 
move necessitated by the finesse e f  power po litics . Internally, they in­
voked the idea of Egyptian wajan (patrie) and wafaalyah (patriotism ). The 
matter was not so'simple fo r toe Syrians.' They were engaged in a b itter 
and bloody figh t against the Ottomans and therefore toe idea o f truckling 
to the Caliph for the sake e f Islamic unity was out o f the question. Nor 
could they fa l l  back on th# idea o f vaftaniyah, since there was no such 
thing-as the Syrian wafan. Syria had been throughout a part o f the Empire 
and the concept o f a Syrian homeland was therefore alien and incompre­
hensible to the mass o f her inhabitants. I t  was otherwise with Egypt who, 
since Muhammad * Aliviad achieved an increasingly distinct status within 
the Ottoman -Umpire.’. Besides,' toe variegated composition o f  the Inhabitants 
o f geographical Syria, made up o f such religiously and socia lly  divergent 
sections as the Sunnis, flhi*Is, Druses, ‘ Alawla, Kurds « m3 Ism a'ills (not 
to speak of the Christian minorities) seriously undermined aiqr fee ling  o f 
specific 'Syrian so lid a rity '• •_
But the Syrian leaders managed to make up fo r  these shortcomings 
by presenting an idea which, especially in the light of recent literary, re-
%curani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 121-145.
: 16o,
v iv s lt <possessed In fin ite attraction for their people: that o f the Arab 
irorna and, aa i t 9.corollary, of the ? Arab qsMwTrah (nationalism))’ .trans­
cending a ll. denominational differences,,. I f  the Syrians could not lega lly  
claim a distinct, nationality fo r  „themselves because of ...their being Otto­
man .citizens they could, instead, ty  virtue o f their language and, their 
historical heritage, -regard themselves , as-members o f the Aj^b jy^ ma. Be­
sides, ty extending the,principal.ideas o f Egyptian.watanlyah, aa pro- 
pounded Ty ’JahJawT, Nadlm, Marsafl and Namil, beyond the confines of a 
specific homeland, they could also -.lay,claim to an Arab watan. I t  is  in 
the conter* <"»f nil rtrmaiderations.that ’ r«aH t-f i»« of the Arab
world at the befinn ing o f the twentieth 'century as the general apathy of 
the Syrians „towards the idea o f „Islamic unity, .and the Christians’ leader- 
ship of.the Arab nationalist movement, can make sense,. The idea of Arab
- Y- *
unity, as launched cy tne Syrians, besides terns• the .outgrowth o f a 
h istorica l.process within the Arab-Muslim world, entailed also' a position 
o f immense .tactica l’value,‘ I t .  offered attraction/to millions o f other 
Arabs who were reeling under the How» o f Ottoman tyranny and,'therefore,
constituted a major external prop fa r  the .Syrian nationalists. ,
* 1 ...................* .............................................
Nevertheless, it  must not be thought *there was a complete rupture 
between t^h© Syrian-Arab nationalists and Egyptian patriots. , Cairo never 
ceased to be the.centre of Syrian/Arab nationalists and thelrintrigues
Gaither-Branne, ♦’Die Entwlcklung- des Natlona 11 smus* ' In P c ltra gepp.* 434-435«
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against the Ottomans, .
As a representative o f ea rlier Syrian protagonists o f the idea 
o f Arab unity* in Egypt, one might perhaps mention *AdIb Ishaq ( I 856-  
1835), an eminent poet and writer, and one o f the leaders o f modem
nationalism in the nineteenth ttry Egypt. Ial?Iq annealed fo r  a
laio nationalism, mainly based on the rallying bonds of language, race 
and patriotism*! In an article entitled dawlat?al *arab (Arab government) 
he onoe wrote* ■- ■ „
they made contact with one another «ad arranged fo r  a 
meeting between themselves in which they would con­
verse, negotiate and declare their aims with a united 
voice, as i f  they spoke with the same m o u t h . D o  '• 
they think that such a voice would find no echo’* or 
do they fear that their e ffo rts  might go to waste?
Or do they not know that such a gathering /which should 
bg7 free from a l l  religious bonds, exclusively, based on 
ethnical ( .Unairah)and patriotic relationship ( 1asablrah?
. and composed o f most o f the Arab sects (ni|tal) t would - 
create a sensation in the world, end would bring /sthejgP 
‘ governments over to Its  side either through sympathy or 
through fear, thus returning to the Arabs the waif which 
they look fo r , and conferring upon them the rights which 
they demand, and on their leaders ’nor fear shall come, 
nor g r ie f* ."2
Another link between Arab nationalists and Egyptian patriots was 
Paris which, almost until the French Occupation o f Syria (1920) was the 
cultural rtKaabaw of the Egyptian and Syrian intellectuals as well as the 
focus o f a l l  manner o f Arab patriotic and nationalist activ ities .
"Uhat harm would i t  do the leaders o f this 1  i f
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The period roughly starting from the beginning of the Twentieth 
Century arid ending in 1939 witnessed the growth of the idea of Arab 
unity. But unlike the nineteenth century which, as seen in the previous 
chapter, was mainly the epoch of writers, thinkers and reformers, this 
was the period of agitators, plotters and fighters, Even those Arab in­
tellectuals who could be considered as the leading sophisticated souls 
of the nationalist movement in the period possessed also the qualities 
of devoted,' down-to-earth militants.
A typical figure of the movement up to the Arab Revolt was the 
Christian Syrian, Najlb i r l ,  tt is thanks to his lifelong friend 
and colleague, Eugene* Jung, the former French vice-resident in Tonkin/
that the'major facts of his life  are known.' ‘Izurl was educated in
/• .
France and obtained his diploma at the age of twenty from F.cele des Hautea 
Etudes. He then returned to Jerusalem, where he stayed for six years 
and of which he eventually became Deputy Governor, But in July 1904 we 
find ‘ Azurl condemned to death by the Turks in absentia "because of hay­
ing left his position without permission and having gone to Paris where
' ' " • ' '" ’ '' 2
he has engaged in activ ities  detrimental to the existence o f the State",
His main achievement in Paris, which soon won him a considerable 
renown in the Arab world as well as in the interested'European circles, 
was the creation of the Llgue de la Petrie Arabe. The programme of the
Eugeno Jung. La Re volte Arabe, I, Librairie Colbert, Paris, i.924* p. 20.
2 ' -• * - ■ 'IM«» P- ?5.
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league is a significant document so far as i t  throws light on the 
initial Arab stand in .their relations with the Ottoman Einpire, and an 
their solution for the problem of the Caliphate« There are two French 
versions of this programs» availabla to us« The first» which is  the , 
translation of an Arabic original, is  addressed to the Arab peoples; 
the second version is  malnljr intended for the European and American public. 
On the Arab relation with the Ottoman fiaoire both the versions of the pro­
gramme are identical, both appealing for a complete rapture. But on the 
question of the Caliphate, there is  a meaningful difference between them. 
Whereas the firs t  version does not state clearly whether the future Arab 
saltan would wield religious power er not (n*ktre souverain sera Arab et 
Musulman"1), the second version stipulates that
"Le vilayet actuel du Hédjaz formera, avec le terri taire 
de Médine, un «moire indépendant et dont le souverain 
* sera en mime temps le Calife religieux de tous les Musul- * 
man. Ainsi une grande difficulté, la séparation du pouvoir 
civil du pouvoir religieux dans l'Islam, aura été résolue , 
pour le plus grand bien de tous,"*
This difference should be put down, on the one hand," to * Issue's d iffi-
atraosphere of France and, en the other, to his desire to secure European, 
and primarily French, support for his schemes by promising an irreligious 
character to.the future independent Arab state.
den ce in expressing openly his laic outlook, formed in the anti-clerical
"^Dokuœente mm 
Islams. -VIII* 1 _
2Ibld.» P. 100.
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‘Izurl's  rich French background in education waa a decisive factor 
in his political career. In 1905# vhlle in Paris, he published a book en- 
titied k H t w U  de la  Nation Arabe dans l'Asje ;Tugatlf (Libraire Plon, 
Paris) an account of the social and political jplight of the Syrian Arabs 
under the Ottomans, Saji4 al Hosti has singled out this book as an example 
of the f i r s t ’AraVeffart t® secede from the Ottoman Empire, The book made 
two major ■suggestions with regard to the future of the Arab world. The 
first waa the unification of a ll Catholic churches in %rla under the name 
of the Arab Catholic Church and the second the secession of the Arab 
vilayet» from the Ottoman State with the.Hijas as the scat of an Arab 
Muslim Caliphate and with Iraq, Syxt&jn Lebanon and Palestine forming 
a united secular State -  i.e , the gist ef the programme ©f ‘ Amiri's
i-r ,
League. Smg also has mentioned Le Revel^. together with his own 
Lg».. Puissances deyant. .la . Revolts.... Arabe2 (Hachette, Paris, 1906), 
as two main works which apprised the world of the existence of the Arab
2The Times» review of this book on Au(|ttSt 24» 1906, shows the similarity 
between Jung's thesis and 'Izu rl's  Programme of the League. Jung's 
proposition, writes The Times, " is  noth ng else than the revival or con­
struction of a great empire. This is the solution of the problem cf the 
_Middle East," J*M. Jung proposes nothing less than the reconstitution 
I of the Wahabite' kingdom supported by European powers, enlarged by the 
‘ addition of the Arabs now subject to Turkey, stretching from Egypt to 
Persia, from Aden to Asia Minor.” "A solution of the religious d iffi­
culty, even more delicate in the East than in the West, is proposed.
The Mussulman Pope, the Cherif of Mecca, is  to have an independent Papal 
- ¡State, the Eedjaz. Religion is to be freed from lay .entanglement by 




‘Izuri^s other achievement in Paris, again with the help of Jung, 
was the publication of a monthly review called 1* Independence 'Arabs of 
which th® first issue appeared in April 1907 and the last in September 
1908. In the following pages,we~txy to infer the main features of 
‘Sswrl's nationalist thought from the contents of the fifteen issues 
of this review.
The suffering of th# Syrian Arabs constitute the main concern of 
*lzurl. Nothing else can so tench arouse his feelings and stimulate his 
Journalistic abilities. He holds Syria, to be entrusted with the mission 
of liberating a ll Arabs.
"The complete and definite emancipation," he says, "of 
the whole of the Arabian?peninsula, is closely tied up 
with the fate of Sjyrla.?
and_, t
"It is understood among our compatriots and friends that 
„we 3hould-concentrate our most laborious efforts on the 
Syrian provinces of Jerusalem, Damascus, Beirut, Alepn®
- and Adana,"’ ' '
Numerous ’ articles In the 'issues of 11 Indfloeildene» are 'devoted
• , '' ‘ • • i - •1 - _ ' , _ _ V
to setting out the profound racial, cultural and political r ifts  between
, *. • , . i
the Syrian Arabs and their Turkish oppressors,. *lzur[ therefore clamours
•^La ftevote, * pp, ■ 9-10. ‘
21»Independence. April 1907, p. 3.
3im -
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for Syrian independence both on groundi of humane Considerations- and 
political expediency. Bat ‘ IzurT is  particularly anxious to see & 
united front of Syrian Aral»,«* whether Muslim or Christian -  in the face 
of the Ottoman' tyranny. '
"The paiofttl convulsi-ms, * he says, ^ in  which our un- 
fort mate land (otrrtt) ia floundering allow us to detect 
the Turks* intentioa to rekindle* before they are ex­
pelled, our ancient internecine diseordaj they thus 
want to sake us fa l l  upon one another, so that they . 
might be able to consolidate their shaky tyranny through 
exploiting the ignorance and the worst instincts which 
can be found in a ll peoples,"’
_ It is  m  indication of *Xsixl*s genuine Arabian that he takes equal
- -• - - ' * ? • , • •. - > ,  . . .  •. < . .  .
interest in the rebellious stand of the other Arabs against the Ottomans, '
■v ‘"h'* • ■ > r-'- . ^ .....
especially that of ‘Abd al ‘ Asls Ibn Sa*tsd in the Najd and Imam Ya^yain
the Yemen, whom he describes as a "true Arab". He in fact regards only
the "Asiatic Arabs" as."the Arabs proper" and refers to the Egyptians,
Tunisians, Moroccans sod others merely as "Africans who speak oar language*.
*An article ty Victor Berard in 1 *Independence of Jane 1907* after ex­
plaining the Arabs* cultural superiority oxer the Turks, concludes by 
saying that» "Neither fusion nor even understanding has ever been poss- - 
lfcle between the Turks and the Arabs; the contrast between these two 
races, these two languages and these two temperaments is too great,"
2In an article entitled l*Atttaaomle de Cyrie by Ludovlc de Contensan the 
.-■■case has been put - forwardlor the creation of an autonomous buffer-state 
in Syria in order to prevent a clash between the ambitions of Germany and 
- "the dissolving intrigues" of. Britain in regard to the Ottoman Hapirt.
ibis, says the writer, is the task of Franca as her contribution to main- 
_  tairlng world peace, t1fInj§ptndepee, May 1907, p, 19»)
l ^»Indepswdnee, May 1907, jv  2. '
' ,*0 *4 .’ - ■ - " :
-Tbit.
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Certainty the mo3t significant feature of ‘Izurl^s Arab nwHrtn«11 wm 
is its conflict with Egyptian patriotism. Of the various patriotic groups 
in Egypt i t  was naturally MufFfcafa tfSmil*a Blzb al WatanI which received 
his sharpest attacks. The main point of conflict was the attitude towards 
the Ottoman Caliphate, As we noticed above, *lzu*5 advocated the Arabs* 
complete rupture with the Ottomans, He therefore condemned those Egyptians 
who, because of basing their ”patriotic theories on the Muslim religion 
and its universal and unique Caliphate” regarded the Sultan of Constantin­
ople as the "legitimate sovereign*,1 In the firs t  issue of 1♦Independence 
* Azuii promises te criticise in future this "sophist dogma" of the iSmilist 
group. Disappointment results when his analysis turns out to be no more ' 
than either journalistic polemics against Kamil or shrewd expression of 
support for anti-Kamil parties -  even to the point of approving the British 
Occupation of Egypt, It is interesting to note that just as Kamil de­
fended Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt in order to combat the British, *Izurl 
and otter Arab nationalists defended the British in order to thwart the
Ottomans, In an article entitled*£bose d’Eitvote -  Douches Froldeafpromin- v
/ . * . .....
ence has been given to the formation of an Algophile party in Egypt led 
ty Muhammad Wahid Bey, Support for other Egyptian Anglophile parties 
and press, such as al muqtatam, al watan and al baflr, has also been ex­
pressed in another article entitled* "Les Partis Politiques en Egyptet •*
•*•11 IndependonceMay 1907, p. 2, 
fobld. . May 1907, p, 28 et sea.
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1 'Initiative de Ilohaaed Wahid-Bay*. In which Kamil ha3 been denounced
1
as an agent of Constantinople, Even Kamil's death was seized upon by ■
1*Independence as an occasion for his renewing attacks on the Anglophobe 
2
patriots in Egypt. •
* ■ As a politician, ‘Szurl was, lika Afghani, definitely an apostle 
of Kealoolltlk. • He conceived the whole system of European politics as a 
welter of intrigues and manoeuvres on the part of great powers in quest: 
of grandeur and might...Since Germany was the main protector of the Otto­
man Caliph, *lzurl'a sympathies naturally lay with the British and French. 
By likening Britain to ancient Carthage and Germany to ancient Rome, he
f
unscrupulously encouraged the' British to interfere with the political de­
velopments in the Arabian peninsula " i f  they did not want the fate of
3
Carthage to befall them”. Hia admiration for France was motivated, not
so much ty the cold calculation of power politics, as by his belief In
/
her as the leader of contemporary civilisation. No wonder, therefore, 
that he was in favour of an alliance between Britain and France to hold 
in check the German penetration into the Arabian peninsula." In view of 
MS keen interest, in the subtleties of .power politics, ‘Xzurl could ..be. no.
m /Independence. Cctober-Noveraber, 1907, p. 121 et seq.
2,tbld. , AprilW'ay, 1903, p. 193 et seq.
%bid. . Augu3t-Scpte-i ber, 1907, pp. 65-72.
^Ibld. . June, 1907, p. 33.
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believer in the.mass straggle. In his opinion, ordinary people, especially 
in the Eastern countries, could have neither the power nor the competence
-  -  -  - 0
to determine.their destiny, He does not .express this view openly in re­
gard to the Arabsjm in fact in his first elect!on"speceh addressed to his 
'' ,» 
constituents in Jerusalem, after the Young Turk ^evolution ®f July 1903,
1
he extols their heroic struggle against oppressive governors. It  is 
rather from his analysis of. the Persian revolution of 1903, entitled Expose'' 
TTiatorloue du Mauvement Liberal Persan. that his belief in the impotence of
- '■ • '  ^ V f . .l
the masses is  laid bare, ■ He holds the Persian people incapable of running
2  *
their own affairs, • He is so much obsessed with this belief that at one
point, when he uses the ward "citizens'’ tcltavens) . he hastens to define it
as .■
.The Young Turic Revolution of 1908, as was stated above, raised- : ■ ‘ ' • • ; - *■ - * - W • V; .•
hopes of liberation among the Arabs, *lzurl, like many other Arab in-" ...... i •.' * V V "
tellectuals, maintained for some time close co-operation with tho Y»ung 
Turks, • This co-operation seems to have corns to an end in 1907, A para­
graph in the communique of the Coaite explains the rupture in these terms*
n t . .
\ f *. V < .... I.’  ^ : . * *
1*Independence. July-August-September, 1908, pp, 241-242,
2Ibld .T December *1907 -  January 1908, p, 132.
.:^ IM ^.,' p, * 135.
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"¿pe have/ t© address a word of sympatïgr to the 
excellent friends whom v© have among the Young Turks ' 
and te ll them how much we re?ret to have to separate 
our cause from theirs.
This secession has not been caused, as one is tempted 
to think, by /an7 antagonism between our race and the 
Turkish nation or by an obstinate parti oris allegedly 
underlying our conviction that this is the sole means 
of improving our destiny,™.
But with the 1908 Revolution there occurred another change in 
‘ïâ ir l 's  thoughts in favour of co-operation with the Young Turks, In 
his election speech referred to above he announces complete agreement 
between the Young Turks ( "mes compagnons d ^ x il”) and himself on the
A
reforms to be rectified by the new Ottoman Fterliament. Besides, in a
long article entitled! Bistoire des Peux Constitutions Turques, after
discerning promising symptoms of a liberal and egalitarian policy in
the new Turkish regime, he makes the significant statement that:-
"In these circumstance  ^ our attitude towards the new 
government of Turkey should be of such a nature as t© 
facilitate its task of reform. We had always promised 
our Young Turkish friends to furl our separatist flag . 
and to unite with them in a common cause once they 
succeed in overthrowing the Hamldlan absolutism, be­
cause we were convinced that under a liberal regime, 
based on a system of decentralisation, a ll the con­
stituent nationalities of the Ottoman Empire would in­
dividually achieve progress in a prodigious manner,n?
I 1independence. April 1907, p. A.
^Ibid.. July-August, September, 1903, p. 2^2.
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Thus ‘Saurl dropped one of the main items of his 1904 programme 
of the Llgue de la Ration Arabe!la which the separation of an independent 
Arab State from the Ottoman Rnpire'had been contemplated.
Although in the last, triple issue of l 1Independence *Izurl 
promises that,1 in spit* ©f thetruce (treve) in "the fight’' and his 
departure for Jerusalem to stand as a candidate in the forthcoming
elections.' 1*Independence w ill continue to appear under the editorship ,
2of Eugene Jung, there was no further publication of the review, ’
The truce of ‘la i r l  with the Turks, like that of a ll  the otter 
Arab nationalists, was short-lived, *lzurT was among the first  to fa l l  
victim to the anti-Arab policy of the Young Turks, On his arrival in 
Jerusalem he was deterred ty the Ottoman authorities from standing as a 
candidate in the elections on the founds of his previous conviction, 
and was soon placed under surveillance. He managed to escape from Jeru­
salem and reach Cairo,^ Henceforward, '^zuri devoted a ll  his time and 
energy to subversive activities against the Ottomans. He created a 
Masonic Lodge of the Scottish rite in Cairo, the aim of which was to
■^ Independence. July-August, September, 1908, p. 257.
2Antoniu3, p, 99.
I^ a Revolts, I, p. 25.
172.'
”11berate the nation”. ' *Xzuri alee took-part In variées arme deals,
•jeter, alla, with the Italian delegation in Cairo, on behalf of the Arab
2 '  rebels,.. He also started the publication of..a new journal called l ’Egypte.
3
of which Jt»g was the Pails correspondent. The very name of this new 
journal^ compared with that of 1Azurl■s previous review fl»Independence 
Arabe), reflects his desire and effort to enlist the support of the 
Egyptians for the cause of Arab nationalism-*■ another phase in the Egypto- 
Sjrrian co-operatibn.towards Arab unity. Thé French’ indecision and passi- 
vity in the face of repeated Arab appeals for intervention on their ac­
count do not aeen tojhave made him waver In his Francophile attitude.
"We w ill always,” he wrote to Jun  ^on November 17, 1912, "remain loyal 
to France, and it  w ill not be our fault i f  we fa il" . This "loyalty" *
sometimes assumes the character ot desperate expression of obedience
* j  .-J.'. '■> ■ ■;  Î  ^ - : L ' :  ! ■ - '  : : j ' .  '■» ¡ - . t  y ' : . - . *
towards France, and compassion for French interests. "They ¿referring
• ... J ■ ■ , -
.-i .  .  i  . ■ y \  ■ ■' - *
to the French/ must help us," he says in the same letter, "and te ll us
, .. j... ? ....... p» .... > -, * * ; »
what they want us to do. " We w ill then perform what is expected of us.
Put i f  they continue to listen to the palabras of the consuls and dip­
lomats . . .  then they are apt to be surprised ty events and, as in 1882,
„ ■; • i r , i î 1 f i i i J' .5 £ ;
they w ill regret not having taken even a part in the direction of the
•' 5 '
movement,". .
•^ Jung, La Rlvolte. I ,  p. 33.
2Ib ld .. pp. 33-39.
3iMd.,p.~'4i;.... -■
^It is interesting to recall that Adïb Ishaq's first Journal in Cairo 
was also called mlgr (Egypt)* V. supra. p,i£>l
5
Jung, LaJiSZalii» I» P*
1
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On June 18th, 1913» the firs t  Arab-Syrian Congress opened in
Paris* Its'programs« was to study*
1* The rights of the Arabs in the Ottoman Empire;
2« Becessity of safeguarding the national life  of 
the Arab Ottoman lands;
3. The aspirations of the Arab colonies established 
abroad; .•
A. Syrian emigration and immigration;
5* Necessity of reform in the Arab Ottoman lands on 
the basis of decentralisation.
There seems to have been a serious r ift  among the Arab national­
ists with regard to the programme and alma of the Congress, ‘ laurl 
approved the idea of the Congress, but In view of his differences with 
its sponsors, he made an eleventh-hour attempt to postpone its opening 
so that he might be able to attend. The Congress, however, went ahead 
according to its schedule,
"The real organisers,* he wrote to Jung," of this Con­
gress are Shukii Ghanim and the liujran brothers. The : 
others are the sheep of Panurge,"
After referring to Ghanim’s grovelling at the Turks* feet to obtain
high positions, he goes on to say that*
"At heart, a ll  these men want the independence of the 
Arabs, But knowing that this is a difficult task in­
volving sacrifices and activ ities,„ . they prefer to 
appease the Turks, This is the whole of the question.
The Paris Congress w ill be composed of fifty  delegates,
fflii&k, p. (ft.
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of whom only five or six really understand what decen­
tralization means, I am happy about this Congress be­
cause it w ill demonstrate to these men as well aa to 
the whole world the futility of a ll attempts at under- 
'standing^r co-operating with,the. Turks. ” 1
- The proceedings of the Congress confirmed <Azurl*s hidden fears 
at the ocpense of contradicting his prophecy,. The majority of the dele­
gates expressed their desire to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman 
iwnpire, A deputation from the Congress called afterwards upon the Crown
Prince of Constantinople and ’’assured His Highness of the loyalty and
2attachment of the "r&b nation to the ^ Ottoman dynasty and country . It  
was apparently as a reward for this expression of loyalty that the leaders 
of the Congress were soon appointed to high official positions, but were
3
among the first  to be executed by the Turks with tho outbreak of the War.-, 
‘Xzurl was in the midst of preparations for the Arab Revolt when 
ha vas attacked by embolism and died in June 1916 in Cairo.
Antonius maintains that *AzurI's activities, because ©f "being, 
conducted from a foreign capital and in a foreign language” never reached 
"the heart of the Arab nationalist movement”.^ But the fact remains that 
as far as the period immediately before the Arab Revolt is concerned, *■.. 
*izurT. represents a ll  the aspirations, hopes and fears of the first  pro—
■^Jung, op.cit,. pp. 66-67.
. p. 69.
■^The Arab Awakening, p. 99,
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tagonists of Arab unity.
Antonias* criticism of *Azurl reveals one of the cardinal 
characteristics of the Arab natirralist movement at the loginning of 
the Twentieth Century -  the wide gulf between the contemplating elite 
and the militant mass. This was the result of another characteristic 
of the movement to which we have just referred, i.e , its main emphasis 
on practical rather than theoretical politics.
With the division of geographical Syria into the Lebanon and 
Syria proper under the French mandate, and Palestine and Transjordan 
under the British mandate (which also included Iraq), following the 
First World War, the striving for the universal!stic ideal of Arab unity 
was relegated to the background in favour of the fight for the particular­
istic object of local indépendance, wen when theoe countries attained 
fu ll independence it  took the idea of Arab unity some time to come to 
the forefront of Arab politics as the unequal social and political de­
velopment of each one of them under a separate mandatory power, compared 
with their equal stagnation under the Ottomans, had robbed the idea ©f 
much of its former relevance. But Just as at the beginning of the Twenti­
eth Century the components of Arab nationalist thought were welded into 
a fairly coherent system only as a reaction to the Turkish nationalism, 
the idea of Arab unity, following the political developments between the 
two world wars, also stood In need of a fresh "catalyst” to externalize 
it . This catalyst was provided ty the Palestinian disaster, of 1943 and
the general tnalaise in the Arab world after.the Second World War, 
points w ill be discussed In the following pages.
These
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HOPKRK ARAB NATIONALISM 
I  Background
What 'Turanian Chau»inism' performed for the emergence of Arab 
nationalism after 1903, as briefly described in the previous chapter, 
the rise of Jewislnationalism achieved for lta recrudescence immediately 
before and after the Second World War, Viewed in the context of the 
long history of Arab-Jevish symbiosis, this interrelation between Arab 
and Jewish revivals should not appear as a novel phenomenon,  ^ To go 
back to an earlier historical instance, which is the reverse of the case 
just cited here, it  was only after the rise ©f Islam, and mainly during 
its first, creative, five centuries, that the Jews within the Muslim 
world succeeded in achieving their first real unification and ascendancy. 
The economic progress and entrance of the Jews into the class of business 
and professional people; the commercial and family relations connecting 
Jews from many Muslim countries; the allegiance to ecumenical and re­
gional central authorities; the travel for "the seeking of wisdom" and 
for pilgrimage to holy places and finally the uniformity of the laws 
respected by a ll Jews wherever they lived were the main agents, created
after the rise of Islam, which worked towards that unification and ascend- 
2
ancy.
XCf, A. IT, Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, p, 106 et seq.
^S, D, Goiteln, Jews end Arabs, p, 39 et seq. and p, 124.
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A recent, and more relevant, example is the simultaneity of the 
Jewish and Arab movements towards national independence since the begin­
ning of the twentieth century. It  is sufficient to recall that the per­
iod of the expansion of the Zionist movement in general, i ,e , ,  the years 
1917-1925,  ^ coincided almost exactly with the mast fervent Arab national 
stirrings. Is it no^Lronical that the Eleventh Zionist Congress in
Vienna, which, Inter a lia , tgr conducting for the first time part of its
2
proceedings in Hebrew, gave such a great impetus to Jewish cultural 
effervescence, was held in 1913 -  tbs same year that saw the convening 
of the first  Arab Congress in Paris? Another interesting parallelism
r
can be found in the fact that both the Arab and Jewish awakening was 
preceded ty literary revivals. I f  Arab nation a ll am drew force and in­
spiration from the achievements of Bustan! and Tizifll, Jewish se lf-
respect was buttressed ty the assiduous work of scholars like Zunz,
3
Graetz and countless others. In a ll these oases Arab and Jewish move­
ments had an intensifying effect on each other.
The first  serious clash between the two communities, from 1936 to 
1939, was of momentous Import for the Arab national movement as well as
^Israel Cohen, A Short History of Zionism. Frederick Muller, London, 1951, 
p. 33 et seq.
2Ibid.i pp, 62-63» also Paul Goodman and Arthur D, Lewis, Zlonlsmt Problem;' 
and Views. T, Fisher Unwin, London, 1916, pp, 117-155.
^Goitein, Jews and Arabs, p, 129.
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for inters Arab relationship. The clash cam about not only as the 
result of the growing Jewish immigration into Palestine, but also in 
consequence of the ever-widening cultural and economic gap between the 
two communities during the Mandate* since 1920, under Article 15 of 
the Mandate,'*' a dual system ©f separate Arab and Jewish education gradu­
ally developed in Palestine, formed on a linguistic and racial basis,
o
providing for a separate curriculum and programme for each group.
Besides, the Jews* policy of avoda lvrlt (Hebrew Labour), which committed 
Jewish enterprises to employ only Jewish labour, as well as their policy 
of tozeret lvrlt (Hebrew product), under which Jewish products were sold 
at higher prices than their cheap Arab counterparts, accentuted the ten­
dency to develop two parallel economies in Palestine.^
The 1936-1939 clash produced two connected results which deserve 
to be treated separately*
a) Firstly, there was, on the popular level, a sudden expansion of 
the trends working towards achieving Arab unity, of which the most te ll­
ing example was the Muslim Brethren (lkhwan al musllmun). This religio- 
politlcal movement, which was founded by Hasan al Banna’ in Ismai’ lIyaH
Article 15 recognized* M. . .  the right of each community to maintain 
its own schools for education of its own members in its own language,*
%ony d. Gab bay, A Political Study of the Arab-Jewjsh Conflict. Librairie 
E, Droz, Geneva, 1959, p. 25. .
3lbld.. p. 29.
130
(E§ypt) in 1923, and was Inspired ty the teachings of Afghani and *Abdtth,1 
started to create branches outside Egypt soon after the Arab rebellion 
against Jewish immigration. In 1937 its first branch was opened in Dam­
ascus and was to be the headquarters for the Central Committee responsible 
for setting up centres in the various districts of Syria and Lebanon,
"Host likely," writes Ishak Musa Husaini, "the movement 
there /In SyrijJP its boost from Syrian students who 
had studied in Egypt and were members of the Brethren 
during the period of their studies. The Brethren gave 
special attention to the Arab students who were studying 
in Egypt | they treated them with cordiality and gave 
them equal status with the Egyptian members. Here the 
contact between2the movement in Egypt mid the Arab stud­
ents was made,"**
This contact should also be regarded as but another phase of the Egypto- 
Syrian co-operation towards Arab unity to which reference was madejbefore. 
The Syrian branch was soon followed by the spread of the movement to 
Sudan and North Africa, Ths Palestine branch was set up in 194.6 -  that
Ishak Musa Husaini, The Moslem Brethren. Khayat, Beirut, 1956, p, 25*
The Brethren movement was, as stated by Ilusaini, "a reaction to a transi­
tional, intellectual oeriod, the contact of East and West, and the social 
upheavals which followed the wars. These factors resulted in a spiritual 
crisis, a struggle between the old and the new, religion and science, 
liberalism and tradition," (Ibid. . p, 96),
Referring to "the popular movements" of the kind of the Brethren, H.A.R. 
Gibb also remarks that they represent "a revolt against what is fe lt to 
be in some particular relations, an Intolerable state of affairs. In 
conformity with the atomistic and discrete character of Arab and Muslim 
thought, the imagination and effort are concentmted upon an immediate 
objective — the removal of something that can no longer be borne."
(Modern Trends in Islam, p. 113»)
2




ig, later than the Syrian branches by about ten years. The delay was
due to the fact that Palestine was suffering from »violent political
1
disturbances which distracted thinking from religious matters". Never­
theless, the Brethren took an active part In the Arab rebellion of 1936- 
1939, 2
Since two of theprincipsl alms of the Brethren were the realiza­
tion of Arab unity and "throwing off the yoke" of those European countries
3
which "have aggressed or are aggressing against the Islamic homeland", 
it  is only natural that their growing strength should have acted as a 
contributory factor towards the growth of Arab nationalist feeling. It  
was in consequence of this growth that, in September 194.2, fifteen of 
the most active of A**ab, anti-Western groups decided to join forces in 
a new organization called ittifcad ahabab al afrsab wa*l hai*at (tbs Union 
of the Youth of the Political Parties) in order to step up "resistance 
to the British, to boycott them, and to prevent any Egyptian from nego­
tiating with them". This organization comprised, in addition to the 
Brethren, the Nationalist Party (frlzb al WatanI) » the Egyptian Front, 
the Propaganda Front for the Nile Valley, the Committee of Liberation, 
the Nationalist Committee of the Azhar, the Arab Club, the Sudanese Stud-
1
The Moslem Brethren, p. 80.
9
%hld * a p# AA* tt
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enta* Union and others.^
In addition to the Brethren, other movements, albeit of less sig­
nificance, were launched in Syria following the Revolt in Palestine. In 
1937 a Muslin youth organization called the na.1.1 adah was formed in Lebanon 
which "believed in Pan-Arabism, disowned localism and tribalism, and ac­
cented as its programme to work for some form of Union of Arab countries,
2
provided that autonomy in internal affairs was preserved". On the whole 
the Revolt aroused great enthusiasm in Syria and helped to drive the 
nationalist movement along the path of extremisms and violence, both be­
cause of the Close links between Syria and Palestine and because of the
presence in Syria and Lebanon of a large number of Arab nationalist re-
3
fugees who had found it impossible to remain in Palestine. But of 
special importance was the first Pan-Arab Conference which was held in 
September, 1937, in Buldan (Syria), attended ty five hundred private re­
presentatives; the Conference passed a resolution declaring that "the 
Arab nation and the Muslim people would continue the struggle fear the 
Arab cause in Palestine, to achieve the liberation of the country and 
the establishment of an Arab government". It  was after the Buldan 
Conference that protests against the Jewish immigration, and demon- *2
Politioal Trends in Modern Egypt.
2K. A. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon. Kmest Bonn Ltd., London, 1957, p. 195 
%ourani, on.clt. . p. 222.
^Gabbay, op.clt.. p. 36«
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strations of solidarity, were organized In some Arab countries for the 
first time,^ In October, 1938 another conference took place in Cairo,
It  was called "The World Inter-Parliamentary Congress of Arab and Muslim 
Countries for the defence of Palestine», In spite of a ll their differ­
ences, the delegates were "united In their opposition to the Mandate and
2demand for Palestinian Independence",
b) Secondly. In addition t® Arab popular reaction, there was also an 
Arab o fficial reaction to the Revolt of 1936 which was manifested by 
inter-governmental conferences, exchange of notes, diplomatic protests 
and so on. It was this second kind of reaction which led to the recog­
nition, on the part at least of one Great Power, of Arab solidarity in 
regard to the Palestine problem. The first o ffic ia l Arab intervention 
came in 1939 when Britain invited the Arab government to attend the 
London Conference to discuss the situation in Palestine, The Conference, 
which took place during Fetruaiy-Karch 1939, further awakened the Arab 
states to the necessity of unity In the face of Jewish challenge, al­
though politically it  failed to reach any solution to the Arab-Jevlsh 
3
differences.
It  was as a result of the combined force of those popular and 
official demonstrations of solidarity, coupled with *  considerable measure
xGabbay, oo .clt,, p.
hm .
3£ M . t P. 37.
36.
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of British encouragement, that the League of Arab States came into 
being In 1945. The League, in addition to embodying the common feelings 
and demands of the Arabs with regard to one of the most urgent problems 
occasioning its creation, i.e , tho Palestinian impasse. also served to 
"sharpen the awareness of Arab officialdom (to) the interdependence of
2the Arab states and (to) the imperative need for greater Arab cohesion”.
However, the above brief account of Arab-Jewlsh relations would 
have been irrelevant to air research had it not been for the fact that 
the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 is regarded by the Arabs, 
not only as a Jewish encroachment on their homeland, but also as a sym­
bol of Western predatory policy against themselves. This association 
in the Arab mind between Israel and the West is due not only to American, 
French and British contributions to the creation and/or consolidation of 
the State of Israel, but also to "the prolonged connection of ninety 
per cent of the Jewish people with Europe and Western civilisation"^ as 
well as to the European character of the Israeli State,
^Arab Unity, pp. 117-119. H^urani, op.clt. . p. 269.'
2Arab Unity, p. 138,
%oitein, Jews and Arabs, p. 9*
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"The Kuropean character," says 3. D. Goitein, Chairman 
of the School of Oriental Studies, Hebrew University 
(Jerusalem), "of the new (Israeli) State is  even more 
pronounced, i f  we take into account its political and 
spiritual leadership. As far as I know, of the Mini­
sters ©f State only one is of non-European extraction, 
and of the members of the Supreme Court of Justice or 
of the fu ll professors at the Hebrew University of Jeru­
salem not a single one. In other walks of life , the 
situation is not very much different, i f ,  for exemple, 
eme exmines the leading writers of the older generation, 
the doctors or the engineers."
The State of Israel is therefore the "spearhead of the West in the midst 
of a hostile Eastern world". Opposition to tha West cannot, then, in 
Arab nationalist thought be separated from abhorrence of Israel.
No account of modern Arab nationalism can be complete without 
taking into account the material and spiritual malaise of the Arab 
countries immediately after the Second World War. The onset of this 
malaise was due to a host of interrelated economic and sociopolitical 
causes, nearly a ll bound up with the Arab-West relationship. The un­
equal distribution of wealth was exacerbated ty the consequences of the 
War, with the rich becoming richer and the poor, poorer. The rich bene­
fited by the war-time shortage of imports, the increase in demand arising 
from the presence of Allied troops and the consequent rise in prices.^
^Golteln, op . clt« . p. 12. 
p. 9.
^Charles Issawi, Egypt» im Economic and Social Analysis, p. 91.
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The poor, on the other hand, did not enjoy such ‘fruits of the war1.
The post-war decline of world cotton prices, to mention one example, 
had a ruinous effect on the Egyptian fallahln and thereby on the Egypt­
ian economy. But the cotton decline was more than an economic setback; 
it  had far-re.?chlng political implications. It  undermined rural support 
for the regime of King Biaruq, thus preparing the ground for the 1952 
military coup.* The astonishing increase of the Egyptian population, 
to mention another example, created a more serious problem. In 1947 
Egypt had a population of over 20 million (compared with about 16 million
A *
in 1937 ; living on 6 million acres of land -  "a population density of
1,198 persons per square mile of habitable land as compared with 27 in
Turkey and 44 in the United States” .^ This simple statistics accounts
for the accentuated poverty of the Egyptian masses and the magnitude of
the task before the Egyptian wreformers”.
The same pattern was discernible in Syria, where there was a
considerable Increase in the wealth of the landlord-merchants under the 
4
French mandate, but Mneither time nor the economic structure made it  
possible for whatever wealth that cme to the country to percolate down
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to the workman and the peasant”. The population problem, although
leas acute thanthat in Egypt, was and s t i l l  is great enough to confront
the agricultural potentialities of the country with the danger of ex- 
2hauation.
No lesa important was the 'age-old problem of the complexity of 
the world of thought which now embraced nearly a ll Arab countries and 
was intensified by the Introduction of a ll manner of Intellectual in­
fluences. The major trends of Westernization, ^slamio revivalism and 
local patriotism -  as discussed in the previous chapters -  proved, with 
growing clarity,’ to be ineffective in the face of the stllljraore in­
tractable new problems, now only served to add to this general complexity. 
The idea of Arab unity, under these circumstances, presented a relief 
from a ll the prevalent conflicts, inconsistencies and anarchical situ­
ations.
One positive result of post-war economic development in the Arab
countries, which has been instrumental in promoting the rise of modem
Arab nationalism, was the gowth of the urban population and of the hour-
3
geoisle in general.
"Almost invariably," says Carlton J, H, Hayes, "it  
was from the ranks of the bourgeoisie that the pro-
^Ziadeh, op.cit.. pp. H2-H3J Hourani, Syria and Lebanori. pp. 17A-175.
2Ziadeh, SP^citA, p. 2A1.
^Jacques Berque, Lea Arabs ¿♦Hier à Demain, p. 6? et seq.
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fessional nationalists were drawn.,.. They patronized 
societies for the preservation or revival of the nation­
al language. They founded museums for the collection of 
national relics.
These words, which were written in describing the emergence of Euro­
pean nationalism, equally hold good of modem Arab nationalism which, 
contrary to its earlier phase, today enjoys a solid social basis.
Finally one needs to take account of a persisting factor in the 
Arab political life  which was instrumental in fanning the flame of 
nationalist feelings. This was an exasperating sense of humiliation.
The Arabs suffered humiliation at the hands of both the West and the 
Jews, and this further identified Western imperialism with Jewish menace 
in the Arab mind. The Western humiliation of the Arab world was symbol­
ized by such events as the crushing of the revolt of Rashid ‘ All GilanI 
in Iraq (May 1942), and the French bombardment of Damascus (May 1945) 
and last, but not least, by the Palestine nakbah (disaster). A ll these 
events were also seen as part of the general Western drive to subjugate 
the Arab people, Ko wonder that the leaders of the Egyptian amir’ s coup 
4 !S M  of July 22, 1952 have a ll jfciven such a prominent place to the
determination to erase the stigma of the Palestine difeat in enumerating
2the motives for their action.
^Quoted in Rationalism and Internationalism, edited hy Edward Mead Earle, 
Columbia University ^ress, New York,1950y p, 3.
%ohaamed Neguib, Egret1 a Destiny, p. 29. Anwar el Sadat, Revolt on the 
Nile. Allan Wingate, London, 1957, p. 92. V. infra. fxyo ’.
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Having familiarized ourselves with the background, ve can now 
proceed to an analysis of the basic ideas of modern Arab nationalism.
Two points related to Arab political terminology can be briefly 
disposed of before starting our discussion,
1, , The word mam in the works of modem Arab nationalists has lost
a ll its religious connotation and has, therefore, become the exact Arab
1
equivalent of nation. One of the first Arab writers to use uaaa in
this sense was perhaps Adlb Ishaq, who applies the term to any group
2
of people enjoying ethnical ( llnsl) community,
2, The common Arab term for nationalism is ctawmlyah. which is now 
rarely confused with wajaretyah (patriotism); whereas the former is 
used mainly in describing the general Arab movement for unity, the lat­
ter is employed in respect of ftèparate patriotic movements in each of 
the Arab countries. One can therefore speak of Arab omHaErah. but never 
of Arab watanlyah, OawraTvah is a ¿derivative of oawra. which is mother 
Arabic word for nation but, contrary to nana. has no religious connotation 
and seems to be applied to groups of people with mainly racial affiliations.
See, ig ie r jU a ,  MuffadS ShH M ,".al qa^yaK wa «awàkdlutm" in 
ibni. Damascus, July 1953» 33}3, p. 375.
ad durar. pp, 100-102, 168-171, 230 et sect, V, supra, p.\&\
v
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It is significant that ciawm has been referred almost a ll over the
Koran to such atheist and/er ill-fated peoples os ‘Id, Thaniud, and
the ’’peoples'* of Abraham and Noah,^ a point which should make the
term oawmlyah highly objectionable in the purists’ eyes. It is  algo
noteworthy that another derivative of gawm. i,e , acwanlyah. is used
o
in the sense of "internationalism” as opposed to nationalism,r. In
view of a ll this, it  would perhaps havebeen better to coin another
word for nationalism. Some people have su~ge:;ted ummlvah. but this
has been rejected on the ground that i t  might be understood as a deri-
3
vative of umml. i,e , illiterate, hence meaning Illiteracy,
^■"Moreover, I f  they charge you with imposture, then already before them, 
the Qawm of Noah, and Ad and Thaaoud, and the Qwm of Ahrfaaia, and the 
Qawm of Lot, and the dwellers in Madian, have charged their prophets 
with imposture, Moses, to© was charged with imposturo. And I bore 
long with the unbelievers; then seise on them; and how great was the 
change that I wrought,” (¡ÉXII, A3)
”And as to the people (Qawm) of Noah, When they treated their Ano sties 
as impostors, we drowned them; and wo rado them a sign to mankind; a 
wicked chastisement have we prepared for the wicked,” (XXV, 39)
”And It  was he who destroyed,,« The Qbmb ef Tharaoud and left not one 
survivor. And before them the Qawm of Noah who were most wicked and 
most perverse,” (LIII# 52 and ¡53), In some places Qawm has bean referred 
to the Arabs themselves, tat when there is talk of their misdeeds or dis­
advantages: "But thy (Muhammad's) Qawm have accused the Koran of false­
hood.,," (VI, 66) "This is one ofthe secret Histories we reveal it  un­
to thee; neither thee nor thy peopie'knew it  ere th is.,," (XI, 51)




I I  A Critique of the Works of Modern 
-Isanentg. of_Arab Natlonallga. .
The modern exponent» of Arab nationalism can be divided into 
various schools fro® various social, political and philosophical points 
of view. However, the basis of our division here w ill be the signifi­
cance which they attach to each of the factors working towards Arab 
unity. On this general basis we can discern three main schools among 
modern ^rab writers»
First, there is the school which adopts a monistic approach to 
the question by emphasising only one factor of Arab unity in such a way 
as either to comnletely obliterate the other factors or to relegate them 
to the background.
The second school is based, contrary to the first, on a pluralistic 
outlook, and attaches equal value to a ll the factors of unity.
The third and last school is characterized by its concern for the
M o
circumstances writer which such factors should operate, and holds the 
factors themselves to be merely of secondary importance.
The Konlstlo School
Of a ll the factors of Arab unity, the Arabic language has re­
ceived the greatest attention of modern ^rab nationalists. This has 
been partly due to the circumstances surrounding the emergence of Arab 
nationalism, and partly due to the impact of the West. As ve saw in 
Chapter Three, the rise of Arab nationalism in the early „part of the
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twentieth century was preceded by Arab literary revival as led by 
Bustanl, Yaziji and others. Later on, under the influence of Western/ 
and particularly German, nationalists, the Arabs started to rational­
ize the part played by language in their nationalist revival. I t  w ill 
be recalled that tha German apologists of nationalism, in their endeavour 
to secure the unity of a ll German-speaking peoples, regarded language as
nthe most important criterion by which a nation is recognized to exist,
1
and to have the right to form a state on its  own". This Idea received 
a systematic exposition through the works of such great German thinkers 
as Herder and Fichte, In Herder’s philosophy of nationalism, language 
is the main instrument of every nationality, "not an artific ia l instru­
ment, but a g ift of God, the guardian of the national community and the
2
matrix of its civilization". In his Addresses to theGerman Nation. Fichte 
|joes so far as to say;*^4 give the name of pearl® to men whose organs of 
speech are influenced by the same external conditions, who live together, 
and who develop their language in continuous communication with each
other".^
An adaptation of the ideas of Herder and Fichte to the particular 
conditions of the Arab world has been attempted by A'Bijihaldun Saji* al
% lie  Kedourie, Nationalism. Hutchinson of London, I960, p, 64,
^Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. The Macmillan Company, New York,
1944, p. 431.
\edourie, oo.clt.. p. 64. »
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JTusii, the doyen of modern Arab nationalists. An interesting feature 
of ^ugrrl’s life  is his extensive association with most of the Arab 
countries; this has lent a markedly "Arabist" character to his works.
is Syrian V  origin, Yemeni Vgr birth. His father, As Sayid Muhammad 
Ililal al Hufrl, was an *allm (learned scholar) who studied in the Azhar 
and obtained his 1.1azah (licence). Upon hi3 return to Aleppo, Muhammad 
embarked up-'» a Judicial career which eventually led to his appointment 
a3 President of the Court of Appeal in the Yemen. It  was in San*a1, the 
capital of Yemen, thatlHujxl was born, {¡fugil accompanied his father on 
many of his travels to Athens, Ankara, Tripoli (North Africa, now part 
of Libya), back to Yemen and again to Tripoli, where his father was ap­
pointed President of the Court of Appeal. $usrl finally parted with 
his father and settled down in Constantinople where he completed his 
secondary school studies. After graduation, he started his varied careen 
First he worked as a teacher of natural science at loAnnina (Greece) for 
five years; then he was appointed to various high administrative posi­
tions in the Ottoman administration in Khaskov© (Bulgaria) and Fiorina 
in the Greek province of Monastra, Monistxswaa then an active centre 
of the Young Turk agitation against *Abdul Hamid, and $uprl was among 
those Arabs who co-operated with that movement An the hope of its sub­
sequent contribution to Arab emancipation.
After the 1908 Revolution igupxl went back tohis teaching career, 
this time in Constantinople; for some time he taught the principles of 
education and ethnology; after the deposition of 'Abdul JJamid he was
___L_
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made Director of the Teachers' Training College,’ At the beginning of 
the First World War he founded two schools, one for children and another 
for training women teachers for children. These activities coincided with 
the intensification of the anti-Arab polity of the Young Turk rulers.
After the First World War, and with the expulsión of the Turks from 
the Arab countries, $ufrl le ft Constantinople for Syria and was soon ap­
pointed Mnister of Education under Faisal's short-lived rule. Being Ba 
personal friend and advisor of Faifal'’ he was appointed by the latter as 
his special envoy to conduct negotiations with General Gouraud, French 
Commander-in-Chief and High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon, after 
the ultimatum of ^uly 1920, When Faijal was expelled from Syria ty the 
French $ugrl accompanied him to Europe, Upon Fai?al's accession to the 
Iraqi throne £u$rT became engaged in intensive educational activities in 
Iraq, He was successively made Dean of the Faculty of Law and Director 
of the Department of Antiqditiesj he maintained the latter position for 
twenty years, - After that he went to Syria where, as the Technical Ad­
visor to the Ministiy of Education, he brought about far-reaching changes 
in the educational programme of the, countiy. From Syria he went to Egypt, 
where he was made lecturer at the Institute of Higher Education for Teach­
ers, His next position was Advisor to the Cultural Department of the 
Arab League up to the year 1951. Then he founded the Institute of Higher
•^Zeine N, Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence, Khayat's, Beirut, 
I960, pp, 176-178.
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Arabic Studies and, after a short period as its director, resigned 
a ll his positions to devote his time entirely to teaching, ^ugzl's 
scientific interest was first confined to the natural sciences; his 
studies in this field eventually aroused his interest in psychology, and, 
this in its turn brought hi» into contact with the art of education and, 
finally, with the social sciences and historical critique,
\TujrI also tied his hand at» Journalism for a short period. In 
Constantinople he founded a review called «war al 1 ulurn (Lights of the 
Sciences), Two other reviews, one called at tadrisat*al ibtlda’IvahfTho 
Primary Instructions) and at tarbivah (Education), appeared during his 
holding educational posts. He visited Europe many times, staying in 
Switzerland, France, England, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Human*, Italy  
and Holland either to study modern methods of education, or, to attend 
various international conferences. He went to Spain in 1936 to visit 
the historical monuments of Andalousia; from there he went to Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia and finally Sicily (in  1939).^
As can be understood from this short account, £ujrT*s active life  
has been mainly dedicated to education, rather than to participation'in 
the various political movements connected with the Arab awakening or Arab 
unity. He must, therefore, be regarded as belonging to that breed of 
Arab revivalists which is  represented by Jah'fawT, rather than by *Azurl,
S^amT al FaiyalT, al adab al-* arabl al mu*aplr f l  surlyah, dar al ma* arif 
bi mlfr, Cairo, l9W.' P.122 ’ e j'. seal ’
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Hugrl's experience under the Turanian fanti-Arab chauvinism of the 
Turks made him aware of the vital part which the Arabic language can 
play in Arab revivalj but this awareness, as w ill be presently seen, 
became later an obsession with him which has coloured his entire poli­
tical outlook on Arab unity,
The fact that the latter part of IJugrl's educational career has 
been almost equally divided between Egypt and the Fertile Crescent should 
be regarded, especially in view of his systematic exposition of the idea 
of Arab unity, as one of those rare, conscious links between the Egyptian 
and Syrian Arab nationalists.
$u§rl has written many books and pamphlets in defence of Arabian 
and the unity of a ll  Arab-speaking countries. In one ©f his more straight 
forward apologetics entitled ara1 wa afradlth f l * l  qawmlyat*al * arblyah 
{Opinions.and Traditions about Arab,Rationalism) he propounds his con­
ception of the term mama and the Arab urnaa. In his discussion of the 
contemporary divergencies between the Western thinkers on the meaning of 
the nation, he simplifies the matter ty dividing those thinkers into the 
French school, represented in his book ty Ernest Renan's Qu'est Ce 
Ration, and the German, ef which no specific representative has been 
mentioned. The French school, says IJusri, bases the concept of nation 
on the principle of "w ill and desire", the meaning apoarently being that 
anyone who merely wishes to be included in a nation Is therety a member
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of that nation. Bat the German school, which enjoys the fu ll sympathy
\
and approval of the writer, considers language as the basis of nation-
alitys a ll people speaking in the same language belong to the same
nation. The writer accepts the German concept of nation which, as he
says, maintains that "the basis of nationalism, oawmlvah and its right
standard, i3 language", Starting from this assumption, he comes to the
2conclusion that* "Every nation which speaks Arabic is Arab",
IJufrl does not put forward any concrete arguments in support of
the standard of language for the assessment of the concept of nation.
Instead, he tries to refute the views of the French school by ascribing
them to narrow-minded expansionist schemes,
«The French had for many centuries," he writes, "achieved 
their political unity œad dominated territories whose in­
habitants did not speak French, Besides, they had for a 
long time aspired to expand their territory to the north 
in order to gain access to natural borders..,, therefore, 
acceptance of the German theory would have resulted in the 
miscarriage of their deep-rooted aspirations. Moreover, 
this would have exposed some French provinces to the dan-
fer of secession. It was thus in the interests of the rench strongly to oppose this (German) theory,*’
The theory which the French propounded to counter the German school,.
continues HufrI, was that of "the w ill and desire’* (a l iràdah wa*l
mashlvah). But the writer does not express ary real argwnent in support
of the German theory which coincides with his own, except the sweeping
yugri makes his discussion considerably complicated by sometimes using 
the term qawmLrah. as he himself, says, as the equivalent for the German 
Volkstnm. and sometimes in the sense of nationalism. Here, I presume, 
he means rather the Volkstum.
^Satl* al yuprl, ara’wa ahadlth f 1*1 qawmlyat'al ‘ arablyah, dar al * ilm l i l  
mala*Tn, Beirut, 1959,'. (third’ed,)1, p. 65*
3Ibia,. p. 67.
\statement thati "All the political event a which have taken place since 
that time (?) have come to confirm the German theory end discredit the 
French school«"* A few lines further down the writer makes clear what 
he means by these "political events"t "the historical events, from the 
time of the unification of Germany down to the creation of Yugoslavia,
2have proved th.rt the life  of a nation is primarily based on language".
He must note here that the example of Yugoslavia cannot possibly corro­
borate the writer's thesis as that country» with her Serb, Croat and 
Slovene components, together with her sizeable Macedonian, Hungarian, 
German and other minorities, is anything but a state based on a unique, 
common language.
At the end of the chapter in which the foregoing discussion takes 
place, the writer, in summing up his views, suddenly raises the important 
point of historical ties between the members of a nation. Contesting 
the French view about the importance of the "willingness to live to­
gether" in the creation of nation, he says that this willingness is  
only the »suit of the nation's existence and of the idea ofnationalisra.
"The individuals," he goes on to say, "speaking in the 
same language, and sharing the_same historical process 
(ya'maluna f i  tlrari tarikhi wahld) understand one an­
other and 'cherish mutual affection more than they do 
with other peoples. Therefore, they tend to live to-
198
*gu§rl, QD.clt, » p. 68,
2ibia.
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gather or separate (themselves from others), and it  
is in this form that the habit of living in common grows 
-  a habit which is the ^ natural outcome of community in 
language and history."
does not, of course, attach to history the s :ine importance which 
he attaches to language because whereas he regards language as the life ­
blood of the nation, he holds history merely as the source of its con­
sciousness.
"The nation,” he says, "is a historical being, consist­
ing of life  and consciousness ( ahu* ur) . The life  of the 
nation is (or depends on) language and its consciousness 
is (or depends on) its history. The nation which forgets 
its history, but s t ill retains its language, is like a 
social element which has lost its consciousness and aware­
ness, but s t i l l  continues te live. The nation recovers 
its consciousness when it recollects and learns its history.
But, i f  the nation loses its language and adopts another 
language, it  becomes integrated in the nation (speaking in 
that language) and, therefore, loses its particular ex­
istence. .. .B2
One should simply compare the above sentences with the following para­
graph summarized from Addresses to the German Nation in' order to appre-
3elate Fichte's influence on HugrT:
The French, says. Fichte, were originally Teutons who forsook 
German speech for a neo-Latin idiom. With the neo-Latin language came 
a ll the faults of the Fjoman3, and the French now suffer '’from the idea
^ u f i i ,  op.clt.. p. 69.
2Ib ld .. p. 69.
^Cf, Sylvia Haim, Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism, p. 37.
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of lack of seriousness about social relations, the Idea of self-abandon­
ment, and the idea of heartless laxity”. Had they retained their ori­
ginal speech they would have never allowed such degradation to befall 
them, for they would have s t i l l  possessed a living language, and would 
have been able, by means of it, to guard a-ainst the notions introduced 
and made popular by the use of Latin,^
TJugrl further propounds hi3 language-centered theory of nation in 
another book entitled al 'urubah bain du*atlha wa mu'arljlha (Arabism 
between its Friends and Enemies), A large section of the book is devoted 
to criticizing the views of Anton $a* adah, the leader of the Syrian Nation­
a list Party, ^  {JugrI rejects ."a* ad ah's belief in common territory as the 
determining attribute of nationality^ and assigns this role t6 language.^ 
£Eu§rI's conception of Arabism is definitely laic. This becomes 
evident from his adherence to the interpretation made by the First Arab
Kedourie, op.cit.. p, 65.
^Sa'adah'3 Party "professed or rather formulated the specific Syrian as 
distinct from Arab nationalism". At first  a secret society in Syria, 
it  was discovered by the authorities in 1935 and its leading members im­
prisoned, From that time it  grew in size and Importance. The Party 
reached its zenith a year or two before the beginning of the Second World 
War (Hourani, Syria and Lebanon. p, 197), The Party was suppressed in 
1949 and Sa‘ ad ah himselfwas executed in the same year. In addition to 
emphasizing the historic reality of a Syrian nation, the Party is also , 
characterized by its markedlyjLaic outlook as well as its dogmatic atti­
tude on the question of national loyalty (Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon, pp, 
103, 105, 103, 109, 112, 197.)
^al ' urubah bain du'atiha wa mu'arlijlha, dar al ‘ lira li* 1 mala’ln , Beirut, 
.third edition'.' p." 79 et 'sen'.
*Ib ld .. p. 132.
Cultural Conference (Lebanon, 194-7) of the term:
”Arabian has not been, and is not, confined to a parti­
cular group or to a particular religion.... The solidarity 
between the Arab nationals . . .  does not differentiate be­
tween the Arabs on the basis of their religions."^
In dlfi* fan al <urubah (Defense of Arabisa), Hujrî sets himself
the task of replying to a ll  the objections which have been levelled airain ut
Autism. An uneasy feeling results when the reader realises that the book 
does not inform him of these objections in fu ll, but rather summarizes 
them in (Jufri’ s own words. Let us cite an example*
In a chapter entitled "linguistic Unity and National Unity” $u§xi 
discusses the situation of multilingual countries "such as the United 
States (s ic .), Belgium and Switzerland" in order to answer those oppon­
ents who deny the value of language as a basis of national unity*
"'The United States of America, runs the argument of 
the opponents, seceded from Britain although it had 
an English-speaking population} the Latin American 
countries seceded from Spain and Portugal, although 
their languages did not differ from one another. And 
then there is Belgium whose inhabitants speak in three 
different languages.* I have read and heard this kind 
of objection since a quarter of a century ago, and have 
repudiated them several times on the basis of historical 
facts."* 2
In reply to this objection gufrl has two things to say*
^Çufiï, al 1 urûbah bain du*âtlha wa tnu'ârljlha, pp. ¡‘H-liL1?.
2dlfâ* fm al *urûbah. dâr *ilm 1*11 malâ’ in, Beirut, 1957, second edition, 
pp. 14.6-147.
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(a) As a considerable number of the peonies of the United States are 
immigrants who went to that country only during the first two decades
of the present century, Wwe should not call the United States an English-
speaking” country,"*" Besides, it  teok a very long time for English to
2
become the coimnon language of the country.
(b) The United States and Britain are separated from each other ty
the ecpanse of the Atlantio Oceant
"Undoubtedly, tho geographic situation also played an 
important role in the creation of the new (United States) 
government at the end of th is (American) revolution,
"There is  no doubt that the situation of the Arab countries 
greatly differs from that of the United States The Arab 
countries have had a common language for many centuries , , ,  
their territories connected with one another, a complete 
geographical connection, without there being the expansive 
Atlantio Ocean which separates America from Europe."4
If  these arguments may not silence the opponents of Arabism, they 
serve instead to reveal some contradict!-'ns in IJusrl*s thoughts« The 
mere fact that he points out the geographical separation between the 
United States and Britain as a justification for their political separa­
tion indicates his implicit admission of at least another important .fac­
tor in the formation of nation, that of territorial unity.
^ ifa *  an al ‘ urubah, p.162.
2IM d.. p, 161,
3 l M , ,  p. 155. 
*Ib ld .. p, 16*.
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gufrT makes further concessions over his monistic theory of 
nation, as set out in ara1 wa ahadlth, when he tries, again In reply 
to opponents of Arabian, to explain why the Latin American countries 
have not aspired to unity with Spain and Portugal in spite of their 
common language. Here 1» mentbns the ethnical diversity ef the Latin 
American peoples together with their linguistic differences, both be­
tween themselves and with Spain and Portugal, a3 the causes of the separ­
ation,^ thus conceding the partial significance of the ethnical factor, 
Hufrl's discussion of the examples of Belgium and Switzerland is yet 
further admission ef the complexity of the concept of nation and the 
impossibility of ascribing it  to one single force« Belgium, he says,
was created, and hold3 together, because of the machinations of foreign
2interests and the intense promiscuity of her two major communities, 
Switzerland also owes its unity and existence to a "long series of in­
ternal and external -  geographic, historical, political and social -
3
factors and circumstances'*, which the writer readily analyses in five
Upages.
The reader, then, in the latter part of the book, vatohii a piti­
fu l, gradual collapse of H url's  monistic theory. But to stave off c riti-
^ Ifa *  an *1 *ur«bah. p. 166 et.seg.
2Ibld., p. 171 et aeq.
3lbld.. p. 183, 
Albld. , pp. 182-187,
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cism against this self-inconsistency he seizes upon a weird logic at 
the very beginning of his discussion of "Linguistic Unity and National 
Unity"i
" . . . T*e should study," he writes, "these examples (of 
the United States, Latin America and the rest) and 
probe into the causes which underlie them, to see 
whether (these examples) present a real contradiction 
with the principle of the rise^of governments on the 
basis of nationalities (cawalvat)-  and with the theory 
of the role of language in the creation of nations -  
or whether their contradiction is merely superficial, 
similar to that of some natural happenings with the law 
of gravity.”1
The writer then mentions the instances of climbing smoke and flying
birds which might be taken ty some uninstructed people as evidence against
the law of gravity but, in fact, are caused by other intervening natural
2
factors which counter the gravity of the earth. Accordingly, the con­
tradiction of the examples of the United States, Latin Ameri a, etc,
with ^ugrl's theory of nation is only superficial, due to complicated ln-
3
ternal and external causes operating in these countries.
^ujrl's argument on this point contains a major flaw. Basically, 
it  is not logical to demonstrate the correctness of a theory by Likening 
the slating evidence against it to the exceptions of natural laws. By 
this chop-logic it  is possible to corroborate every figment of human im-




agination dubbed a3 theory. Besides, contrary to what £u$rl suggests, 
it  does not seen that nations with single, national languages (a) owe 
their creation to these national languages, (b) outnumberthe multilingual 
nations to such an extent as tctaake the latter group seen an exception 
to Ijupri1 s theory. As regards national languages, it  must be said that 
in most cases they achieved importance as such only after the emergence 
of their respective nations. English became the national language of the 
British Isles when the English, Welsh and Scottish inhabitants of these 
islands achieved unity among themselves; it  was not the English language 
that created the British nation. The same holds true ©f French, which 
became a national language after the unification ef various ethnical 
groups inhabiting Gad. I t  seems fairer to say that language does not 
create nation, but rather assists in securing Its survival by contribut­
ing to the building of a national spirit*1
On the question of the numerical superiority of nations with 
single languages to those speaking in various languages, so far as the 
present state of affairs in the world goes the latter group seems to 
outweigh the former. In fact, there are few nations in the world with
single languages; $ugrl himself mentions only the examples of the Arabs,
2Italians and Germans. It  is indeed this group of nations that form
^Bee also Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, pp. 7 et sec, and 14« 
flLlfflafelfe» P* H8.
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the minority in the world. There ere, of course, natlonaljLlanguages in 
many countries* but these are languages, originally alien to many in­
dividuals of the nation, adopted either for the sake of political ex­
pediency or for administrative convenience. They are not, as Hugrl 
would like to believe, languages spoken Tty a ll members of a given nation 
from time immemorial. India is a case in point. According to the Indian 
Constitution (Article 324), Hindi is the o ffic ia l, national language of 
the country, but actually there are some two hundred and twenty two lan­
guages in India, of which fourteen have been recognized Ty the Constitu­
tion. When Hindi legally becomes the national language of *ndia in 1965 
and takes the place of English (although grave doubts have been already 
expressed Ty learned Indians on this matter), it  w ill not be a national 
language in the sense that HusrI has in mind and believes to be the basis 
of a nation's existence.
As it  has been observed earlier the Germans, Italians, Arabs and 
some others enjoy an exceptional position from the viewpoint of lin­
guistic unity* namely, in the case of the first  two (not to »peak of 
the Swis3 and Austrian oases), the political and linguistic boundaries 
almost coincide with each other and the same holds true for a ll Arab 
countries and w ill hold true for the greater Arab country yearned for
^"Hindi" in the devanagari script is the official language of the Union... 
the English language, however, w ill continue to be the official language 
for a period of not more than fifteen years from the commencement of the 
Constitution." ,
"The following languages are recognized Ty the Constitution» ( l )  Assarae, 
(a ) Bengali, (3) Gujrati, (4) Hindi, (5) Kannada, (6) Kashmir, (7) Malaya- 
lam, (3) Marathi, (9) Oriya, (10) Punjabi, ( l l )  Sanskrit, (12) Tamil, (13) 
Telugu, (14) Urdu." (The Times of India Tear Book. London 1959-60» p.46.)
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V  the Arab nationalist s. This linguistic unity is undoubtedly a valuable 
asset and an enormous contributory force in the bringing about of the 
unity of a ll Arabs, But this should not lure anybody into theorisings 
about the decisive role of language in the creation of nations.
1
The Arabic language, being one of the major unifying forces of 
the Arabs in their present struggle, is bound to figure prominently in 
any theoretical discussion ty modem '‘‘Tab nationalists. But this unify­
ing functions seems often to bejieutralized by one of the unfortunate 
characteristics of the Arabic language, which is not thoroughly discussed 
ty Fugii, that is the difference between spoken and written Arabic, a 
difference greater than that prevailing in European languages. This has 
been caused, on the one hand, by the constant changing of spoken Arabic
Arabic, strictly speaking, is  the language of_three groups of people in­
habiting Arabia; the first  group is "arab" ‘ Irlba. the original Arabs 
of pure stock; they numbered nine tribes which are regarded as the des­
cendants of Aram b. Sam b. Nuh and the first  settlers in Arabia: ‘Id, 
Thamiûd, Umaiyim, ‘ Abll, |asm, Jadis, Imlïq, Jurhum and VJabar. These are 
extinct except for a few manants incorporated in other tribes. The 
second group comprises the muta ‘ arriba (the arabicized) who are not 
pure-blooded Arabs; they are regarded as descendants of Kahtan and live 
in southern Arabia. The third group is called emsta *rlbat this name 
is  also applied to tribes who were not originally Arabs; they trace their 
descent from Ma ‘ add b. ‘ Adrian, a descendant of IsroS’Tl, who is  said to 
have lived with the *arab ‘ «riba and to have learned their language,
(Gibb & Kramer, Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam. London 1953» p* 418)
n
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over time and apace and, on the other, by the fixity of the written 
language owing to the grip of the classics and, s t ill more, to the 
fact that Arabic is  the language of the Koran. The difference, in 
addition to Rising a major obstacle in the way of the spiritual unity 
of the Arabs, hns also given rise to considerable difficulties in the 
education of children, for whom classical Arabic is virtually a new 
language.^
A number of suggestions has been put forward to solve the lin­
guistic problem. While the Egyptian writer Tawflq al ^aklm proposes
the adoption of a 'third language' ( lughah thillthafr)combining the best
2
features of both spoken and written Arabic, the Jewish scholar S, D,
use of
Goitein suggests the/Judaeo-Arabic dialects of Morocco, Tunis and Yemen
3which already possess this mixed character.
Another difficulty which further disrupts the linguistic unity 
of the Arabs is the great variety of Arabic dialects. The extent of 
this variety can perhaps be gauged from the simple fact that the differ­
ence between the dialects of Mossul and*Araarah, both in Iraq# is greater 
than that between the dialects of Palestine and Syria. There are, how­
ever, some modern Arab writers who do not consider these differences -
^Cf. Charles IssawT, oo,clt.. p. 191? The Passing of Traditional Society, 
p. 269.
2Jacques Berque, T-es Arabs d'Hler a Demaln. p. 183.
^Jews end Arabs, pi 133 et sec.
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whether between dialects of between written and spoken Arabic -  to be 
of such importance as to offset the unitj^f the Arab people. The argu­
ments in favour of this viewpoint have been stated by Nablh Amin Faria, 
Head of the tepartraent of History at the American University of Beirut, 
and Muhammad Tawflq Husain, Professor of Islamic Philosophy at the same 
University. They can be stssmarized as follows»
Constant reading of the Koran throughout the ages has maintained 
the link between the literary language ( lughat* al fugfra) And the illite r ­
ate masses. The gap between spoken and written Arabic has been consider­
ably narrowed down thanks to such efforts as the translation of the Old 
and New Testaments into a language at once understandable by the masses 
and pleasing to the learned. Finally, dialectical diversity is rot con­
fined to the Arab world and can be considered in almost any country in 
1
the world.
The factor coming next to language in the formation of Arab nation­
ality is religion, or to be more precise, Islam. We w ill discuss the 
attitude of Arab-Muslim religious circles in regard to Arab nationalism 
in a subsequent chapterj here we concern ourselves with the attitude of 
Arab nationalists towards Islam.
The predominant positionjof Islam in Arab nationalist thought is
^haza^alam al * arabl. daral * lira l i ’ l  mala*in, Beirut, 1953» pp. 39-41•
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primarily accounted for by the simple fact that the majority of the 
Arabs are Muslims, But adherence to this quantitative consideration 
confronts the Arab notionalists with the same contradiction as had been 
faced by Mustafa Kamil: an umma exclusively based on Islamic bonds be-
& k JC S j
tween its members would keep the Arab Chriatians/from participating in 
national life , and this would seriously undermine national solidarity 
which is an a ll important prerequisite for achieving Arab unity. There­
fore a more profound argument is needed -  one that is qualitatively em­
bracing rather than quantitatively overwhelming -  to Justify the place 
of Islam in Arab nationalism. Fortunately for the religious-minded 
nationalists such an argument is provided by one of the main weaknesses 
of modern Arab nationalism:
Nationalism, In the sense of a high degree of passionate con­
sciousness of their distinctness from others by any people, stands,above 
a ll, in need of a spiritual support. In the absence of any powerful 
ideological trends, able both to mobilise the masses and reflect the 
genuinely Arab traditions, Islam is the only source which can provide 
such a support. It has been the main force behind a ll tbs great achieve­
ments of the Arabs in the past; its rise was marked by the end of the 
period of lahlllvah -  a period of ignorance, of dissension and of chaos; 
its history embodies the memories of the glorious days of Arab overlord- 
ship in the world.
"Although," says Hourani, "the movements of Arab and 
of Islamic revival lav emphasis upon different points 
i t  is impossible wholly to separate Arab nationalist
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feeling from Islamic feeling. In most Arabs the two 
tend to flow togetherj the movements of national and 
of religious revival are energized by the 3ame complex 
of desires and emotions within the individuals who 
have created and who sustain them; and the ordinary 
Muslim Arab is not conscious of belonging in one aspect 
of his being to the Arab community, and in another to 
the Islamic, but rather of belonging to a single inte­
grated 'Arabo-Iatomic* community in which he does not 1 
clearly distinguish the Arab from the Islamic elements."
The same cannot be said in the case of the nationalistic movements of
other lixslim peoples. The role of Islam in fostering Arab nationally
becomes more apparent when Arab nationalism is compared with Persian
nationalism in recent history. Modern Persian nationalism has often
had irreligious and, in certain cases, anti-religious features. This
is because, among other reasons, Persia's ancient glory, manifested ty
the Persian ¡.¡mpire in p re-Muhammad days, came to be extinguished in the
wake of the onslaught of Arab nomads under the banner of Islam. Distinct-«*
ion should be made, however, between the negative aspect of nationalism, 
consisting of thoughts and sentiments against foreign oppressors and in­
ternal tyrants, and its positive aspect marked by appeals and efforts 
towards social reforms. This brings ua to the second argument in favour 
of Arabo-Islamia nationalism.
The negative aspect has surely drawn force and inspiration from 
the religious tenets which can be effectively Invoked in any movement 
against the Western Powers and their Persian associates as "enemies of
1-,iyrla and Lebanon, pp. 102-103«
ti
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Islam* -  a religio-political tactic which attained its highest form 
through the works of Afghan!.* This was especially in evidence, in the 
case of Persia, during the Tobacco Monopoly crisis (189l ) ,  the Persian 
Constitutional Revolution (1906-7) and even the recent clamour for 
nationalising the o il industry (1951-53)* In view of what' . we said be­
fore on the anti-colonialistic character of Arab religious circles, Arab 
and Persian nationalisms have a good deal in common from this point of 
view. The same does not hold good in regard to the positive aspect of 
nationalism. In Persian nationalism the positive aspect, on the contrary, 
has had more often than not an anti-religious character, as shown by the 
achievements of Riia Shah (1925-1941) and Dr, Mufaddiq's head-on co lli­
sion with Ayatullah Kashaniin carrying out social reforms. In short, 
religion in the eyes of conscientious Persian nationalists has been con­
ceived rather as a means of achieving the more important aim of national 
salvation.
For the Arab nationalists, however, Islam is the end, the ideal 
and the culmination of material and spiritual efforts. Without Islam, 
Arab nationalism is shorn of its individuality and uniqueness. This is  
because of the important position of religion in the life  of the Arabs.
A Persian or an Indonesian can have as firm a belief In Islamic teachings 
and rules as has an Asfcj but the Arabs' belief in Islam has the sign lfl-
‘V. supra, p. 78 et sea.
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cant overtone of pridej pride in the fact that God's final message 
to humanity was first delivered to them and then again, thanks to their 
resourcefulness, was carried across the earth and made known to millions 
of peoples of diverse qualities. This in fact is the reverse form of 
the statement which we have just made -  that the Arabs regard their past 
glory and unity as the direct.product of Islam. With the same conviction 
they believe that the cast glory of Islam has been the direct result of 
it being originated with, and cherished fcy, the Arabs. Herder’s defini­
tion of the religion of ’ the primitive peoples’ as "their character, 
their heart and their history"^ finds perhaps its most telling ‘example 
in the relationship between Arabs and Islam.
Arabism and Islam are thus fully identified with each other, and 
Islamic History becomes part and parcel of Arab history, and vice versa. 
This is in contrast to Western history, in which the religious and lay 
components are clearly discernible and easily separable.
Modern exponents of Arab nationalism propound Islam’ s role with 
varying degrees of emphasis. Most of them appreciate Islam as only one r 
the standards of Arab nationalism because of its function and ability 
-to rally peoples collectively called "Arab" with divergent social, histori­
ca l and ethnological charset eristics. But there are also a number of 
v^lters who-view Islam as the only genuine determinant of Arab nationality. 
ffnelr nationalism is, to paraphrase Hourani, Arabo-Islamic. This is the 
fti&ln theme set out in Afcmad Shaitanl’s al uses ath thawrawlvah 11’1 
^■jawmlvat *al *arablyah (The Revolutionary Bases of Arab Nationalism).
^Hans Kohn, op.clt. . p. 449
2 u.
ChaJtianI startles believers In the universallstic teachings of Islam
by describing the Prophet Muhammad as the first Arab "nationalist hero"
1
(batal al oawai). He demonstrates the Islamic character of his nation­
alism by stating, with an almost religious fervour, that the ideals of 
the Arabs In politics as well as in a ll fields of social life  should 
be the same as those of Islam. His patentlyreligious outlook reveals 
Itself on nearly every topic which he treats. He extensively quotes 
the Caliph ‘ ttnar (634-44) In connection with the qualities of a proper
Muslim,3 the evils of imperialism,^ the individual's duties towards 
5 6state and social Justice. He even goes so far as to express the hope
that the Arabs w ill achieve the status assigned to there by the Koran as
7
leaders of humanity.
The writer probably does not regard Islam as the only rallying 
bond of the Arab taama. but nowhere in his book can one get even a vague 
notion of any attribute of the Arab umma other than its religion. It  is  
also evident that Islam in his eyes is no adequate basis either for &
al lists ath thawrawlvah l i ' l  qawmlyat* al *arablvah. p, 81.
^Ibld.. pp, 65 et seq.
3Ib ld .. p. 77.
^ihia.« p. 111. 
bid.. p. 115.
6Ib ld .. p. 176.
^Ibld.. p. 81,
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clear understanding of the present problems of the Arfcba or for dis­
covering the best way3 and mean3 of solving these problems. The sub­
lime examples set by such prominent Islamic leaders as the Caliph ‘ Umar 
in mercifulness, self-denial and modesty, so very frequently and 
passionately admired by the writer, cannot constitute the sole gliding 
principles for a people who, as the writer himself aptly puts it, are 
passing through the"phase of national creation, the nhase of resuscitating 
the Arab unrna".^ It ia not just that the Islamic principles and the in­
structions of great Islamic leaders in the past are not applicable to 
the complicated conditions and problems of the present and, especially, 
to those of a people faced by the massive challenge of a superior c iv ili­
zation. This the writer does not seem tobelieve. But what he does be­
lieve, and what is  more important than the applicability of the Islamic 
principles to the modern world, is the fact that the Muslims have not 
subjected these principles to any critical study in order to bring them 
into line with the exigencies of modernism. The writer unequivocally 
admits this negligence»
"I cannot help," he says, "referring here to a deplorable 
fact, whichis that the Muslims» since the death of the 
two great learned men, Jamil ad Din Afghani and Muhammad 
*Abduh, have not nurtured any educated elite.among them­
selves who would study Islam in the light of the sciences 
in modern times."2
Ihaibanl. oo.ctt.. p. 174.
2Ibld.. p. 159
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Unless such a critical study has been effected, any exclusively 
religious approach to the idea of Arab unity, and any appeal for a re­
turn to the Islamic teachings on such general natters as humanism and 
equality, is bound to induce intellectual stagnation and, eventually, 
reaction and fanaticism. In fact the writer's confession of the lack 
of this study weakens the two main contentions which he makes In his 
book. First, his belief that Islam can be made the social and political 
framework of Arab revival is proved unjustified when the realities of 
the Islamic world of today point to the failure of such an attempt.
Even i f  the exa pies of Saudi Arabia and the lomen, as the two mo3t out­
standing examples of this failure, can be dismissed on grounds of the 
anachronistic fanaticism of their rulers, then Pakistan, regarded by 
Professor Smith as the Islamic state of our time,'*’ stands out as a source 
of great disappointment for writers like ShalbanT. ShaibanT’s second 
contention is the complete compatibility of Arab nationalism and Islam, 
This is a far more serious point, which unfortunately does not receive 
adequate treatment in fcls book. ShalbanT readily disposes of the issue 
ty saying that, since Islam is aiming at a universal state, the Arabs 
should, as the first step towards this goal, unite themselves with the 
purpose of their subsequent integration in a "united, unitary and univer­
sal world governmentArab unity is therefore merely a transitory stage *2
•^al usus ath thawrawTyah. p. 81,
2
IbJjd^ », p• 30 • '•
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in the human drive for unity. The crucial problem of the relationship 
between Islam and nationalism, including the contradiction between the 
spiritual message of *slam and the material character of nationalism, has 
thu3 beip passed over in silence.
The problem has, however, attracted the attention of other Arab
writers. The best expression so far of the Arab nationalist’ s view of
his position towards Islam is that of the Iraqi *Abd sr Ragman al Bazza«
who concludes that "Arab nationalism which is devoid of the spirit of
1
Islam is like a body without a soul". Baezaz studied in London, where
he helped to organize an Arab Students' society, al .1am *Iyah *arablvafa
In Baghdad In 1939 he was a member of .1am 'Ivat *al .1 awwal al * arabT
(The Arab "Roving" Society), which was banned in 1941. The author was
then interned and was in three different camps during the war years.
"Active both in Fanarab and in Muslim organizations," says Haim, "he was
often criticised for his illogical behaviour; people always told him
2
that these two activities could not be compatible with one another." - 
In a pamphlet entitled al Islam wa*l QawmXvat' al * arabTvah (Islam and 
Arab Nationalism) containing the text of an address given in Baghdad in
•^Sylvia G, Haim, "Islam and Arab nationalism" in Die Welt des I  aims. 
N.5., 3, 1953-54, p. 201.
^Haim, on.cit. . p. 202.
January 1952 he tries to answer his critics by establishing the com­
patibility of Islam and Arab nationalism.
He starts off by discussing the Tong significance attributed, 
under the impact of the Western concepts, to the word "religion". Is­
lam, he say3, does not admit a narrow view of religion by restricting
1
it within the limits of "worship, ritual and the spiritual beliefs'1.
Contrary to Christianity and Buddhism, It is "a social order, a philo-
2
sophy of l ife , a system of economic principles, a rule of government". 
After quoting Bertrand Russell’ s definition of Islam as a "political 
religion or socially directed religion" Bazzaz concludes that "since 
Islam is a political religion, it  does not therefore necessarily contra­
dict Arab nationalism, unless their political aim3 differ bit this is
3
unthinkable
The writer then goes on to correct another misunderstanding -  
this time connected with Arab nationalism. Come people, he says, think 
that Arab nationalism can only be built upon racial appeal or racial 
chauvinism and would, therefore, be contrary to the universal nature 
of Islam. The exaggeration of some nationalists has undoubtedly been 
on#',of the Important reasons for this misunderstanding and, no doubt» 
what some Uramayyad governors, princes and walls have done in their en-





thuslastic tribal chauvinism and their racial propaganda was contrary 
to the nature of Islam.
’’But the Arab nationalism," declares Bazzaz, "in which 
we believe, and for which we call, is based,.,, not on 
racial appeal but on linguistic, historical, cultural 
and spiritual ties and fundamental vital interests."z
Baszaz's next concern is to demonstrate that, since Islam was re-
3
vealed first to the Arabs, " it  is their own special religion", Denouno-
/
lng the efforts of some historians and men of letters to break the tie 
between Islam and Arab life  and "to give the picture of Islam a cosmo­
politan character", he states that Islam is mainly an Arab religion be­
cause "the Prophet la from them and the Qur’an is  in their language".
He then cites a number of grabs from the Koran (xivt A» x liiii 24» xiii 2, 
xlivt 53, lx ilj 2, ixt 128, vi* 66, xxit 107) in supoort of this thesis/1
After enumerating other factors of Arab nationalism, l.e. "language,
5 —history, literature, customs and qualities", Bazzas examines Arab 
nationalism as "a political movement working to unite the Arabs and to 
give them self-government". Here again he finds Arab nationalism in 
agreement with Islam.
^ s o  V. supra, p, 14.
^a ln , op.clt,. p, 204,
^Ibld., pp, 207—211, 
5Ibld.. pp, 211-214.
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"The ¿kroti? national movement,” he soy3, ’!ia •demo­
cratic1, 'socia list ', 'popular* and 'co-operative',
Islam, although it did not lay down in detail the or­
ganisation of government, requires consultation, and 
does, without any doubt, accept completely democratic 
organisation. Its financial legislation and juristic
principles are, in essence, socialist....... It  is enough
to remember something of the life  of the Prophet and of 
the Caliphs, to realise the extent of the co-operative 
and the popular spirit of Islam. The position being 
such, the national government for which we call does rot, 
in any way, contradict Islam,"1
To say this, however, is rot to imply a call for Pan-laland am which,
"although it  may be desired by a ll the pious Muslims, is not possible
in practice, the reasons being many -  geographical, political, social -
or, at leasts it  is  not possible under present conditions, even if  we
agreed to limit this union to the parts of the Muslim homeland which 
2
are contiguous". And even I f  we assume that these parts could be 
united, then the unification of the "parts which speak the same lan­
guage, inherit the same literature and have the same history, is more
3
urgently needed, and more worthy of consideration". In other words, 
Bazzaz, like Shaibanl, considers Arab unity as the cornerstone of the 
edifice of Islamic unity and, therefore, does not see any contradiction 
between the two, "The nearest analogy," he concludes, "for the relation





between them /Islam and Arab Nationalism/ is that of the general to 
the particular*,^
As opposed to the "Arabo-l3lamic" nationalists, it  is not of 
course difficult to find some modern Arab thinkers appealing for a dis­
sociation between Arab nationalism and religion. Some of these writers 
base their case for this severance on the necessity ofseparating "church" 
from "state". Their arguments are more or less the same as those put 
forward by *AÏï 4Abd ar Raziq, to which we referred in Chapter Two,
Thus in his book on the crisis of Arab thought, azmat* al flkr al * arabl 
(Beirut 1954)» Dr. Ia$âq Musa al Çusainï contends that, whereas religion 
can not be divorced from society, just as the soul can not be divorced 
from the body, spiritual and temporal powers must be kept separate in
order to ensure both the distinct and natural growth of each "in the in-
,.3terest of the hum»! society as a whole" and to safeguard Arab national 
solidarity.^ Other writers substantiate their case by two arguments: 
one express, one suggested. Their express argument is that Arab history 
and Islaraio history are separable -  a view opposed to what Bazzaz tried
waim, op.clt.. p. 215.
^a»at* al flkr al * arabl. p, 23. 
^IMd.. pp, 24-25.
^ V. supra, p. 119 et sep.
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to establish. Their suggested argument is that many Christian Arabs
have jointly contributed, especially during the First World War, to
Arab nationalism. But their arguments mostly reveal stark self-contra-
__ v
dictions. Typical of such writers is *Abd al Malik *Udah, lecturer in
political science in the University of Cairo, He ascribes the failure
of Arab nationalism during its first phase (1916-1941) to a number of
causes, chief among which being the fact that*
"The philosophical principles and concepts of the (Arab) 
revolution (in the period between 1916 and 1941) were not 
clear enough to distinguish between Arab thought and Is­
lamic thought. The first reason (for this) was that the 
Muslims, namely, the majority of the inhabitants of these 
countries, were not accustomed to the historical and philo­
sophical distinction between the historical idea of Islamic 
unity end the religious idea of Muslim brotherhood."1
But *Udah's explanation of the second reason indicates his inner belief
in Islam as the main constituent part of Arab nationalism,
"The second reason," he says, "Is that Arftb nationalism 
Is based on multiple bases, one of which being a common 
history,,,, but we find that the Arabs' history and their 
active historical part in «human evolution does not start 
until the rise of Islam,"*
The writer does not apparently consider it  necessary to explain the rea­
sons for which the Arabs should have distinguished between "the historical 
idea of Islamic unity" aid "the religious idea of Muslim brotherhood",
Muhadarat Glyaslyah. maktabat* al an jilo 'l mijrlyah, Cairo, 1958, p, 114,
^Ibld.
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although the second point which he mentions, namely, the Identification 
of Arab history with Islamic history, strongly militates against such 
a distinction. Unmindful of the fact that his case has been thus seriously 
undermined, he immediately goes on to make the significant point which 
today secma to be the opinion of most non-Marxist, 3ocialist-mird8d in­
tellectuals in the Arab world*
"This is the cause of confusion in the minds of many 
nationalist leaders through the generations. In my 
opinion, this (confusion of identification of re li­
gion with nationalism) represents an overwhelming 
danger for, and an impediment to, the idea of nation­
alism and its active role in transforming the life  of 
the Eastern societies as a whole. Our nationalist 
movement is based on the fact that the Arabs form a 
nation distinguished from other nations by their basic 
values| (this movement) appeals for Arab unity and 
requires the establishment of a government on modem 
and scientific bases."1
Echoes of the pleadings of leaders of Turkish renaissance prior
to the First World War can be clearly heard in such clamourings. But
writers sharing *Uriah*s opinions on the desirability of a laic Arab
nationalist movement seem to overlook, or play down, the fact that,
while the Turks substituted at least a clearly revised fora of Islam
2and a modernistic national ideology for orthodox Islam, the Arabs have 
so far failed to do so.
^Uriah, op.clt.. p. 115.
^To have a grasp of the Turks* achievement on this score see, inter alia, 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam In History. pp. 161-205,
The Pluralistic School
In contrast to the ’’Monistic School” the ”Pluralistic School" 
conceives of Arab nationalism, not as an integral force, but rather 
as a conglomerate of various distinct factors. Foreseeing the contra­
dictions into which they might run as a result of too exaggerated an 
assessment of the role of language, religion or any other single factor 
in the formation of Arab nationality, the followers of this "pluralistic 
school'' adopt an eclectic attitude, avoiding any commitment to a single 
spiritual or material factor as & criterion of nationality. Whereas 
the Moribtic School is , as was noted, under the influer ce of German writers, 
the FXuralistic school shows traces of the influence of French and British 
thinkers.
Thus, in his widely-read book, taa<âlim al frayât *¿1 al *aràblyat* al 
ladldah. Dr, Kunlf ar Razsâa tries to steer clear of the dogmatic trends 
which seem to be very much alive in the Arab intellectual world. Dr,
Razzaz typifies the present generation of Arab militant-intellectuals.
He was bom in Damascus on December 17, 1919. Hl3 years in primary school 
thus coincided with the French occupation and the gowirg bitterness of 
nationalist feelings in Syria, "I have not forgotten up to this day," 
he writes in his letter to the present author dated April 21, 1962, "the 
roarings of guns, the sight of incendiaries and the movements of French 
troops,” His family moved to ^ordan at tho end of 1929« From that time 
until 1946, when he obtained his doctorate in medicine, his academic life  
was divided between 4Amman (Jordan), Jerusalem, Beirut and Cairo where
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ho completed his studies. This varied experience familiarized him*
with the different conditions and problems of the various’Arab countries.
In 1947 he became a member of "The National Committee for the defence of
Palestine", In 1949 he Joined the ba*th. and was nominated aa the Party
•
candidate for ‘ Amman in the general election of 1951, but failed to be
elected, Pis nationalist activities earned him the anger of the Govern-
«
ment authorities. In 1953 he was deprived of his Jordanian nationality 
and banished from the country for six months. Theretinon he vent to 
Damascus; it  was there that he wrote ma*allm al havat al * arablyaWhich 
eventually won the First Prize of the Arab League. _ Theye have been four 
reprints of this*book to datf, making a total of 14,000 copies — a ‘ privi­
lege’ rarely conferred on a book pf similar nature in any Middle Eastern 
country. In May 1953 he "returned to Jordan, But after the declaration 
of military law in ‘Amman jLn 1957 he was again arrested, and this time 
was kept in prison until the end of January 1959. Dr. Razzaa seems to
9
have taken a ll these ordeals stoically. "There is nothing," be modestly 
writes in the same letter to the present author, "in my life  worthy of 
mention. It has consisted of a series of storms in tea-cupsj".
9 mu C''Dr. Razzaz's treatment of Arab nationalism and especially the 
criteria of the Arab nation is characterised ty an almost "English" sense 
of non-commitment. The author discusses Arab hationalisra at the end of 
his book under the title "The National Life" (frayat'al qavml) after ana­
lysing a wide range of social, economic and political problems such as
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the various rights of a citizen, the nature o f democracy and the p o li­
t ic a l ,  economic and ethnical bases o f  society, n il with special re fe r ­
ence to the Arabs. Razzaz's explanation fo r re legating the discussion  
of Arab nationalism to the end of the book is  revealing of h is un- 
dogmatlc approach to Arab problems*
"X relegated the question o f Arab nationalism to the 
end o f the book fo r a very simple reason indeed. I  
believe that what creates a unique nation, engenders a 
unique nationalism and sets the lim its o f a unique home­
land is  the unity o f the problems fac ing that nation, 
the unity o f the factors dominating it s  existence, i t s  
past and it s  fu ture, and the unity o f  the solutions to 
these p roblem s.»,.. I  found i t  necessary to explain these 
problems and the ways which, in  ny opinion, lead to their  
solution. Thu3 the reader would sae, throughout the d is­
cussion, how the d iffe ren t governments in our Arab re a lity ,  
in spite o f the d isparities  in  th e ir circumstances, face  
sim ilar problems, and how the solutions to these problems 
are iden tica l fo r  a l l  these governments, whether they are
This is not the proper place fo r  dwelling upon Dr.Razzaz's re­
marks whether or not the problems facing a l l  Arab countries are re a lly  
so sim ilar as to furnish the basis o f  their future unity. But i t  i s  
interesting to note that, in  propounding the case fo r  Arab nationalism, 
Dr. Razzaz sh ifts  the emphasis fromthe world o f imponderables to .agoni­
zing tangible r e a lit ie s .  Hi3 imnlied argument is  that unity o f the Arabs 
is  necessitated not so much by th e ir common lin g u is t ic , re lig ious and 
h isto ric a l bonds, as by the s im ila rity , nay unity, o f the obstacles
m a l  bayat’ a l * arablyat* a l  jadldah, dar a l *llm
, Ì95$, (^ r T Tai ¥lon)T^P»'''263=3:
11*1 mali* In ,
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standing in  the way of their progress. This does n->t, o f coarse, lessen  
the importance o f language, re lig io n  and other factors about which the 
author is  b r ie f  and circumspect. " I t  is  a mo3t d if f ic u lt  task ," thus 
he disappoints the readers accustomed to the fa c i le ,  peremotory and sweep­
ing generalizations of some modern Arab w riters , "to  define exhaustively
1
the lim its o f any nationality*. He immediately goes on to repudiate, 
although in mild terms, those schools of thought which emphasize a single  
sp iritu a l or material factor in making such a defin ition . Of language 
he believes that Mty i t s e l f ,  i t  cannot be the basis o f  nationality ! fo r , 
as we know, B ritain  and the TJhited States share the same language but do 
not share the same nationality , whereas Switzerland, Belgium and India  
have each numerous languages and ( s t i l l )  each o f them forms a single
3
nation*. He voices the same d isb e lie f in the a b i lit y  o f re lig io n , or 
common te rrito ry , or h isto rica l bonds or common economic in terests alone 
to determine the bounds of a nation and to give r ise  to n ation a list ic  
fe e lin g s .^  But i f  none o f the factors o f h istory , geography, community 
of in terests, language and re lig ion  can ty i t s e l f  create a nation and 
a national movement, then what does create it? Dr. Razzaz's reply to 
th is question shows that he has accepted Renan's defin ition  of nationalism
hiazz&zt oo.clt.. p. 265.
2Ib id . . p. 266.
3Ibid.. p. 265.
¿ Ib id .
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in spite of ^Tujrrl’ o denunciations. His remarks almost echo the words
of Henan In his Qu'e-st-ce On*Une Nation? Says Dr. Hazzâz:
"The fact is  that oawmTyah i3 not determined by any 
of these factors (h istory , geography, e tc .) I t  i s  
prim arily and f in a l ly  determined Ty the awareness ' or 
consciousness.(Sh^ur) o f the whole peple o f th e ir be­
longing to one nation. Some, a l l ,  o r even a few, of 
the factors which we have Just mentioned, as w e ll as 
other factors, may link  the people together. But the 
basic and unique factor which surpasses a l l  these fac­
tors in strength and firmness is  the awareness o f the 
3 0ns ofthe nation that they are the sons of a single  
nation. I f  this awareness slackens, the oawmlyah can­
not be assisted whatsoever ty the assemblage of compon­
ents: i f  the awarene ss (¡rows strong, i t  natters l i t t l e  
i f  the people share only a few of the elements o f  a 
united nation.
The basic sim ilarity  between Razzaz's words and the follow ing
famous defin ition  of nationalism ty  Henan is  worth considering:
"Une nation est une grande so lidarité  constituée par 
le  sentiment des sacrifices  qu'on a fa i t s  et de ceux 
qu'on est disposé a fa ire  encore, tSlle suppose un passe, 
e lle  se resume pourtant dans le  present par un f a i t  tan­
g ib le : le  consentiment, le  désir clairement exprime de 
continuer l a  vie commune. L 'existence d'une nation est  
un p leb isc ite  de tous le s  Jours."* 2
Awareness, continues Br. Kazzàz, does not consist o f superfic ia l 
abstract emotions. I t  Is  rather the knowing o f the unity o f direction, 
of the community o f interests and of the uniqueness o f the v it a l  centre 
which the nationoecupies. The w riter mentions, by way of example, the
^Br. Razzâz, on.elt. , p. 266.
2Qu'est ce qu'une nation? Faris, CaLaann-Levy, 1882, p, 27. See also 
Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 80.
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French nation which feels that something "above the language, the family 
bonds and religion" distinguishes it  from the French-speaking people in 
other countries and from other foreigners. In the some manner the in­
habitants of the southern and western parts of Belgium are aware that 
there is something-which separates them from the French in spite of the 
community of language and, to a lesser degree, of shared past history 
and links them to another people with a different language. This aware­
ness, which is evidently the essence of nationalism, is bound to rest 
on certain fundamentals» it is bound to be actuated and nurtured by
a number of common features in the life  of the given people. As regards
%
the bases of Arab awareness, and thence Arab nationalism, Dr. Razza* 
finds them in five major sources which are analysed below*
I The common territory or, as the writer calls it, "the unity of 
locale, ard", -  a locale stretching from east to west and from 
north to south in the shape of a parallelogram split into countries 
tilth almost identical deserts, mountains and plains and» therefore, 
each inhabited by people divided into the Bedouins, badawi. and 
the town-dwellers, hadart.
I I  The Arabic language, which has been commonly spoken by these popu­
lations for fourteen centuries.
I I I  The common history, which needs litt le  more explanation. Although/ 
says the writer, the whole of Arab history since the rise of *slam 
is marked ty secessions and dissensions, a ll small and great Arab 
countris, whether in the glorious days of Islam or during the time
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of its decline, have been 'ploughing along the same furrow'.
Besides, with the exception of the Umayyads in Spain, there
ha3 always been only one Islamic Caliphate, when the Arabs
fe ll  under the hegemony of the Ottoman Emoire, they a ll shared
this fate at the same time, When the Ottoman rule disintegrated,
a ll Arab countries found themselves on the same path, under the
shadow of Western Imperialism. And when the new nationalist
movement started in the Arab countries, it started everywhere
in the Arab world "in the same manner, along the same lines and
1
towards the same goal".
The correctness of the writer's remark on Arabs sharing a 
common history can hardly be contested, although opinions to 
the contrary are held by some contemporary Arab authors.^
But id3 statement on the unity of the course and aim of 
nationalistic movements in a ll Arab countries is open to serious 
doubts, ¿ver since the Xoung Turk Revolution of 1903 there have 
been numerous eruptions of the Arabs' ardour and wish for emanci­
pation, unity and progress. But one can hardly see any similarity 
in the motives, methods and aims of these eruptions. There have 
been one or two major issues in every phase of this period such
^Dr. Razzaa, on.clt.. p. 269.
^Pr. IJusain Munis, nal *arab wa madihumtl (I’he Arabs and Their Past), in 
ath thaqafaH (The Culture) l9$ll ' The views of such^authors have been 
critically discussed ly Ijugrl in his d i f  a** an al * urubah. pp. 93-106,
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as Turanian Chauvinism, Jewish nationalism or Western imperial­
ism, which have accorded the Arabs' struggle for unity a semblance 
and even substance of unity. But against a ll these motives of 
unity there have been pertinent problems of far-reaching political 
consequences, both tactical end strategical, which have divided 
the Arabs and have occasioned dangerous and sometimes sanguinary 
conflicts between them. The desire for Arab unity, to mention one 
example, was, until some tin® ago, or perhaps precisely until the 
Egyptian revolution of 1952, a constant source of discord and 
acerbity between them, There have been men, like P-u§$afa iQail^ 
and Anton ¿a 1adah,^ who, as we have seen, preferred their res­
pective Egyptian and Syrian nationalisms to the wider concept of 
Arab unity. There have been Egyptians who have shown opposition 
to the idea of unity with other Arabic speaking peoples by ex­
pressing their desire to regain the glory of the pre-Islaalc,
3
Pharaonoic Egypt, There have also been Syrians who have empha­
sized the Phoenician origin of the Syrian people, but their nostal­
gic particularism has been far less strident than Egyptian Fhar- 
aonlsm,^ No wonder that the announcement in the Egyptian Consti—
*Sr. sunra, p. ¡‘to s*f 
sunra. p, 3-oo .
3y, sunra. p, 5S
4-IIourani, on.cit. , p, 133. Hr. Razzaz, op.cj^. , p, 271 ct seq.
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tutlon of 1956 that the Egyptian people are "an Integral part
1
of the Arab nation", was hailed by Arab nationalists as a step
oforward and a gratifying re lief. After the parochialism and 
narrow-minded nationalism, one should refer to the medley of 
oon+radlctoi*y schemes which have been put forward even by the 
expounders of the idea of Arab unity for achieving their common 
purpose. The disagreements over the much notorious Fertile Cres­
cent, the Greater Syria and the rest r (  the Federal Union and the 
United Arab Republlc)have been too radical to allow for any dis­
play of unity between their sponsors. The recent bitter war of words 
between the United Arab Republic and Iraq, the two major powers in
^Constitution of the Republic of Egypt. The following phrase in the pre­
amble of the Constitution is  also noteworthy* "We, the people of Egypt, 
realising that we form an organic part of a greater Arab entity, and 
aware of our responsibilities and obligations towards the common Arab 
struggle for the glory and prestige of the Arab nation,,.,"
2"The inclusion of these phrases (the phrase in the preamble and Article 
One) in the text of (the Egyptian) Constitution is an important event 
worth emphasising in the history of the development of Arab nationalist 
thought in Egypt, and gives cause for rejoicing and appreciation. The 
fact is that Egypt embarked upon the path leading to Arab Awakening only 
a short while -ago. Her progress along this path was slow and sluggish, 
until the Palestine catstrophe. The reason was that the Egyptian opin­
ions on the nationalistic problems were surprisingly confused and divided 
among Pharaonic tendencies, Egyptian parochialism, Oriental affiliation  
and Islamic community. But the idea of Arab nationalism was vacillating 
between these various tendencies and could not easily find its way among 
the people. This state of affairs, h-wever, rapidly changed after the 
Palestinian catastrophe. The idea of Arablsm gained in strength from day 
to day, and started to overcome other tendencles_v±th increasing speed, 
teultiplied after the 1952 revolution," gu jii, ara*wa afradlth f i * l
yj^h,  p, B,
V
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the Arab world, both professing similar theoretical principles 
as the bases of their internal (Arab socialism) and external 
(positive neutralism) policies, is another example.
To say that Arab nationalists have so far been at variance with 
one another over the same ideas is not to deny th-t this variance 
is diminishing with the years, and that the alternatives to unity 
facing the Arab countries are today far less numerous than they 
were until only a decade ago. But the fact remains that what is 
usually referred to as Arab nationalism is- actually a patchwork 
of disparate and conflicting ideas, and that its; history since 
the First World War ( not to speak about earlier periods) does 
not offer a consistent and even pattern. Thi3 is the reason why 
the very term Arab nationalism 13 dangerously misleading insofar 
as it  makes a variegated movement with divided aims and loyalties 
look like a monolithic entity with unified objectives. This does 
not^  of coarse, mean that in analysing this movement and in assessing 
its relations with the West one should not, as a measure of schol­
astic convenience, use the tirm in a general sense. We apnly other 
similarly complicated terms, such as the Western civilization or 
the Western way of life , mostly in an indiscriminate way and with­
out paying much attention to their subtleties,
IV The fourth base of Arab nationalism, continues Dr, Razzaz, is Islam. 
The writer reminds the reader that, by placing this factor after 
geography, language and history, he does not mean to diminishits
significance. In pursuance of his dialectical logic, he admits 
that religion by itself cannot delimit any nation or nationhood, 
since a ll religions, including both Islam and Christianity, em­
brace nations and groups with different characteristics. Never­
theless we would argue that the significant difference between 
Christianity and Islam is  that Islam has tinctured the Arabs' 
thought, traditions, customs, myths, opinions and everyday life  
on a scale far larger than Christianity and, for that matter, any 
other religion has affected the spiritual and material life  of its 
followers. This has been due, as has been previously noted, to 
the complete integration of Islam in the social and political 
structure of a ll Muslim countries, striking a sharp contrast with 
the Christian world where the dichotomy of the religious and the 
lay has been a reality. Therefore, Dr, Razzaz is  right in saying 
that» "Islam in these (Arab and other) countries has been, not 
only a religion, but history, civilization and spiritual life , 
hayat'al *aq1Tya'a"^ lie regards this also as an explanation for 
the fu ll integration of the Christian Arabs in the Arab civilizar- 
tion and the deep impact of Islam on their material and spiritual 
life .
V. Dr. Razzaz concludes by saying that the fifth  basis of Arab nation-
of the Arabs.
alism should be sought in the shared misfortunes and wants/ As
Dr. Razzaz, on.clt., p. 270.
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referred to before, this community, which is in the writer's eyes 
the most real and reliable bond linking the Arabs together, forms 
the subject of the greater part of the book. He analyzes this 
community first  in the political field. A ll Arabs, he says, are 
ruled by governments which donot represent their interests,1 *3 The 
reasons for the emergence of these unrepresentative governments 
are identical in a ll Arab countries. They aret firstly , the de­
plorable economic conditions of the masses, which render them in- 
potent as a political force,*6 Secondly, the disillusionment of 
the literate section of the population because of its inability 
to have any say in the running of the government and its resulting 
passivity,^ Thirdly, the defective electoral laws which, in some 
Arab countries, deprive the women of political rights and in a ll 
of them serve the interests of the upper classes by such measures 
as admitting only the rich to the election campaign or providing 
for " two-degree” elections.^ Fourthly, theunsuccessful career of 
the political parties which are, almost everywhere in the Arab 
world, based, not on principles and ideas, but on personalities;





their over-cautiousness in carrying out progressive measures; 
the ambiguity in their blue-prints which regularly hold out 
promises of promotion of national independence. The raising 
of the people's standing of living and the like, with ut explain­
ing the means and way3 of implementing these high-flown ideals; 
the anti-democratic nature of their organisations, where the 
leaders reign supreme, offering no opportunity to the rank and 
f i le  to express themselves, and barring the way to young talent 
and, finally, as a consequence of a ll these defects, the growth
• i
of the one-party system in almost a ll Arab countries.
In the economic field , the writer does not do Justice to 
his own purpose: he does not, in other words, elaborate sufficient­
ly on the similarity of the economic interests between Arab count­
ries, This is both disappointing and puzzling since, as can be 
Judged from the contents of the book as a whole, he seems to have 
an adequate grasp of, and an unmistakable preference for, Socialism.
He often attempts to emphasize the economic undercurrents and bases
2
of most of the Arabs' social problems. The bulk of his chapter *2
l)r. Razzaz, QP«clt.. p. 70 et seq,
2Thl8 has already been demonstrated in outlining his views on the politi­
cal impotence of the Arab masses which, he thinks, is due to their eco­
nomic privations (see the previous page). Elsewhere, analysing the cul­
tural and educational problems of the Arab countries, he says that these 
problems can have no "real and profound solution unless with the change 
of the whole economic regime, and with placing it  on the basis of serv­
ing the public instead of that of profiteering, and with the elimination 
of the class regime," (p, 1 6 1 . )
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on the economic aspects of Arab life  Is devoted to propounding 
the rights of individuals in a ll countries to be assured of work, 
of a minimum wage, of re3 t and of safeguards against unemployment.
He also points out the Importance of state control over the econo­
mic life  of the country and its interference in favour of the poor 
and the downtrodden. The whole chapter bears a striking resemblance 
to Laski's discussion of the economic rights of the individual in 
his Grammar of Politics. But what the writer fails to do is to 
demonstrate cogently that there are actually similar economic con­
ditions prevailing in a ll Arab countries, lending a vigorous reality 
to their unity in other fields. He gives a picture of this simi­
larity by stating that a ll Arab countries are victims of feudal 
economies,^ a ll of them possess ample amounts of natural riches
such as oil and cotton, a ll of them suffer from a low level of
3
national production and a ll of them fa il to put into effect those 
economic rights of individual which the writer takes upon himself 
to enumerate in fu ll.^  But a ll these references are sketchy, 
meagre and, in the general context of the writer's economic inter­
pretation of the Arabs* plight, unconvincing, ’.’hat is  needed is
...................................................................................................................................... ........ 11,1 I I ■ II ■■■!  I l l  ■ '  I I II ■ .. ... ...............  ................................. . —
^Dr. Razoaz, op.clt., p. 1 1 2  et seq.
% bid ., p. 12A.
^Ibid. . p. 1 2 5  et sea.
Arbid. . p. 129 et seq.
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to establish the Arabs’ economic Interest in unity by pinooint- 
ing concrete fact3, quoting instructive statistics and criticis­
ing those who ignore, or deny, this interest.
Having disposed of the econorac problems, Dr. Razzaz proceeds 
to explain the Arabs’ backwardness in the social field. Conform­
ing to his ever-present pattern, he does this in the form of pass­
ing remarks while discussing the social rights which, in general, 
an individual should enjoy in order to contribute his fullshare 
to the welfare of the society. On this score also the Arabs to­
day find themselves in similar circumstances as a ll of them (ex­
cepting the Lebanese) suffer from a low level of l i t e r a l ,1 23and
receive inadequate attention from the Government, financial or
2 qotherwise, with regard to education and health service.
To sum up, as i f  in an attempt at forestalling Vie stern criticism
*
(and certainly under their impact), Dr. Razzaz conceives the necessity 
of Arab unity against a wide background of political, social and economic 
factors. He admits, though implicitly, the difficulty of bringing about 
this unity by clarifying its complicated nature and by explaining its




numerous pre-requisites« From this viewpoint, his study might prove 
disappointing for the emotional and the idealistic hut it  certainly 
displays a greater degree of realism and, therefore, can be more helpful 
to the cause of Arab unity, than those works which merely praise this 
unity and overlook the obvious hurdles in its way. Contrary to most 
protagonists of Arab nationalism, who over-simplify the issue by empha­
sising only one or other of the common features of Arabs such as religion 
or language and the like, Fr. Razzaz points out, although not always 
successfully, the plurality of the issues involved.
With added emphasis and, -’ometimea, in a more elaborate way a ll 
the factors concisely analysed above are enumerated as the pillars of 
the Arab xmm& by another Arab writer, the Syrian tfujjammad Izaah Darawzah, 
in 1* book al wahdat* al *arablyah (Arab Unity), Under the heading "The 
Growth of the Bases of Arab Unity« he provides the reader with a lengthy 
analysis of the common features of the Arabs as a nation* his only dif­
ference, in this respect, from Tr. Razt&z and many other Arab analysts 
is  that he introduces the racial unity as one -  and so far as the order 
of matters goes -  the Aost important, of these factors. The treatment 
of the racial unity of the Arabs is  a rare phenomenon in the works of 
modern Jteb writers who, as was noted In the case of Ilazzaz, mostly try 
to push it  aside, or content themselves with a passing reference Tfo it* 
this is either in deference to the anti-racial character of !slam or,
24D
more important, becau3© of the ominous ring of a ll claims to racial
purity and unity in the second half of the twentieth century, especial y
in the face of a suspicious, disparaging West* Although Darawzah, on
more than one occasion, expresses his firm belief in Islam as a great
religion and a unifying force of the Arabs, this does not prevent him
from dwelling upon the racial question at considerable length.
A more detailed exposition of Darawzah's racial outlook can be
found in his voluminous book entitled tarlkh al .1ins al * arabl (History
of the Arab Race). Drawing on both European and Arab sources, he tries
in the three volumes of the book to relate the pre-Islamic history of
the Arabs. The dominant purpose of the book is to vindicate the position
of the Arab3 as wa race occupying a unique position among the leading
and very active races of mankind".^ It  is, however, with his al wahdat*
al *arablyah that we are concerned here.
He starts off fcy emphasising that a ll Semitic peoples inhabiting
the Arabian peninsula and its surrounding countries should, in fact, be
2called Arabs and not Semites, since their original residence was the 
Arabian peninsula, and not Babylon, as some scholars would like to believe.
^tarlkh al .11ns al *arab£. al maktabat' al 1 afrlyalj, Beirut, 1957,
Vol. I ,  p. 5.
2al wafadat* al 1arablya^ p. 26.
ti
He argues this point ty quoting Dr, Jawâd A ll, Dr, Hasan Karaâl, Jurjl 
Zaidân and I In Khaldeun, as well as such European scholars as Bristide 
and Le Bon and many others, on the centrifugal movements of Arab emi­
grants from the heart of the Arabian peninsula in a 13. directions to
1
Iraq, to Egypt, to Syria and to the ma"hrlb. It is no doubt on the basis 
of these statements that he modifies even the word Islam with the adject-
ty
ive "Arabic", al lsïâa al *arabl.
On the question of the religious unity of the Arabs Darawsah is
i t
more emphatic than Çujsrl and Dr, Razzaz. /¿Iso in his other book entitled 
ad dustur al gur1«* ! f l  shu*ûn al bayât (The Koranic Law on the Affairs 
of Life) that Darawzah gives a fuller treatment of Islam. His main con­
cern in this latter book is to underline the social and political character 
of Islam by analysing the Koranic injunctions on a wide range of subjects,
including government,  ^ finance,^ judicature,5 defence and the holy war
-  6 7 8 Q( jihad) , propaganda,' social co-operation, individual morals . etc, But,
^al wahdat* al * arahlyah, pp. 21-1,2,
2Ibld.. p, 4-3.
^ad dustûr al qur»anT f l  3hu*un al bayât, dâr ihyâ* al kutub al *arabîyah, 
Cairo, 1956, p. 49 et'" seq.
^Ibld. . p, 34 et saq.
^Ibld. , p. 160 et aeq.
^Ibld. . p. 224 et aeq.
7
Ibid.,  p. 222 et jim.
3 "Ibid., p, 367 et seq.
9Ib id .. p. 489 et seq.
In wahcHh, Parawzah confines himself to defining the position of Islam 
as a factor of Arab unity. The religious unity of the Arabs, he says, 
is underlined, not only by the fact that nearly 93 per cent of a ll  Arab3 
are Kusliras, but also by the inclusion of the majority of them in the 
Sunni fold.'*' He regards as insignificant not only the differences be­
tween the two main sects in Islam, i.e . Sunnism and Shiism, hut also 
the various divisions and subdivisions within each of these sects.* 2
Although, as the writer says, these differences and schisms do 
not in’ fact touch the essence of Islam, it  can not he gainsaid that they 
have at times represented serious impediments to understanding between 
the Arabs. On this occasion one must recall the sinister history of the 
Sunnl-f h!*! internecine quarrels in Iraq, which have some times been 
reckoned as one of the causes of the social and political instability in 
that country. Such quarrels have undoubtedly decreased recently both 
in range and in intensity* but this has been due less to conscious, 
deliberate and well-organised conciliatory moves than to the rallying 
effect of foreign pressure and oppression.
Contrary to some Arab apologists who tend to engage in prolonged 
theological arguments to demonstrate Islam’s superiority over Christian­
ity, Darawzah maintains that both religions seek to achieve the same 
things#
^al wahdat* al * araMyah, p. 77.
2Ibid.. pp, 7m
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"There is no difference," he says, "between the aims 
and appeals of Jslora and Christianity . . . .  Islam admits 
the sanctity of Jesus Christ, his nobility and (vener­
ates) his testament. There are no disparities between 
Islam and Christianity either in the political, govern­
mental, institutional and legislative fields or in respect 
to the economic and social rights and duties of the indi­
vidual,,,, The ■‘‘slamic injunctions clearly and emphatically 
appeal for generosity, equity, amity and good behaviour,
J\ire Christianity introduces kindness and peace, and de­
nounces personal rancours and desires,"*
The similarity between these words and what we quoted before from Jabia 
2
yusain on the relation between Islam and Christianity is too close to 
be dismissed as mere coincidence. The writer ascribes occasional i l l -  
feelings between the Christian and Muslim Arabs to foreign intrigues. Thus, 
while he emphasises the racial and religious unity of the Arabs, he tries 
not to make this appear in any way offensive to the Western and Christian 
world. Considering that the concepts of Arab nationalism, at least for the 
time being, are of anti-Western implications, and that, with the continu­
ation of the Arab-West disputes, there is  a growing danger of these disputes 
being interpreted in exclusively religious terms, such broad-minded and de­
tached approaches to the relations between *slam and Christianity are most
3welcome. The explosion in the Lebanon in the summer of 1958, ' where the Mus­
lim and Christian sections of the populations took up arms against each 
other over a basically political issue, was a dire reminder of the fact 
that communal relations within the Arab countries are not always governed by 
the liberal Koranic injunctions concerning thejdhlmaia. I f  the drift 
to an "internal" crusade in the Arab world is  to be stopped, » j stained
*al wahflat* al * arably ah, pp, 81-82, 
2V. supra, pp, 54- 55.
h s.M m >  P. 250 ,et seq,.
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efforts are required to take the edge off the religious clashes.
Earawzah, like mo3t of the Arab writers, treats the Important 
question of similarity of the social, cultural and legislative systems 
of the Arab countries in a very brief manner. But, unlike Dr, Tlazzaz, 
who sought this similarity rather in the defects and shortcomings of the 
system, Darawzah discerns it  in their underlying principles. Laws, tradi­
tions, customs and arts of the Arab peoples, say3 the writer, are a ll
tinctured ly the Islamic teachings.^ Thus the Arabs are governed by
2
the same penal and civic regulations as laid down in the Koran and 
expressed through the flnh and, although many innovations and adaptations 
have taken place since the middle of the last century, "the principles 
of the Islamic sharl*ah. under which the Muslims have lived for a con­
siderable time, have retainedjtheir validity for most of the Arabs, as 
these principles have become an integral part of the life  of the Muslima,
who fora the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the Arab home- 
3
land". Another proof of this similarity is that Western civilization,
■^ al waljdat *al ‘ arablyah, p, 85 ft  seq.
%he Islamic law does not present such a homogeneous picture as Darawzah 
suggests here. Notwithstanding the main division in Islam, i.e , that 
between Sunnism and Shiism, the subdivisions and schisms based on each 
of these two sects have inevitably resulted in great differences and 
altercation*a3 to multiple problems of lav and commerce. Gee Aaaf A, A, 
Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law. Oxford University Press, Second edition, 
London,' I960, pp. 13-43J Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Juris­
prudence . Oxford University Press, London, 1950*
^al wafrdat1 al *arablyah, p, 86,
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by coming Into contact with the Arabs, has caused identical changes
1
in the social systems of a ll Arab countries, which would not have been 
possible had these systems been different from one another. On the 
question of the best political and administrative shape which a united 
Arab State should take, Darawzah shows his preference for the federal 
pattern of unity in his discussions on the Constitutions of the United 
States of America, the Soviet Union and India as "examples of the united 
state" which he regards as the correct organizational (.lihazl) method of 
Arab unity. In this stand he is Joined ly many other nationalists,-7
The Arab nationalists’ appreciation for Western federalism dates 
back to the days of Hamidian despotism (1379-1903). Two of the main 
Arab nationalist societies of that period, i.e , al *ahd and al qafr$anlyah, 
set the pattern for Arab borrowing from W®stern federalism "by suggesting 
the transformation of the remaining Arab and Turkish parts of the unpire 
into an Arab-Turkish federation, to be established on the image of what 
looked to be a federal Austro-Hungarian Empire",^ The failure of their 
attempt together with the final breakdown of the Ottoman Empire at the 
end of the First World War "marked the end of any universal Imperial or­
^al  wahdat’ al *arablyah, p. 87,
^Ibid.. p, 642, £'45 et sen.
%u§rl, d lfl* an al *urubah. p. 151 et sea., p. 174 et sec., p, 182 et seq. 
Keguib.'Tferpt's Destiny, p. 270 et sea.
4Dr, Hessan Saab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire, p. 277.
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ganisation" in the Middle ’Cast, »hat was''left of the Arabs' scheme of
"imperial federalism" was, therefore, only its federal component.
"As the Arab nationalists," say3 Dr. ^assan 2aab, "of 
el-Ahd sought salvation in the imitation of the Austro- 
Hungarian federal pattern, Arab nationalists in Egypt,
Jordan, .Syria, Lebanon and Iraq contemplate today the 
imitation of the federal pattern of organization of the 
United States, Switzerland and the Soviet Union."*
The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union, the two powers at
present directing the course of human civilization, have federal organi-
r r t  S f t f t * .  O f f fa s *  < & '-0 ts U *tce s )
zatlon, in other respects, enhances "the appeal of
federation to a ll human cultural, regional, or national large groups which 
aspire to unification".3
On the whole, Darawzah’s analysis of the components of the Arab 
Nation is comprehensive Insofar as he speaks of the spiritual life  of 
the Arabs. But there is  an evident and lamentable neglect on the part 
of the writer even to face,without assessing, the eanomic and social 
realities in the Arab world. His reference to the social characteristics 
of the Arabs is, as can be *athered from the previous passages, short 
and perfunctory. Besides, it  does not treat these characteristics with 
the adequate scientific precision and detail required for his own pur­




Arab countries, each of which, owing to the domination of a different 
foreign power, haa ty now developed unique features. His book does not 
provide an adequate analysis of the economic factors in their relation 
to Arab unity. Thisjinevitably leaves us with the impression that the 
writer has shunned the economic issue because he himself is convinced 
of the lack of an economic unity in the Arab world. In another chapter, 
on the "Necessity of Unity",'*’ Darswz&h touches upon the economic problems 
of the Arabs in a bid to prove that, ty pooling their resources and ener­
gies, they w ill achieve prosperity and prevent these resources from being 
dissipated and wasted. But this Is quite another matter. It  is one 
thing to prove that a given group of people do, in fact, form a nation 
because of the community of their interests and characters. It is quite 
another matter to convince them that it is in their interest to achieve 
this unity. Darawsah performs this second task successfully. But, per­
haps like other advocates of Arab unity, his arguments on the first question 
are rather timid and defective.
Responding to some Western doubts about the possslbility of realis­
ing Arab unity in the teeth of various social, political and economic
al Tafrdat* al *arablyah, p. 90 etseq.
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differences between the Arab peoples, a nu ber of writers tiy to sound 
realistic ty conceding such differences. Perhaps typical of this group 
of writers is Natlh Amin Paris, Head of the Department of History at 
the American University of Beirut, to whom we have referred in our dis­
cussion on the Arabic language. *n his book min az zawlyat1 2al *arablvah 
(Prom the Arab Viewpoint), a collection of disjointed articles on the 
problems of the Arab world, the pillars of Arab unity a~e said to be 
language, history, religion, spiritual life  ( *aolIyah) and what he calls 
"the pressure of new factors". He divides the3e last factors into ex­
ternal and internal. The external factor is represented ty the menace 
of colonialism and its attendant miseries.^ ^y internal factors he means, 
on the one hand, the development of mass media and educational systems 
within the Arab countries and, on the other, the expansion of "new econo­
mic plans transcending the frontiers of a single (Arab) country and ltnk-
p
ing together the brotherly states". The writer gives no inkling as to 
what these economic plans are, although he emphasises that "the economic 
factors are at present the greatest tangible factors of unity"3 and that 
"the political tmion or unity between the Arab countries remains in the 
realm of unrealizable dreams unless it  is preceded by economic union or
iNablh Amin Paris, min az zawlyat* al *arablvah. dar bairut, Beirut,
1953, p. 15.
2Ibld.. p. u .
3Ibid.
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unity”, 1 I f  the economic factors are as essential for Arab unity as 
the writer seems to believe, then he should provide the reader with a 
far wider explanation of the potentialities which the Arab countries en­
joy in order to lend reality to their economic unity. In one place he
hints that "the factors and the crude materials of such economic and
2
social unity exist, although they lie untapped”, In another place he 
mentions "the differences between the economic, social and cultural stan- 
d a r d s of the Arab peoples as setbacks to the cause of their unity. Al­
though one might imagine the case of two countries with differences in 
their economic standards and systems, and s t i l l  with potentialities for 
merging their economic resources, this does not absolve the writer from 
the task of ironing out his self-contradiction Ty stating facts and fig ­
ures.
One novel and interesting feature in l 'ir is1 book, as compared with 
the other works surveyed in this thesis, is  the view that the Lebanon 
should assume the leadership of the contemporary movement of Arab nation­
alism.^ He somewhat undermines his case by admitting that emotionalism
^Faris, op.clt.. 
^Ibid.. p, 15.




haa induced him to make this plea, as his ancestors, up to seven gener­
ations back, lived and died in the Lebanon. Emotions apart, the question 
of the Lebanese leadership of the 'Vab nationalist movement in its pre­
sent phase cannot be taken very seriously, but as Faris apparent^ is not 
the only person! who makes this appeal it would seem appropriate to dwell 
on the subject at some length* Hourani has given an account of the "hist­
orical and ethnological" views of the Lebanese people in regard to Arab 
nationalism which can be summarized as follows«
Firstly, there are some Lebanese who regard themselves as simply 
a branch of the Arab people, and their destiny as indistinguishable from 
that of the Arab people as a whole,^ Secondly, there are some who, al­
though admitting "the slightly different character" of the Lebanese his­
tory and tradition as compared with the Arab peoples, do not regard this 
difference as forming the basis of a special mission or destiny at pre­
sent* A third group believes in a special although restricted function 
for Lebanon which is to provide an asylum for those who^religious loyal­
ties or racial origins moke it difficult for them to live in neighbouring 
regions. The function is restricted because "it can only be actualized 
under perpetual foreign protection or guarantee, since the hills altó valleys 
of Lebanon no longer immunise her from interference! and secondly, be—
■*t)ne of the most prominent, contemporary exponents of this school is per­
haps Kamál JanbalaJ, leader of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party.
See hi8 haqlqat* nth thawarat^al lubnanlyah. dar an nashr al * arabTyah, 
Beirut, 1959, pp. 97 ei seq., Í2£,"Í5é, 166,
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cause it offers to the communities who seek refuge in her no ideal ex­
cept to be le ft alone and to live on the margin of history'1. The fourth 
school is that of those Christians who maintain that Lebanon should be­
come fully a part of the Western Christian world and that she should not 
be politically or in any way a part of the Arab world. Finally, there 
are some who wish Lebanon to remain Christian without, at the same time,
ceasing to be Arab and to some it is  a centre from which Christian and
1
in general Western influences can radiate to Arab Asia.
Kourani maintains that the first two views are held by many of
the younger generation of the Druzea and Greek Orthodox Christians but
by fewer of the Maronltes, the third view by those, to whatever sect they
belong, who are deeply suspicious of the Sunni Muslims and at the same
time conscious of their own wea’mess. The fourth and fifth  views are
2
held only by Christians.
3
In the face of such confessional and ethnological diversities and 
with her economic and cultural conditions considerably at variance with
^This school of thought is now represented by Pierre Jumayil, a Christian 
of Frencheducation, leader of katl*lb al lubn&alvmh (Phalanges Libanalses) 
who emphasize that they desire good relations with the West, but that 
their first loyalty is towards Lebanon not towards Arablsm or Westerni­
zation. (See Arnold Hottinger, Zu*agtt* and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis 
of 1958, The Middle last Journal, Spring 19&1, p. 137.)
2Svrla and Lebanon, pp, 133-135.
%ee also Clyde C. Hess Jr,, Herbert L. Bodman Jr., Confesslonallsm and 
Feudality In Lebanon Politics. The Middle Last Journal, 1954, PP. 10-2b.
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those of other Arab countries, Lebanon seen3 to have a very slender 
chance of leading the Arab nationalist movement in which Islam, at 
least at present, occupies a predominant position.
Faris' book was written in 1953, that i3 to say, before the 
Lebanese civil war of the summer of 1953« Although political pre­
diction, especially in the case of the unpredictable Arab affairs, is 
as unwise as unreliable, it would not have been humanly impossible In 
1953, with the above divisions and the «amples of the civil wars of 
1341, 18^ 5 and 1S£0 in mind, to foresee a clash of religious interests 
in the Lebanon especially when the war of loyalties in the Arab world 
was assuming a clearer shape out of Its previous confused welter. The
Lebanese bloodbath of the summer of 1953 and its aftermath of a more
1
subtle and sensitive system of iluslim-Christian co-existence should 
have frustrated a ll hopes for the Lebanese leadership. The fact, however, 
remains that for a long time to cane the Lebanon is to stay ahead of 
practically any other Arab country, not only in cultural and educational 
fields, but also in the domain of political consciousness and dynamism.
^In his inevitably biased account of the 1953 Civil War, Janbala$ (v. 
supra, p. 250) tries to represent the religious conflicts among the 
Lebanese as manifestations of the much more important political differ­
ences. He especially holds the Christian leaders responsible for the 
exploitation of the religious sentiment of the masses in the interest 




For the time being the majority of books and pamphlets on various 
aspects of Arab nationalism are written by the Lebanese, and even those 
by other Arab writers are mostly published in the Lebanon. Certainly 
the fact that nearly ninety per cent of the Lebanese are literate is  par­
tially responsible for this. But far more important is the high measure 
of political liberties enjoyed by her people, at least so far as the free­
dom of political polemics and discussions are concerned. In the past, 
also, the most enlightened books on Arab nationalism have appeared in 
the Lebanon. Whatever their defects, these books and publications possess 
the merit of representing divergent views and opinions about the Arabs and 
their politics as opposed to the literature prevalent In the other Arab 
countries, which tends to be highly "regimented", tediously uniformed and 
dangerously apologetic. But political consciousness is not the only pre­
requisite for political leadership. This is as true in the case of per­
sonalities as it is of countries. I f  qualities other than political aware­
ness, such as boldness, organising ability and astuteness are required to 
make a person competent for leadership, far more complicated and subtle 
conditions are necessary in order to enable a country to be accepted as 
worthy of political leadership. Lebanon, undoubtedly, excels in politi­
cal sophistication. This very fact, coupled with the delicate system of 
her confessional composition, accounts for her temperate and sometimes 
conservative stand on the issue of Arab nationalism. And one of the causes 
of the civ il war of 1958, according to those who raised the bamer of 
rebellion against the ■Sham*un Government, was the departure from this
V
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temperate line** It  is evident that a country which, owing to her own
internal problème, has to prefer vagueness and silence on many l33uea,
cannot take the lead of a movement whose problems require bluntness and
courage. As a last word, we must aay that the Christian participation
in  the Lebanese administration is  anotheijreason which should d isqua lify
Lebanon from Arab leadership at least in the eyes of Far is who, now,
2
contrary to what he thought only about a decade ago, assumes Islam as 
one of the main features of the Arab umma.
Arab " Jacobin Nationalists"
The third, and the last school of Arab nationalists is character­
ized by its concern for the environmental changes which should take place 
in the Arab world prior to the realization of Arab unity, We have meta­
phorically calledthem Arab Jacobin nationalists sinc^ they possess a ll  
the characteristics associated with this term in the history of political 
movements* 'intolerance of dissent, reliance on militarism, religious 
intensity awl appeal, and missionary zeal'. In the words of an Arab 
writer, they call "for drastic alterations in the fracture of Arab society"
^JanbalaJ;, baglaat^ath thawarat^al lubnahlyafa, pv 58 et. seq. . pp, 112-113.
2In his book entitled The Living Arabs (Beirut 1947), iTiria ascribes the 
el men t a of discord in the Arab world to the fact that n Is lam -  as a 
policy -  did not provide for the concept of (me nation".
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revolting "against the quasi-feudal system of land tenure, and economic,
social and political stratification of Arab society on the basis of 
1
that system".
The most notable representative of this school is undoubtedly the
Syrian i€shll *Aflaq, who has been known as "the philosopher of the Arab
Renaissance" (fallasuf al ba^eth al *arabl). *Alfaq studied history, in
France in the years 1923-1932, and after his return to tyria en^a^ed in
the teaching of history. He took an active Dart in the Iraqi revolt of
19-42, as well as in the Palestinian war of 1943. But his most important
achievement was the creation in 1943 of the first socialist party in the
Arab world called frlzb al ba*th a l *arabl* (the Arab Renaissance Party)
3together with a number of his close friends including Akram Ecurani.
Before that he is said to have been one of the leaders of the Syrian ' 
4
Communist Party.
*Aflaq has summarized the aims of the ba*th in three wordsi 
Freedom (hurrlyah). Socialism (lshtlraHyah) and Unity (wafrdah).^  All 
these three aims are pursued with an eye on the interests and ideals of
Sayegh, Arab Unity , p. 162.
%JshTl *Aflaq, ma*rakat* al maglr al wabid, dar al adab, Beirut, 1958, 
p. 18.
^Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Kiddle East, p. 159.
^Ibld.. p. 333.
^ma*rakat* al maglr al wafrld, pp. 33 et seq. , 135.
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a ll the Arab peoples. The two main pillars of his movement are, then, 
socialism and nationalism. It would be useful to analyze 1Aflaq's in­
terpretation of socialism and nationalism in order to appreciate yet 
another aspect of the Western impact on modem Arab political thought.
Ail important point to be noted about 'Aflaq's 'Arab socialism' 
is its estrangement from Marxism and, of course, Communism. He is against
a ll materialistic interpretation of history which is the very essence of
2
Marxist philosophy.
"The Communist philosophy," 1» writes, "is  based on 
the belief in the matter, interpreting the historical 
and social evolutions on the basis of the economic 
factor which it erects into an absolute finality . . . .
But the philosophy of the Arab Renaissance ( ba*  th) 
does not accept this materialistic theory. It  main­
tains that the spiritual factor exercises immense in­
fluence on the evolution of history and the progress 
of humanity. It  is therefore neither irrelevant nor 
contradictory to Arab spiritual movements including 
Islam."3
Elsewhere 1m adduces a more interesting argument for his rejection
of Communism. Punning on the words gharb (West) and gharlb (alien), be
says that Communism is wa child of modern Western thought and Western
A
conditions", steeped in "the revengeful Judaism" of Marx and, therefore,
ma* rakat* a l maslr a l w jhid. p. 18 et aeq.
^Henri Lefebvre^ ProHem# Actuels du Marxisme. Press Universitaire de 
France, Paris, 1958, p. ¿1 et sep.
3*Aflaq, f l  sabll al ba*th a l * arabl. dîr a$ Jall* ah (? Beirut), 1959, 
P. 97.
^Ibld.. p. 71. See aise p. 15.
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alien to the Idea« and needs of the Arabs. He finds traces of Communistio 
thoughts in those movements of past and contemporary Arab history which 
were notorious for their anti-Arab activities* a) in the shu*ubl^ stir­
rings of the Abbaaid period which called for "the Communism of wealth 
and property, dissolution of family, and abandonment of religion, and 
denigrated the Arab w i t ' ,  (b) in the "Frenchified wayof thinking" which 
"has been poisoning the modern Arab movement" ever since Napoleon's ex­
pedition to Egypt. "Small wonder, then," he writes, " i f  the French in
£fcrria have been for years emphasising in their universities and teachings
2
these su*ubl chapters of Arab history, even giving an exaggerated admir­
ation of 8u*ubIs. M
But i f  this socialism is not Marxist, then what is it? *Alfaq does 
not give any clear answer to this question, a question which, especially 
in view of the innumerable variations of non-Marxist socialism in our 
divided world^ is of the utmost pertinence. let it  is possible to form 
a general idea of 1Aflaq'a 'Arab socialism• from his numerous essays and *2
^8hu*ubiyahor "partisans of the Gentiles" began with the contention that 
a ll Muslims were equal and finished "in some cases by declaring the Arabs 
Inferior to many other races". Every shftubl "vaunted particularly the 
diaims to distinction of his own nationality, whether Syrian, Nabathaean, 
Egyptian, Greek, Spanish or Persian; but the last named were at once 
the most vehement and the most numerous," (E# G, Browne, A Literary 
History of Persia. Cambridge University Press, 1902# Vol, I, pp, 26f-266.)
2f l  sabltal ba*th, p. 72.
%orman Mackenzie, Socialism» A Short History. Hutchinson's University 
Library1, London, 19A9, p, 11,
ti
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articles. Firstly the socialism of his conception is merely a servant 
of Arab nationalism, a means (v^sllah) of achieving nationalist alms. 
It  Is not therefore an end in itself, and it is a far cry from inter­
nationalism.
"Our socialism," he 3ays, "is a means of bringing about 
our national renaissance.1 23*1
"Our Party is not only Socialist. Nor is socialism its 
first  attribute. It  is an Arab party, the party of Arab 
Renaissance."2
"In the hierarchy of values, Arab unity is  higher than
socialism."’
Secondly, this socialism is not so much a detailed system of 
economic reforms as an ideal state of equality and Justice. It is  
a protest against the *material poverty and physical squalor*, not of 
capitalism, but of feudalism, which is the prevailing pattern of socio­
economic relations in the Middle Cast. It is neither against the in­
stitution of private ownership nor against the right of inheritance.^
In both these aspects, i.e . the subordination to nationalism and
in regard to
the upholding of spiritual values, as well as/private ownership, Arab 
Socialism is in complete accordance with Asian Socialism.
^ma*rakat;al maglr, pp. 29-30.
2Ib ld .. p. 39.
3IMd..» P. 37.
Afl sabll al ba* th. p. 93
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“In Asia,” says Alex Josey, "a Socialist is first a 
nationalist, since both the socialists and nationalists, 
in opposing the Western colonialism, automatically op- \ 
pose feudalism or capitalism with which it  is  associated."
A more interesting characteristic of the Asian socialist is him concern 
for equality which is often presented to be of a mystical nature. Per­
haps the best example of this association between socialism and egalitarian' 
isra can be found in Gandhi*s works.
"Socialism,* he says, "is a beautiful word and, so far 
as I an aware, in Socialism a ll the members of society 
are equal -  none low, none high. In the individual body 
the head Is not high because it is the top of the body, 
nor are the soles of the feet low because they touch the 
earth. Even as members of the individual body are equal, 
so are the members of society. This is  socialism.
In view of the "uni vers alls t1* concepts of Islam -  as referred to in the
Introduction of this thesis^ -  the Muslim mind is  perhaps more receptive
to the egalitarian spirit of Socialism than the Indian mind. Hence
the attraction of socialism for many religious-minded Arabs.
The essence of * Aflaq'a nationalism is the renaissance fba*th) 
of the Arab peoples, by which he means their revolt against "a ll the ' 
forces of evil and corruption within end without".^ Ba*th ia therefore
^Alex Josey, :>oclallam In Asia. Donald Moore, Singapore, 195A, p.2.




W  rakat* al maslr al wahld, p, 113.
26o,
at once a renaissance and a revolt. In his view it is only through 
this revolt that the Arab people can recover their national identity.
Such a revolt "awakens the people ( she* b) . stirs their sense of responsi­
bility, and Incites them to co-operation and activity whilst the waverer
1
and the intriguer are e¡¿posed and discredited in the process
It  is perhaps this conviction which makes him so contemptuous
2of any academic exposition of the factors of Arab unity. However exag­
gerated may be his interpretion of ba* th as the main source of Arab unity, 
he sounds a realistic note by saying thfct the formation of the United 
Arab Republic •»  195S was caused not so much by the a&gencies of concrete 
economic and social condition a In Egypt and Syria as fcy the similarity 
in their 'revolutionary policies*,'' Ey dissociating himself from the 
economic aspects of socialism fAflaq rids himself of a ll  the doctrinal 
contradictions that might arise in his call for 'Socialist revolution'.
But the case is not 30 simple with those Arab revolutionary thinkers who 
want to anply a full-blooded, Marxist socialism to the particular con­
ditions of the Arab world.
As a representative of this 'revolutionary* school we might men­
tion the Lebanese, Dr, Jurj farina. He was born in 1891» graduated from
the American University of Beirut in 1912 and obtained his doctorate in
/
*ma*rakat' al rnaflr al valjid, p, 113. Also pp. 122, 14.0, H2, 144. et ,s,eq 
where he descriter'lliC Algerian rebellion against France as one of tbs 
most glorious manifestations of the Arab nationalist M lth.
h u a . . pp. $8, 98.
3Ibld.. pp. 73, 76-77, 80 , 83. »
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medicine in 1916. He served as a soldier in the Ottoman Army in the 
First World War, After the War he returned to Beirut and founded a 
maternity hospital, •'But my Lebanese nature,” he writes in his personal 
letter to the present author,*- "did not allow me to remain ensconced in 
the health service. I  therefore took part in the 1943 revolution and 
was elected to the National Congress”. It was the National Congress 
which, together with the youth organisation, controlled the revolution. 
During the Palestine war he was appointed Head of the Relief Committee, 
Through his numerous articles, pamphlets and books  ^‘ Dr. £Tanna has 
established his fame^s one of the leading, progressive theorists of Arab 
nationalism.
Dr. Hanna is  Marxist by conviction, "I believe in Marxism,” he 
writes in the same letter, "but do not have ary connection with the Com­
munist Party.” His nationalism is therefore an accommodation of ’histori­
cal materialism’ to the specific condition of the-Arab world. ”National- 
ism," he writes, «does not consist of a metaphysical consciousness
(shu’ ur ghalbPt rather, it  consists of a consciousness occasioned by
3
circumstances which are mostly material. He conceives Arab society as 
a vortex of class struggle in which the "feudal lords exploit the peasantry *2
V  Hanna wrote this letter (dated April 20, 1962) in reply to a query 
by the present author about his biograply.
2Zladeh, Syria and.Lebanon. p. 77.
3pr. Jurj Hanna, waoi* al *alam al *arabl. dar al *ilm 11*1 mala’In,
Beirut, 1952, p. 127.
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and the capitalists exploit the workers”. Feudal lords and capitalists 
form only a minority. The majority of the Arab nation "wallow in poverty, 
ignorance, illiteracy and humiliation".1 2 In world affairs, his sympathies 
lie  with the Soviet ünion. "In spite of," he writes, "the anti-Soviet 
policy of Arab goveramerte, In spite of their participation in anti-Soviet 
alignments, the Soviet union his never 3hown ary hostility towards the 
Arab world."2
Pr. $anna enumerates the bases of Arab nationalism as follows*
a) unity of language,
b) unity of history,
c) unity of destiny (maslr) and,
d) unity of interests.
In explaining the first two factors he Is in complete agreement with 
other exponents of Arafe nationalism. He sometimes even strikes quite a 
few "conservative" notes which are out of tune with some of his Marxist 
conceptions of the Arab world. In his analysis of language he is es­
pecially emphatic about its influence on htmian thought and Ideas, attach­
ing great importance to the Arabic language in engendering the scientific 
and philosophical movements of tbs "Golden Era" of Arab history.
" It  was," he says, "the Arabic language which awakened
the Arab movement after its long slumber. The works of
^Fsrma, op.cit.. p. 51.
2IMâ.» P. 134.
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the Arab, or A rabid  zed, leaders of Islamic thought and 
philosophy in the medieval age, such as I bn Khaldun,
GhasslU, Avicenna, Averroes, IIhaze a and I bn JIunain were 
the main agents of the age of awakening,"
From this he deduces the importance of the Arabic language in the emer­
gence of Arab nationalism, regarding the achievements of la z ijl,  BustanT, 
Afcmad Faria ash Shidyaq, *Abduh and Shawql as "the causes of Arab awaken—
a rare feature in any Marxist analysis of- nationalist movements. As re­
gards religion, while he castigates the Muslim clergy as the supporters
and Islam in bringing about Arab unity.
But it is in the writer*s discussion on the remaining factors, 
namely "the unity of destiny" and "the unity of interests", that he dis­
plays revolutionary concepts. In this discussion, Ur. £anna takes an 
express stand against a ll the existing governments in the Arab world, and 
this is what affords him a distinct position among Arab theorists. This 
may seem natural in the case of any Arab intellectual in 1952, when Nagir 
was d£Lll an obscure figure and the Iraqi revolution seemed a remote poasl-
V nna, op^cjlt^, p. 12.
In speaking about Arab history, Dr. gonna pursues the same
3
’ traditionalist* line. He even refers to the Arabs' community of race
^Ibld«, p. 14. 
4-1bid. . p. 15. See also pp. 21, 59, 67, 76, 9A
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bility, Bat Hr. ^anna*s anti-government arguments go deeper than 
occasional-tirades against this or that particular Arab government.
He is often at pains to make clear that in appealing for Arab unity he 
is thinking, not of governments, but of peoples, "The unity of peonies," 
he says, "is  more important than the unity of their governments and states". 
•The Arab world has stumbled into a deplorable situation f indeed; i It is 
neither wrong, nor exaggerated, to say that this has been caused bythe 
lack of social, patriotic end political consciousness in the peoples,
*  y  v  i i  ■ - r  +  * ; ! ■ . ' /  v ! / ■_  i : ■ -
- and ty the monopoly of rtheir leadership being in the hands of rulers,
■ kings and statesmen," I.Dr, ganna’uses a ll these arguments t® substantiate 
his views on the historical unity of the Arabs -  to prove that a ll the 
divisions in the Arab world have been due to the i l l -w ill  or inefficiency 
of the Arab governments.
But on the question of the Arabs* unity of interests, the writer 
finds himself ©nAuncertaln ground, especially in the light of his intro- 
ductory remarks emphasising the paramount role of class struggle in 
social and political developments. ' I f , as his remarks suggest, Dr, £anna'
' U J..\‘ I ...... • “
accepts the Marxist axiom that a ll history i#  a register of conflicts 
between various social classes, then how is he to reconcile this with hi# 
,view_on the unity of interests between the Arab peoples? I f  he admits
^anna, op,t„cl|f , p.5 
2Ihtd..  p, 6.
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the division of the Arab nation into warring classes'** how can thqse 
classes be bound together by common interests? Dr. l^anna does not give 
any answer to these questions. All he does is to describe, in broad 
terms, the impoverishment of the Arab masses and their possession of 
untapped natural resources as the bases of their common interests. The 
Leninist principle that, In the anti-imperialist phase ©f the national 
struggle, a ll class differences can and should be submerged in the in­
terest of national unity does not seem to be of any assistance to him, 
because he has concerned himself not only with the passing phase ©f the 
anti-imperialist struggle of the *rabs, but also with the whole range 
of their efforts for unity.
Dr, !Janna's disquisitions in favour of Arab unity typically re­
flect the kind of difficulties which an Arab Marxist is bound to face 
in adhering to the flag of nationalism. In defending national movements 
a Marxist has a very limited field for manoeuvre. The point has been per- 
hap3 beat analysed by Christopher Hill*
«The Marxist view,* he says, "of national movements 
is  an historically relative one* it  holds that the 
establishment of an independent nation state is  a 
necessary part of the bourgeois revolution and la an 
essential pre-condition for the winning of democracy.
Its economic basis is  that ’ in order to achieve com­
plete victory for commodity production the bourgeoisie 
must capture the home market, must have politically 
united territories with a population speaking the same 
language’ * As against whit preceded them, the creation 
of such •bourgeois’ nations is an historically progress-
Vi-esgpra. p* 261. 1*'
no p, 266 
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ive step. »One cannot be a Marxist,' Lenin wrote in 
1915# 'without feeling the deepest re3pect for the 
great bourgeois revolutionaries who had ah historic 
right to speak in the name of 'bourgeois fatherlands', 
who aroused tens of Billions of people of new nations 
to civilised life  in their struggle against feudalism».
So long as a national movement would have the effect 
of freeing a people from foreign oppression, Marxists 
supported itj this in the nineteenth century Marx was 
an advocate both of German and Italian national unity, 
and of the independence of Poland and I reland.,,..
Really complete national unity, Lenin held, could only 
be attained under socialism, since aa long as imperial­
ism existed, the motive for exploiting other peoples 
would remain. But then Lenin held the view that fu ll  
democracy could only be obtained after the overthrow 
of capitalism, whose economic exploitation made nonsense 
of political equality. So in each case -  in working for 
democracy or in working for the independence of email 
nations -  Lenin argued that these 'bourgeois revolution­
ary* demands were also of the greatest importance for 
socialists, since in so far as they were achieved im­
perialism a ll over the world would be correspondingly 
sapped and weakened."
One concrete thing which emerges from this quotation is that, for 
any Marxist -  whether socialist or Communist -  nationalist movements in 
underdeveloped countries represent a transitional period in the general 
history of the human struggle for 'freedom and democracy'j it  can only 
be praised and supported, from a Marxist standpoint, for one of two 
reasons) a) as one of the factors of the general collapse of imperialism, 
and b) as a step towards eliminating feudalist divisions and consequently 
preparing society for the socialist revolution.
Dr, Hanna*stvlews on Arab unity, however, give quite a different .
1Christooher H ill, Lenin an 
sities Press Ltd. (London)
d the Russian Revolution. The English tfoiver- 
, 1957, pp. 13&-137, HOvUl.
ti
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impression} they seem to he dominated hy the assumption that this 
unity is an ideal in itself.
Jamâl *Abd an Na§lr
We conclude our study of the ideas of Modern Arab nationalism 
with a survey of the opinions of an Arab leader Sto has come to personify, 
both in tbs «yes of Arabs and non-Arabs, the vigour, the devotion and the 
emotionalism of the new phase of Arab nationalisât Jamal*Abd an ïGfir.
To non-Arabs he represents that fresh state of mind, that revived, over­
sensitive pride raid that self-confidence which has characterised the 
Arabs after their recovery from the shock of the Palestinian nakhah 
(disaster) of 194-8. To most Arabs, who have avidly searched for a 
leader for nearly half a century, he is the very man and the idealised 
image of their best selves,^
Kafir’ s earlier life  was dominated by a factor which exercised 
a deep impact on his social and political outlook and which perhaps en­
abled him to epitomise Arab nationalism. This was the humiliation, 
which he suffered both as an ordinary individual «id as a patriot. Kafir 
was born on January 15, 1918 into a fallifri, or peasant, family in BanT 
Mur (a village near Assiut) as his ’propagandists’ assert, or in Alex­
andria, as a Journalist has recently claimed.^ When his family moved to
*^ Aflaq, ma* rakat* al reagir al wifrld, pp. 108-109, 151.
2yâhS * Abd al Baqi Sumr, Jamil * Abd an Kafir , rajul ghayyara wajh at 
tarlkh. al maktabat »al *ÎS3ymS,' Cairo, 1957, ¿. "TO
3j©achim Joesten, 
p. 13. The writer 
during which Kafir gave him "a
(p.10.)
London, 1962
it«  uaa a suouitu. ------ ,
lot of Information about his earlier life  .
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Asaiut in 1923 they found their baladl ("Provincial") origin a source
of great social embarrassment.
"Some idea," writes an American Journalist who has had 
long experience in Egypt, "of the humiliation the family 
must have suffered at the hand of the Assiut landlords 
is revealed when you ask members of those great clans i f  
they knew Abdel Passers in Beni Mer. 'Oh, ve lcnew them 
a ll, of course,' is the^_inevitable answer, 'But we never 
spoke to such people.'"
In later years Kagit's baladl extraction continued to be a major obstacle 
in his career. As a*: example, when he wanted to enter the Egyptian Mili­
tary Academy in 1936, his application was at first  rejected both because
of his poor background and because of his participation in the anti-
2
royalist demonstrations of 1935. As Kafir's political consciousness 
grew with the years this personal humiliation was further deepened by 
the greater humiliation which he experienced as a patriot and nationalist. 
He chafed at the unedifying unity which had been forged between British 
imperialism and Egyptian feudalism in plundering and oppressing the Egypt­
ian people. Even his years at the Military Academy, which inevitably
necessitated his aloofness from a ll political agitation, were marked by
3
occasional humiliation under British and other non-Egyptian commanders.
The war years inflicted s t ill  greater injuries on his nationalist pride.
Wilton \^nn, Nagger of Bferot. The Search for Dimity. Arlington Books, 
Cambridge, 1959, pp. 18-19.
^Georges Voucher, Gamal Abdul Hasaer et son Ermine. sub-title* Lea aliases 
d'humiliation et la concmete du pouvolr. JulHard. Paris, 1959, p.88.
Ibid. , p. 107 et seq.
3
Perhaps worst of a ll was the British ultimatum to King Faruq on February 
U, 19*42 to Instruct Kahas Pasha to form a cabinet, and the British sub­
sequent occupation of the "Abdln Palace which resulted in the King's sub­
mission. Most army officers were deeply shamed by this event. It  was 
this same year that saw the organ'nation of a secret revolutionary society, 
already created in 1939, 'dedicated to the task of liberation', to be 
later known as du*»t * al ahrar. (Free Officers) Palestine offered a
battlefield where young Egypt could vindicate her honour. The Free O ffi-
« ,
cers -took a moat active part in the hostilities, Kafir drew up a secret 
plan wherety certain air force units would take action and thus commit 
the entire Egyptian army to war against Israe l.  ^  But the Palestine war 
turned out to be one of the saddest, most frustrating chapters of modem 
Arab nationalism. The coup d*etat of July 1952 was therefore nothing 
but the inevitable reaction of an injured pride against a succession of 
national humiliations for which the West was held to be mainly responsi­
ble. "The British," Nafir never tired of saying, "are at the root of a ll 
3
our troubles."
Against this background we now tty to present an appreciation of 
Kafir's thoughts under three headings* ( I )  Kafir as a political thinker, 
( I I )  Kafir and Islam, ( i l l )  Nafir and Arab unity.
Sadat, , p* 14«
2Wyim, op.clt.» pp. 33-34.
^Vaucher, op.clt.. p. 108,
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I. Kaglr as a political thinker.
A common feature of a ll the leaders of the Free Officers seems 
to be their aversion to abstract and doctrinaire politics. WI have 
always,” says Anwar as Sadat, one of the prominent figures of the Free 
Officers, '•mistrusted theories and purely rational systems. I believe 
in the power of concrete facts, and the realities of history and exper­
ience, Ky political ideas grow out of my personal experience of op­
pression, not out of abstract notions; I am a soldier, not a theoretician, 
and it  was by an empirical process that I came to realise my country
needed a political system which responded to its essential needs and re-
«1fleeted its  true spirit* As has been noted by Vaucher, for Nagir and
his friends revolution did not represent an historical fact propounded
through academic studies and discussions} It was rather a phase in the
national life  which had to be launched and organised. It was a faetbf
2the future and not of the past.
It is  therefore not surprising that the only book of I<Taglr as far 
published, with its high-sounding title ijLdsaMifaat’ath thaw rah (The 
Philosophy of the Revolution), should have been subjected to a sharp, 
sarcastic remark from his former colleague, General Najlb (Negulb),3 
But, both as the leader of modern Arab nationalism and the President of
■Revolt on the Nile. p, 53,
2 ' '
Carnal Adbel Nagger et son Equips, p. 111.
^Egypt's Destiny, p. 215,
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^gypt, Naflr has had to make a number of speeches and addresses on the 
various problems facing the Arab peoples. In assessing the views and 
aspirations expressed through such statements one has to consider them 
in the context of Kafir's general political convictions. In other words, 
one has to take him, even i f  for a moment, as a ’ political thinker’ .
The most Important feature of Na§ir the politico la his consist­
ent refusal to commit himself to any particular school of thought. I t  
would not be fa ir to ascribe this wholly to opportunism. A more realistic 
line would be to regard it  as the result of his political observations 
and experiences under the anclen regime. As an ’angry young man' Kagir 
threw himself desperately into one political movement after another, em­
bracing ary Ideology that might free Egypt of imperialism and feudalism.
He successively joined the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wafd, Kifr al Fat at 
("Young Egypt") and the Communist and Socialist parties,* Kona of them, 
however, succeeded in satisfying his quest for a panacea for Egypt's 
plight, hit a ll of them served to convince him that he could never be 
doctrinaire,
Nevertheless, it is  not Impossible to identify in Kafir's statements 
and speeches the main trends of thought which have contributed to his 
present political outlook. One can divide these trends into three cate­
gories, These are, in order cit priority;
* Voucher, pp.clt. , p. 67 fljufla«» P» 71*
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a) Egyptian patriotism. Two leaders of this trend have especially
enjoyed Hafir's respect. One is Muj^afa Kamil,^ of whom we
2
have already spoken at length. The other is  Tavflq al ffakTm, 
whose emphasis on the Pharaonic origins of the Egyptians has 
also been referred to. gaklm’s *awdat* ar rufr (Cairo 1933) has 
a unique place among Hafir's favourite books, perhaps because of 
the curious resemblance of its main hero', Mxfcsin, to Nafir,^ It  
was no doubt in recognition of his high esteem for Hakim that, in 
1955, Hafir decided, over the head of the Egyptian Ministry of 
Education, to appoint him to the Supreme Council of Arts and 
Letters.
b) Islamic revivalism. Kavakihl's jaba'l* al istibdad^ and scattered 
works of Afghani and ‘Abduh^  have served to form the basis of 
Hafir's belief in Islam as a pulitical force in achieving Arab 
unity*
c) European radicalism. The spiritual leaders of the French Revolution, 
and especially Rousseau and Voltaire, should be mentioned under
■^ Vaueher, op. d t . . pp. 50# 72-73# 73# 87» 100,
~2V. supra. f-)32. %aJ2SS£&*P-sS'
¿Vaucher, op.clt.. p. 56 et seq. 
ffV, supra.
Gaucher, op.clt. . p. 51.
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this heading. Hig interest in these two thinkers dateB back to
his days at the Secondary School nahjat1 al mlsrlyah. He wrote
an article entitled Voltaire. The ^an of Freedon in the school
magazine.1 But his special admiration was reserved for Napoleon.
Three features in Napoleon's personality must have fired Kafir's
imagination; the Corsican's hostility against the British, his
humble beginnings and his administrative renius as manifested in 
2
Code Naooleon.
Kafir has tried to rationalize his aversion to doctrinaire dis­
putes through his "Unionist" theory, that is, through his appeal to a ll 
classes of the Egyptian people to Join hands, irrespective of their con­
flicting interests, in a single front -  or, to use his term, in the Nation 
Union lttiliad al qaymT. He thus refutes the inevitability of the class 
straggle. In an important interview with the editor of al ahran which 
was devoted to expounding his political views (the only statement of its 
kind available to the present author) he likened, in broad terms, this 
unity and co-operation to the peaceful co-existence in the international 
scene, "If  we," he said, "appeal for peaceful co-existence in the world, 
why should we not appeal for it in our own country. The Rational Union
^Vaucher, on.olt. . p. 52,
^ b id ,, p. 101.
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la a manifestation of peaceful co-existence betvreen classes."
Napir conceives this unity and co-existence not as an "armistice* 
in the class struggle, but as a stable« permanent status designed to 
promote justice, freedom and peace. He rebukes the Communists who, al­
though supporting the idea of peaceful co-existence in international re­
lations, reject the principle of national co—existence and unity on 
grounds of the Inevitability of class war.^ iiapir has supplemented the 
"unionist theory" with his more elaborate economic blue-prints. At the 
Co-operative Congress on December 5» 1957, he observed that a happy and 
prosperous society depended upon the elimination of the exploitation of 
the majority ty a few. In his view the country was "moving to a new 
phase, a transitional phase", in which the objective was the establishment 
of a "socialist, democratic and co-operative society, free from political, 
social and economic exploitation". While he was determined to eliminate 
"opportunist Individualism" he did not believe that tbs alternative was 
” state capitalism". Instead, he anticipated the state In the role of
"trustee" over the people, with protection of the "small capitalists and
2i?mall savers" as a principal objective.
Kafir's views 3eem valid on paper. But here he is faced with the* 
a^me problem as Dr. yanna for he does not explain how he is going to re- 1
1 -.......... ............ ... ..................•—  1 ....................... ........-  —  - ■ ............................ . ............. ......... ■ ■ ■
^ a l ahram. June 2, 1959*
Aieith Wheelock, Nasser's Kew Egypt. Stevens and Sons, London, I960, p* 6(9*
V
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condle, on the one hand, his appeal for ending the class war with 
his call for socialism and how, on the other hand, he can achieve a 
modus vivendl between the conflicting class interests of the people.
The issue as presented here forms, in fact , one of the most in­
tractable problems facing a ll serious-minded nationalists in the under­
developed countries. But it has not been a dilemma confined to the East, 
In the West, to be sure, the Germans had to face a similar problem only 
half a century agao when the sudden upsurge of Marxism among the German 
toiling masses threatened to disrupt national unity, A solution to 
the problem was suggested by the prominent nationalist of Wilhelmlan Ger­
many, Friedrich Naumann, who believed social reform and imperialistic 
wars to be the most effective means of achieving an alliance between demo­
cracy and the Kaiser “in the interest of national security, the imitera­
tive of a ll politics",^ A trace of Kaumann's •democratic Caesarism* can 
be discerned in the politics of Passerism which, while making the most
skilled use of Egypt's external problems in rallying the classes of the
2
nation, does not forget the issue of social reforms,
XI Hafir and Islam,
_ 3
Hafir's attitude towards Islam is similar to that adopted by Kamil) 
that Is, it  should be subordinated to the requirements of nationalism,
^William 0, Shanhan, "Friedrich Neumann» A German View of fbwer and 
Nationalism" In Nationalism and Internationalism, oo.clt. , p, 383, also 
pp. 362, 380, 332.
3*’heelock, on.clt. , p, 277 ej seq.
3oV oS u p ra0 p, <X
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This has given rifee to an evident contradiction in Nagir*s personality. 
Uhile in private life  he is a staunch practising Ku3lim* -  a fact which 
must have been decisive in bringing the Free Officers into contact with 
the Muslim Brotherhood before 1952,- in public he has maintained a cur­
iously inconsistent attitude to Islam as a factor in the present move­
ment of the Arabs, It  is noteworthy that, in his Philosophy of Revolution. 
he concedes, but only in a passing remark, the importance of Islam when 
defending the case for Egyptian leadership in the Arab Islamic world.
Egypt, he says, forms the centre of three circles* the Arab circle,
3
the African circle and the Islamic circle. He has also noted, on var­
ious occasions, the role of Islam in bringing about the past glory of 
the Arabs.A But, as regards its place both as a guiding principle and 
as a unifying force among the Arabs of today, he sore times becomes as 
reticent as he is  on ideological niceties. Whether this is due to an 
inner, genuine conviction that Islam as i t  is now does more harm than 
good to the Arab political struggle, or to a temporary bitterness and 
annoyance following the Ikhwan’s attempt on his life  (October 1954) is 
not quite clear. The point can be brought into greater re lief ty study­
ing tfagdr*s ideas on Arab unity.
*Abd ai BaqI, op. ctt.. pp. 118—119.
Revolt on the Kile, p. 26 et sen., pp, 30, 43 «t  oeq.. 61 et seq.
.The Moslem Brethren, p, 118,
^The Philosophy of the Revolution. Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1955# 
p. S3 et seq.
(cont.)
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I I I  Naglr nnd Arab Unity,
Kafir is  among those Arabs who conceive the existence and un ity
of the Arab mama as the outcome of multiple forces and factors. Because
of this, he should evidently be placed in a category which is opposed
to ^ugrl's monistic nationalism,
”To me,” ho says in an article especially written for 
the American magazine Life. "Arab nationalism means 
many things. Above a ll Arab nationalism is a spiritual 
force, a voluntary solidarity of the Arab peoples every­
where based on a common heritage of language, culture 
and history, (Note the significant omission of religion,)
This is a feeling that comes from the heart} it  cannot 
he imposed. It comes out of the Arab past, but i t  can 
also confer great political benefits on the Arabs today.
By military solidarity and by voluntary co-operation in 
economics, culture and foreign policy the Arab nations 
can grow strong in their own right,”1
Therefore, the Arab umma. in the eyes of ^afir, is  an entity resting 
on a triangular base of language, culture and history,' We find, neither 
in the above mentioned article nor anywhere else, Kafir’s own inter­
pretation of each of these factors in a clear and straightforward way. 
There are, however, some passages in his various and numerous speeches 
which give us an insight into his conceptionof the Arab umma.
(cont.)
* ”(The peoples living in our region were united by the power of belief 
(* aoldah) when ^slara raised its banners, proclaimed the new divine 
mission, confirmed the preceding missions and uttered the lait word 
of God appealing to his peoples for justice.”
(Speech at the National Assembly, February 5, 1958* quoted in al 
jurahurlyat  ^al * arablyaV al muttahldah, dir ma*arif hi algr, Cairo, 1958,) 
See also w i m ; a ; 1 on. d i i t  p, 66 et seq.
^Gamal Abdul llafir, "Where I  stand and Why?”, Life International.
17 August 1959,
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Of the three factors enumerated above (language, culture and
history) Nasir, as a leading champion of a movement seeking unity and
solidarity, is naturally most interested in history, which has been
his favourite field of study since his youth* and which, in his view,
is  but the story of Arab unity. "The history of unity in the life  of
2
our uama is the history of our uaaa itse lf,w Being a soldier tfafir 
tends often to interpret this history in military terms as the account 
of a series of exploits and feats achieved by the united Arabs against 
internal and external enemies. In a lecture delivered from the Chair 
of the Professor of History at the Egyptian Military Academy addressed 
to the Academy*a graduates on April 26, 1959, he sets himself the task 
of elaborating his previous statement on the identification of Arab 
history with Arab unity. Two events in Arab history figure prominently 
in this lecture. The first j|t3 the Arabs' resistance to the Crusaders 
in the eleventh century and the second, the Egypto-Syrian joint resist­
ance to the Tartars' invasion of the thirteenth century. Here again 
we do not find any reference to Islam. Even the Arabs' heroism and 
sacrifices in the Crusades are viewed by him in an irreligious light»
"The appeal of Arab na+ionalism has been predominant and 
its banner held aloft since the tenth century, because 
the Arab umisa. when it  was subjected to the invasion (of 
the Crusaders) and placed in jeopardy, realised that it  
was only by adhering to the appeal of Arab nationalism
*Vaucher, op.clt. . p, 59. |®ba *Abd al l&ql, oo.clt.. p, 69. 
^al jumhurlyat* al muttafrldat' al *arabiyah, p, 20,
that the Arabs could 3 e cure their survival and preserve 
their traditions and territory,"1
Evldently, liajlr does not regard Arab nationalism as merely consisting 
of mottos and slogans adopted according to the exigencies of changing 
circumstances. In fact, he has more than once referred to It  as a "com­
prehensive social philosophy and opinion"» "For the first time on one 
of its battlefields, Communisn^ as faced a comprehensive social philosophy 
and opinion, **acidah wa falaafah l.ltlraa*lvah kamllah.^ This statement 
gives rise to the expectation that $»firite nationalism should consist 
of a whole range of social, political and economic principles represent­
ing either the application of the old Islamic ideals to new conditions, 
or the combination of the traditional traits of Islamic thought and re­
levant teachings from the Western civilisation. As mentioned above, we 
find no explanation ty liagir himself of the nature of these principles.
For these reasons the Nafirite definitionof the Arab umma and its alms, 
and especially of the actual function of the forces which go into the 
making of the tamsa. is far from being comprehensive.
But matters do not end there. Vagueness and reticence may be 
helpful when the battle is being waged in the diplomatic field , where 
attachment to concrete principles and doctrine prove to be serious impedl-
^al ahraa, April 26, 1959. 
^Ibid.. April 30, 1959.
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Bents to free manoeuvre and slick improvisation, but when the conflict 
spreads to the realm of ideas, these qualities can hardly be beneficial.
It  is indeed in the latter case that the shortcomings are laid bare and 
inner beliefs, hitherto unexpressed for the sake of expediency, are ex­
posed in the hrat of the moment. This was exactly what happened at the 
time of the first real conflict between Communism and Arab nationalism in 
the spring of 1959. It is irrelevant in this discussion to analyse the 
Causes of that resounding clash but the event was of great importance 
for the Arabs since, perhaps to the surprise of observers on a ll  sides, 
it  proved to be an ideological challenge to Arab nationalism. This was 
quite understandable. In standing up to the Western onslaught the Aral» 
have had to face a mainly material and economic offensive. Bven the 
Western intellectual and cultural invasion of the Arab world, overwhelming 
and far-reaching as It may have been,cannot be regarded as an Ideological 
challenge because of its variegated nature, multiplicity of sources and 
division of aims. French, British and American modes of thought and 
Judgment, as introduced to the Arab countries through various direct 
and indirect means, do not represent a clear-cut and premeditated set 
of thoughts and ideas, capable of being called "ideology", This has en­
abled the Arab apologists to keep their -temper in certain fields and to 
counter the attacks by adopting tactics and borrowing ideas from West­
ern liberalism in their fight against the diehard Imperialists, Some­
times they have been able to face the challenge of one Western country 
by resorting to the teachings of another Western country. We have already
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considered how Çugiî repudiates the French school of nationalism, to 
give one example, which in his view contradicts the basic principles 
of Arab nationalism, by invoking the aid of German thinkers.
The Commun!3t onslaught is , by contrast, strikingly ideological*
It  stands for a distinct and defin itely  of living and thinking. Con­
trary to its Western counterpart, It  is  coherent, consistent and central- 
isedj it  is set in motion by a single force and pursues established aims. 
For these reasons it  is a far more formidable force to resist, and thus 
its  clash with Arab nationalism in the spring of 1959 caused a consequential1)» 
deeper heart-searching. Although occasioned by purely political causes 
the clash touched the very heart «md kernel of what were thought to be 
the traditions and alms of Arab nationalism. Representing a spiritual 
and mental onslaught far more vehement and vigorous than the Western 
challenge, it  had to be faced with a greater vigilance Mad a more effect­
ive weapon. The vigilance which was immediately displayed was indeed 
commendable. In March and April 1959# throughout the Arab nationalist 
world, mammoth demonstrations were staged against Communism, a ll vying 
in bitterness and enthusiasm with those held against Western colonialism. 
Memories of the misdeeds and crimes of the Communist states, either against 
their own nationals or against their weaker neighbours, glossed over at 
the time of commitment for reasons of policy, were resuscitated by Arab 
orators and columnists to remind the baffled Arab populace of the lack 
of difference between the "black* and "red* Imperialists,*
lse«» lnter_alla. & ! . . . # accounts of the Ukranlans' anti-government 
demonstrations {21 March 1959), Tibet’ s revolution against China (27 
March 1959) and the Soviet aggressiveness towards Japan (April 30, 1959),
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As for the choice of ideological weapons to counter the Communist 
offensive, the matter was not so simple. I f  there were ever a real 
opportunity to tegt the Arengthpf the Naslrite Interpretation of the 
philosophy of Arab nationalism it was certainly this first battle with 
a well-defined alien ideology. So far as could be seen no such inter­
pretations and elaboration of principles took place. But what did take 
place was a rush by Kafir and his followers to seek refuge with *slam, 
in spite of the leader's reticence on the importance of Islam, The "com­
prehensive opinion and philosophy" transpired tobe nothing other than 
the Islamic precepts. One is almost surprised at the religious terminology 
used by Naslr at this time to vindicate Arab nationalism and denounce its 
opponents. In a speech addressed to tens of thousands of demonstrators 
in Damascus after they had uttered their Fridajprayers in the Umawl 
Mosque he announced* "We reject the principles which represent servility 
and heresy, lib  ad". At the beginning of his speech he praised God who 
"has united the hearts of this nation to protect its religion". In the 
e speech he defined the internal opponents of Arab nationalism, in
this case the Communists, as "the outsiders* or khavarll. a term applied 
to a 'deviationist* sect of Islam,^ "We praise God , , ,  who has armed this
^The name of khawarlJ (or Kharijltes) was originally given to the troops 
who deserted Alt, the Prophet's son-in-law, daring his dispute with 
Mu' awlyah* Thenoeforward it  was applied to those who adopted an extremist 
and fanatical attitude in regard to the duty of every Muslim "to exhort 
men to do good and restrain them from doing evil". The khawaril regarded 
this as an "absolute duty to bo pursued In season and out of season, even 
at the cost of life  Itself", (H.A.R.Glbb, Mohammedanism. Oxford Chi­
ve rsity Press, London, 1949, p. 120,)
i i
nation with vigilance (or consciousness (va*y)) to rout the conspirators 
and the khawarlj."^ Nevertheless, fears of an outright identification 
of Arab nationalism with *slaa seems to have restrained **a§ir from being 
too emphatic on the religious theme. His language in this respect sounds 
far milder and more timorous than that of his immediate followers and 
assistants, who wars thought to be more suitable agents for revising the 
religious zeal of the people and exposing the atheistic principles of
4
Communism while showing the compatibility of Islam with the progressive 
alas of Arab nationalism. This is shown by statements and speeches made 
by General ‘la ir , the United Arab Republic Minister of War and Anwar as 
Sadat, the Secretary of the National Union, Ittlfriad al qawnii, the only 
political party in Egypt. In a speech delivered at a special memorial 
service for the Iraqi "martyrs of Arab nationalism" at the celebrated 
University of Al Ashar (Cairo) Sadat praised Islam as a "noble revolution" 
engineered fourteen centuries ago by Muhammad to secure human dignity and 
"to give Moa his (due) place". It represented not one, but numerous 
revolutions. Having propounded the egalitarian teachings of Islam and 
its contribution to the liberation of the human mind and soul, Sadat re­
minded his audience that the strength and prestige of the Muslims four­
teen centuries ago was due to the fact that "they were holding on to 
their religion". He then denounced Imperialism as the first invader^f
*al ahraa. March 21, 1959*
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the Islande vorld* Imperialism realised that it  could never dominate 
the Islamic countries as long as these clung to their beliefs. Thus 
it  set out to sow scepticism and doubts of their religion in the hearts 
of the Muslims,
"The battle," continued ¿adit, "which started a century 
ago is  s t ill continuing in Asia, Africa and many other 
places. Imperialists fight us by insulting our beliefs 
and by sowing doubts in our minds about our creed and our 
principles.*
Having thus associated imperialism with anti-lalamlo forces and thoughts, 
Sadat explained the situation of Islam as regards democracy, capitalisa 
and communism. He maintained that Islam contains a ll the useful elements 
of these schools of thought and solves a ll material and spiritual prob­
lems, Sadat stated that the real battle today is between materialism 
and spiritualism and that Islam has found the right solution to reconcile 
the matter with the spirit by regulating both of them in a way that 
neither can dominate the other. His concluding sentence is a blunt ap­
peal to the Arab nationalists to adhere to Islamic principles*
"Amidst a ll these developments, amidst this battle, 
the solution lies with us, the Muslims. I t  is  extremely 
simple* to return to our revolution which was launched 
fourteen centuries ago by our Prophet, Muhammad, and to - 
reflect on its.scientific, ethical, social and spiritual 
instructions,"1
One should only compare the above perorations ith Sadat*s ex­
plicit plea for separation of 'church* and state in his Revolt cm the
1al ahrin, 30 April 1959,
I !
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S U »1 In order to appreciate the compelling need which the Egyptian 
leaders fe lt  in the face of the Communist challenge to have recourse to 
the religious sentiments of the Arabs.
The Arab-Communist clash of 1959 proved that Kafir*s "philosophy” 
of nationalism is, in effect, an undeclared combination of the Islamic 
precepts with the day-to-day political exigencies of the Arab nationalist 
movement. It  also disclosed Kafir’s inner conviction that Islam, more 
than any other factor, is s t i l l  the main force capable of securing, and 
consolidating, the spiritual unity of a ll Arabs.
Conclusions
"In form«* times," says H.G.Wells, "ideas trickled; in our times 
they Jet". This sentence can well be used in describing the present 
relationship between Arab nationalism Mid Western civilisation* Whereas, 
in the nineteenth century, Western ideas merely trickled into the Arab 
world, today they submerge it  in a sustained, torrential sweep. But a 
curious irony can instantly be observed here. In the nineteenth and 
the beginning of the twentieth century Westernisation in the Arab world
was on a small scale and nevertheless found such staunch champions as
_  Today
'¡’ah f^iwl, Stamayil, £aha Husain and others, / Westernisation, although em­
bracing the whole range of Arab life , can hardly claim such eminent
1  “
Especially those parts of the book in which Sadat tries to justify 
Kafir’ s suppression of the Muslim Brethren. (See Revolt on the Nile.
pp, 68, 80. )
%he World of William Cllssold. New York, 1926, I, 59, 212.
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adherents among the Arabs. In other words, the deeper the Ideas of
Western civilisation have penetrated Into the Arab world the more
anti-Western the Arabs have become. This has been most evident among
the intelligentsia. Drawing cm the results of an illuminating sample
survey carried out in Egypt and three other Arab countries, Daniel Lerner
has expressed the Arab-West paradox in these terms*
"The keynote among the professionals was extreme ambi­
valence, an unruly co-existence of love and hatred to­
wards the British. Oriented towards the West by their 
education, whence they have derived their conceptions 
of the good society'* they suffer from a sense of re­
jection by the West. Mary feel driven, in self-defence, 
to turn their rage against the erstwhile object of af­
fection. From high expectations crushed seems to come 
their sense of extreme deprivation."I
But have the Arabs managed to balance this negative feature in 
their political thought with a positive approach to the problems of 
their national identity? W© try to answer this question in the following 
pages.
Our study has shown that, undoubtedly under the impact of Western 
political thought, the Arab writers and theorists as a whole now tend, to 
regard nation not as the outcome of one single spiritual or material 
factor, but as the product of the inter-action of a series of complicated
^The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 223.
t t
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and sometimes unpredictable forces, both spiritual and material, Havlng 
awakened to the necessity of placing the expansive mass movements of 
their countries on definite principles and of steering it through a wel­
ter of rival ideologies, they have set about, somewhat belatedly, for­
mulating ideas in order to simplify the tasks before these movements and 
to counter opposing trends and thoughts. One can discern in a ll these 
efforts a sign of nervousness and fluster for which one reason may be 
the mental distress to which any people in the process of so formidable 
a struggle is inevitably subjected. But a more important reason is  the 
constant and vigilant watch which is being kept on the A mb peoples by 
a West invariably ready to carp at them. Feeling that every single move 
on their part is being closely followed by a cohort of Western critics 
who indiscriminately apply their own political, social and moral standards 
of judgment, t) the acts and thoughts of an alien people,' the Arabs have 
fallen victim to certain defective habits of mind.
Firstly, in the haste to assert the reality of the umma and vin­
dicate its aims and attitudes, most Arab writers run into pathetic con­
tradictions, Haunted by a way of thinking disastrously accustomed to 
simplifying and dissecting facts and thus missing the intricate relations 
between the component parts of each phenomenon, willing to emphasise 
the major composing elements of the Arab uama such as language or religion 
and, at the same time, anxious to imbibe the doctrines and teachings of 
Western liberalism, their thoughts are afflicted by inconsistency and 
sometimes anarchy. It  isnoticeable that, so far, no A^ab writer of a
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considerable intellectual calibre and adequate international repute 
has helped to resolve this contradiction by effecting a critical study 
of the West’s spiritual impact on the Arabs, 3uch a critical study is  
necessary in order to sift this impact — to commend certain doctrines 
and ideas as congenial to the Arab mind and to reject the others as the 
offspring of the special social end political conditions in the West,
This is especially essential in the political field. The progressive 
Arab writers and intellectuals have so far been in the habit of avidly 
absorbing and lavishly launching the principles of Western democracy.
On the other hand, most of them, including those Arab leaders who can­
not possibly be branded as reactionaries and mukhagrama (old-fashioned 
politicians), after disappointing years of practical contact with the 
masses and the agonizing experiences of ruling them, have come to a 
different conclusion -  that Western democracy, or at least its institu­
tional forms, are not adaptable to the requirements of the Arab people. 
Whether this non-adaptability is due to the innate and basic characteristics 
of the Arabs and therefore permanent or whether it  is due to certain 
shortcomings and defects in the social structure of the Arab countries 
and therefore not transitory, is not yet quite clear. Hence the hesita­
tions and doubts which have invaded the political mind in the Arab world 
and have given rise to contradictions. In addition to this, the Arabs 
are not certain which tenets and principles from their vast heritage of 
the Arab-Islamic civilizations are apposite to the conditions of our time. 
Secondly, the Arabs blissfully overlook some of the obstacles which 
stand in the-way of their unity and progress. One wonders whether "over­
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look” is the right word, for the Arab state of mind sometimes is  even 
unaware of these obstacles. It  is not just a proverbial matter of not 
washing dirty linen in public. More seriously, it  is a question of not 
knowing that there is  any dirty linen in the home at a ll, Otherwise, 
there is no reason why thereAiw no overall analysis of these obstacles, 
not only in the "propaganda” aimed at impressing the outsiders and on­
lookers in the world, but also in the serious literature which is addressed 
to the Arab masses and especially to the elite, There are hints and 
references here and there a ll indicating, i f  nothing else, the enormous 
ability of their authors in minimising Arab problems, Ey obstacles in 
this context we mean a vide range of spiritual and material factors re­
sulting in the division of the Arabs on a number of levels. An outstanding 
example of such factors is the divergence in the political, economic and 
social conditions of the Arab countries which figures so rarely and In­
significantly in modern Arab literature. I t  is high time that a fu ll and 
realistic assessment was made by Arab writers themselves, of these diver­
gencies as part of the effort tomake Arab nationalism a more self-conscious 
and a less timid movement. It  is not this assessment or any similar at­
tempt at revealing the lacuna^ but rather the abstention -  or, according 
to a more charitable interpretation -  the inability to face the facts 
at a fairly  close range, which is liable to"undermine ¿rab solidarity in 
the face of the common enemy. The Arab masses, no less than impartial 
and uninstructed foreign observers, are often baffled by the acrimonious 
exchanges between their leaders, who a ll avowedly pursue the same aims, 1)
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are actuated by the same desires and fight against the .same enemies.
They are nonplussed by the fact that, although various tribal and re­
gional prejudices have now given way to the sweeping movement of Arab 
unity, although many families, dynasties and governments openly solicit­
ing foreign assistance against internal advocates of unity have been 
superseded by nationalists, the pattern of division in the Arab world 
has remained almost unchanged. A decade ago monarchical Egypt was sus­
pected, in Arab eyes, of harbouring aggressive intentions towards frater­
nal countries. Today she remains subject to much the same suspicion, 
although in lieu of a corrupt and reactionary monarchy now stands a 
progressive and devoted Republic. The same anathemas and abuses which 
were hurled by neutral Egypt against the monarchical pro-West Iraq not 
long ago were being used until quite recently by the same Egypt against 
a republican and neutral Iraq. ïSîrqïbaj?,the hero of Tunisia's struggle 
for independence against Prance, is as much subjected to charges of be­
traying Arab unity as King Husain, * the champion of the Western cause* 
in the Arab world. Consternation at these development reveals ignorance 
of those psychological, social and economic differences which today divide 
the Arabs from one another. The fact that some or most of these differ­
ences are artific ia l does not at a ll exonerate the Arab writers from not 
explaining them.
It is true that the Arabs' timidity in exploring the deeper causes 
of their political squabbling* is only a reaction a-ainst the exaggerated 
pictures which some Western writers, and especially journalists, have been
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trying to make of the differences in the Arab world. These writers
1
have always emphasized the factors which tear the Arabs apart, rather 
than those which can contribute to their eventual unification, Some 
of them seem even to believe in no real common features in the lives 
of the Arab-speaking peoples to warrant the notion of Arablsm and to 
Justify the effats for Arab unity, Extremism breeds extremism and the 
wholesale negation by W®stern writers of Arabian provokes the Arab 
nationalists' refusal to concede any discrepancy between the Arabs or 
any imperfection in their words and deeds.
These are, then, the two main flaws of Arab nationalism in its 
present theoretical and practical aspects:(a) the contradictory nature of 
the arguments put forward ty some of the Arab leading political analysts 
and (b) the failure on the part of the majority of them to concede the 
significant differences in the social, political end economic conditions 
of the Arab peoples.
To a certain extent these flaws can be traced to the hostile, 
disparaging attitude of the West, but to a greater extent they should be 
put down to that characteristic of Oriental history which has contravened 
the Western pattern of social evolutions. The emergence of European 
nationalism was preceded by a technical revolution which, after occasioning 
the rise of economic units, prepared the stage for social changes. The 
history of European nationalism is marked by a steady progress from "the
See, inter alia, John Connell, The Most Important Country, Cassell & 
Company Ltd,, London, 1957,
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most concrete to the most ideal, from force to justice'*. With the
Orient the case has been qi&e the reverse. Oriental nationalism started
with a demand for Justice a.3 a prerequisite to industrial and technological
development, °ne could almost say of Oriental nationalism what Marx re-
* .
marked about the philosophy of Hegeli you have to turn it up3ide-downt
1
because it walks on its  head.
None of these explanations, however, absolve the Arabs from blame  ^
for failing to correct these faults and to prevent them from corroding 
the national mind. In our individual and social existence our reactions 
to unexpected foreign stimuli may be physically or mentally harmful. Once 
we understand the nature of these stimuli and are able to a certain ex­
tent to predict their recurrence, we can control our reactions, or at 
least, whittle down their vigour and intensity. Ignorance, on the other 
hand, of the cause of reactions undoubtedly fortifies and makes them part 
of one*s second nature. Men constantly become frightened hy the out­
break of a disease, however frequently it  may occur, until they gain 
knowledge of its nature and causes. Fear, i f  continuing unchecked, may 
become a permanent characteristic of the frightened, giving rise to 
cowardice.
The contradictions and inadequacies in the Arabs* statement of 
their case for unity, as well as their timidity and refusal to face facts, 
are excusable only for a limited period as responses to spéeific external
* Jacques Berque, on.cit,. p. 90.
causes. The Intensified military onslaught of the West on the Arab 
countries during and after the First-World War, represented by the French 
occupation of Syria and the British highhanded policies towards Egypt,
Syria, Palestine and Iraq, shocked the Arab nationalists and prompted 
them to forge a united front towards the Western invaders. Coupled with 
that ahock was a deep sense of helplessness in the facf of tbs West’s 
overwhelming cultural and spiritual challenge. That shock and this help­
lessness together le ft thetr inevitable marks on Arab political thought, 
which was compelled to concentrate itself rather on the merits and assets 
of Arab nationalism than on the cleavages and memories of past setbacks.
The occasion, of course, should have caused, as it  did cause among the 
more far-sighted Arab thinkers, serious heart-searchings over the whole 
structure of Arab civilisation in its present phase. It  should also 
have created a strong Incentive to effect a far-reaching and imaginative 
revision of some of the principles of this civilization. But, on the 
whole, the emphasis on the positive aspects of the movement for unity
«
and the minimization, nay ignorance, of the obstacles seemed Justified 
in the light of circumstances.
Then came the Second World War and the ensuing creation of the 
Israeli State, No event in history has made the Arabs feel so desperately i 
weak, so treacherously let down and so profoundly humiliated as did the 
Palestinian nakbah of 194-8. That episode not only threw a lurid light «1 
the corruption and selfishness of some of the Arabjmlers and the dis­
abilities of their subjects, but also showed how far from unity were the
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Arab peoples. The revolutionaries and reformists, outraged by the new 
scandal and feeling the necessity for outspokenness, could not go very- 
far in uncovering the ria l causes of the Arabs* failure lest they should 
boost the spirit of Israeljand this has remained, ever since, one of the 
main factors blunting the self-critical powers of the Arabs,
The situation underwent radical changes after Egypt's coup d'etat 
of Julyl952, So far as the mental state of the Arab peoples is concerned 
that Revolution represented an antidote to the Palestinian nakbah. A 
revolutionary and devoted group had overthrown a corrupt regin» in the 
most important and largest of the Arab countries and had taken as one of 
its battle-cries the urge for Arab unity, Arab pride and self-confidence 
soared byleaps and bounds as the new Egyptian regime scored resounding 
successes over forces which, rightly or wrongly, were hitherto considered 
as the opponents of Arab unity, Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia 
in June 1955 eliminated that exasperating spirit of loneliness that had 
prevailed among the Arabs since the Palestinian war. The nationalization 
of the ¿uez Canal exalted the Arab spirit a stage further by demonstrating 
the delicately favourable position which can be enjoyed by the small states 
in a world held together by the cement of terror. Finally, the failure 
of the Anglo-French-Israeli expedition to Egypt in November 1956 con­
vinced the Arabs that the period of their international isolation was 
really and definitely over. Arab pride has been demonstrating Itself with 
growing vigour in every field since these developments. It has been able 
to afford an intransigent attitude In relation to the Uest, Egypt, for
instance, refused for a long time, in spite of compelling economic
necessities, to restore her diplomatic relations with Great Britain
after they were broken off in the wake of the Suez crisis. Iraq most
noticeably, but also Syria, adopt*? an attitude deliberately aimed at
now
humiliating France* The same apirlt/prevalls in Arab relations with 
some of the Aslan countries such as Pakistan, Persia and even the Chinese 
People's Republic,
tie are thus witnessing a gradual but rapid upsurge of Arab fakhrr-. 
which is  something more formidable, more overwhelming and more conse­
quential than the familiar Western pride, combined as it is with an over- 
sensitivity unrivalled in the characteristics of other nations. This 
stillenerging pride is  buttressed by the overtures to various Arab 
countries made on the part of both sets of the Great Powers to win them 
over to their respective camps as part of their efforts 1» secure victory 
in the present cold but certainly eventual hot war. The fact that the 
United dates and Britain, spurred on by the realities of the cold war, 
found themselves compelled to supply arms to Tunisia (November 1957) in 
defiance.of their friendshlo with France and of NATO solidarity, ©r that 
Britain has had to enter into an arms deal with on Iraq by a ll indications 
unfriendly to her (May 1959)» merely to prevent Soviet intervention can­
not fa i l  to pitch the Arab spirit s t i l l  higher.
All this means that the Arab« have not only recovered from their 
in itia l shock and depression, but are in the process of gaining a refresh­
ing sense of self-confidence and security. In such a case one would ex-
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pc-ct them to speak more frankly about their faults, setbacks and short­
comings in achieving their unity, Ju3t as one would expect a strong man
cbes
to be able to afford more modesty than>a weak one» Those who could ex­
cuse the Arabs for having, in the past, turned a blind eye to their de­
ficiencies on the grounds of expediency can no longer approve of and 
sympathise with their present negligence in this respect. But two factors 
seem s t il l  to be barring the Arabs from a genuine, effective and frank se lf- 
criticism. Firstly although they have grown out of their previous feeling 
of insecurity and immense defencelessness, the habit of under-estimating 
the obstacles consequent on that feeling of insecurity and defencoless- 
nes3 seems to have eaten into the Arab mind and it  may well take some time 
to eradicate the cause and k ill the effects. Secondly, and in this the 
Arab apologists can well plead mitigating circumstance although the West’s 
material (i .e , military) pressure on the Arab world has decreased con­
siderably, its spiritual and cultural onslaught has been intensified.
The intensification has been not only in the form of an increasing barrage 
of Western ideas and way3 of life  but also, a3 has been frequently emphasised, 
thro gh the despising and anathematising of Arab thought and traditions, 
pro ressive Arab writers have to face both these factors i f  they do not 
want to see their people swathed comfortably in self-complacency and at­
tractive illusion. They can combat the first  factor, the spirit of under­
estimation, by adopting a bold and frank attitude in evaluating the suc­
cesses and setbacks of the Arabs in their struggle for unity and glory.
They should denounce fiercely the ir.edieaval theocracy of the Imam of the
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Yemen, even i f  he happens to be an ally in the cause of unity, as they 
condemn the tactics of pro-We3t King Husain who does not fully live up 
to the standards set for an Arab nationalist. They should reveal in 
clear and convincing terms the political, economic and social differ­
ences in the systems of the Arab coutftries a3 strongly as they indict 
the crimes of Western colonialists against their peoples. Finally, they 
should consistently and unequivocally deprecate any emergence of Arab 
nn*arahor haughtiness, especially towards neighbouring and co-religious 
countries, any claim to the uniqueness of Arab genius and any intolerance 
towards inferior or opposing cultures. On the question of Western taunts 
and reprimands they should adopt a cool but vigilant line. They should 
never dismiss a ll Western criticisms of the Arab world by ascribing them 
to vile and wicked colonialist motives. They should concede the true, 
and repudiate the unfounded and false of these criticisms through a ve il- 
organised campaign shorn of emotionalism. Thus they may well remove a
i
good desl of the misunderstandings and suspicions engendered against the 





Religion, or rather Islam, is  the life-blood of the Arab social 
system. But, with greater force and for reasons which we w ill try to 
explain in this chapter, it is the life-blood of Arab nationalism. This 
is inevitable, especially i f  we recall that, as was shown in the fore­
going pages, the Arabs* adoption of the Western idea of nationhood has 
landed them in doctrinal inconsistencies and sometimes contradictions. 
Therefore, Islam is s t i l l  regarded by many Arab idealists as one of the 
few factors which would bring a ll the Arab peoples together in their 
struggle for unity, as well as in their stand against the West. This is  
a fact accepted by most of the Arabs, although not admitted by a ll. The 
lack of unanimity is due to the evident contradictions between national­
ism as an idea and Islam as a world religion and, equally important, to 
Islam's inability to come to grips with some of the social and political 
problems typical of our age.
. Yet Arab nationalism is today characterised by a growing.domination 
of religion. Considering that, as we pointed out in the previous chapter, 
modern Arab political thought consists mainly of notions adopted from 
the West, this growing domination results in s t i l l  greater contradictions 
and conflicts in Arab nationalistic thought. The purpose of this chapter 
is  to show the extent to which the domination of Islam over Arab nation­
alism is a by-product of the Western impact.
i
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Ve have already seen that the relation between Arab!am and Islam 
has been a moot question ever since the beginning of Islam but notably 
so since the Muslim peoples embarked on their movement for freedom and 
progress towards the end of the nineteenth and in the beginning of the 
twentieth century,
Me saw in Chapter Two that the leaders of Islamic revivalism did 
not maintain a uniform position towards the idea of Arab unity, While 
Afghani appealed for a comprehensive Muslim unity superseding a ll con- 
fessional and ethnical differences, Ri f^a, especially towards the end of 
his career, took an active part in the Arab nationalist movement and 
KawakitI took up and maintained a position halfway between Afghani and 
Ri^a. 1
The situation was different after the first  World War when Arab 
nationalism became a dominant force in the Muslim world. The Initial 
reaction of Arat/Muslim thinkers to Arab nationalism was outright con­
demnation, To Muslim orthodoxy, Arebism, like Pharaonlsn, was against 
the spirit of Islam, The Rector of the Azhar University, Muhammad Abul 
Fadl al Jizarl, and the Mufti, *Abd ar Hainan Qurrah, led the attack on 
the nationalist heresy. In 1923 they declared that nationality existed 
only on the basis of religion and that Islam regarded a ll  "the believers" 




religious figure, Shaikh l-Su^ ammacl a l  GhunaimI at TaftazanI, stressed 
the hostility of Islam to a ll ethnical particularism or inlimlvala Later, 
in 1933, the new Rector of the Azhar University, Shaikh Kug^af a al 
MaraghI, pointed out the hostility of religion to racialism and called 
upon the ‘ ulema* and Muslims in general to strive "for Islamic unity, 
without occupying themselves with Arab unlty".^
Denunciation of nationalism was not confined to the orthodoxy. It 
was also voiced, as stated in Chapter 3Vo, by such a prominent reformist 
as *Afcd ar Raziq in his Islam wa ugul al frukm.^
Welcome for Arab Nationalism r '
With the recrudescence of Arab nationalism after the Second World 
War we observe a radical change in Hie attitude ©f Arab/fouslim thinkers 
towards Arab nationalism. Notwithstanding their previous condemnations 
the religious circles in the Arab WorldAthrew the whole of their weight 
behind the idea of Arab unity. This apparent change of heart was nec­
essitated by two factors apart from "the Jewish menace"*
First, the apprehension that the new phase of Arab awakening 
might eventually lead, at the best, to the emergence of laicism in the 
structure of Arab states as in the case of the Turks or, at the worst, 
to the domination of "Communist atheism". Second, the age-old problem





of Islam’s diminishing prestige with the rising generations of pro­
gressive and Westernized youth, from whose ranks new rulers often rise, 
whose main-characteristic is a readiness to identify Arab backwardness 
with attachment to Islam and, in general, to regard religion as an ally 
of reaction. With a mounting urgency, this problem made it  absolutely 
essential for the ArabA‘U3lim leaders to give their fullest support to 
the policies of ruling nationalists, however, un-Islamic they might be.
In both directions the task of these leaders was made considerably easier 
ty historical association In the minds of both the faithful and the 
sceptic between Arab grandeur and the establishment of orthodox Islam 
on the one hand and ly the need of officialdom to solicit the assistance 
of the clergy in times of distress on the other. Whatever their motives 
the efforts of leading Muslim *ulaaa* in this period had a clear aim 
which was to put an Islamic cansl ruction on a ll the ideals of Arab 
nationalism and to point a manifestly religious nature to the etruggle 
of Arabs for independence and progress.
The Azhar University in Cairo and especially its monthly review 
malallat *al azhar are today the most reliable and most significmt 
sources of organised Muslim opinion within the Arab world and, therefore, 
deserve our earnest consideration. In view-of the purpose of the present 
chapter we shall concern ourselves here with the issues of the review from 
the beginning of 1952. to the end of 1958 and attempt to elucidate the 
views of the most prominent representatives of Modern Islamic thought
it




Viewed in the context of roa.lallah's histoiy since it was created 
in 1930 two major changes can be observed in its attitude during this 
period -  the growing tendency to take an interest in, and express opinions 
on, important issues of Arab politics and, as the corollary to this, the 
shifting of ennhasis from the problems and interests of Muslims in general 
to those of the Muslim Arabs in particular. Both changes are evidenced 
by the appearance in the majallah of an increasing number of articles and 
essays on a wide range of political and social problems facing the Arabs 
in general and the Egyptians in particular. Both changes reveal impressive 
contradictions as regards Ar b nationalism which have also beset the minds 
of Arab religious circles.
1
*The aim of ma.jallat *al ashar (henceforward referred to as malaltah^  as 
can be understood from most of its annual forewords, before and after 
this period, have been threefold: (a) to serve Islam; (b) to serve the 
cause of Islam in general by attacking the materialistic philosophy and,
(c) to serve the Islamic community, which constitutes the social aspect 
of the Journal’s activities. Thus far, the Journal's three successive 
editors have conceived these aims in different lights, each adopting a 
different attitude according to his own interpretation of the situation 
of Islam as an entity. As Professor Smith puts it: "For the first  editor 
Islam was a transcendent idea, which it  is man's duty to ascertain and 
follow. For the second (Wajdl) it  comes close to being an historical 
phenomenon which it  Is man's duty to defend, For Wajdi makes clear his 
conception of the service that Aslam today requires. I t  is defence,"
(V, S. Smith, Islam in History, p, 134.), Ve might say that, for the pre­
sent editor Islam represents a mainly social and political system, 
which can provide a progressive and revolutionary regime with a ll the 
necessary weapons to reform the society. Its main characteristic, as wiHle 
presently seen, is  anti-Westernism,
i t
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The Egyptian Revolutian of July 1952 was given an enthusiastic 
welcome ty majallah. which hastened to voice hopes of the ascendancy 
of Islamic tenet3 unrer the new order and took the opportunity to de­
nounce the "ignorant, llhi.ll> and corrupt regime" of the previous rulers. 
It  is noteworthy that/one of the grounds on which Muhibb'-.ild Din al Khajlb, 
the editor-in-chief of maiallah. in his editorial of October 1952 attacked 
the former regime was its attempt at isolating the Islamic church from 
social and political life*
"That regime (Faruq’S)- was trying, with its own methods 
of lenience and sgu.ple.ige. to confine Islam to the mosque, 
so that its principles and traditions do not extend to the
The remark was significant, indicative as i t  va3 of the Azharites* de-
of the orthodoxy
termination to assert Jthe position/hs the arbiter of the trama's life .
In fact it  could be regarded as a warning to the revolutionary officers
against any attempt at secularising the administration and holding its
T>~n a I
religious activities in check, MuJiiéájad^Khatlb also found the Revolution 
an incentive to renewed and Intensified efforts on the part of the re-
ligious' leaders to diffuse Islamic principles among the masses:
"God has now blessed humanity with this great revolution, 
which has taken place within our sight and hearing during 
the last three months, uniting as i t  has the Heirs o f the 
Pronhets in their stand on the mission of *slam. The re­
volution has thus refuted a l l  the excuses to which some of 
the resorted to in ju stification  o f their attitude
^»a la llah . 20 October 1952, Cairo, p, 133,
1.
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on the Implementation of the Islamic mission, when­
ever their conscience reminded them of the obligations 
with which God has entrusted them."
One reason for this exaltation of the Revolution should be sought in
the general decline of religious and moral standards under the order
now defunct and especially in the increasing isolation of A! A^har from
\
social developments. The revolution, with its proclaimed aim of arrest­
ing the downward course of Egypt towards social and moral collapse, thus 
could not fa il  to rouse hopes among the men of Al Azhar for a resuscita­
tion of religious life  in their country. This is admitted unequivocally 
in an article by Muhammad kbdul La$If a3 Subkl, Member of the Body of 
Senior * ulema*, in which, after condemning Islam's degradation before the 
Revolution he says that recently things had come to such a pass that Al 
Azhar had become "something of an intruder among ¿'people alien to it". 
The writer then hails "the followers in the footsteps" of *Utaar and *Aar 
itn al. ‘Is , namely General Najib and his friends, for having "overthrown 
the government of corruption, injustice and heresy, and for having re­
vived the honour of the country, the sanctity of religion and the re­
splendence of the nation". The occasion was one not only for saving 
Egypt from moral decline, but also a time for restoring Islam to Its 
proper place in the world, Realizing that the new regime, in its drive 
against feudalism and corruption in the country, would be in dire need 
of moral and spiritual support and that -  at least for the moment -  this 
support could only come from religious circles, the Azharites gained an 
almost unprecedented sense of self-confidence“, appealing for a greater
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share In the political structure of the new order.
This is the main and recurrent theme of many of the articles 
during a considerable period after the Revolution -  a theme which, in 
spite of a ll Its defects, has at least permeated the ma.lallah with a 
commendable spirit of consistency and harmony. *Atd as Salim al Qaba’T, 
Professor of the Faculty of sharl*ah. for instance, in an article en­
titled "Islam and Its Contribution to the liJifice of World Peace", calls 
upon Al Azhar to assume the Islamic task of eliminating differences be­
tween classes and peoples "in the new era, under the Revolutionary Govern­
ment", in a bid to maintain world peace*
"This is  an opportunity," says the writer, "which w ill 
never again be available to Islam. The venerable al 
Azhar should take advantage of this (opportunity) . . .
Gone are the '’ays, in which whenever Muslims spoke, they 
were called * the prejudiced ones1. An era has come in 
which world statesmen w ill ask for our assistance to re­
pel the infidel Communists.wl
But most Interesting of a ll was the Azbarites* attitude towards 
Na j ib ’s drive for land reform. In order to appraise this attitude In 
its right perspective we have to go back a litt le  and review a special 
Incident which Is revealing of the position of Muslim orthodoay under 
j'aniq's regime.
In 1940 the Muslim Brethren produced ja circular on the question 
* of wealth in which the leader of the Brethren, Shaikh Hasan a l Banna* de-
\ia.1allah, October 1952, p. 224«
V
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dared that wealth should not be monopolised ly one class, aa this is
I contrary to the laws of Islam, and that it Is the duty of the government
to distribute agricultural lands in accordance with prophetic traditions.
Banna* drew the conclusion that no land should be hired or rented and
that private ownership should be limited to the extent of that land which
the owner himself is  able to cultivate, "over and above that, he should
allot to the landless", Banna* claimed that Islam opposes the system of
capitalist feudalism, which permits the absolute ownership of land^just
as it  is , against atheistic Communism, where the state owns a ll the land.
. He proposed a solution that Is midway between Capitalism and Communism
in that the individual should own as much land as he can cultivate and
1
that the residue should be given to the landless, free of charge.
This claim ty Hasan al Banna* was strongly rejected ty Shaikh 
Hasanain Muhammad Makhluf, the i'ufti of Egypt who, in a special fatwa 
(legal decision) quoted extensively from the Koran and the traditions In 
support of the existing capitalistic system and, in particular, the 
practices of land tenure. He maintained that no Muslim could be asked 
to give up his property to anyone else, or be satisfied with only a 
sufficient quantity to provide him with his daily bread. The Mutfi ter­
minated his findings with the admission that the poor classes were in 
need of decisive treatment, but be was of the opinion that there was no
V  The Knslfm Brethren, pp. 41, 57, H6.
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remedy except to follow the teachings of Islam with regard to financial 
and social matters, the elucidation of which is another matter and God 
knows best (Allah a * law)*
The approach held ty A1 Azhar with regard to the land reform 
programme of the Najlb government was the very opposite of Shaikh Makhluf' 
conclusions. Thus, in an article entitled "^imitation of Ownership in 
Islam" ( tafrdld al mllkTyah f l * l  Islam) , Muhammad *Arafah, Member of the 
Body of Senior *uLama>. sets himself the task of providing examples of 
Islam’s limitations in the practice of land tenure. He starts ty citing 
a letter from the Caliph *Uraar addressed to his general, Sa*d abl Uaqqaf, 
on the day of the Arab Conquest of Iraq, In which Uaqqas is instructed 
not to allow the concentration (takadd.ua) of conquered lands in the hands 
of the Arab invaders, but to leave them to their tille rs who would be 
asked to pay land-tax ( .llarah) to the Muslims, This decision was evi­
dently contrary to the Prophet Muhammad'a famous ruling at Khaibar to 
divide conquered lands into five parts, of which one part should go to 
"God, the Proohet and the poor", and the remaining four-fifths to "the 
warriors" (muoatllah^. But ‘ Umar contravened this ruling on grounds of 
both expedienecy and justice, since, had the warriors divided the lands 
between themselves, the succeeding generation of Muslims, other than the
^Bunne, Religions and Po litica l Trends in Modern Egypt, p, 53«
2ssM M >  October 1952, p. 14.2,
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warriors* heIra, would hare been landless. After demonstrating that the 
Arabs observed ‘Umar's instruction in the other occupied countries, in­
cluding Egypt, *Ar&fah concludes, by Implication, that, just as 'ttaar 
wisely set aside the Prophet's Khaibar tradition to secure the long-run 
interests of Muslims, so the present regime has adopted a programas of 
land reform which, although being rai-IalMie, is omit welcome, especially 
i f  one takes into account the appalling povertyof the fallahln wit^All 
its social and political evils.^ ^
art this wholehearted support far the revolutionary measures of 
the new regime did not indicate the adoption of a revolutionary attitude 
by al Azhar itse lf with regard to social problems. Par from this, an 
editorial by Kufcibh. ad Din al Khaflb made an unequivocal appeal for Egypt's 
return to Islam's orthodojqn
"God has now terminated the age of oppression (or 
trespassing (ftfghySn). Egypt, whose Muslims fora 92 
per cent of tnewBSXe of berpopulation, wishes to re­
turn to her Iglsmisa, Just as al» did in the firs t  cen­
tury of the history of Islamic conquest. The greatest 
man on earth earn! the noblest hero in history is  I »  who 
strives for the renovation of that glorious period...**
The patriotic tone of the following sentence, in a journal which
is trying to concern itse lf with the interests of the Muslims of a ll
countries, is especially significant!
"This renaissance of the Golden Age of Egypt's history 
can or should be brought about by reviving her morality,
malallah. October 1952, p, 145* ! /
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justice, simplicity, clemency and affection between 
a ll the Inhabitants of the homeland (wat«*)» irrespect­
ive of their opinions and religions, sotKat they co­
operate with one another, to achieve the highest and 
finest degree (of progress) attained ty the peoples of 
the earth in sciences, industries, and the means of ad­
ministering their affairs, ameliorating their services 
and promoting their development, in order that we get 
the best of everything and become the moat experienced 
nation in these (fields) . . .
As can be observed the Asharites could not welcome achievements of 
the new regime without committing themselves to the ideas of Arab nation­
alism, which wes the main battle-cry of the Officers' movement. But, a ll 
commitment to nationalism raises the burning issue of its contradiction 
of the principles of Islam. How do the Azharites resole this contra- .
r • ‘
diction? Unfortunately, we cannot find in their articles and essays 
much reference to this matter. This omission makes their works as open 
to criticism as those of the political and laio theorists of Arab nation­
alism. ait the Azharites can be said to be presentir« at least a more 
enlightened and straightforward concept of the relation between *slsm 
and Arab nationalism by clearly identifying the one with tbs other.
Such a starting-point precludes any question of contradiction. Let us 
mention a few oca®pies.
In his editorial of the April issue of 1956 trader the title MHas 
the Giant Woken Up?" Khajlb depicts the ups and downs of Islam and 
Arabista in history to prove that they stand and fa l l  together. The Giant
malallah. February 1953, p. 653.
which is the nation inhabiting the Arabian Peninsula, carried 
at the t i i »  of the Orthodox Caliphs (632-661) the "banner of Justice 
and wisdom" to the three known continents of that time, namely Asia,
North Africa and Europe, establishing tbs existence of Arabism (kian »1 
*umhah) and the humane Islam (al Islam al lnsanl) at the same time.
Islam started to decline, continues Khaflb, at the time when its govern­
ment was Persian!zed,1 and when the Giant was benumbed:by the "absurdities 
of Greek philosophy and the imaginings of the Brahmanist Sufiam" as well 
as by many other factors. Consequently, the Giant went ' »  sleep for many
It is both regrettable and astonishing to find a great number of malallah*s 
writers suffering from nationalistic prejudices, especially in assessing 
the contributions rendered by non-Arab Muslims -  including Persians -  to 
the growth of Islamic culture and science. Like some of their lay counter­
parts, this group of Azharites either ignore such contributions or deni­
grate as a whole the participation of non-Arab Muslims in the construction 
of Islamic civilisation. Here also we can discern a dear manifestation 
of the precedence which some Azharltes accord to their nationalistic 
emotions at the eepense of Iglamlc universality as well as of indubitable .. 
historical facts. It Is useful to quote here a paragraph from I bn Khadun* s 
muooadimah on the role of non-Arab Muslims in the creation of islamio his­
t o r y . " I t  is ," writes I bn Khaldun, "a remarkable fact that with few ex­
ceptions, most Muslim scholars both in the religious and in the intellect­
ual sciences have been *a.1«i (Persian). When a scholar is of Arab origin, 
he is *«.11 In language and upbringing and has V a i l  teachers. This is 
so in spite of the fact that Islam is an Arabic religion and that its  
founder was an Arab. The reason for this is  that at the beginning Islam 
had no sciences or crafts. That was due to the simple conditions (that 
prevailed) and to the desert attitude. The religious laws, which are the 
commands and prohibitions of God, were in the breast of the authorities... 
(who) at that t i l  were Arabs. They did not know anything about scienti­
fic  Instruction or the writing of books and systematic works,.,We have 
mentioned before that the crafts are cultivated by sedentary peoples and 
that the Arabs (Bedouins) are of a ll  peoples the least familiar with the 
crafts. Thus the sciences came to belong to sedentary culture, and the 
Arabs were not familiar with them or with their cultivation. New the 
(only) sedentary people at that time were the * ^ 1  and, what amounts to
(cont.)
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centuries, during which foreigners, fromMongols and Crusaders to'Portu­
guese, Dutch, British and French colonialists, occupied many territories 
in the eastern and western parts of the Islamic world, "But has the 
Giant even now woken up? Are we now passing through a new phase in the 
history of A^abism and Islam, in which we are requiredty the history of 
mankind to resume our mission so as to perform on the seem of life  an­
other chapter of tteMsfcory of justice and benevolence?" Khafïb believes 
that the Giant is now in a state midway between sleep and awakening. It  
has so far recovered from "the benumbing effect of Colonialism in its 
military and political aspect} but there are s t i l l  many other sopori­
fics preventing the Giant from resuming its mission". For many years 
he had developed the conviction that the Muslims (at this point he does 
not mention the Arabs separately) were well on the road to salvation, 
and that their weakness was dus to defective leadership. But "less than 
four years ago", he announces rejoicingly, "the Revolution which broke 
out in Egypt brought about changes in the machinery of leadership which 
now manifest themselves daily at home and abroad*. Thus he regards the 
Egyptian ^evolution as beneficial for the whole of the Islamic world at 
a time when, throughout the Islamic countries, especially in §yria, Persia
(cent.)  ^ ”
the same thing, the clients and sedentary people who followed the "aiam 
at that time in a ll matters of sedentary culture, including the crafts . 
and professions, (Ibn Khaldun, The Muoaddimah. translated by Frans Roser>- 
thal, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958# Volume 3# pp* 311» 313«)
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and Indonesia, religious circles were outraged by Nasj-r's ruthless sup­
pression of the Muslim Brethren following the attempt on his life  in 
October, 1954.
But it is not only Islam whose interests are Identified with those 
of Aratiem as a whole. There are sentences in the article which denote 
that the Arabs * interests are, in fact, thesame as those of the whole of 
humanity. He describes, for instance, the Balfour federation of Nov­
ember 1917 as disastrous *for the whole of humanity" (*ala*l insanTvah 
leulllha)i or «includes his article by saying that the Giant, i f  awakened 
-will have in its hand "the remedy for a ll the moral, social and political 
plight and sufferings of Mankind".1
Kha^Ib, therefore, by postulating a comprehensive identity of 
Interests between Islam and A^ablsm on the one hand, and between Arab­
ian and humanity on the otter, does not allow any doctrinal contradiction 
-to undermine his arguments. What is more interesting is that, as can be 
gathered from the passages quoted above, by Arabism Khaj,Tb rather means 
Its Egyptian component for which he pleads a leading role in the Islamic • 
vorld. * From this viewpoint, the Azharites’ ambitions considerably eae-
oeeded those of the leaders of the Egyptian Revolution, who mostly con-
2tended themselves with the leadership of the Arab world.
^malallah. April 1956, pp. 937-941.
%ee, inter alia. Mohammed Neguib, Egypt's Destiny, p.2-6A-
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Attitude towarda Arab Leadership.
But have the Arabs got the prerequisites of this leadership? I f  
they have, what are they? The Azharitea* answers to these questions 
reveal as much of the basic principles of their social thinking as of 
their attitude towards the West,
Of the numerous factors enumerated ty the ideologists of Arab 
nationalism as the basts of Arab unity -  i .e , , language, culture, re­
ligion, race, geography, etc, -  the Azharites place the emphasis on 
the first  three, which they also regard as the main potentialities of 
the Arab world for leading humanity on the path of salvation. In a ll 
their dissertations they throw into fcelief the Arabic language and Arab 
culture as the two main instruments with which Arab nationalism and 
Islamic tenets can be blended into a unified social force of limitless 
strength. The religious leaders* immense interest in the first factor -  
language -  can be gauged from the enormous attention which ma.lallah pays 
to Arabic by publishing regular essays under the title  of lugfaatwlrat 
(lexicology) thrashing out linguistic subtleties and correcting common 
errors in its day-to-day use and by emphasising the necessity of-clean­
ing " the Koran* s language* from unhealthy accretions. I t  can alms be 
gauged from the frequent statements by Its contributors on the blessings 
of Arabic and its unequalled capacities for conveying shades of meaning.
Such statements are based on more or less the same arguments as .
a
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those advanced ty §ujr[,^ to which we referred in the last chapter, hut 
with two major differences« Ffrstly, unlike $ufi?, the Azharites, in “ 
establishing the fundamental part played ty language In fostering nation­
alism, do not seek refuge in any Western school of thought. We w ill ex­
plain the reason for this a litt le  later. Secondly, a ll their arguments 
have naturally a strong religious tinge. The mere fact that the Koran 
has been sent down to Man In Arabic is sufficient to make its position 
unassailable and Its value unmatched, from the linguistic, social and 
political points of view. On the question of preserving and promoting 
the Islamic/Arab culture in order to further the cause of Arabian the As-, 
harites are more emphatic. Their attitude in this respect shows that 
they regard the A^ab-Islamic culture as a self-sufficient phenomenon, 
capable of meeting the requirements of the Arabs in every field, and as 
a patrimony which should be safeguarded against any foreign manipulaticn, 
MaJallah constantly reminds its sceptical readers of the achievements of
^The following passages from an article entitled "Arab Nationalism and 
the Part of al Asshar in it3 Revival" by Zakarlya al BarrI are worth 
quoting at this Juncture*
«Historical and social studies have demonstrated that language is the 
soul of the nation; that it  is the backbone and the essential constituent 
element of nationalities; that nations are primarily dependent on (their) 
linguistic unity, which makes for unity of spirit and conscience.•«, The 
history of the Arab nation has taught us that Imperialism, although rob­
bing some Arab countries of their political- independence, has not been 
able to undermine the very existence of the Arab nation, because the Arabs 
continued in preserving their own language... al Azhar has been the key 
with which the Arab nation was released from the prison of Imperialism, . 
preserving as It  did this eternal patrimony (Arable) ty studying it  from 
the viewpoints of grammar, syntax, eloquent», usage (wad*!) ,  prosody and 
Jurisprudence, poetry and prose.’1 (Maiallah. November 1955, p. 415.)
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great Arab thinkers and scientists In the past and of the Insidious part 
played by Western culture In strengthening the Western influence In 
Arab countries. This does not mean that theAaharttes believe the Arabs
not to be in need of Western technique and modernity. In fact they admit 
Arab needs in this respeot, but qualify their admission with an interest­
ing argument. One must differentiate, they say, between Western culture 
and Western science,
"Imperialism,’’ writes Khajüb in his editorial of April 
1957, "has, for us, mixed culture with science, thus 
causing us to believe that foreign culture« are part 
and parcel of foreign science, of which we are in need, 
and that our need of foreign culture is  prior to our 
need of science. It  (Imperialism) thus fastens the tie 
between our sons and those forelm cultures in a bid to 
make them alien to their genuine (or original’* &gll)oulture. "1
Thus while the Arabs should be anxious to imbibe Western science, they 
should exercise the utmost vigilance in preventing the notions and prin­
ciples of Western culture from "polluting" their thoughts and traditions.
Malallah is  at pains to demonstrate to the eventual critics that 
its denunciation of western culture with a ll  its dfcfcendant evils does not 
mean its opposition to Western science. It  does so by regularly report­
ing the latest industrial and scientific achievements in Arab countries, 
especially in Egypt, and by welcoming the teaching of Western lmguages 
in al Azhar and in the country as a whole. To convince the more in­
credulous of the critics i t  sometimes publishes on its cover photographs
'
^matallah. April 1957, p. @03.
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©f tha Axhor students working in laboratori«» on natural sciences.
But in attacking Western culture la a l l  its aspects natali.A  
is «trerely outspoken and ruthless. So far as may be judged tmm tha 
language and tona of the articles it  is possible to say that tha As- 
barites feel a deep abhorrence against Ve irte» culture. This abhor­
rence la sometimes expressed against some of the weak and defective 
aspects of Wests» culture (aoeh as Vestorn cinema, press, etc.}, by 
asserting the superiority of Islamic institutions to their Western 
counterparts or, no re often than not, by the condemning of Western cul­
ture as the naln instrument used by Western colonialism in order to 
achieve its military and eoonosdo domination. tteder the title wColonial­
isa and Cultural Coloniali 8®" Muhammad te ln a l fusata!, the I t i f t l  o f 
Palestine, levels virulent criticism against a ll vehicles of West e »  
culture In the Arab countries. Ha especially deplores the presence of 
Western schools and universities on Arab soil. The fact that, according 
to the 1951 statistics, 79,900 students in Egypt, 44>900 in the Lebanon, 
S,0ri0 in Jordan and 9,000 in Syria were imbibing, what he calls na
foreign culture injurious to (our) patriotism, «reed and traditions’* * v i s
Western
indeed l indicati vet- of "an extremely dangers*** /feaslaaght with fa r -
2
reaching» effects’'.
*See, inter alia, issues of Hoveaber 1955 end January 1956*
\aiallak . January 1956, pp. fi00«^03*
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Anti-Westernism. ■
Resentment against Western culture sometimes easily develops 
Into resentment against everything Western, This process is especially 
accelerated by the misdeeds and the blunders of the Western Powers, No 
tetter example can be given of this than malallafo’a reaction in the 
course of the Sues crisis in October 1956* Whether disclosing their 
deep-seated hatred of the entire Western world, or mere g iv in g  vent 
to the anger fe lt at the sight of Muslim Arabs falling victim to Anglo- 
Franco-Israeli aggression, the Azharitcs launched their most bitter anti- 
Western ompalgn* It  was a resentment not only against Western leaders 
and apostles of ’gunboat* policy towards the Arabs, but against the West­
ern peoples as a whole,
"This is the West,” announced Khaflb in majallah’s 
issue of October 1956, "and such are its attitudes 
to justice, to peace and to human co-existence. They 
are a ll  of them Anthony Edens, They are a ll of them 
Gty Mollets,"
He tried to prove these generalisations ty stating that people like
Balfour and Eden, in adopting their anti-Arab policies, were not » r e ly  ..
acting in purely personal capacitiesj nor were they acting on behalf
of their governments alone, Balfour*s promise to create a national heme
for the Jews in the heart of the Arab homeland and Eden’s sabre-rattlings
against the Egyptian people exercising their rights ty nationalising the
Canal had'*' been bat evidence of "the West's rancour against the East,.,
1
a rancour which a nation harbours towards another",
^ma.1allah* October 1956,
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According to Khaflb this rancour found its sxpression in Eudyard 
Kipling* s saying that **£&»! is East and West la West, and never the 
twain shall meet*, «a well as by Byron on his way to Greece end By Hugo
la his tfi.Oriental«.' Therefore, concluded Khajlb, the question is
greater than tbi« or that petty quarrel. He stated "it is the question 
of East and West*, Western state««, had' earnestly „tried to prevent 
the awakening of the Giant i f  entertaining the Arabs with visual arts, 
sceptical philosophy and a ll manner of moral degradation end effeminacy 
(takhannath). Khaflb held.. *the whole .of Western nations end the 20th 
century civilisation and culture1* responsible for tho misdeeds committed 
by the British end French colosiali« towards the Arab«,1 a conclusion
I
identical topne readied by Basil following the Anglo-French entente of
Aversion to Western civilisation is  especially noticeable from the 
following, rather rhetorical fragment, written in the wake of Anglo- 
French operations against Egypt in 1956» presumably i n ' «  issue of 
al ahraeu and quoted in the Hovember issue of tbs maisllah, ’‘Cairo, 
the capital of the Islamic world and the radiant essence of the East­
er» civilisation. Cairo, the generous and noble (city) which opened 
lte  bosom to French m i English commerce, Industry and ( culture) 
(Apparently the word culture, not having been In the original, has 
been inserted by ftfflfMftl1* editor «gad for that reason put within 
brackets). Utls same Cairo is (mm) being bombarded by the Brltieh 
and Trench. What a disgraceful thing! I t  is  a shame tint the clothes, 
which we import from their countries, should at this time be aeordilng 
our bodies! I t  la a disgrace that we have opened our markets to theta* 
and linked our industries to theirs! It  is  a disgrace that we '
should be educating our children in.their schools and Institutions •- 
whether in Egypt, or abroad, in tendon end in FfcrieJ It is  e disgrace 
that vc should see our wives and children looking appalled, as i f  asking 
why ve have a ll this time been lying to them in our praises of W*stern. 
civilisation.* ( ip j . - .  p. 4*7).
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Thus the tension in Arab-West relations is  conceived as the 
symptom of a deeper clash between A^abism and Western civilisation. 
For this reason, so the Azharites* argument runs, Arab nationalisa 
should insulate itself against the cultural penetration of the West 
and maintain its individuality, otherwise the Arabs w ill not succeed 
in their struggle. Once they- take up this position they feel them­
selves bound to defend Arab culture «id civilization in a ll their re­
presentations and to prove their points of excellency over other cul­
tures and civilisâtions. External aggression and internal scepticism 
both combine tolend a strongly apologetic nature to the efforts of the 
Azharltes, as to the entire Arab mentality at present.
One significant point on this attitude of the Asharites towards 
Western civilization is  worthy of motion. The distinction between 
science and culture is not as rigid as Khajlb suggests. Scientific 
researches in every society are inevitably dominated by concepts de­
riving f r a  religious, philosophical and other social convictions.
The successes of great Muslim scientists in the past, such as Farabi’s 
discovery of contagious diseases and Kharazml*s creation of algebra, 
would not have been possible without belief in the Islamic conception 
of the universe as a dynamic aw! uniform phenomenon. The fact that
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scientific revelations soretimes run counter.to religious teaching 
does not in any way invalidate this assertion, as such revelations 
are s t i l l  coloured by other spiritual characteristics prevalent in 
the discoverer’s society.
Accordingly, Western scientific notions, when introduced into 
the Arab world, bring in their wake a set of technical and social changes 
which are regarded by the Azharites as disastrous fcr the emancipation 
and healthy progress of the Arabs. The point has been brilliantly dis­
cussed by G, E. Von Grunebsum in his essay entitled "Westernisation 
and the Theory of Cultural Borrowing"» Hi® discussion takes the fora 
of a critique of Arnold J• Toynbee’ s theses on the phenomenon of cultur­
al borrowing. Toynbee has attempted to interpret this phenomenon in 
terras of four theses* (a) Individual traits ©f an alien culture w ill 
"be more readily admitted than that culture as a whdsj (b) "the pene­
trative power of a strand of cultural radiation is usually in inverse 
yatio to this strand’ s cultural value", (c ) "one element of an alien 
civilization, i f  admitted, w ill draw after i t  the rest"; (d) "the lone • 
clement may be more disturbing to the receiving civilisation than the 
le would have been".
The main implication of these theses, says Crunebaum, is  that 
«"initial borrowing of an essential element of an alien civilisation neo- 
^ssarily entails in due time the almost complete taking over of a ll its 
^ssential elements"'*’ -  a view diametrically opposed to what Khajlb had
3 2 2 ,
contended, Grunebaum seems to adopt a middle course. On the one hand, 
he refuted Toynbee*s theses tgr demonstrating that integration of Indian, 
Greek and Persian elements into the civilisation i f  Islam in the early 
Abbasid period did not lead to the extinction of the npersonality'’ of 
Islam,'*' Islam, therefore, “is in no danger of becoming physically dis­
tinct” owing to technological borrowing from the West. But, on the other 
hand, he admits that the Westernisation process in the Muslim world leads 
to "a higher rationalization of thought and the co-ordination of economy, 
technique and the State”.
Thus Arab life  is w illy-nilly exposed to the impact of Western 
thoughts, traditions and Ideas, Per this reason, it  is neither possible 
nor desirable to insulate Arab culture against alien elements. What is 
possible, and highly requisite, is the reinterpretation of the basic 
principles of this culture, and especially its religious content, in terms 
apposite to the necessities of our time. Islamic culture absorbed the 
most logical and progressive features of Greek and Persian civilisations 
in the past, without losing-Its individuality and without Jeopardising 
Islam's political predominance. The works of Avicenna (ibn Gina), Aver- 
roes (Ifcn Rushd), Avenpace (itn Bajafc)and others represent In fact a 
masterly engrafting of the most magnificent aspects of defunct c iv ili­




More important than its aversion to Western culture is malallah' s 
attitude to the political problem of relations with the West as a whole. 
As this attitude is basically hostile and negative, and as the Azharites 
apparently do not want to add to the Egyptian Government's troubles, i t  
is  rarely reflected in malallah's pages, although the regular reader can 
easily infer it  from the gneral line of the Journal's arguments. Here 
again the follies of the West come to al Azhar's help. As might have 
been expected, the Sues aggression enabled the Journal to give more fre­
quent and more eloquent expression to its thoughts on Arab-West relations. 
This can be observed, for Instance, in a lengthy review, appealing in 
maiallah' e issues of March and April of 1957, of a boolc entitled (The) 
Islamic Culture sad Modern Life, published in 1956 by the Franklin Pub­
lications and comprised of papers read at the Princeton Colloquium in 
the summer of 1953 by several representatives of Islamic countries and 
American experts on Islam. The reviewer, Muhammad Husain, regards the 
conference as an aspect of the United States' efforts to substitute its 
influence for the declining domination of the British and French in the 
Islamio countries by establishing friendly ties with the Muslim peoples.
"This friendship," says the writer, "w ill never mater­
ialise -  i f  it  ever does -  except on the basis of mutual 
understanding and homogeneity (mustiakalah) as a res-ult 
of which the respective points of view w ill be unified, 
and their temperaments brought close to each other. Such 
mutuality does not become a realty, except by closer rap­
prochement between (the Arab and Western) social «id eth­
ical values, which la impossible in view of the fact that 
the Muslim nations cherish values opposed to those in the 
West."3-
•^ ialallah. March 1957, p. 744.
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"Therefore," concludes the writer, "the 'Joat is le ft with two alter­
natives» (a ) either to ’ eradicate1 Islam by fostering doubts among 
the people of• its values and basic concepts and by preventing its in­
fluence from embracing the social life  of the people; or (b) "trans­
forming" ( tatwllr) Islam and turning it  into an instrument for Justify­
ing the Western values and for "bringing closer the Muslim and Western 
nations", Muhammad Husain maintains that, as recourse to the first
alternative is criminal, the Westerners have deemed it  more expedient
,  1
to persuade the Muslims to transform the Islamic values.
Mantel
It can thus be seen that the writer is  against a ll kinds of re­
lations with the West, He regards them not only as evils equal to the 
Justification of Western values, but also as a means of the "trans­
formation" of Islam, But more imooriant s t il l ,  he condemns any effort 
at revising the Islamic concepts and values by ascribing these attempts 
to the machinations of Western Imperial! aa. The Azharites’ suspicions 
in regard to say Western effort to establish and expand relations with 
the Arabs are understandable and well-founded. Experience has led them 
to the conviction that every seemingly friendly and altruistic step on 
the parttf of the Western governments to win the good faith and support of 
the Arabs for themselves is likelyfto have selfish and colonial!stic aims.
12 S M M * March 1957, p. 745.
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These suspicions were kindled by the 'great betrayal' of the Husain- 
McMahon agreement during the First World War, nurtured by the ruthless 
and high-handed measures adopted by the French and British governments 
between the two wars towards their Arab Mandates and further justified 
by such post-war events as the creation.of Israel and the Suez expedi­
tion. Just as the experience of two world wars has entitled-the French 
and British to be acutely pessimistic over any move towards revival of 
a powerful centralized German government so have these events taught 
the Arabs to be wary of the West's friendly overtures. But views such 
as those of Muhammad ^usain on the impossibility of genuine friendly 
ties between the Arabs and the Vest, as veil as the implied appeals for 
the outright severance of the sdsting ties, are certainly untenable.
They only serve to reveal “the Azharites* uncertainty of their intellectual 
resources for standing up to the West's cultural challenge.
This uncertainty, itself a negative factor, is the most positive 
incentive to questioning the old values and searching for new ones. It
•N
is  the breeding-ground of reformism, which is another agonizingly im­
portant problem in the religious circles of the Arab world today* It  
is also a problem which has become closely linked with the Arab-West 
relationship since there are numerous people within Arab religious cir­
cles who, like Muhammad Husain, are ready to condemn reformism as just 
another aspect of the Vest*» drive to wreck the unity end strength of 
Islam. This was not the case in the earlier period of Arab and Islamic
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awakening, i.e , towards the end of the nineteenth century and tie 
beginning of the twentieth century. Each of the omtanding thinkers 
of that period was definitely associated with a revisionist and reform­
ist movement,'1“
In today*s atmosphere of suspicion against the West reformism
2
seems to be a dishonourable term to the bulk of Azharite thinkers, Ko 
book has been better able to reflect this pessimistic attitude on re­
formism than Dr, Muhammad al Bahay* a al fikr al lslamlal  hadlth wa 
jilatHhi) bi* 1 isti*mar al §harbT (The Modern Islamic Thought and its 
Relation to the Western Colonisation)* Dr, Bahay is Professor of Islamic 
philosophy at the Faculty of Arabic Languages of al Azhar, The main pre­
mises of the writer*s arguments throughout the books are that the on­
slaught of Western colonlali*ation in the Muslim world has created two 
trends within the Muslim elite* (a) the trend to come to terms with 
the West in Its attempt to consolidate its hold3 on the Muslims, (b) 
the trend to oppose the West and to encourage the Muslims to safeguard 
their heritage. According to the writer the outstanding representatives- 
of the first trend are Sir Sayld Ahmad Khan and Ghulam Aljmad QadianI, 
both Indian Muslims, The best representatives of the second group are
al _  „
Jamal ad DinvAfghani, Muhammad 1Abduh and Muhammad Iqbal,
Most of the book Is devoted to denouncing the first  trend as a




movement "founded ty the Britishln the Interest of Western colonialism",
and extolling the second trend as "a genuine Islamic movement to oppose
2
Western Colonisation", The writer has also conceded the existence of a
third movement, which is in fact subsidiary to the first , consisting of 
those Muslim thinkers and writers vhojunknowingly, by propagating the West-
3ern view on Islam, play into the colonialists* hands.
Dr. Bahay's main criterion in distinguishing these groups from 
one another is their attitude towards reformism, toJgXd« The first and 
third groups clamour for reform of Islamic principles and concepts, while
the second goup do not see any necessity for this. With such over­
simplification any exponent of the inadequacy of Islamic principles to 
meet the requirements of our age inevitably incurs the odium of con­
tributing to Western schemes. This becomes amply evident in those parts 
of the book where the writer attempts to define the nature of reform!«,
"The reformist movement ($ard.kat *at tajdld) in 
Islamic thought," he write?,' Hnas oceSTbSUSid since 
the beginning of the present century on either a 
materialistic negation or denigration of spiritual­
ism (ruhlyah) or on the studies of the orientalists 
aimed at smearing Islam and giving a prejudiced ex-
. pianation of its teachings,«*





It  Is also Interesting that, In the chapter entitled "The Religious Re­
formism" in which the writer admits the emergence of a well-meaning and 
sincere reformist trend in modern Islam thought (thus contradicting his 
sweeping statement against reformism quoted above), he recognises Muham­
mad Iqbal as the only representative of this trend and, in fact, the 
whole chapter is a survey of the works and ideas of Iqbal (from page 373 
to page 4.36). Nevertheless the writer strongly criticizes Iqbal for 
some of his suggestions which touch upon "the decisive palings of Islam"'*’ 
such a3 his appeal for equality between men and women in matters concern- 
ing marriage, divorce and inheritance.
As can be seen, consideration of preserving the unity of the Mus­
lims, especially under the present conditions of Arab-b'est tension, con­
stitute a serious obstacle to any reformist movement among Arab religious 
circles. There is no doubt that the lack of such a movement at present 
among these circles, especially al Azhar, should not be ascribed wholly 
to a stubbornness to refuse to face facts. The attitude of the Azharltes 
on many a social issue in the Arab world, and especially in Egypt, even . 
i f  surveyed during the period <1952-58} not only shows al Azhar as being 
well aware of the Inadequacies of certain Islamic principles, bit also 
as countenancing and even itse lf effecting far-reaching revisions of these 
principles.
1 al Bahay, oo.olt.. p, 445
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A notable example of thig Is ma,1allahfa policy on the enfranchise­
ment of women In Egypt and other A*“ab countries. The Muslim orthodoxy 
hi|S always prohibited the participation of women In public affairs and 
political activities and has based this prohibition on many explicit 
prophetic traditions and interpretations of some of the verses of the 
Koran, After the Egyptian Revolution of July 1952 the problem of granting 
political rights to women, together with other progressive schemes of the 
new regime, assumed a fresh momentum and topicality, Directly:: or indir­
ectly, the revolutionary leaders gave notice of their favourable view on 
allowing women a share in the running of their country* s affairs but, as 
they had not yet firmly entrenched themselves in power and s t ill depended 
largely on the blessing of religious circles, their attitude on this mat­
ter was bound to be timid and hesitant. Nevertheless, al Azhar immediately 
reacted against the prevailing official and unofficial mood on the poli­
tical rights of women by vigorously denying the admissibility of such 
rights in an Islamic state and condemning a ll the efforts that were being 
made towards that aim,
"The Islamlo sharl*ah." announced Shaikh *Abd ar Raljmeai 
fa j, th© Rector of Al Azhar, "has forbidden the mingling '
( lkhtllat) of women with men. The appeal for the grant 
of political right3 to women is a means to the achieving 
of this, the women thus seeking to cover their association 
with men under the guise of the public interest. This is  
something of which Islam does not approve, and it  is not 
permissible in any of its sects, because the shax%*ah has 
taken cognizance of the social and moral evils that com# 
of woman’s mingling with man, as well as of the ev ils ,,,, 
the mere probability of which suffices to Justify the 
prohibiting and eliminating of this mingling."
‘Haalallah. January 1953» p. 572,
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The writer then refers to the fatwa issued by a special committee of 41 
Azhar explicitly denying the social rights and obligations of woman, who 
"should confine herself to her house under the protection and care of 
her husband".^
The situation was entirely different in 1957. With its prestige 
considerably strengthened, both internally and externally, after the 
Anglo-French Suez expedition the Egyptian Government was now firmly in ’ 
the saddle and Independent of the blessing, and invulnerable to JhO - 
"curses'* of any particular group in the country. It  could thus easily 
set in motion its revolutionary and un-Islamic schemes witheut fearing 
ary major internal upheaval engendered by the agitations of organized 
minority groups, whose interests or ideas it  could now ignore. The 
Egyptian Government, for instance, with the new Constitution published 
in August 1957, enfranchised Egyptian women. Faced with a military gov­
ernment determined to carry out social reforms without much concern for 
religious niceties the Azharites had no choice but to give in. While 
they did not undertake to Justify what the Government were doing, their • 
attitude in the matter was one of grudging acquiescence,
Referring to the changes in si Azhar’s outlook and organization 
since the time of Hu^ ammad 4Abduh, H.A.R.Gibb writes*
"It should not surprise us, however, that al-Azhar 
yields slowly and reluctantly to the necessity for 
change and that such changes as have been made affect
V la l la h .  January 1953, p. 573
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the organization of studies rather than their spirit 
and substance. The impatience with al-Azhar which is 
displayed by the Western-educated classes and the secu­
lar nationalists is easy to understand. But a school 
with a tradition of nearly eight hundred years behind 
i t  and, s t ill more, a school which stands throughout 
the world of Islam as the guardian and (in a certain 
sense) the authoritative exponent of Islamic orthodoxy, 
cannot easily trim its sail3 to every passing wind.”^
We might add here that the tempo of the Azahar’ a reluctant submission 
to the necessity for change is today remarkably quicker, as can be 
gathered from the example mentioned above, than in the time when Pro­
fessor Gibb*3 statement was made. This accelerated speed can be as­
cribed to two factors* first, the irresistible pressure now exerted 
by ’the impatient Western-educated classes and the secular nationalists* 
and second, the distinction which has come to assert itself in the minds 
of the Azharites, as a result of the determination of a successful mili­
tary leadership,between those social issues with obvious political con­
sequences and those which can be regarded to be of purely religious, 
or at least, non-political import. It is  interesting to compare the 
Azharites1 submissive attitude towards socio-political reforms with their 
reaction to changes affecting Islamic injunctions of a purely religious 
nature, such as fasting, or with non-political implications such as a 
man’ s attitude towards the woman he is  to many. Any implicit or ex­
plicit act of defiance on these matters brings forth a spate of strongly-
'Modem Trends in I aim, p, ¿1,
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worded fatwaa and statements by eminent Asfeaiites.
State and Religion
The above examples also clarify to a certain extent some aspects 
of the relations between government and religious circles in a Muslim 
country. It Is Important to note that the very emergence of this duality 
has been due to the impact of Western political thought. Theologically 
a monistic religion, Islam recognises no distinction between state and 
churdi.
According to Islamic tenets, the head of a Muslim state is re­
garded as having the dual mission of securing the worldly welfare and 
spiritual salvation of his subjects. The introduction, therefore, of 
Western concepts of government and statehood tended to upset the accepted 
pattern of relations between state and religion in the Muslim countries. 
The (pawing complexity of social problems, in respect of which no pro­
vision has been made in the Koran or in the thinking of Muslim Juris­
consults, prompted officialdom in these countries to adopt ideas, enact 
laws and make decisions which more often than not ran counter to basic 
Islamic rules. Even where thingpdid not go quite so far as that the 
mere fact that Muslim governments found themselves compelled to seek the 
remedies for their social problems in non-Islamic sources created a gulf 
between the rulers and the religious circles. Nevertheless, this-divorce *
*See ma.1allahfa issues of March 1957, pp. 704-705, aid of April 1957, 
article entitled n§awm ramsdan".
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was not sanctioned by any constitutional alteration in any of the Muslim 
states (with the single exception of Turkey),
An anomalous situation has thus arisen in which, theoretically, 
the Muslim governments enjoy the blessing of religi-us circles and do 
as they prescribe bit, in practice, live outside the pale of Islamic or­
thodoxy, On the one hand, the necessities of political life , especially 
when the community is threatened from without, force the governments to 
solicit the assistance of the religious circle as has been sufficiently
described elsewhere. This is  both because of the lack of any concrete 
ideology to protect these governments against the foreign challenge and 
because of the ease with which ideas can be put across to the masses 
when expressed in religious terms. On the other hand, whenever the gov­
ernment want3 to put through some social reform in contravention of Is­
lamic traditions, it  has to do this in the face of opposition of the re­
ligious circles which, as in the example of the enfranchisement of Egypt­
ian women, w ill at some time peter out. We might, therefore, describe 
the relation between state and religion in a given Muslim country as 
follows; It is a positive factor, willing to strengthen the hand of 
officialdom and endow it  with a spiritual force, for the religious circle 
can s t i l l  exercise a considerable influence, and is even recovering some 
of its ebbing prestige, ^wever once it  starts to question an official 
act -  especially i f  it  is one of a reformistic nature -  on the plea of .
1
mupholding the sanctity of religious rules it  is cynically ignored and 
easily reduced to ineffectiveness.
Herein lies one of the causes ©f the backwardness and obscurantism 
with which, in Arab countries, Western policies are so readily associated. 
In modern Muslim countries the orthodoxy generally ranks in popular myth 
among the most unpopular of the ctisens. Quite apart from those parasiti­
cal attributes, hypocrisy, cant and indolence, which are such common 
characteristics of this element in society almost everywhere in the world, 
the emergence of the * alamo* as an ant L-Islamic hierarchical body is parti­
cularly responsible for this.
But the impressionability of the illiterate masses towards the 
insinuations of the clergy and, as has been seen, the rulers* dependence 
on them in times of distress for the spiritual mobilisation of the people 
have so far preserved the clergy against a ll  opposition. A foreign act 
of aggression or high-handedness towards a Muslim country thus serves
•*
the twin purposes of bringing back the * ulama* into the picture and so 
providing them with a new chance to perpetuate their hold over the masses 
and of restoring their weakening control over officialdom.
There is a further reason for the unpopularity of the *ulama* 
with the intellectuals which is also sometimes associated with the West, 
namely, that, representing basically an important part of the forces 
favouring the status ewe, the * ulama* are opposed to any revolutionary 
change in social and economic conditions, especially i f  this be of a 
Western colouring. Although it would not be very difficult to find among
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them Individuals atemplifying a successful combination of islamic prin­
ciples with socialistic tendencies, the *ulaaa* and the religious circles 
on the whole are Justly regarded as reactionaries,
Hince one of the distinctive features of Western colonialism in 
the prevailing myth is also its hostility tosociol and economic progress 
in the colonised land3 the * ulama* thus come to figure as the unconscious 
allies of colonialism. The adjective ”unconsclous'* is  changed into ’’con­
scious'* when a Western colonial Power makes common cause with the domestic 
religious leadership in opposition to the reformlstio/anti-Colonial pol­
icy of a Muslim government. This is vhat happened, during the ’twenties, 
in Afghanistan, when King Ammanullah, ty pursuing a policy at once dir­
ected against British interests In India and against the superstitious 
and obscurantist teachings of the anllaa. found himselfopposed by the 
combined forces’ of the British and the mullas and ended by succumbing 
to them.
But in addition to their reactionary characteristics, the *alaaS* 
Jiave also their anti-colonialist propensitivss which, as shown before,1 
0 TB chiefly based on their oppositionta?\ the basic principles of Western 
civilization. This second trait often serves as a counter poise to the 
£ irst one, i .e . their reactionary attitude on social reforms, so saving 
-them from out-and-out disaster. Here colonialism should be called the
H * .  supra, p. ZW •
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unconscious ally of Muslim orthodoxy because in almost every Muslim 
country the *ulaiaaf have been at their best and strongest whenever 
Western economic and political pressure on that country Its been at its 
highest* In Persia, for instance, after a long period of apparent ex­
tinction -  either because of the anti-clerical policy of P.ida Shah, or 
owing to the subsequent growth of the Communist and other anti-religious 
forces -  the *ulama* and mullas made their impressive reappearance in 
the political arena of the countly when the former Anglo-Iranlan Oil 
Company, together with the British Government, resorted to a Palmerston- 
ian policy towards Persia. In contrast, when the British pressure came 
to an end with the coming into power of a pro-Western government in 1953» 
the fortunes of the *ulamaf started upon their downward course, culmin­
ating in the complete eclipse of suoh well-known religious figures as 
Ayatullah Kashanl*
The intellectuals are, therefore, Justified in holding the parti­
cular onslaughts of Western colonialism responsible for the perpetuation 
of the actual or potential influence of the fanatic and reactionary 
section of Muslim orthodoxy in their countries.
The period of relative respite from Western pressure on the Arab 
countries, especially on Egypt, which started with the filure  of the 
Suex expedition in October 1956, robbed al Azhar and its counterparts 
In other Arab countries of any opportunity to play a role in respect of 
important social and economic problems or tsexercise any authority over 
the rulers. In Egypt this might be called "the period of laiciaationn,
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during which tbs Government set out to grapple with a great many In» 
ternal difficulties in more or less complete disregard of the misgivings 
of religious circles and even, as in the case of enf r anchiscment of women, 
in defiance of Islamic traditions. The respite, however, was interrupted 
by the interference of the American and British governments in Lebanon 
and Jordan respectively in the summer of 1953 as a result of the Lebanese 
civil war and of the Iraqi Revolution of 14. July, But it3 most specta­
cular interruption came in April 1959 with the first open clash between
1
Arab nationalism and Communism, Whatever the outcome of that clash 
there is no doubt that it  presented al..Azhar and others with an ideal op­
portunity for coming to the fore and talcing advantage of the ideological 
resourcelessness of the Arab rulers. It would certainly take the ir­
religious and progressive Arabs a considerable time to neutralise the 
effects of such a triumph of the religious circles over,the laic forces.
It thus becomes apparent that the tempo of social reforms in 
Arab and other Islamic countries, as well as the final result of the 
present inter-action between the -erlergy and laity in these countries "
are, to a considerable extent, determined by the issue of the Arab -
2
West conflict and especially by the attitude of the West,
surra, p. &g0 et U f .
point which requires special emphasis here is the distinction which • 
one must draw between the religious convictions of the people and tie 
power of the 1 clergy ’ in Muslim countries. The latter can give no 




In 1947 Professor Glib ascribed the tension in Islamic thought 
to ths conflict between the transcendentalist and immanentist wings 
within Islam. He added, however, that ''the two wings were brought to­
gether by their common opposition to European control of Muslin lands 
and their struggle against the pervasive influences of Furopean culture 
and material civilisation", "The conflict,” he concluded, "remains 
subordinate to the need of maintaining as far as possible a united front 
against Christendom."^
In so far as the Arab-Muslim world in the middle of the twentieth
century is concerned the above remark can be said to have been fatally
confirmed. Not only the transcendentalist-versu3-iimnancntlst but, in
2
fact, conflict within Islam has been suspended in the face of growing
(cont.) ■ ' "
is more general, is the sizeable proportion of those believers who 
in almost any religion prefer to live outside the pale of religious 
institutions and, more important than that, donot wi3h to give any 
ceremonial expression lia their faith. Another reason, which is  
peculiar to Islamic thought, is the immediacy with which a Muslim 
can establish contact with God -  a fact which constantly exposes 
the olergy in Muslim countries to accusations of uselessness and 
obstruction. These two reasons provide an explanation for the para­
dox which can normally be observed in any Muslim country, whereby the 
religion 3 beliefs and sentiments of the people can be at their strong­
est, while the power and influence of the * ulamâ*s are at their weak- 
test. They also serve to explain the superficial contradiction which 
can be observed in oar assessment of the relations between Arab nation­
alism and Islam.
M^odern Trends in Islam , p, 32.
A
This otherwise harmful ‘truce’ has had at least,,one healthy result*
(cent,)
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Western pressure.^ Th±3 trend has been evident notonly in the case 
of extremist, lay movements (,e ,g. the Muslim Brethren), but also with 
regard to such learned bodies as al Azhar, One can in fact observe a 
curious similarity between the attitudes of the extremist and the con­
servative wings towards the internal and external problems of the Arab- 
Kuslim world, ‘Avoidance of the battlegroun ■ s of theological dis­
putation* and the subordination of the religious aim to politics have
2been characteristics first of the Brethren and then of al Azhar since 
the Second World War, Arab nationalism and Islam have thus Joined their 
forces in a united front 'against Christendom', Coes thi3 also mean that 
the Arab countries have become more Islamized than before? Rare we must 
moke distinction between the formal and the substantial aspects of Islam- 
ization. In the Muslim countries as a whole, whether Arab or non-Arab,' 
religion has become, in the words of a Western observer, a hue with which *1
(cont,) _
the formal ending of the old sunnl-shl*! war with the fatwa issued by 
Shaikh Kafcmud Shaltut, the hector of al Azhar, on the permissibility 
of a Muslim adhering to the ' imaml-shi*! sects'. Instrumental in bring-i 
ing about this rapprochement was dar rt~taorIb bain alrtadhahlb al islam- 
Xyah (The Society for the Bringing Togetherof the Islamic Sect3) in 
Cairo (see Mufcammad Taql al Qunm, qlggat* at taqrlb, dar at taqrlb, 
Cairo, April I960,)
1
Qummi, op.cit,. pp. 6, 9, 11.
T^he Moslem brethren, pp, 4.2, 81, 106, See also Dunne, Pellplous and 
Political Trends In Modem Egypt, p, 47.
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social and political institutions are coloured.1 This is an absurd, but 
inevitable, development. 0n the face of it most Arab countries today
1 look ^  "l3la®ic" than they did, say, thirty years ago. (Exceptions 
like Tunisia are not many.) Tho same trend can be observed in other 
Muslim countries. Even in Turkey there has been a similar evolution, 
marked by a scries of concessions on the port of the state to the reli­
gious leaders, such as the admissibility of reciting the Koran in the 
original and the creation of a high religious sohool in Ankara.  ^ All
John G, *adeau, "Islam and the Modern Middle East’', in Forelm Affairs. 
October 1959.
I^n Persia, raraa^ an (the fasting month) is observed today by the Govern­
ment more strictly^ than ever before. The mu^ urram demonstrations which 
were banned by Hi$a Shah during the best part of "hie reign are now being 
held with greater passion end enthusiasm. The statements of leading 
personalities are often sprinkled with references to the excellency of 
Islamic instructl ns and the necessity of promoting the religious con­
victions of the peoole. The teaching of fiqh (the Islamic law) at the 
primary and secondary schools is conducted with greater care and perse­
verance.
3r»0ne of the most striking features of the present return to Islam is 
the astonishing rhythm of new mosque building. Exact figures are un­
obtainable, bat officials in the Directorate of Religious Affairs in 
Ankara estimate that notless than 5,000 new mosques have ben built in 
Turkey since 1950, of which about 50 are in Afakara alone. The amount 
of financial assistance given by the Government for this purpose is 
difficult to ascertain but it is known to be large.
This figure of 5,000 new mosques built in the 10 years since 1950 
is, by a curious coincidence, not far from the figure which is given by 
the Ministry of Education for the number of new schools built during the 
same period. This silent struggle for scarce resources between mosques 
and schools.seems highly symbolic of the greater struggle between the 
forces of secularism and Islam in Turkey.
It is illustrated by the controversy over the new secondary schools 
for and preachers which come under the Ministry of Education. These
y (cont.)
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thia has lured so»# Western observers into talking of Islamic reform­
ation in the ^rab and other Muslim countries.
But as vas noted.in the previous chapter the evolution is in fact 
of a superficial nature and marks the efforts of the Muslim countries 
to compensate for their lack of a netionaiideology. The more ovexv. 
whelming the challenges of the West and other alien powers to the national 
traditions and way of life  in these countries, the more vigorous v i l l  be­
come the efforts of officials to ensure the formal observance of Islamic 
rules and to deepen the Islamic hue of the social and political institu­
tions. But beneath this appearance of religious orthodox is a constant 
ferment of ideas and a ceaseless disintegration of traditions. Facing 
the inevitability of adapting themselves to the great industrial and tech­
nical revolutions of our time the Muslim people, including the Arabs, un­
hesitatingly and sincerely îmbib® Western teachings in these two fields. 
But together with industrial schemes and technical devices comes the in­
vasion of Western thoughts. In this agonizing situation earn Muslim
" "( cent •) _
schools, which have increased in number from seven to 19 since 1951» 
and w ill be further expanded, are producing about 4 »500 graduates every 
seven years, for religious work in the towns and villages. The in­
struction they receive in the schools, though mainly centred on Muslim 
theology and the study of Arabic and Persian, is today "westernized* by 
the addition of scientific subjects, mathematics, history, and one Euro­
pean language." .
(The Times, 22nd February I960.)
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governments are bold enough to defy the w ill of the orthodoxy and 
put through the reforms which modernity requires.
Others remain straddling and hesitant, but s t i l l  see no alter­
native to infringing some of the most outdated religious rulings, not 
in order to give themselves a semblance of progressiveness, but merely 
to solve part of their internal difficulties. For them thi3 infringe­
ment is a matter, not of vanity, but of common sense.
To sun up. I f  we take cognizance of the two parallel trends in 
the social texture of the Arab countries, namely the growing emphasis 
on the formal Islamic character of the state institutions and achievement, 
and the equally rapid and substantial laiclzation of nearly every branch 
of social life , we shall not be rubied ty the above mentioned seeming 
contradiction. Thedegree of an Islamic state's reliance on the *ulama* 
depends on how much the state find3 it necessary to ensure the continu­
ation of the first trend; and this, in its turn, depends first  and fore- .. 
most upon the amount of Western political and ideological pressure. In 
extreme cases, such pressure enables the 'ulama* to get the upper hand, 
to arrest the process of laicization and even to neutralize its  effects.
It  can thus be seen that, while Western technique, science and certain 
political traditions help the Arab peoples toovercome their backwardness 
in various fields -  a help which even the most extremist, anti-Western 
Arabs and other I'uslims dohothesitate to acknowledge -  Western 'imperial­
ism*, by its ill-advised and high-handed tactics, represented by the Suez 
expedition and Algerian war, force officialdom to seek refuge with the
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orthodoxy. This development In its turn w ill bring about the re-lntegratlon 
of the state and religion which, as has been pointed out earlier, are at 
the moment practically, but not legally, divorced from each other. In the 
event the West has antagonized both the orthodoxy and the intelligentsia.
It  has antagonized the orthodoxy because ef the basic incompatibility which 
the *ulaai* find between Islam and the whole of Western civilization -  an 
Incompatibility which some of them, including the Azharites, do not think 
to be removable. It  has antagonized the intelligentsia, since they hold the 
Western imperialistic policy responsible for the protracted existence and 
activity of the superstitious, reactionary and parasitical strata of fiuslim 
clergy. One harmful result of this situation is that the necessity of 
modernization for the Ku3llm countries ( which is mainly a ’cosmopolitan* 
problem the solution to which is regarded desirable ly a ll  parties) becomes 
immersed in the vortex of '’the cold war*' between Islam and Christianity and 
is often gainsaid ty the extremist followers of the former as a fulcrum of 
Western economic and political domination.
It was stated at the beginning of this chapter that the clergy in • 
Arab countries have taken part in the movement of Arab nationilsm mainly 
to repudiate the accusations of reaction aid obstruction levelled against 
them by the rising generation of Westernized Arab3, as well as to sal­
vage their waning prestige ty interpreting their principles in terms 
appropriate to the aims of Arab nationalism. After analysing the views 
of the most learned of the contemporary Arab-i'usllm religious theorists, 
it  is now possible to say that none of these alms dan be achieved
so long a3 hatred for anything Western and Westernized forms one of the 
fundamental beliefs of those erudites.
Me have blamed Western imperialism for the occasl -'nal violent 
eruption of this hatred, which seems to be ba3e<5 on a mistaken view 
held ty the*itlaaa* or part of them, on the whole course of human history. 
It is  noteworthy that, as we have considered, the *nlama1 do not give 
any expression to this hatred or, to use a euphemism, to their doctrinal 
opposition to western civilization as a whole, except when the Western 
Powers ty their acts of imperialistic oporession Invoke the hostile feel­
ings of a ll Muslims. This only goes to show that the *ulama* themselves 
are aware of the irrationality¡of this hatred and, therefore, do not 
give vent to it except in moments of emotional explosions of the masses, 
when there is no time for making a cool and balanced Judgment.on the real




A fter analysing the impact of the West on the theoretical aspect 
of Arab nationalism, that i s ,  it s  basic ideas as v e i l  as it s  re lig ious  
content, we shall now proceed to study the extent to which the West has 
impinged on the practical side of Arab nationalism. Cne of the main 
vehicles through which the ideas of Arab nationalism are today being put 
into practice is  m ilitarism .
The follow ing chapter tr ie s  to explain the upsurge which m ili­
tarism, both a3 an idea and as a soc ia l in stitu tion , has enjoyed in tbs 
Arab countries from 1952 up to the present time. I t  s tarts  by surveying 
the position o f the Arab armies during the la s t  fifte e n  years and then 
proceeds to assess the Vies tern impact on th e ir r is in g  power and prestige.
As w i l l  be noted, contrary to it s  Western counterpart, Arab m ili­
tarism has a firm  re lig ious bas is , i .e ,  the idea of Jihad8 that i s  why 
we have devoted some space to surveying and c r it ic iz in g  Jihad in it s  
past and present forms.
In those Arab countries which have experienced the arrry’ s accession 
to power follow ing peaceful (Egypt) or violent (S y ria , Iraq ) changes o f 
regime since 1949 the m ilitary e lit e  today performs two important funtions:
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(a )  a3 a ’’conscious, independent agcnt"^ o f national expression; (b )  
as a vehicle of soc ia l change.
I The Army» Agent of Nationalist Fxpresslon
The am y, s f i r s t  function, in so fa r  as the A.rfab Middle la s t  ie  
concerned, dates back to the * Arab! Revolt (1379-1332), Under the Impact 
o f Ottoman decline and increasing European influence the native army o f f i ­
cers, outraged at the Ottoman favouritism towards the Turks and C ir -
caasions, made common cause with the other e lit e s ,  "notably the w riters
2
and the re lig ious leaders” , in  a general movement of opposition to fo r­
eign, non-Mu3lira exp lo iters. The leadership o f the movement was soon 
taken over by the army o ffice rs  who, In their drive towards improving 
th e ir position in  the hierarchy, had "found themselves a p o lit ic a l vor­
tex; of great attractive power".^ Th'ugh the movement fa iled  to main­
ta in  it s  position owing to B ritish  intervention (1882) " i t  gave Egyptians 
some glorious moments of s e lf  confidence which la te r  generations could 
seek to emulate".^
The British  Occupation o f Egypt and the daricening shadow o f  Otto­
man despotism over Syria rendered impossible the recurrence o f the * Arab! 
experience in  any part of the Arab World, I t  was not u n til a few years
Morroe Berber, M ilita ry  E lite  and Social Change, su b -t it le » Egypt since 
Napoleon, Frinceton University, I960, p, 3.
^ Ib ld . . p. 1/..
3T M d., p, 16.
4lbtd.
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before the F irs t  World War that ar.bitlous Arab o ffic e rs  again set
cvout organizing the discontented elements against fo re igners. This
new phase of the m ilitary -nationalist activ ity  was narked by the creation  
1 2
in 1912 or 1914 o f a l *shd (The Covenant), to which vo referred in 'a ' 
previews chapter. The founder o f this secret society was *AzIz *AlT 
.al K is r l ,  an "Fgyptlan Arab O fficer" in the ottoman Arry who had already 
participated in the creation o f al muntada*! a^avT (the Literary Club) and 
the secret gahtftnlyah^, both centres o f Arab ra tio n a list  stirrings  in the 
Ottoman itamire,
l i i j r l  graduated fr-m the m ilitary  academy in  Constantinople in  
1904 and soon a fte r  that, "orompted by his Arab national ideas as by his 
devotion to the Ottoman empire",^ joined the Committee o f Union and Pro­
gress. Taking advantage of the general Arab frustration  in the C.U.P, 
follow ing the 1903 Revolution, MisrT founded a l  4ahd with the aim o f  
securing in ternal independence fo r the Arab countries while admitting
the necessity fo r maintaining the Caliphate "in  the hands o f the Ottoman
5 6
fam ily". As stated in fa previous chapter a l ahd thus appealed fo r  •
\ l  .1 arid ah. Cairo, August 13, 1955» p. 3.
^Antemius, o o .c l t . . p. 134-.
sunra. p. 157
4pr. Hasan Saab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman iranlre. p. 235.
^ Ib id . , p. 236.
6y, suora. p. 2 4 5 .
the establishment of a Turco-Arab empire " sim ilar In architecture to
1
the Austro-Hungarian ed ifice” -  an aim, that is ,  sim ilar to that of
— 2 
qahtanTyah, "expressed in so ld ierly  parlance". The Society*a member-
hip vas exclusive to m ilitary men and the Ira q i element, "being the mo3t
3
numerous in the Ottoman army, vai particu larly  strong" in i t s  councils. 
The area of ac t iv itie s  vas extended to a l l  the provinces o f the Empire
U -
"from Salónica to Yemen". In February 1914 M-.srf vos arrested by the 
Ottoman authorities and was sentenced to death in a secret m ilitary  court 
A wave o f indignation and protest at once swe-1 over the Arab world. His 
sentence vas la te r  commuted to one of fifteen  years with hard labour but, 
as the Arab agitation against the in justice of the sentence continued, 
he vas pardoned and net free . Thereupon K i j r i  sailed  fo r  Egypt and "re ­
ceived an enthusiastic welcome. His t r ia l  had shaken the Arab World more 
profoundly, perhaps, than any single act o f Turkish tyranny, and greatly  
hardened the Arab w i l l  to freedom, fo r  i t  had moved the masses as w ell 
as thinkers". Even a fte r MisrT*3 departure a l *ahd continued its  acti­
v it ie s .  Or the morrow o f Turkey’ s entry Into the F irst World War  MipiT " 
warned, from Cairo, h is fo llow  partners of a l *ahd "not to be temoted
^Saab, o n .c lt , . p. 2?6.
^Antcnius, on .c lt; , p, 119.
3 lb ld . . p. 119.
^Saab, o n .c lt . . p. 235.
^Antonius, o n .c lt . . p. 121.
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into hostile action against the Ottoman Empire".^ But after the con­
clusion of the SharTf-WcPahon agreement al *nbd gave up its  "loyalist
2
federalism " to revolutionary separatism. Thdouttedly the growing 
disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Br.nire was also instrumental in 
bringing about th is  change of policy. I t  made an invaluable contribution  
to the Arab Revolt by o ffering the services o f many o f it s  members. A fter 
the F irst World War, a l *ahd provided the Arab states of the F ertile  Cres­
cent withloaders, commanders and o ffic e rs .
The significance o f a l  * ahd a3 a pattern fo r the m ilitary -nationalist  
movements a fte r the Second T orld War, especia lly  the (fehaj;* a l  ahrar (the
Free O ffic e rs ),  was immense. Na3lr has spoken of K i j r l  a3 "the sp ir itu a l
3
father o f the Egyptian m ilitary revolution". Sim ilar compliments to
I'ijrT can be found in the memoirs of the other leaders of the 19 5 2  com
d 'e ta t . *  ________________
The status of the army in the Arab countries since the Second
World War has run a f u l l  c irc le  from the height of popularity, before and/
(hiring the Palestinian war, to the depths o f disgrace a fte r that war, 
especia lly  a fte r the unsuccessful and sometimes "black" experiments of 
m ilitary  dictatorship in Syria, and then back to the pinnacle c f  popu­
la r it y  following the climax of the West-Arab con flic t in  1956.
^Saab, o n .c lt . . p. 233.
2Tbld.. p. 239.
^ Ib id ., p, 2^0,
*?’>adat, Revolt on.the N ile , pp, 26-27, 34» 108.
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The Palestinian war of 194.2 and the defeats suffered by the 
Arabs at the hands of the Jews, followed by the setting in of the feel­
ings of political isolation, focussed on the Afab armies a ll the pomilar 
hopes of revenge and restoration of Arab prestige, Thisprocess had a 
dual effect: On the one hand, it became a necessity that the honour 
of the army should be preserved and even enhanced by every means; that 
is why, in any assessment of Arab disasters in the past, especially in
the "elegies*’ on the Palestinian wa", no important charge is brought
1
against the Arab armies in the field. On the other hand, the process 
further disposed the Arabs to dismiss the distinction between the mili­
tary and the civil.
Finding itself the repository of national hopes, the military 
elite in the most advanced of the Arab countries deemed it necessary as 
a preliminary step to do-away with the regime of the discredited old- 
fashloned politicians or mukha<jrams, first in Syria and then in Egypt.
In this task they were helped by the failure of outwardly democratic 
regimes in the Arab countries. The experiment of the new Arab gener­
ation with democracy va3 at no time a happy one,
"For," says F-ajid I-hadduri, ,wno sooner had democracy 
begun to operate, with its complicated procedural 
problems of electioneering and parliamentary debates 
Ito say nothing of the endless quarrels that devel-
"See, inter a lia . Muhammad Darawzah, al wafrdat* al * arablyah, pp. 524-544.
ti
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oped among r iv a l  parties and p o lit ic ian s ), than the 
people began to learn how scandalously it s  process 
could be misused by unscrupulous leaders. To the 
old school, democracy fa ile d  to command the respect 
or allegiance o f the peonle in the same way as A llah*s  
law had done in the past. The ac tiv ist ic  character of 
democratic p o lit ic s  appeared too vulgar and too worldly  
in the eyes of pious Moslems, who have habitually  revered 
the awe-inspiring trad itional in stitu tion s ,1,1
What rendered the situation more d i f f ic u lt ,  continues Khadduri;', was
the absence of any significant middle clas3 with interests intermediate
to those of the few rlchor of the many poor. Such a middle c lass would
have championed democracy against autocracy and feudalism, as did the
2
middle class o f Western furope. In  these circumstances the m ilitary  
e lit e  offered the only hooe o f rea liz in g  nationalist hopes. But, as 
w i l l  be 3hown presently, the army's intervention in p o lit ic s  produced . 
disastrous re-T ilts, by the f a l l  o f 1954-» In both these countries.
In Syria, the co;-r> d*etat o f 39 March 1949 by Colonel Juani az 
Za'Tm, Army Chief of S ta ff , was primarily hailed by the People's Party 
(h izb ash sha*b) , one of the oldest and most important o f the Syrian 
parties, and by large sections of ordinary people who had tired  o f the 
arid c irc les  o f y rian  p o lit ic s  and the misrule o f a -e lf-seek ing o l i ­
garchy, Although Colonel Za*Tm's subsequent high-handedness reversed 
the process and turned the popular jub ilation  into accumulating fu ry  the
^Tbe krm O fficer* His Role In Kiddle Western P o lit ic s , Social Forces . 
in  the Middle ¿ast, edited by Sydney Kettleton F isher, Cornell University  
Press, Ithaca, 19r5> p. 1&5.
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Syrian Army's prestige does not seem to have.suffered.'*' A second coup 
ty Colonel H inn awl was also welcomed ty the People* s Party and, later 
on, when he gave his support to the project of Greater Syria, Plan- 
Arabists and a number of independent politicians of high standing also 
enlisted their favour on his aide. It  was certainly thanks to under­
standing and good relations between the army and the people that the gen­
eral elections of November 194-9 were held with a certain amount of free­
dom, and the People's Party gained ascendancy in the new Chamber. But a 
number of issues, among which the most important being the nroblem of 
’Tnlty with Iraq and that of the «institutional shape that the new regime 
was going to take, threatened to upset these relations. The threat be­
came increasingly serious as the political parties began to clamour for
S'
a new democratic constitution and, in the autumn of 1949, the arny's
2
patience reached breaking-polnt1 A coup, the third within nine months, 
was staged ty Colonel Adlb ShishakH on 19 December 194-9. The nationalist 
and ba* th parties at first  did not give way to despondency and continued 
to lend their support to ShlshaklT, who shrewdly welcomed their co­
operation to play them off against his staunchest opposing forces in the 
country, the People's Party» This period of marlage de convenance between 
the Shishakll regime and the civil power came to an end in April 1952 
when a ll  parties in Syria were dissolved ty decree. The ensuing two
"Siladeh, Syria and Lebanon, p. 100 SLMSSf 
^Ibld.. p, 106 et seq. _ . ”
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years witnessed, on the one hand, the pursuance of a policy of re­
pression and naked dictatorship by the Sblshakll regime, and a mount­
ing popular animosity against army circles, on the other. When a group 
of nationalist officers carried out another coup in February 1954- the 
air was so heavy with anti-military feeling that these officers deemed 
it wise to keep in the background in favour of the civilians,*’
In Egypt the events followed a similar pattern but, owing to 
the existence of a relatively less noisy and less active political life , 
the pattern was far simpler. There the army’ s claim to be the saviour 
of the nation enjoyed some historical justification, especially in the 
light of the ‘Arab! Revolt, as briefly noted above, Which never failed 
to arouse deep feelings in the army’ s favour, ’«lien the army struck its 
blow in July 1952 the party system was so much discredited that it  could 
be dispensed with in any arrangement regarding the lot of the Egyptians -  
a sharp contrast to what happened in Syria. The army’s action was greeted., 
by the people with patent relief bordering on enthusiasm. The first  
three months of General Najlb’s rule passed with the Wafdlst leaders and' 
mukhdarams under house arrest, and the people impatiently watching the 
slow pace of the new regime’s achievements in respect to its two main 
declared aims -  the suppression of corruption and redistribution of land.
Deep frustrations developed as the Najlb regime, encountering serious
/>
^Ziadeh, op.clt,. pp. 126-141.
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obstacles In carrying out Its policies, made attempts to curry favour
1
with the Wafdiets, Saadists and other moribund political forces. After
seventy one years of political passivity the Egyptian army had again
stepped into the country* s history and, this time, contrary to the * Arab!
drama, had succeeded in overthrowing the corrupt regime; this was a
unique opportunity to meet the popular expectations of the arity and
iNa^Ib’s overtures with discredited politicians dangerously frustrated
2these expectations. NaJ lib's subsequent proclamation of the revival of 
political parties and the re-establishment of parliamentary institutions 
prompted his opponents to vigorous actions which culminated in his re­
moval from the presidency (14 November 1954). A ll this greatly damaged 
the arrry's prestige and heartened its adversaries who, presumably through 
the agency of the Muslim Brethren, went to the lengths of making an at­
tempt on Premier Nasir's life . Persecution of the Muslim Brethren leaders 
only served to 4voke stronger feelings against the army, not only in Egypt,„ 
but in a ll Muslem countries from Indonesia to Sudan. By the end of 1954» 
from every corner of the Sunni world, messages of denunciations, of warn--
g
ing and of exhortations were pouring in on Colonel NSjir and his colleagues.
^Neguib, oo.clt.« p, 170 etaeq,
^Wheelock. Nasser's New Egypt, p, 32 et sea. , The_Pasqlng Of Traditional 
Society, p. 242 et »m .
T^he Moslem Brethren, p, 151,
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As can be seen, the years 1953-54 marked a drastic fa ll  in the 
popularity of the arny in Syria and Egypt and the upsurge of the trends 
opposing military rule. In Syria five years, and in Egypt two years, of 
tria l in military government had ended, at least theoretically, in com­
plete fiasco. A serious rift  had occurred between the military and civil 
brands of Arab nationalism, and long-standing respect for the army had 
been unmistakably undermined.
It  took the Western policies towards the Arab countries after 
1954 to salvage the sinking prestige of the Egyptian and Syrian armies 
and bring them to their zenith of popularity during the forthcoming years.
Western intervention in this respect mainly took the form of a 
series of diplomatic moves aimed at buttressing Western political and 
economic interests in the Middle East as a whole, WesSiall discuss, i 
these moves more fully in the chapter entitled "Neutrality”. Here suf­
fice it to point out that first the British-Iraqi authorship of the Bagh­
dad Pact (February 1955) offended the nationalist feelings in Syria and 
£Specially in Egypt where there has been a well-founded claim to Arab 
leadership. Then cone the withdrawal of Anglo-American promised aid for 
the Aswan Dam (July 1955) and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal as a 
riposte to this (August 1956), which a ll rallied the civil nationalists 
in Etypt round the army and roused strongly sympathetic sentiments in Syria. 
The Suez climax put an end to the timid attitudes of the civilians and 
galvanized the uneasy and implicit coalition between them and the arny, 
with army leadership rendered inevitable. The militarists' status among
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the nan-committed Afro-Aslan countries, already enhanced ty President 
Kafir's participation in the Bandung Conference (April 1955) ,  was also 
favourably affected hy a ll these developments.
By the end of 1955 the Egyptian military elite, as led by Nigir, 
had become the moat genuine spokesman of Arab nationalist feelings,
I I  The ACTrer» Vehicle of Social Reform
The c-ncept of the military elite as the most efficient factor 
of social reform is not confined to modem Arab nationalists* In the 
West its earliest example can be found in the Roman Constitution, which 
rested finally on the most successful military organization in history.
The Roman citizens and the Roman army were me; the army "assembled in 
its centuries was the chief lawmaking body in the Senate",^ The concept 
received its modernist exposition at the hands of German nationalists in 
the nineteenth oentury who, encouraged by the adventures of the Bismarck­
ien leadership and stirred by the wish for the advancement of Germany's
great power status, had come to regard militarism as "the only guarantee
2
that social relations might proceed undisturbed". Host of the Western 
democratic countries have, however, acted against the advice of the Ger­
man nationalists by keeping the army isolated from domestio politics, Al-
% i l l  Durant, Caesar and Christ. Simon and Chuster, New York, 1944» p. 33. 
2Shanahan, Friedrich Naumann. p. 372.
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though "military advice has often been sought on foreign policy” (such 
as in the United States) and "persons whose career have been in the 
military service are not frequently elected, or appointed to high poli­
tical positions", the military has seldom chosen to occupy high polit-
1
ical office through "the weapon of its own profession".
In the Arab World the tradition of the army acting as the in iti­
ator of social change in recent history dates back to the era of Muham­
mad ‘ All (1805-19-48). The shock of the Napoleonic adventure and its dis­
play of science and technology "made it  possible for a conqueror like
Muhammad ‘ All to envision an empire built upon these amazing sources of
2
power over men and things". In pursuit of this desire he carried out
an extensive programme of modernisation of which the main aim was, as
g
noted before, 1» create a powerful, modernized army. His greatest im­
pact on recent Egyptian history was in "providing later generations of 
modernizers with a glorious era to look back upon" -  an era in which the 
army had played -  perhaps unconsciously -  the dominant role. Under the 
British tutelage the Egyptian officers, because of forming a disciplinedi 
cohesive unit "by the nature of their calling and professional education", 
became "the strongest and most solid native elite familiar with Western
^Khaddurlj, .the.lag-Ofll,£g> P* *63. 
2Berf*r, o p .c lt .« p, 6,
%.*.msarm, p. 3a.
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patterns of the nationalized application of violence”. When British 
imperial power started to decline, the minds of many of the younger 
officers came to be pro-occupied with the ideas of nationalism and 
political and social reform.2
All these features of the military elite became more marked after 
the Second World War, not only in Egypt, but in a ll the Arab Middle East, 
where men of the military profession gradually became the most prosperous 
stratum of the nation. The reason is  not far to seek. The necessities 
of the cold war ft3 a whole and the special problem of Arab-Israell re­
lations forced the Arab and other Islamic governments in the area to con­
centrate their resources on defence even, and often, at the expense of the 
economic development of their countries. The pro-Western governments did 
this under Western pressure, exerted in the guise of military treaties, 
with a vi(W to combating the Communist threat, direct ofc indirect, inter­
nal or external. The neutral governments did it  to shield themselves 
against the oepansionist schemes, real or imagined, of their pro-Western 
neighbours. Both sets of governments armed themselves heavily in the 
face of a rapidly-developing Israel. The upshot was that military men 
were well-paid, well-fed and well-housed, while the large masses of the 
people became increasingly poor and impotent.
^Berger, op. olt,« p, 3 
^Ibld.. p. 19.
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The above development has given rise,.in the social structure of 
the Kiddle Eastern countries, to a new division, mainly economic, cutting 
across a ll the other extant social, economic and political divisions. Al­
though there are other prosperous groups in society, the army’s prosperity 
coupled as it  is with unassailable power, assumes a special character.
Hie array thus seems to he in the process of turning into a separate 
class with distinct individuality and well-guarded privileges, seething 
with political ambitions and ready tooverrule the views and demands of 
other potent pressure groups hitherto dominating the political 3cene. On 
the one hand, "since the advent of Western influence, the separation of 
the military from poll tied sard religious elites and the recruitment of 
officers from classes other than at or near the top of the social hier- 
areby the military elite has become highly Westernised in a technological-
ideological sense and alienated from the political and economic interests
1
of the upper classes”. On the otter hand, they seek to awaken the
national consciousness of sections of the population, mainly the peasants
and the urban workers, which had previously lain outside the political
2
community.
According to the Marxist doctrine, in a bourgeois society, whether 
monarchical or democratic republic, such institutions as the army and
“^Berger, on. clt, , p, 31« see also Gibb, Whither. Isjjjjm?, pp, 60-61 
2Ber§er, P* 30.
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the civil service form part of its ’’superstructure”, represented tgr 
the various organs of the state. The characteristics and composition 
of the "superstructure” are determinedty the "unfer-structure” of the 
society in such a way as to serve the interests of the economically 
dominating class.
With their rebellion against the existing order and their negation 
of a ll narrow-minded class convictions, and especially with their drive 
against the special classes with which they might be considered to share 
the same economic interests, the armies in some of the Kiddle Eastern 
countries provide a striking exception to this Marxist concept. Although 
the leaders and the majority of the officers of the Egyptian and Syrian 
armies belong to the middle class they may be considered, ly virtue of 
their achievements so far, as social groups without specific attachment 
to ary of the existing classes and avowedly devoted to the service of the 
whole of their nations. The theory of ’’The Middle Glass” character of 
the array does not seem 1» bo tenable. It  is evident that, in the Arab 
countries, as in other under-developed lands, My progressive movement 
should be primarily aimed at (a) effecting a speedy solution of the land 
problem to improve the living standards of the peasantry, which forms 
the majority of the nation, and (b) strengthening the position of national 
industries ly restricting the freedom of foreign firms and other economic 
and financial interests in the country. These two alms, which have been 
and are the minimum objectives of every socialist-minded, nationalist 
government in the Kiddle East, necessarily lead at the outset to the
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growth of the middle class. This development has lent some plausibility 
to the concept that the armies in these countries are tools of the 
Middle Class, The truth, however, is the reverse of this.
Even the implementation of the most orthodox socialist schemes 
in any of the Middle Eastern countries would result in a growth of the 
bourgeoisie because of the release of vast economic and financial re­
sources accumulated in the hands of a few big landlords or financiers, 
as well as the improved position of the national markets in the face 
of foreign competition. Therefore, the fact that the policies of the 
armies in some Arab countries have so far promoted the interests of the 
middle class should rot be regarded a3 a sign of their subjugation to 
the middle class'^ interests, Asides, the policies of the middle class 
are often characterised by their temperate and middle^of-way tendencies. 
The policies adopted fcy the Egyptian and Syrian armies after their coming 
into power have so far had a strong revolutionary tang, quite untypical 
of the attitudes of such countries as India, which are distinctly dom­
inated ty middle class interests.
The present actual or potential domination of the army over the 
civilian groups "^ is  botmd to persist in some Middle Eastern countries 
perhaps until and unless these countries achieve a high degree of economic
^There are, however, other countries in the Middle East in which armies, 
in spite of a ll their power and potentialities, remain the faithful ser­
vants of the ruling classes. This has been either due to paucity or 
even lack of political dynamism and ambition within the armies, or to 
the complex syotem through which a close association between the army 
and the civilian rulers has been made possible, Afghanistan represents 
the case of the military lack of interest in politics, and Persia that 
of the military-civilian coalition.
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and political progress so as, at least, to remove the social and economical 
imbalance between the military and the civil. Before such an equalization 
takes place a ll efforts for the establishment of a truly democratic re­
gime are doomed to failure. In view of a ll these facts one is often tempted 
to entertain the opinion that it  is both realistic and fa ir for thece 
countries to entrust the armies with the power to rule as the trustees of 
the national authorities for a transitional period during which the proper 
economic and political transformation of the national life  should be carried 
out. This is what is actually happening now in Egypt, although the mili­
tary leaders in that country do not seem to conceive their rule as an 
ad hop arrangement, but rather as the implementation of a historical mis­
sion exclusively designated to their.,'*' In Iraq the military leadership 
is not endowed with the ame "messianic" character as in Egypt and seems 
to be maintained in power by sheer force. The Sudan presents a ¿Lear
example of military government being called into being by the "bank-
2nptcy of a parliamentary sy~teran. There, contrary to Egypt, Syria and
3Iraq, "parliamentary government on its extinction found no defenders".
In the other Arab countries, where despotic theocracies reign supreme -  
in Saudi Arabia, in the Yemen and the Sheikhdoms -  the material and spirit­
ual difference between the armies and the masses do not seem to be so
The Philosophy of the Revolution, p, 42.
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profound as to Justify a strictly military rule. Besides, the tradl- 
tional Islamic monism In politics, represented ty the blending of the 
spiritual and temporal authorites in the Amir, Sultan etc., blurs In 
the public mind any distinction between the military and the civil.
The Lebanon is the only Arab country where, thanks to a relatively fair 
distribution of incorres between a ll the classes of the people, the poli­
tical parties are s t ill able, in spite of a ll their internecine conflicts, 
to exerci-e a considerable influence over the political life  of the country. 
The fact that the high prestige and resourcefulness of a military leader 
like General Shlhab has played an important part in the preservation of
the civilians* hold and taking the edge off the militarists’ ambitions
1
should not, of course, be minimised.
I l l  Dootrtnal factors
We have tried in the foregoing pages to throw light on the social 
and political factors which have helped the armies in the most advanced 
of the Arab countries to achieve their present dominance. But it  is  
equally important to familiarise ourselves with the Ideas whlch, during 
recent years, have come to provide the most reliable spiritual support 
for Arab militarism. A3 we hinted at the beginning of the present chapter, 
outstanding among these ideas is  the Islamic concept of jihad. In the 
following pages we shall try to study the development of this concept from 
the time of its inception up to the present tiro.




Jihad, or holy war against the Infidels, represents one of the 
main characteristics of Islam as compared with Christianity. There are 
v e r s e s  in the Koran which preach this militancy in a clear and unmistak-{ ‘M
able way. "When you encounter the Infidels," prescribes the a—«**i Verse 
of the Surah of Muhammad, "strike off their heads t i l l  you have made a 
great slaughter among them, and of the rest make fast the fetters", "Wage 
war," advises the 124th Verse of the Sara of Immunity, «"against such of 
the infidels as arc your neighbours, and let them find you vigorous".3.
But any emphasis on the importance and necessity of jihad should 
bo accompanied with two significant qualifications, both of a historical 
nature. Firstly, even at the height of Islamic expansionism, as w ill be 
noted in the chapter on neutrality, a kind of de facto peace was recog­
nised ty the Muslim leaders between the Muslim territory (dar al Islam) 
and several countries outside its confines; this was either because 
Islam voluntarily refrained from attacking them "in deference to their
benevolent attitude towards the Prophet Muhammad and his companions or
_ 2
because of their inaccessibility, as immune from the dlhad". Secondly, 
and perhaps because of the above mentioned considerations, the Koran 
also contains verses which might be construed as contradictory to those
*See also the Koran II , 214-15, IX, 5, 6 and 9.
%ajid Khadduri, Mar and Peace in Islam. The Johns Hopkin Press,
Baltimore, 1955, P. 252,
on the necessity of jihad. Contradiction of this kind is one of the main 
problems in understanding end implementing the Koranic injunctions. This 
difficulty exists in the case of other holy book3 as well, but the more 
so as regards the Koran because of the insertion therein of a large num­
ber of instructions on a multitude of practical and doctrinal issues. 
Whatever attempts are made by the religious doctors and commentators at 
solving these contradictions the choice between the alternatives is s t i l l  
an open one. It  is evident that the preference of either of these alter­
natives over the other is established only by historical tradition and 
the attitudes adopted by the most powerful and influential Islamic leaders. 
This, however, does not Invalidate the case of the followers of the rival 
course of potion who, by Invoking the equally valid Koranic verses on the 
necessity of that course, try to expose the aberration of their opponents, 
A similar pattern presents itself in respect of a ll doctrinal dis­
putes over the idea of jihad. But being an issue directly connected with 
the status and power of the Islamic countries, as compared with countries 
of the enemy territory (dar al barb),  Iliad involves the additional prob-.. 
lem of Islam's position in the world of power politics, thus bringing thB 
element of international relations into its pattern. That is  why the 
militant spirit of ^slam has always been made commensurate in intensity 
with the potentialities of the leading Muslim powers, whether Arab or 
otherwise. The spirit was at Its height at the time of the First Four 
Caliphs (632.-661 A.D.) and the earlier part of the Abbaald period (729- 
$47 A.D,) ,  petered out into Independent states after the disintegration of
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the Caliphate In the thirteenth century, emerged with Increased vigour 
during the period of the Ottoman Empire (1517-1918) to be seized upon 
ty the Arab nationalists in the course of the First World War in a hid 
to secure Arab emancipation and statehood.
Perhaps the most outstanding exponent of jihad towards the end of 
the nineteenth century was Jamal ad Din al Afghani, In view of his immense
influence on a ll the modern exponents ©f jihad we quote here only an extract* *
of one of his articles on this subject.
In discussing the difference between Christianity and Islam,Af­
ghani lays special emphasis on this militant mood of Islam)
"The Muslim religion Is based',©n a quest for victory 
and might, iftltafr and glory, and on rejecting every­
thing which runs counter to the canon law ( sh&rl* ah). . .
Whoever studies the principles c? this religion and reads 
the Koran, w ill undoubtedly give the verdict that the fol­
lowers of Islam constitute the first military (harblyah) 
nation In the world and that they lead a ll peoples' in fhe 
invention of weapons and perfection of military science...
Whoever meditates over the ayah; 'And make ready then 
against them what force ye can' w ill feel sure that he 
who believes In Islam, believes In the love of conquest 
and in the quest for every means which might render 
smooth his way to victory . . .  Whoever considers that the 
s h a l l ' has forbidden a ll  kind3 of wagering, except (in)
(horseyrace (slbq) and marksmanship ( rlmayah) w ill dis­
cover the extent to which the lawgiver has been interested^ 
in the science of military techniques and their practice."
This "bellicose" spirit was considerably tuned down after the
creation of independent Arab and other Muslim atatesj tie idea of ilHad
— — — —  .................................. ii I   ""■■■■■■   ........ ...............mu            ■  ■■■  ■ m  ...............
^'urwat' al wuthoa, pp, 25, 28-29.
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underwent radical changes and came to be interpreted ty modern Island 
apologists in terns of the spiritual, peaceful life .
Among others, Syed Ameer Ali deserves special mention. In Ms 
impressive^apologetic work The Spirit of Islam, mainly devoted to re­
plying to the Western criticisms of Islam, he analyses the meaning of 
it had in this context, describing the circumstances which forced Muhammad, 
unlike Christ, tojresort to the Idea of fighting the infidels. He says 
that, contrary to Jesus who, during his short ministry, exerted influence 
over a small body of followers Muhammad had to address his teachings to 
an ever-increasing number of followers "among a nation steeped in bar­
barous usages" and looking upon war as an object of life .
From the moment he accepted the asylum offered to him by the in­
habitants of only one town -  Medina -  in a hostile land, from the moment 
"he was called upon to become their chief magistrate as veil as their 
spiritual leader,.his fate became involved in theirsj from that time 
the hostilities of idolaters and their allies required an unsleeping 
vigilance on the part of the Muslims, A single city had to make head­
way against the oombined attacks of multitudinous tribes of Arabia.
Under these circumstances energetic measures were often necessary to 
sustain the edstence ofthe Muslim commonwealth. Vi hen persuasion failed, 
pressure wa3 required," Ameer Ali thus rerards the idea of 1it»d as a 
means of consolidating and Justifying the early Muslims• instinct of 
self-preservation. Once the Arab tribes were united under the banner 
of Islam and peace was established among them,Muhammad proceeded to in*-
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press upon them "habits of self-control and self-denial such as have 
never before been revealed in the pages of history". Henceforward Ameer 
tries to bring into relief the Islamic injunctions on toleration and 
give prominence to those Koranic ayahs (verses) which call upon the Mus­
lims to resort to the sword only in self-defence,* He supports his argu­
ments on this point by demonstrating that a ll Muhammad's wars with foreign 
states, as veil as with surrounding idolatrous tribes, were imposed upon 
him because of theaggressive attitudes of the adversaries.
Whatever the reason for the Islamic injunctions on the fact
remains that it has inspired in the minds of the Arabs and some other 
Muslim peoples a kind of religious respect for men of the military pro­
fession and warriors.
^The writer mentions the following ayahs in support of his arguments«
"It shall be an expiation with God when on® shall drop his right of 
retaliation," "He who shall mediate between men for a good purpose 
shall be the gainer thereby, but the mediator for evil shall reap 
the fruit of his doing," (iv, 85,)
"Let there be no compulsion in religion," ( i i ,  257.)
" I f  thy Lord had pleased, verily a ll who are in the world would have 
believed together. Wilt thou then force men to believe when belief 
can come ^nly from God? Adhere to those who foresake youj speak truth 
to your own heartj do good to everyone that does i l l  to you," ( i i ,  257.) 
"And fi^ht for religion of God against those who fight against youj but 
transgress not (by attacking them fir s t ), for God loveth not the aggress­
ors • ••• and i f  they attack you, slay their.j but if  they desist, let 
there be no hostility, except against the,ungodly." ( i i ,  186). (See 
Ameer Ali, The Spirit of Islam, Christoohers, London, 1922, pp. 204-221,) 
It is noteworthy that Ameer A li does not make ary reference to the Koran­
ic verses mentioned at the beginning of this chapter on the necessity 
of jihad and the way to treat the infidels.
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It  la to be recalled that the Prophet Muhammad and a great
number of the subsequent leaders of the Muslim community, especially
the First Four Caliphs (Abu Bakr, *TSnar, Btbman, * A l l ) ,  and many others
were also eminent military figures whooften personally took part in
the field of battle and this provided further Justification for the
high status of railitar^aen and the dignity of their profession in Islam.
The term in Arabic literature approximately corresponding to
chivalry in the Western culture is furustvah. or horsemanship (from
fares, horse), which has always been regarded as one of the magnificent,
manly qualities of a proper Muslim, Strictly speaking, furoslrah denotes
an aptitude for carrying outmilitary functions. But the range and nature
of the qualities which have often been associated with furuslvah suffice
to bear out its high place in the hierarchy of human virtues as viewed
by the Muslims. These qualities are* "bodily strength, correctness of
knowledge, depth of intelligence, tenderness of feelings, purity of soul,
skill of action, confidence in moments of distress, modesty in affluence,
1.
reliance on the Creator and service to the people", "Islam," writes
a lecturer at al Azhar, Abroad ash SharabasI, "has paid ample attention
to furusTvah.- It  has encouraged its sons to learn swimming, shooting,
riding and other kinds of sport . . .  the Prophet, may the blessing of
2God by upon him, himself took part in a ll these trainings",
^malallah. December, 19C6, p. 4-28.
?Ibld.. p. 44o. "
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V Resuscitation of the Idea ef .Ttfaafl
In concert with the rising prestige of the military class in 
the Arab countries as described above a spectacular revival of the 
idea of ,1ihad and of the pristine spirit of militancy has taken place 
among the Arab/Muslim clergy and other religious circles. That this 
revival has been only a reaction to the growing pressure of the Western 
Powers should be evident to every student of the post-war history of 
the Arab countries} but what is now and interesting is  the way and 
the tempo in which this revival has taken place.
We shall therefore study here some of the typical responses of 
religious circles to Western pressure on the Arab countries in recent 
times.
Sporadic manifestations of the revival of the idea of jihad in
its most belligerent form can be especially considered in
Ashar as early as 1953, when the %yntlan army had just set about strength-
«•
4nlng its hold over the country and the Western attitude was showing signs
of stiffening. The best example of these preliminary outbursts is per-
haps an article by 'Abdul Mahmud Maslut, a solicitor and a contributor
to majallah. entitled "The Muslims in Divergent Ways», The article, 
o
couched in^highly rhetorical language, tries to analyse the causes of 
the Arabs' weakness and humility,^ These causes are, as or® might well
^mdlallah. Januaxy, 1953, pp. 534-537. It  is indicative of the writer's 
single-minded concern for the Arab® that, although he uses the word 
"Muslima" in the title  of his article, he does not make any reference in 
the article itself to other Muslim peoples and their hardships. For a 
review meant to be concerned with the problems' of the whole of the 
Muslim world such parochial lines of policy do not seem edifying.
n® P. § f& . 
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predict, ’’weakness of faith, slackening of determination, indulgence 
in worldly affairs and divergence from Cod".*
Tbs remedy he reaemends is unity and firmness in dealing with the 
Irperialists,
"One should not," he says, "address these people 
(Imperialists) in the name of world peace, not inter­
state security nor laws for which they plead, because 
these words do not bear any weight with them, and are 
mt appreciated in their societies. On® should not 
address them in the name of human sentiments and mercy 
which reHide in every individual’ s soul, emptied as the 
imperialists’ hearts are of sentiment...."*
The writer’ s conclusions from a ll this is  that»
"The only logic they (Imperialists) understand and the 
only language of which they are afraid are the logic 
and language of force and determined resistance, which
would brook no flagging and slackening.*^
An article ty Kuhanmad * Abdul La$If as Subkl, member of the 
Council of Senior *ulaiaV. in the October 19*2 issue of naJallah is  
also worth mentioning. Under the heading "The Religion and Force -  
Two ’’ays of Achieving the Came End" Subkl seeks to Justify resort to 
force as Just another way of realising the sublime ideals of *slam.
The article assumes a special significance in the light of the develop-' 
ments leading to the Egyptian Army coup of July 19*2. Subic! starts his
ma.1 sllah. January 1953, p. 586. 




article ty analysing the functions of religion (i .e . Islam) which, 
as he says, are mainly characterised ty "peaceful persuasion".^" The 
ultimate aim of religion is to protect the individual from the scourge 
of defection and the societyjfrom crimes which threaten its existence and 
undermine its stability.
But, continues SutkT, he who created human beings did not want a ll 
of them to be of the same nature. He did not want to confer the blessings 
of his guidance on a ll individuals. Hence the inability of religion in 
correcting defecters and subduing criminals. Here becomes evident the 
need of religion for material force "represented by the array, to punish 
the renegades and bring then back to the fold, and to make the deaf ears 
listen to the call of salvation". To substantiate his view the writer 
then quotes from an unnamed Arab poet a verse which reflects a pessi­
mistic conception of human natfire ef  Vagan nature» "Individuals (or 
souls) do not abstain from aberration unless there is something for them 
to be afraid of." It  was for this reason that *alam has based its 
mission on both persuasion and force, and it  was for this reason that 
its followers succeeded in defeating their enemies and achieving mastery. 
But the force which should be used together with religious persuasion
is not something crude and harshj it  is in fact "polished by religion,
3
and nurtured by its spirit, humanity and refinement".
1s a M M >  October, 1952, p, 156.
January, 1953# p. 157.
Perhaps the most bellicose interpretation ever made by the Azhar- 
ites of the idea of .llhad was effected immediately after the Angio- 
Fran(»-Israeli operations against Igypt in October 1956. A1 Azhar*s re­
action in this respect was not only in the form of psychological war­
fare. Soon after the operations a vigorous programme of military train­
ing was put in hand at the centre itse lf for the first time in its his­
tory.1
But more important were the eaijortations of the leading theorists 
of malallah to meet violence with violence and their emphatic recom­
mendations for the military preparedness of the faithful at a ll times.
One can find sometimes among these exhortations and recommendations 
phrases inadmiration of war and its alleged blessings. Tinder the heading 
"The Military Training in the Schooling Programme at al Azhar and Religious 
Schools " ‘ Abbas ^aha tries to justify wars -  with the familiar nec­
essary qualifications -  by making extensive quotations from famous West­
ern philosophers end writers, "The mental and moral factors," he says,
"which become dominant during wartime, lead to the progress of the society 
2
as a whole". The writer considers war as a natural outcome of the ef­
forts of every nation to promote it3 beliefs and principles in opposition 
to another nation.
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^ f .  majallah. January 1957, p. 692j February 1957, pp. 632-684$ 
March 1957, pp. 790-791.
2Ib ld .. February 1957, p. 682.
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" struggle,n he continues, "is, then, a universal law 
of nature. The man has been created belligerent. War 
Is more effective than peace In fostering a life  of 
merit\ In fact it  widens the field of (individuals*) 
merits more than any other factor known in history."
Beac<" and prosperity result in the prevalence of "base personal desires,
and weak, unhealthy intentions".^ As noted above, the writer tries to
buttress his case ty quoting such Western figures as Schiller, Frederic
the Gr$at and Treitschke on the benefits of war. The wry fact of quoting
these men is significant as majallah rarely establishes the rightness
of a policy ly drawing upon the writings of Western sources, A few
words, however, seem to be due on the "militaristic" outlook of those
Western thinkers whose names have appeared in Jaha' s article.
First of a ll, Schiller can hardly be regarded as an admirer of
force -  especially for patriotic aims. He, In fact, never paid ary special
attention to national themes, "What concerned him," says Kohn, "in a ll
themes was their humanity, their human interest, the progress of mankind
o
represented by them, to what ever century or nation they might belong", 
Frederic's "bellicose" spirit is especially manifest in his view« on the „ 
necessity of maintaining "the integrity of a ll the State's provinces",
A small work cast in the form of letters between Anaplstemon and Philo- 
patros, written by Frederick himself, illustrates these views, "Do you 
not see," asks Philopatros, "that i f  the government were to lose a ll these
^trmjallah. February 1957, p. 683. 
^The Idea of Nationalism, p. 409.
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provinces, it would thereby become enfeebled, and losing consequently
the resources it had drawn from them, would be less able to help you
in case of need",^ Finally, Heinrich von Treitschke’s militarism was
motivated by his desire to see Alsace and Lorraine restored to Germany,
"These provinces," ha said, "are ours by the right of the sword.
Contrary to Jaha, who views the necessity of jihad from a purely
social angle and seeks the assistance of Western thinkers in establishing
it , Muhibb ad tin al Kha$Tb, the editor-in-chief of maiallah. treats the
subject merely as an Islamic precept. He analyses briefly the history
of jihad in Islam but, contrary to Ameer All, propounds the idea not as
a passive concept of self-defence but rather as an active injunction
aiming at promoting the causer? of God and subduing the enemies of Islam,
As illustrations we could qiote his attitude to Jewry»
"The safaTh (Collection of Prophetic Traditions) tv 
Bukhari emotes the Prophet through ‘ Abdullah ibn ‘ Umar 
ibn Khatfcab (the Second Caliph) as saying that» ’K ill 
the Jews, until one of them hides behind a rock, and 
the rock says: "0 Servant of Godthere is a Jew be­
hind me, k ill him!"' Or» ’Abu Imamahquotes the Prophet 
in masnad by Imam al A|pad to ths effect that» "Jne 
branch "erf’" my mama w ill always manifest their religion 
.and dominate their enemies and no one w ill be able to 
harm them byoppoaing them,,," The people asked» "0 
Prophet of God, where are these people?" The Prophet 
answered: "In Jerusalem, and around Jerusalem."’ "
It is significant to note that Kha$lb makes these quotations in a fragment
^Kedourie, op,cltx» pp, 11-12,
%ohn, opjclt,., p, 582.
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entitled "The 1ihad of Palentine", The article contains other quota­
tions, either from authoritative hooks of prophetic traditions or 
other great Islamic leaders of the past, enumerating the blessings ac-
s'
crued on those who get killed for the cause of .jihad. even i f  they have
not carried out other religious duties*
"When Cod ordered his Prophet," he continued, "0 
Prophet encourage the tithful to fight (in each a way 
that) i f  there be twenty patient (faithful men) they 
can defeat two hundred infidels, and i f  there be one 
hundred of them, they can dfeat a thousand of the in­
fidels, he meant that the faithful should possess such 
qualities as would entitle them to that victory . . . .
(these qualities are:) military education, self- 
sacrifice, firmness in jihad and attachment to the Is­
lamic principle of f urusivah...."I
71 Conclusions
As a result of a ll the above social and doctrinal factors the 
army in most of the Arab countries is new regarded as the real source 
of power, as it  is only with its awe and strength that a ll obstacles 
standing in the way of economic, social and political emancipation of 
the people can be crushed and foreign plots can be foiled.
^maiallah. November 1956, pp. 391-401. It is to be noted also that dur­
ing the period in question maiallah. as i f  in an endeavour to stress 
the militant spirit of Islam, published an increasing number of articles 
on ghagflwât (wars fought ty the Prophet Muhammad against the infidels) 
and on the lives and activities of prominent Islamic military leaders in 
the past, ~ee, inter a lia , articles on the efaawahof ^adr el Kubri 
(October, 19c3, PP. 149-153)» ghagwahof Quainuqa* (January 1954» PP. 
573-576), ghaaswah of %id (April 1954» pp* 963-963, May 1954» PP* 1074- 
1073), * Uqbat* ibn fSfi* (A «ril 1955, PP* 877-831.)
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The anry is also reoognized in the minds of a ll progressive Arab 
nationalists as the sole arbiter of politics. This recognition has 
been conceded even ty those Arab authors who wish to see the concepts of 
Western democracy introduced into their countries. The arny*s misdeeds 
are now passed over in silence and its conns are praised as shocks which 
awaken people to the realities of political life .
Among others, Ajimad ShaibanT, to whom we referred in Chapter Thre§, 
deserves special mention. In his book, al u.«ms ath thavrawXvah 11*1 
qawmlyat;al *arablvah. he first emphasizes the need to provide the Tyrian 
people with a ll manner of opportunity for exercising control over official­
dom to f i l l  up the vacuum occurring as a result of the disappearance of 
the iaukhadrams, but then proceeds to state that:
"The deviation of the government or parliament from 
a progressive policy at home and a humanitarian policy 
abroad provides an exception to this fundamental rule.
In such a contingency it is incumbent on Arab national­
ists to seek the assistance of the army as a revolution- . N
ary body to rectify the Aviation ©r pre vent its occurrence,H
Then, certainly to the surprise of any believer in democratic principles,
the author enumerates the cases in which tbs army should take over in
any Arab country. These cases are*
(a) When the (c iv il) government concludes a peace 
treaty with Israel.
(b) When the government or parliament refutes to 
^haihanl, op.clt.. p. 64.
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conclude non-conditional economic agreement3 
with foreign powers in accord or discord with the 
Arabs' attitude.
(c) When deflection Is made from the policy of positive 
neutrality.
(d) When the government or parliament compromises over 
issues connected with the liberation of an Arab 
country to secure personal or parochial (qu$rlyah) 
gains. *■
It  is self-evident that cases of this kind arise only in those 
Arab countries which, according to the author' 3 standards, are governed 
by Arab nationalists, ShalbanT does not say anything In this context 
about those Arab countries which are s t ill,  directly or indirectly, under 
foreign domination. But the reader can well infer that, in such countries, 
the case is far stronger for the army to oust the suborned governments.
Elsewhere in the book ShaibSnt confirms this inference by stating his
belief in the two kinds of revolutions
"One accomplished by the people and the other carried out 
by the army in the name of the people,hZ
The sentence can be revealing of the extent t© which the faith in the
\
3 &
The Ueatern counterpart to this Arab conception of the army as 
at once the spokesman and saviour of the nation can be found again in 
the "modern Oaesarism" of the German nationalists at the end of the nine­
teenth century, who, although reoognizing popular sovereignty, "insisted
1
that it be exercised by a single individual". They believed that this 
"compromise would enable Kaiser to combine democracy and authority, and 
provide Germary with a dictator embodying the national w ill for an in­
dustrial future,"* 2
Militarism in the Arab countries, as in many countries of the 
West;(France) and East (Pakistan, Turkey, etc.) is  an attempt at finding 
a short cu*t to solving the great social and political problems of then© 
countries. It  might therefore be regarded as a temporary arrangement 
likely to give place to civil authority once those problems are solved. 
But, unlike its counterparts in the W®st and East, Arab militarism has 
solid historical and religious bases which, as was shown in this chapter, 
have been consolidated under the impact of the West, Militarism has thus 
becoiie an idealized image of the heroic struggle for survival and re­
storing ancient Arab glory. As such, even with the solution of the 
social and political problems which have occasioned its upsurge, it is 
likely to persist for an indefinite period,






Our study hitherto can be said to have established at least one 
fact, which la that the Arabs should, and must, be the lost people in 
the vrorid to go neutral. As w ill be seen in this chapter not only are 
their Islamic traditions in contradiction t® neutrality as a principle in 
international relations but, as has also been pointed out previously, 
their present struggle for unity, with its strong anti-Western over­
tones, often reduces their neutral status to sheer absurdity. Despite 
this, neutrality is today one of the declared principles of Arab nation­
alism.
The following chapter tries to elucidate each of the above points, 
Ue start try demonstrating the contradiction between Islam and neutrality 
and then proceed to an analysis of the reasons why the Arabs have ad­
opted neutrality in their foreign policy. This w ill be done ty criti­
cising the political relations between the Arabs and the west. The chap­
ter thus brings our study, which started in the nebular stratum of lofty 
ideas and doctrines, down to the tangible world of routine interests 
and conflicts.
Neutrality, both as an ideology and a strategy in international 
relations, is alien to the spirit of Islam -  for two main reasons. Quite9 ti
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apart from the militant character of Islam, as discussed in the previous
chapter, the special mission assigned by the Koran to the Muslims or,
as some Arab commentators point out,^ assigned to the Arabs -  that of
2
"repairing and constructing the world into a monistic order” -  definitely
contradicts neutrality* How can a people, who have been destined ty God
3
to be "central" so that they "may be witness for mankind", keep away 
from taking part In international dispites, whether these may be of con­
cern to them or not? As a religion which seeks to administer the worldly 
affairs of Man, In addition to securing his salvation, Islam has made it  
incumbent on every Muslim to enjoin others to do good and abstain from 
evil ( • Therefore, Muslims are
bound to consider such passive concepts as neutrality -  in politics as 
well as in other branches of social\life -  as devices to be applied only 
sparingly and in. exceptional circumstances, and not as permanent guiding 
principles. Neutrality, as a negative political status, is mther in 
line with the teachings of Christianity which does not concern itse lf 
with politics,
Islam aims at universality, at establishing and implementing the 
divine rules a ll over the world. To achieve this aim it  constantly de-
"Sarawzah, al vafrdat *al <arabTyah, p. I l l ,  - ‘ Aflaq, f l  flabll al ba*th. 
p. U2 et .M m .¥*:aucPA.' pp. inY -m
%laj»a( Khadduri, no«..ctt,. p. 160.
%he Koran, l i ,  137.
3S3.
dares war against unbelievers. In Islamic theory the world is divided, 
as was noted before, into dar al Islam. or Muslim territory, and dar al 
harb. or infidel territory, No intermediate status has been conceded by 
the orthodox Muslims, although the Chafi*Is have challenged this uncom­
promising dualism by discerning a third status, dar al *ahd or dar ag 
sulh. i,e , the territory at peace with Islam. War against the infidels 
should go on until the dar al Islam comprises the whole world and swamps 
the dar al harb. It  seems evident that a ll these offensive and militant 
ideals, with their legal and political implications, are incompatible 
with that spirit of passivity and resignation in respect of certain in­
ternational problems which is the essence of neutrality. The point has 
been perhaps beat described byKajid hhadduri:
"The universal nomocracy of Islam, like the Republica 
Christiana in the West, assumed that mankind constituted 
one supra-national community, bound by one law and gov­
erned by one ruler. 1 or it  was told, as stated in a 
Qur*onic injunction, that ’i f  there were two gods, the 
universewould be ruined*, The nature of such a state 
is the co-existence of a second universal state. While 
Islam tolerated Christianity and Judaism as religions,
Islamdom and Christendom,.as two universal states, could 
not peacefully ex ist....1,1
I f  neutrality is taken to Man the attitude of a state which 
voluntarily desires to keep out of war by not tricing sides, no such 
status is recognised in Islamic legal theoiy. For Islam must low  Jure 
be at war with any state which refuses "to come to terms with it  either
\lajld Khaddurl, op.clt.« p. 17.
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ty submitting to Muslim rule or ty accepting a temporary peace arrange«, 
ment.”^
For such reasons neutrality dee3 not seen to have achieved a 
dignified 3tatua either in the works of the Muslim thinkers or in the 
reported maxims of the great Islamic leaders. It  is also of fecial sig­
nificance that the word neutrality, or My ad, as a political term, does 
not appear in the Koran,
Neutrality, of course, was imposed on the Muslims as a principle 
after the eclipse of their glory and power and the Christian West, ex­
panding its political, military and economic domination over the globe 
and growing in a ll the fields of material strength, presented a formidable 
challen e to the basic principles of * slam. In view of their weakness 
the Itoslimshad two courses before them! (a) to ignore the challenge, 
or (b) to take it  up partiallyand to respond to it  only in those fields 
where they were best fitted, Bit during the period of Arab eclipse from 
the fa l l  of Baghdad (in 12f8) up to Gharlf Husain’ s revolt (1916) neither 
of these two courses led to the formulation of any theory or doctrine 
inifefence of neutrality, and the I&tslim powers stood aloof from inter­
national disputes and politics for centuries without feeling any need 
to justify their status.
During the First World War national aspiration and political expedi 
H'ajid Khadduri, op.clt,. p, 51«
r(
ercy provided an occasion for the *rabs to revert to the old spirit of
'partisanship*. They often justified their Ì916 Revolt by invoking the
-  1
idea of Jihad in its most bellicose form.
The 3ane spirit.was prevalent in the initial phaseg of the Second
World War, when there was a growing sympathy with Germany,expressed both
2at official (Iraq and Egypt) and popular levels. This time the reason 
for 'partisanship' was not political expediency, but a frustrated indig­
nation against what has coMe to be known as the British betrayal of tie 
Arabs' hopes of unity.
How is it  that, with such powerful doctrinal and historical tradi­
tions opposed to neutrality, Arab nationalists today, almost unanimously, 
regard neutrality as one of their essential articles of faith?
The answer is inevitably connected with the Arab relations with 
the West and particularly with the Western Powers most interested in the 
Middle bast -  that is Britain end the United States. As we shall see, 
the Arabs have adopted neutrality as a reaction to a scries of Western 
political moves which we w ill attempt to analyse below. As the Arab 
writers, in their disquisitions on neutrality, have so often addressed 
themselves to these two powers, a survey of the roots of the present ten­
sion is therefore essential in order 1» Judge the merits and demerits 
of Arab neutrality.
^■Antonius, o^.clt.. p. 207.
^Husalnl. The Moslem.Brethren, pp. 16, 64. Sadat, Revolt, on the Nile. 
pp. , 4-2—43. "
We have seen that tension in Arab-'”eat relations is caused partly 
ty a series of fundamental disparities and resultant clashes in the 
realm of doctrine and ideology. Qut it  is also partly caused by certain 
political and economic factors which, contrary to the ideological end 
doctrinal ones, constantly change in their scope and intensity. Dis­
cussion w ill go on for a long time between scholars and political ana­
lysts as to whether the clashes on the political and economic levels 
are occasioned by ideological divergencies or whether the latter are in 
fact symptoms and effects of the former. Our task here, however, is not so 
much to determine the order of priority of causes as to understand the 
causes themselves.
Whereas the doctrinal and idelogical roots of the Arab-West con­
flicts have not received due consideration on the part of Western scholars./
Aarc At** i l**tU**f
+h.-...n.c^aiiw] | ' .. . ntiiWml the political and economic causea/most exhaustively,
ITence we shall not treat of the political side great detail, and we 
shall completely omit the economic angle. After a ll, in our view, 
in the Middle East economics has been an instrument of politics. Only 
the policies of the two Western povers, Britain and the United States, 
call for -ur criticism in this context since the influence of Western 
Germany and Italy is only commercial and that of France has considerably 
waned,
1. Britain.
Britain’s relations with the Arabs since the Cecond World War 
have been bedevilled by a lade of confidence. British policies during
and between, the two world ware and at the time of the creation of the
has not been any major economic and political dispute outstanding between 
Britain end the Arabs, memories of pact discords and misdeeds have con­
tinued to poison their relationship -  whereas In Arab-Anerican relations 
the Arabs have always been ready to forgive and forget once a dispute has 
boon settled or a hostile policy has receded into past history. It would 
be relevant at thi3 Juncture to cast a cursory glance at the Arab griev­
ances against the British from the "First World War up to the creation of 
the Eaghdad Bgct in 1955«
First there was what ha3 come to be known by the Arabs as "The 
Great Betrayal", namely, Britain’ s failure to fu lf i l  her undertaking 
during the ^irst World War to help promote the independence of the Arab /
1 T
peoples, and her connivance at the growing wave of ‘'ewish immigration
into FVilestlne, f*hatever construction the British commentators may put
on the Gharif-l'cMahon correspondence of July 1916 the fact cannot be
denied that Britain’s refusal to contribute to the realisation of Arab
independence after the ’rar could not but induce the Arabs to regard Brit-
2ain as a power "swearing falsely in making covenants". On the whole,
the general Arab reaction to Britain's policy at that time could s t ill
3
be defined as one of bitter disanpolntment*- But the British oppressive 
^Zcine, The struggle for Arab Independence, pp. 24, 215 et sea.
Btate of Israel have been mainly responsible for this. Even when there
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policies in Palestine (especially during the 1936-1939 revolt) helped 
tj turn this bitter disappointment into hatred.
Then came the Second World "ar with Britain's determination to 
impose her w ill on the Arab peoples In the name of the crusade against 
Nazism. The Arabs have often been criticised for their pro-Fascist 
8entiment3 and attitudes during the Cecond World 'ar. But have the cri­
tics paid due attention to the real cause of these sentiments and atti­
tudes? The fact cannot be denied that the Eriti3h efforts to set up 
friendly governments in Egypt and Iraq during the first stages of the 
War againat the w ill of the people of these countries could not but 
induce the Arabs to mistrust any altruistic motive behind Britain's 
war efforts, explaining the difficulties in the way of Anglo-American 
co-operation during the Second World War, the former American Minister 
in the Middle hast, Mr. J, M. Landis, writes th: t the British action 
of imposing her own Prime Minister on Egypt "at the point of bayonet or 
rather the tank” and the suppressive measures adopted tewards the pro- 
Nazi elements in Iran, Iraq and Egypt "seemed to flaunt the very prin­
ciples of the Great Charter which at the same time their and our propa-
• 1gandists were shouting from the house-tops."
For an ordinary Arab with a slight knowledge of international af­
fairs it seemed incomprehensible that the British could afford to toler­
ate a near-Nazi Sire on the threshold of their home, but could not re- 
✓
Quoted in Mohammad Shafi Agwanl's The United States and the Arab World.
Institute of Islamic Studies, Moslim Universityj Aligarh, 1955* p*107.
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spect the wi3he3 of the peoples of far-off lands. The combined effect 
of a ll these developments wa3 the complete loss of Arab faith in Brit­
ish sincerity and integrity. And, for that same Arab, the British poli­
cies following the Second .orId -ar helped to strengthen this back­
ground of mistrust and suspicion. Quite apart from the British attitude 
immediately before and at the time of the creation of the State of Asrael,
the adverse effect of which on British-Arab relations is almost univer-
1
sally conceded by British critics, her rigidity towards Egypt (over the 
Suez Canal) -  not to speak of her less important disputes with Saudi 
Arabia and the Yemen -  and her unflagging support of unpopular and cor­
rupt governments in the Kiddie East occasioned the emergence of extrem­
ist movements in the area to the detriment of the Vest as a whole. In 
thee circumstances it was evident that, unless the atmosphere of mis­
trust and hostility was removed, any British measure to secure the friend­
ship of the Arabs, however well motivated and skilfully launched, was 
bound to create the opposite effect.
At this Juncture two events may have caused the British to think 
that Arab hostility had started to subside and that therefore conditions
’’At the end of the Second World War,” writes Glubb Pa3ha, "Britain was 
most anxious to retain Arab friendship, She no longer had any desire 
to exercise direct rule, though she attached great importance to the 
corridor to the Indian Ocean. Before, however, she could be secure in 
such friendship, she had two principal problems to solve -  that of the 
future of Palestine and thatof her relations with Egypt. She was to 
fa il to solve either, and she was to lose her position in the Middle 
East os a result." (Glubb Basha, Britain and the Arabs. Redder & 
Stoughton, London, 19c9, pp, 273-4.'5
existed for a successful British diplomatic offensive in the Kiddle 
East. They were the end of the Persian oil crisis in August 1954. 
and the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement In the same year.
Both these results were secured after motracted and arduous negotiations.
But the policy chosen by the British Foreign Office to exploit 
these developnen4s did nothing to strengthen the British position. It  
only succeeded in intensifying the e&sting rivalries and resentments in 
the Kiddle East. This policy was manifested by the Baghdad Pact, a 
treaty concluded In February 1955 in the name of "regional arrangement" 
with the participation of Pakistan, Persia, Iraq, Turkey and Britain. ^
In this policy the British and American Governments were defeating their 
own er.d3 -  or so it seemed to the Arabs. Apparently the aim of the 
British (and American) diplomacy was that the peonies of the Kiddle East 
should set up a defence organisation, presumably of their own choice 
and initiative, to meet the growing threat of Communism both internally 
and externally, The means adopted to execute this aim looked like active 
British (and American) involvement.
Even worse was the British encouragement of  Iraq to take the lead 
in this organization. For two reasons this policy of the British Gov­
ernment was mistaken. In the first place, the long-standing and strik­
ing unpopularity of the man then heading the Iraqi Government, l.e . rfurl 
as Sa‘Td, with the Arab nationalists and anti-Western forces; and then 
Egypt’s rivalry with Iraq for the leadership of the Arab world, especially 
since the officers' Revolution in 1952. In 195^It did not need any
■^ See The Baghdad Pact, origins and political setting, Royal Institute of' 
International Affairs, London, February 1956, especially pp. 6-7.
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genius of prediction to say that the edstence of Kuil's Iraq at the 
head of the Baghdad Pact would provoke, as it  did, a revolutionary
IfTyptien Government into etridenthpposition -  i f  only for psychological
(
and personal reasons of rivalry. These two reasons were more dominant 
in the minds of Arab nationalists, especially the Egyptian and Syrian, 
than the reason usually mentioned by sore Western commentators to the 
effect that the anti-communist and alarmist terms in which the creation 
of tho ?act was justified frightened the •‘»•rats, who allegedly wanted 
to play off the great powers against each other.'V
; Thus by the mid-fifties Britain*s insistence on pursring the 
policy of "regional arrangements" in the face of fierce Arab opposition 
had turned the edifice of Arch-British friendship into a ruined fort.
We w ill discuss Arab reaction to this development after surveying the 
policy of the United States towards the Arabs in the course of the same 
period.'
II  The United States
There were times when the United States of America, as a Great 
Power, was in an almost ideal position to win the friendship of the 
nascent Arab states and, at the same time, to further American economic 
and political interests in the whole of the Middle East. Contraiy to 
other Western powers the United States was" not associated, in the minds 
of the Arabs, with the betrayals of promises for the establishment of an 
independent Arab State after the First World War, nor did it incur the
a
■'■"The Middle East Since Sue zrt in The World Today .December 1957, p. 500 et seq.
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odium of colonialistic oppression, ?ar from this, the Americans could - 
claim to have rendered considerable contributions to the promotion of 
Arab culture end education and, thereby, to the.emergence,of Arab national­
ism towards the. close of the nineteenth century.. The American Presbyter­
ian missionaries'from 1320' onwards vero always remembered as being dis­
tinguís neo irora all roraer and contemnoraneoua miusleñarlea by their 
efforts to revive Arabic literature and tradition. They established a 
printing'preS3 in Beirut, set up thirty-three schools in various parts of 
Syria and engendered.,the intellectual atmosphere in the Levant which 
should be regarded as responsible for the first nationalist stirrings 
among the Arabs. Two of the most outstanding representatives of Arab 
intelligentsia at that time,.i.e, Fasif ^azljl and %trus al BustanT, 
closely co-operated with the missionaries and In 1347 founded nThe Society 
of Arts and Bolence7 which, as we saw in Chapter Three, later on helped 
to create the Syrian Scientific Society.* - ; • .
The popularity of the Americans with the Arab peoples up.to the 
end of the second decade of the present century can be gauged from the
warmth and enthusiasm with which most of their leaders welcomed American"
2involvement in the Middle Eastern affairs after the First L’oi^ Ld War,
Clause four of the resolution of the General Syrian Congress, adopted on
*Agwani, on.clt,. pp. 19-21. E. A. Speiser, The United States and the 
Near Fast. - Harvard University Press, 1950» p. 233.
' i —2 • ' ; *
Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence, p, 22D.
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July 2n\ 1919,* stated thati
"We rely on ■‘ resident Wilson's declarations, that-his 
object in entering the War was to put an end to ac—
- quisitive desipe for imperialistic purposes. In : 
our desire that our country should rot be made a field  
for colonisation and in the belief,that the.American 
nation is devoid of colonial ambitions and has no poli­
tical designs on our, country, we resolve to seek asist- 
ance in the technical and economic fields from the 
United States of America on the understanding that the 
duration of such »id s h o u ld  not exceed twenty years,1*
Clause 10 expressed the hope that:
"We may look to President Wilson and the liberal American 
nation, wh^  are known for their sincere and generous sym­
pathy with the aspirations of the weak nations, for help 
in .the fulfilment of our hopes,"1 cr . . ,
The fact that between the two 'world Wars .the United dates had
r
no territorial interest in the area was also in itself a great asset.
It  is Interesting tonota that the United States* direct contribution 
to the establishing of the state of Israel in 1949, although deprecated 
with great vehemence ty a ll Aral», did not wholly vitiate the prospects
of Arab-Amerivan co-operation and friendship as it  did in the case of- • *
tho British and French, The Arabs s o »  buried past memories. There were
•i-
two reasons for this attitude of the "rabs. Firstly, the American in- 
volvement in the creation of Israel at least had the virtue of sincerity.
The Americans had made no specific promises to the Arabs that might im-
■ 9 ' ' 'ply their opposition to the emergenceof a-Jewish state. Secondly, con-
‘^ Antonius, oc.cit. . p, 441. Speiser, oo.clt.. p. 239.
> .  . . . .  . -  * '-'-i ■ f
On the contrary, the United States interest in and commitment to the 
development of ’the Jewish National Home* in Palestine were unmistakable 




traxy to Great Britain, which had lost, or wag in the process of losing, 
her status a3 a Great ^ower, the United States represented an ever- 
growing power, ready to aid the under-developed countries in their efforts 
for economic progress. Growing American-interest in the Aifeb world was 
"dramatically illustrated , by the fact that President Roosevelt, in Feb­
ruary 1945 -  barely two months before his death -  went out of his way 
to meet with Arab leaders in the vicinity of Suez."
In such circumstances what should have been the correct basic 
principles of American policy towards the Arab3? Answers to this question 
might be as multiple as they are contradictory, ; Among then« answers, 
however, there is one which can be of immense interest for us* It
- ■ i( 1 ■ ' ■ - ■ _
comes from a man whose policies towards the Arabs, especially during 
the latter part of the ‘fift ie s , formed one of the main factors respon­
sible for the deterioration of Arab-West relations5 John Foster Tulles,
We cannot help being astonished to find that Culles' answer, which was
fcont.) " : ' ■ ’ ■ ' 5 ' * ' r -' ... *
Bid.tain»to secore uninterrupted Jewish immigration into Palestine, After 
the Second World War, the United States openly adopted a pro-Zionist 
policy necessitated by the fate of the Jews in Lurope and the transfer 
of Zionist leadership to American Jewry, In the presidential «lection 
of 1948 the lie publican a and Demo crafts were vying with each other in 
expressing sunport for the opening of Palestine to "(the Jewa) unre­
stricted immigration and land-ownership" (The Times. 3° June 1944). The 
United States also did a great deal to influence the deliberations at - 
Lake Success in 1947 and 1948 in favour of the Zionists, An opposite 
view, however, has...been expressed in E. A, Spalser*B The United States 
-and the Near hast, pp. 223-224.
1 _ .  •.
^Gpeiser, op.oijU. PP* 107, 242,
ft
given ’before ho became Deere tar;;'- of State, was almost identical with 
what the Arab nationalists themselves expected. Hi3 answer does not 
refer only to the A.rab3, bait is concerned with the whole of Asia.
: , "Any policies.regarding Asia and Pacific,” he said,
Mmust be a logical development of the policy of peace­
ful evolution to nat5 on& independence.- They should ' 
re-inforce, not undermine, the Independence of the new 
, , nations,. That independence ha3 been -newly achieved, ‘ 
and while the Western colonial powers may feel that 
, they acted promptly and generously, those who have won \ 
political freedom feel that the action came only grudg­
ingly and.under pressure. These people a^e, and for,some 
time w ill be, suspicious of the motives of any Western 
power, including the United States, It w ill be feared '
that the West is using the threat of Communism as an ex*» 
cuse to regain political mastery over the liberated peonies.
Any Western pressure is bound to react in favour of Com­
munist effort to, arouse violent revolt against the present 
governments. Already we have seen these governments are 
labelled ’lackeys1 of the w'est. We'should give help where 
we can and where it is wanted, but we must not seek to im­
pose it  under unwelcome conditions,” . • "If' the Communist 
parties in Western Dumps,” concludes Dulles, **feel that 
they can make political capital ly  charging the United *
States with intent t>turn these countries into colonies, 
it  is clears that^we must be scrupulously careful In our 
relationsXwni^ w!Cthin the last five years, have in fact 
been colonial possessions of the West."* -
But as soon as Dulles was appointed to office his actual policy 
was in striking contrast to these fine recommendations. Be seemed at 
times, in the eyss of the Arabs, to display a spirit of harsh avuncularism 
and to degenerate into the same "colonialistic mentality” as that of 
the British and the French, although accompanied by less frequent, direct
^John Foster Dulles, War or Peace. George C. ^rrap & Co. Ltd,, London, 
1950, pp. 224-5.
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military Intervention, Although for a good part of the fift ies  most, 
of the governments in the Middle East, whether A^ah,-Turkish or Persian,' 
werebranded as * lackeys' _ and.-! pampered menials’ by their own local 
nationalist.movements the United States Government chore rot only to 
enter into vigorous co-operation with thece governments, but often sup-, 
ported them in the face of hostile public opinion. In two notorious 
cases (Jordan in 1957 and the Lebanon:in 1953) it  caved such governments 
from revolt by direct military Interference. Economic help, instead of 
being given "when and where" it  was v?anted, was more of ten. than not ins- 
posed on those^countries tied to political conditions, as was disastrously 
demonstrated in the case of the help for the construction of the Aswan
Dam in 1956. Participation in the Baghdad Tact, which was officially
. “ ——  
sponsorcc(^F^ri^ia^!iJier^ in the Middle Poet, such
as lJurl as Sa‘Id ’3 Government, again discredited the. Americans in the 
minds of the Arab nationalists. The only bright point in the story was 
the American refusal to co-operate with the British and French in in­
vading the -uea Ganal area in October 19*6. The occasion again offered 
prospects for the establishment of a sound Arab-Amerlean friendship in 
the interests of both. But the proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine 
in 1957 immediately blighted these prospects. The Doctrine aroused 
sharp Arab animosity and failed in its rurpose because it was unmistak­
ably directed against Soviet Russia at a tin» when widespread feelings 
had been created in the Soviet favour throughout the Middle East, thanks 
to its sun-ort for Egypt in the Anglo-Franco-Israeli invasion of that
country. Moreover,the Doctrine looked like another attempt along the 
lines of the Baghdad *act which, after the Sues crisis, had become the 
target of growing indictment from numerous quarters in the Arab world.
On the whole American policies towards the Arab countries since 
the Second World War are symptomatic of the ambivalent feelings of their 
foraulators. On the one hand traditional revulsion against colonialism 
and attempts at forestalling the Russians in winning the friendship of 
the 1'lddle Eastern nations have prompted the Americans in certain cases *
to make offers of economic assistance to support, ttough half-heartedly
■ .. .. . ' „ . ...... . ................ . .
and indirectly, the struggle of the Arabs against their British andPrench
oppressors, and in others to dissociate than selves definitely from the 
policies of their Western allies.i , On the other, fears that the nation­
alist movements, after dealing with the British or French, would soon
*-. • ................ ..  *
turn against them have sometimes tempted them to take a sinister view.of
these movements.  ^ '
/ -
H I - The Arab
. , Taken together, the effects of British 'and American policies.
have destroyed the old hopes of some Arab nationalists la  the United 
States as an ally, and rendered a ll the nationalists more suspicious 
and pessimistic ever the motives and aims of Britain, Today, in . 
the eyes of the Arabs,, the United States occupies a 'position
*7©r a critical steady of the Ifalted States’ policy towards theArabs see. 
Spelser, on.clt.. p. 242 i t .lea,
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similar fa Britain as the » I n  vest era predatoiy,i»p*rialistle truer, 
heat «a orasbing'the'national liberati'1«  movement in the Arab ooontriea 
In +he interest of the grant o il monopolies and ->ther ve *ted'interests, 
tese vnclf«reran critica renard the -United Ci-tatco only «.1 an associate 
or "accomplice" of Britain in exploiting and oppressing the Arab nation.* 
The fact : that these sombre feeling!» towards the United States'are chared 
ty »any other Aslan «rantries, with the significant Inclusion of Nehru*# 
India, an well an the Batin Mmrlean people# who, an Insediate neighbours, 
are known to be the most competent judges of ■American polity,4 tare only 
strengthened the Arabs* sense of the rightness 'of their enti-Aaericaniem• 
What did the Arabs do after exoericncing the*® feelings of betray­
al ty the British and frustration with the TMted States'* As both th®
"The ^nited States ooliey," write# Br. * Abdul Malik' *l^«h, "Is character­
ised ty the support of financial interests, influential circles and in­
restore in their.efforts to emccte rones of influence, acquire sources 
of raw rcateriala and secure desired markets for the epanding American 
economy . . .  (these interests) are aided in their efforts by tbs Mstttagon 
and the la.part^ent of »Hate. Besides,all the proposals for Palestine 
. as veil as the «Johnston plan age aissed at securing and consolidating 
' American influence.* In Dr. ‘ Odah1!  opinion, the American defence schemes 
in the Middle last hare so far been motivated ty the deeir* to preserve ■ 
American financial inttresta^and iimntment in the 1-iddle last at the « * -  
pens® of the British." (Maying arat,p, 67.). "fallowing the Second *J»rld" 
War,"-write3 another contemporary political analyst, Mu^a»ad 'Issah 
Barswsah, "the United States set about establishing Its influence la . 
various* Arab countries, raising the banner of leadership of the noa- 
Scrmunist world, whose peoole like to ©all it  *the free world*, and 
created (in these countries) centres which, with the passing of tine, 
proved to b« imperialistic...." ( al waMat* al "erablyeh, ©p.«4t*, p. 315.)
z : m  also JanbalaJ.'., .W »  ■ &  itJttft»
7B-77.
Western and Eastern blocs had openly contributed to the creation of 
a hostile state in their midst, two contradictory, but parallel, ten­
dencies started to develop among Arabs of different political persuasions» 
first ly , fear of Israeli expansionism prompted them to secure the sunport» 
especially military, of one or oth^r of the Great Powers* but, secondly. 
popular indignation against the involvement of the two rival blocs in 
the creation of Israel rendered it necessary to avoid any open and formal 
alimment with either of them. The Arab mind is more apt to entertain 
contradictory ideas than is any other mind and, since 1943, these two 
onnosing tendencies have found their manifestation in the policies and 
diplomatic moves of almost a ll Arab countries.
The first tendency to curry favour with one of the Great Powers 
resulted, in the period between 1951 and 1956, in two denouements which, 
oddly enough, were contrasting» the Baghdad Pact (February 1955) and 
Egypt’ s arms deal with Czechoiovakiik (June 1955). Whereas the Baghdad 
Pact marked Iraq's departure from, or rather outright denunciation of, 
the principle of neutrality, Egypt’ s move satisfied the urge to secure
foreign help without offending the desire for neutrality aid, therefore,■ » ' • «!•
was consonant with the motives of the po3t-Palestine Arab nationalism, , /
Ag to the second and more important tendency to adopt neutrality,
with a precision which is so rare in the case of ouch social and histori- 
• -r - * ‘ > 
cal developments, one can trace its inclusion in the Arab nationalists*
articles of faith to the Bandung Conference of April 1955.^ The choice ’
■Jaha * Abdul BaqI Surur, ou.cit.. p, 93 et sea.
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of that great assemblage of Afro-Aslan peoples as a suitable occasion 
for glorifying the term neutrality was no wanton or fortuitous act.
As we have seen in the foregoing pages, the earlier half of the 
year 1955 was a period of unprecedented intensification of Western mili-
tary activities in the Middle East, marked by the creation of the Baghdad 
Pact in February and evidence of Persia's adherence to it. The main spon- I 
sor of these activities was the British Government which, after the settle«* 
ment'of its o il dispute with Persia (August 1954) and the conclusion of 
the agreement on evacuation of British forces from the Suez Canal (Octo­
ber 1954)» had set about reconstructing the machinery of its policies 
in the Middle ¿a3t. There were developments which portended a consider­
able measure of success for there British efforts, among which the mast
important ones were- the replacement in Persia of the National Front 
" ' - ' ‘ • ■ - - united ? - .
Government by a pro-Western regime and the/Anglo-Araerican policy towards
■-1' 1 
almost a ll major Kiddle Eastern problems.
^Western analysts and commentators usually overlook or understate the 1* 
effects of the Persian oil nationalisation movement on the inter-action ' 
between American and British policies in the Middle bast. It  is no 
close secret that the Americans had a hand in promoting the initial 
phases of that movement snd, as a whole, in a ll anti-British feeling la 
the Middle East before 1953» a point which was a constant source of sus- | 
nlcicn and complaint in British circles (Parliamentary Debates I Commons, | 
520, col. 4» November 3» 1953.) Deep anxiety and alarm developed in . \
Washington as anti-British feelings and the plea for nationalising Peru. *1 
sia's o il were turned into a nation-wide movement agaJnst a ll fotms of \
Western Influence in that country, and the-soothsayers began to put ~ ...-
forth their familiar stories of teminent, Communist domination of.Persia. 
This made the Americans come round to the British view that Western posi­
tions in the Middle East cannot be assured of survival unless American 
material strength be combined with British political ingenuity in a uni- j 
fied Anglo-American diplomatic system, Such'a system was in fact set In / 
motion after Eisenhower's accession to the American presidency, and was / 
manifested by a succession of Joint Anglo-American reactions towards the ( 
Middle Eastern problems.
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In spite of these developments Britain did not succeed in real­
izing her military and political objects in the Middle East, This waa ') 
due to her error of leaning too heavily on,and insisting on, Iraq*8 \ 
co-operation at a time when the Arab league wa3 a going concern and \ 
Egypt, rejuvenated by a military revolution, seemed to be substantiating/ 
her claim to the leadership of the Arab world. Dormant emotions against 
military alignments conceited by the Vest were thus naturally aroused with 
renewed vigour in the Arab countries on the day following the conclusion 
of the Turco-Irani friendship agreement fJanuary 19?5) .  Egypt promptly- 
responded to‘this challenge1 with the military agreements of March 1956 
with Syria and Saudi Arabia.
But for an idealist Egypt striving to lead the A-abs in a ll as­
pects of political life  and to provide an ideological justification for 
each of her policies, a tactical move along the lines of a military a lli­
ance with the monarchical Saudi Arabia and the not too reliable Syria was 
neither adequate nor appropriate. What was required was a consistent and 
water-tight political Weltanschauung which should be expressed in terms 
at once appealing to the masses and able to evohe the support of the 
newly-independent countries of A3ia and Africa and which 3hould also meet" 
the requirements of a leadersbin unable to commit itse lf to fixed prin­
ciples in i t 3 international relations. All search in this direction with-
It is significant that immediate official Egyptian protest against the 
Turco-Iraqi agreement was based not so much on neutralist arguments, th
on the compiaint^that Iraq had not consulted other Arab governments be-: 
forehand. (Cf, *Udah. pp.clt. . p. 21 ft  «eg. ) .
in the bounds of Arab-Islamic political thought had. tar the middle of 
1955, reached a deadlock. The reason for this,apart from doctrinal In­
hibitions, a3 explained at.the beginning of thi3 chapter, was the fact 
that the Arabs’ conflict with the We3t had hitherto prevented the creation 
of any neutralist tradition in contemporary Arab political thought.
But, i f  the search for an elaborate theory in justification of 
an outward neutrality was unsuccessful inside Egypt, it achieved an im­
mediate result outside.. India, under Nehru’s leadership, provided the 
ideal solution and accepting India as an edifying example was not acci- 
dential. In addition to tho inspiring personality of hchru, who com­
manded great respect'and affection among the Arab intelligentsia, India 
herself, as a country which had achieved a leading place among'the 
Asians after years of strangle and endurance  ^ had many attractive fea­
tures for these leaders whohad, to some extent, been inspired ty Indian 
nationalism»^ «The occasion on which the idea of neutrality was accepted 
and officially proclaimed as one of the pillars of modern Arab nation­
alism was, as we have Ju3t said, the i*andung Conference of April 1955» 
a fraternal occasion where it  wai quite appropriate for friendly countries 
to borrow ideas and slogans from each other, whether relevant or irre le - .. 
vant to their needs, : • : ^
y
tn the documents of the Bandung Conference, "neutrality1* is  
Udah, on.cita.A99 .et.Md.i Xcguib, o ^c it ,, p. 49.
4 0 2 .
"  i  "
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described as "non-commitment"end is explained to mean "abstention 
from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the parti­
cular Interests of'any'of the big powers". To suggest' an innovation In 
phraseology and thereby to give the Impression of political Initiative, 
the Nasirltes Improved on the term "neutrality" ty calling it  "positive 
neutrality" biyad al ijâb l.
"The political characteristic of (Egypt’s) relations 
. with other countries stems from principles which were » 
initiated by the idea of a "peace sone", developed 
with the growth of the Afro-Asian group and manifested v 
in the Bandung resolutions. The political characteristic 
of our relations with other countries is  thus non-commit- 1 
ment. But aa we are living in this age of a triangular 
, struggle (political, military and economic -  against col- . 
onialism, for national progress) President N lsir came to 
call this principle (non-commitment) ’positivé neutrality’ 
in order to express the present situation in a more elo­
quent way than does the term non-commitment.wl ^
Is  neutrality a tenable and sincere line for the Arabs to take 
in their present position in the world? ,
.The meaning of the term neutrality,is fairly clear in politics. - 
A routine definition of the term is  to refrain from giving offence to 
either of hostile parties In a political conflict. One of the oldest 
and roost important problems connected with this status has been how to 
avoid being dragged into such conflict. I f  this problem was of »son» ' : - 
moment as lor® ago as the time of Grotius, it  is of far greater signi­
ficance in our. time when the international community has become more cora- *
*Ddah, pp.cit.« p. 108,
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pact -  thanks to scientific and technical advancements. This compact-
•O-:' .
ness has become more obvious in the division of the world into two 
major political groupings» the Eastern bloc headed by the Soviet Union 
and the Western bLoc ledj: on by the United States. The social, economic 
and cultural implications have been immense and every branch of human 
activity, ranging from science to humdrum day-to«<3ay life , has been af­
fected by the freezing «id blind logic of the cold war. Every word in 
political terminology has obtained a different tang suitable to the 
purposes of the two rival Ideologies. Finally, the whole of the world' s 
material and spiritual life  is being increasingly identified with either 
Communism or Western Democracy. Soon after the death of Stalin, when
. • r. - ' : ■ :  ■, ^ . »■ ■ <- .v : , - V - j ;. ¡.
*• * - * '*■ * ■ ' » • • • *  x - *■ • . . , . s • * f  ’ , .  • • • - 5.1»,■ » '  -
the Soviet leaders started to adjust and normalize their relations with 
Yugoslavia and non-Communist countries on purely diplomatic and, at the 
best, economic bases, high hopes were raised that a third force in in­
ternational politics might com© to exist and survive independent of the 
two great blocs. But these hopes were soon to be frustrated ty the sub- 
sequent developments in Eastern Europe said the growing stiffness of West- 
ern policies.
In spit® of a ll this, we can s t ill  say thatprovided these two
hostile blocs do not absorb or destroy each other, there w ill s t i l l  re-
- :• : ■ - , i. .0 : • i ; , i;"- 1 ' •!./ - '  v . • f ' ^
main a limited room for manoeuvre for neutral states outside them. But
we can also say that such room is available only to those small or "medium”
states which have fully achieved their national independence, and so have
a genuine interest in the maintenance of the status quo and world peace.
ff
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India can afford to adopt a middle policy*because within a decade of  ^
obtaining independence she has achieved a'relative degree of internal 
•lability and has no important diapite with either of the Great Powers.
... . . . . . . .  * t  *  • • . ... f T . . i
Buraa, also, although s t i l l  in the throes of dissensions and intrigues, 
can be neutral because the forces standing In the wav of her nrosoerltv
J v *
have been unconnected with any Great Power and,* for this reason, she has 
no major international dispute, '
The Arab countries present a completely different picture. Accord-
ing to the professed opinions of the leaders of modern Arab nationalism,
» -
these countries are not only passing through a period of dual struggle
"■ “ ■ 1 - v-  -  ~l ■ . . . ,  , ,  .  ,  , , -f . ,  . .  i *  -  ■- r  ■*
against internal corruption and external colonialism, but are also en­
gaged in the fight for reviving and strengthening their unity. As we 
noted above, the Western Powers are often identified with the obstacles 
to this unity. In Ms Philosophy of Revolution $asir describes Imperialism 
and tMs, by numerous explanations and indications throughout, appears to 
mean the «pansionist Western Powers -  as the foremost of the forces united 
against the Arabs. A conclusion which Is inevitably drawn from the book" 
is that tbs Arabs should devote the bulk of their strength to conflating 
this most powerful enemy. It  is also evident that in a bi-polar world, 
once the Arabs embark on tMsjpath, they have inevitably engulfed them- 
selves in the cold war, and this is contrary to a ll logio of neutrality.
The Philosophy of Revolution, p. 98.
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The general trend of Arab policies, especially after the adoption 
of the policy of positive neutrality (1955) provides evidence of this, 
Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia In June 1955 was an unmistakable 
move in the Cold War, aimed at offending the West while not fully committing 
that country to the East, Egypt's and Syria’s silence over the Hungarian 
tragedy in 1956, not only in the organs of the United States but also 
within their own countries, was Just as much helpful to the Soviet Union 
as Yugoslavia's blessing for the Kadar Government, Numerous economic and 
technical agreements between tits UAH and the Communist countries, especially 
the Soviet-TJAR agreement over the Aswan Dam, have made it  difficult for 
t i»  Arab leaders to go too far in complaining of Soviet duplicity towards 
the Arate,
f •
It is to be noted also that the adoption of the policy of positive 
neutrality itself was partly to seek the favour of toe Communist countries. 
Communism, like * alara, precludes in theory any middle status between Cap­
italism and itself; "He who is not with us is  against us"i such is  its  
familiar motto. But in toe thaw that followed toe revision of Stalinist - 
principles it  became necessary to concede, as a tactical measure, the 
admissibility of formal abstention from acoeding to existing military 
alignments, with the tacit understanding that the "abstaining country" 
should In practice tolerate the advance of Communism within its confines.
To sum up. Neutrality is against both the teachings of Islam and 
'the declared aims of Arab nationalism. Its adoption ty some Arab countries
it
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aa a strategy In international relations has dnly been a response to the 
Western pressures and a gesture to please the Eastern bloc. As such, 
neutrality cannot form a permanent basis of Arab nationalism and is bound 
to be abandoned sooner or later as the vague slogans of the Cold War are 
dissolved into clear issues and the Arabs enter the final stage of their 
battle for unity.
408
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
After the lis t  of the general sources w ill follow the names of 
the books or/or by the authors whose na&es have aopeared in this work; 
these are arranged In order of the appearance of the authors' names In 
the the id s.
A. Arab -  Islamic
1. Al Khvaja gunain Hi* flflataliah Kimrl!, at tufefat* al adablyah f l  
tarlkh tammady al mamallk al urubawlrah. ma^ baJ at al ahraa.' 
Alexandria, 1877. if V. surra. p. 90 et aeq . )
2. Wward G. Browne, The Persian Revolution. Cambridge, 1910.
3. ----  A Literary Hlsterr of Persia. Cambridge,
(Four Volumes), 1920.
4. H. A. it. Gibb, "Studies in Conteaoorary Arabic Literature" in
M ile tin of the School of Oriental Studies. Vol. IV, 1926-28.
5. Hans Kohn, A History of fratlonallsa in the East. London, 1929.■
6. Ameer A ll, The Spirit of I s i « . Christophers, London, 1922.
7. H. A. R. Gibb, Whither Islaa?. Victor Gollancz, 1932.
8. George Antonins, The Arab Awakening. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1938.
9. Mattel E. T. Mogannara, The Arab Woman. Herbert Joseph Limited, 
London, 1937.
20. Louis Kassignon, "l'Hrama et ses Synonyraes* in Revue die Etudes Islam- 
¿22128» U ,  15 (1 ), Paris, 1940-46.
11. Richard Hartmann and H. Scheel, Beltrage zur Arablatik. Seaitlstlk 
und Islamwissenschaft. Otte Harrosswits, Leipzig, 1944.
12. H, A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends In Islam. The University of Chicago 
Press, 1947.






















Afcssd Araïn, aai*aia£* al lgïàfr f i * l  agr al fradlth, raaktahat* *1 
* arablyah, Cairo, 1943. —
H, A. H. Gibb, Hohamacdonla«. Oxford University Press, London, 1949.
Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhaamedan Jurisprudence. Oxford 
University Press, London, 1950.
E. A. Spelaer, The United States and the Near East. Harvard University 
Press, 1950.
Nablh* Amin Paris va Muhammad Tawflq Husain, hadh^alam al *arabi. 
dar al ‘lira 11*1 maia’in, Beirut, 1953.
Sylvia G. Haïra, «Islara and Arab Nationallsra1» In Die Walt des Islaraa. 
N.5., 3, 1953-54.




Agwanlf .mà *É£j£8LM 'i» In-
rai  Studies, Mbalia University, Allgirh, 1955.
A l l »  edited ly Sydney Nettleten Fisher, 
Cornell university Press,Ithaca, 1955.
G, K. Von Grunebaua, Islam. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1955.
Majid Khadduri, War and Peace ln Islam. The Johns Hopkln Press, 
Baltimore, 1955.
Humayun Kablp, Science. Pesooracy .«fl. Islam. George Allen end Umrin, .. 
London, 1935.
Sylvie Haïra, wislaa and Arab Nationalisa* ln Me Walt des Islaas.
K.3.4, 1955-56.
Yusuf As*ad Daghir, magâdlr ad dlrâaat?al adabîyah, Belrut, 1955.
Haalra Zakl Nuseibeh, I R U f M ^ f  ..ABÉ  ^M t e t 1! » »  Corne 11 Unlversi^r 
î¥ess, Wew Y©xt, 1956.
Ter Andra#, MytoapuM.«.. The Man and Hjs Faite (translated by TheopMl ' 
Mensll), George Allen & Uhwln Ltd., London, 1956.
Jurjî Zaldân, burnt an nahgat^al ‘ aratiyah, dâr a l h llâ l, Cairo, 1956.
Ishak Musa Husalni, The Moslea Bretbaren. Khayat, Beirut, 1956.
32. Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism In the Middle East. 
Routled§e & Kegan Paul, London, 1957.
33. Muhammad al Bahgy, a l flkr al_islaml al fcadlth wa gilatuhu b i 'l  
lstl*mSr al gharbl.' Iftttad * Ail flukhalmir. Cairo. 1957.
34* Wilfred Cantwell &tith, Islam In Modern History. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1957.
35. Faye a A. Sayegh, Arab Unity. The Devin Adair Company, New York, 1958.
36. Professor Bernard Lewis, The Arfca In History. Arrow Books, London, 
1958.
37. Daniel Lerner, ate Passing of Traditional Society. The Free Press, 
Glencoe (Illin o is ), 1958.
38. I  bn Khaldun, Tbs Muoaddlmah. translated by Franz Rosenthal, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, (Three Volumes), London, 1958.
39. Zeine N. Zeine, Arab-Turklsh Relations and the Emergence of Arab 
Nationalism. Khayat's ,'Beir'ut, 1958.
40. ¿ami al KaiyalT, al adab al *arabl al »u*aalr f l  surlyah. dar al 
ma*arif bl mlfr, Cairo, 1959.
41. John S. Badeau, "Islam and the Modern Middle Hast", in Foreign Affairs. 
October 1959.
42. Glub Pasha, Britain end the Arabs. Redder & Stoughton, London, 1959.
43. Muhammad Taql a l Qumml, qipgat* at taqrlb, dar at taqrlb, Cairo,
April I960.
44. Morroe Border, Military Elite and Social Change, sub-titlet Egypt 
since Napoleon, Wince town University, I960.
%
45. Jacques Berque, Leg Arabs d'Hier a Domain. Editions du Seuil, Paris, 
I960.
■46. Zeine N. Zeine, *0» Struggle for Arab Independence. Khayat's,
Beirut, I960.
47. Dr. Hgosan Saab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Eteplre.- 
Djambatan, Amaterdam," 1960.'
48. Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law. Oxford University Press, 
Second edition, London, i960.
411
B. Non-Arab »  Islamic
49. Ernest Renan, Qu'eat-ce ou1 une Nation?,Calmann-Leyy. Paris, 1887,
50. H, G, Wells, The Outlines of History. New York, 1920,
51. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. The MacMillan Company, New York, 
1944.
52. Norma» Mackenzie, Socialism A Short History. Hutchinson's University 
Library, London, 1949«
53. Nationalisa and Internationalism. edited ty Edward Mead Earle, Columtta
DhiverÀ ty iress,.M«w ïork'," 1950'”
54. Alex Josey, Socialism in Asia. Donald Moore, Singapore, 1954,
55. Christopher H ill, Lenin and the Rusal«] Revolution. The English Uni­
versities Press Ltd, , l4»ndon, 1957.'
56. M. K, Gandhi, Socialism of my Conception. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 
Bombay, 1957,
N %
57. Henri Lefebvre, Problèmes ântneles du Marxisme. Press Universitaire 
do France, Ri ri a, 1958.
58. Elle Kedourie, Nationalisa. Hutchinson of London, i960.
C. Egypt
59. E. W, Lane, An Account of the Manners and Customs of tbs M o d » »
Egyptians. L m O m ,.IS60. 1
60. A. A, Paton, History o f the Egyptian Revolution. Trubner & Co. London, 
1870,
61. Martin Hartmann, The Arabic Press of Egypt. Luzac, London, 1899.
62. Alfred Milner, England in Egypt. Edward Arnold, London, 1894.
63. Shafik Ghorbal, The Beginning o f the Egyptian Question and the Rise 
o f Mehaet All. Routledge, London, 192o,
/
64. M, Sabty, 1* Empire Bferptlen sous Mohaaed AH. Librairie Orientale, • 
Paris, 1930.
65. C. C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt. .Oxford {diversity Press, 
London, 1933.
412.
66. Lord Lloyd, Eafat Since Cromer, ^cmlllan & Co., London, 1933.
67. Angelo Saiaarco, Histoire de l'Egypte Moderne. l'Institut Français 
d*Archéologie Orientale, Cairo, 1937.
68. J, Heyvorth-Durme, An Introduction to the % story of Education in
■ EfiÉot. Luzac & Co.,.London,.193 .^ "
69. Charles Issnri, Egypti An Economic and 3oolal Study. Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, London,194.7. Ses also below Ho, 123
and no. 149 et sea.
70. Heyvorth-Dunne, Religious and Political Trends to Hadern Lernt. 
Washington, 1950.
/
71. Marcel Colombo, l 1Evolution de l'Egypte. 19PA-1950. Maisonneuve,
Paris, 1951.
72. The issues of aalallat* al azhar. Cairo, 1952-57.
73. Mehaamed Keguib, Egypt's Destiner. VictorIGellancz, London, 1955.
74. fAbd ar Raljman.ar^tïfi'I, fâi€kh al fearakat1 al qavmîyah, maktabat' an 
nahdat al mlgrlyah, Cairo, (fouriii édition), 19ÿ?.'
■ y
75. Jean et Flnenne Lacotiture, l'Egypte en Mouvement. Edition du Seuil, 
Paris, 1956,
76. Jan al Muhaonad Ahmed, The intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism.
Oxford University Press, London, I960.1 -
■ 77. ■ Raoul Makarius .La Jeunesse ^ntollootuollo. d1 Egypte act Lendemain de la - 
Deeodege Qmxr® Mondlalo. Mouton & Co.. Parla.1960.
D. Syria and Lebanon
78. • A, H, Hour ani, Syria and Lebanon. Royal Institute of International
Affairs, Landon, 1946.
79. Clyde C, Hess Jr., Hebert L. Bodman jr . ,  Confessionali «a and Feudality 
in Lebanese Politics, in The Middle East Journal, 1954, pp. 10-26,
80. Philip K, Hitti, History of arila. Macnilland, tendon, 1957.
81. N. A. Ziadoh, Syria and Lebanon. Ernest Bonn Ltd., London, 1957.
11
82, KaraalJanbalà£, ^aqlqat* at thawrat* al lubnànlyah, dar an nashr al
* arabTyah, Beirut, 1959, ......
83. Arnold Hottìnger, Zu* ama* and Partisi» In the Lebanene Grigia of 1958. 
The Middle East Journal, Spring',1961.
' a
E, Other Arab Gaunt ria» ' -
r
84. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iran 1900-1950. Oxford University press, 
London, 1953#
85, P. M. Halt, A Modern Ustorr of the Sudan. Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1961.
86. Paul Goodman and Arthur D. Lewis, Zlonismt Problems and Views.
T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1916.
87. Israel Cohen, A Short History of Zionism. Frederick Muller, London, 1951.
88. S, D. Goltein, Jews and Arabs. Sehooken Books Ino., York, 1955.
89. Keny E. Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arah-JWlsh Conflict.
Librairie E. Dr®*, Geneva,1959.
I I  SPECIFIC
Muhammad ite * AM al Wahhab
90. Muhammad itn *Abd al UahhSb, Kit ab at tawfrld, Ms, (aritish Museum), 
O.H. 4529.
91. ------ Mukhtiaar sirat* ar rasùl, matta* at’ as
fonati mafcasamadlyah, Cairo, iffS.""^1"....
Rifa? ah gSfi* at Sahtawl
92. Rifa* ah Rafi* at Tahtawì, takhlls al ibrls f l  talkhls bari*,dar at
$it»* at’al amir ah, Cairo, 1848. ' "  " " " " ...........
al *atrlyab. Cairo, 1869.
93
A H .
94. Rif a* ah Ran.* a$ JahJawl, nlhayat* al Ijaa fT el rah sakin al hijaz 
ma^ ba* i  mad aria al mulklyah, Cairo, 1174.
95. Jamal ad2Blji Mu&anm.ad ash Shaiyal, Rif a* ah at Tahtawl, az za*lra an 
nahdat al-fikrfyah f l  misr Muhammad^Xll. ’A^lan aL Islam. (Cairo! 1947.
Ya* nub lbn Rafa*ll ganan*
96. —  lames of Aba laffarah, a l Mungif' and at
' tawaddud (The Libraries of the Schoolof Oriental and African Stadias 
and the British Museum.)
97. — -  |asn al isharah f l  musamarat abl nagfarah,
Cairo, 1910.
93, Ibrahim * Abduh, abn naszarah« Imam as flbifat* al fukahlvat* al 
muggawarah va za^ 'im almasrah f l  roipr, Cairo, 1953.
99. Irene L, Gendzier, "Jane3 Sanaa and Ifeyptian Nationalism" in iteJSUfflft 
East Journal. Washir&ton, Winter 1961.
Taha gusain
IDO. Tahui J!usain, f l * l  adab al iah lll. dar al ma*arif bi misr, Cairo,
1927.
101. — -  muataqbal ath thaqafah f l  mipr, matba* al ma*arif, Cairo.
102. The Tuture of Caltore of Egret. Sidney Glaser*s translation ©f the 
above book, American Council e f Learned Societies, Washington, 1954.
103. Jahta IJusain, naqd va lg lib . dar al *ilm l i * l  mala’Tn, Beirut, 1956.
See also above Koa. 23 and 65.
Jamil Sidql az Zahawi
104. Loula iAas3lgRon.♦Presne Arabt» "La Question du Voile"» in Revo© du 
Monde %talman. Paris, XII. XI, 1910, p. 466.
105. Mahdl cAbbas al Abirl, bacioat* aa ZahiwI. matba*at* ar rashld,
Baghdad, 1947.
Seo above Nos, 2, 65.
106. Lujf TJliah Klian-i-Asad Xbadt, 3harh»i-hal ya athar-i-aeyed djeraal-ud-
dln (sic ) aaad sbadl ma*ruf bl afAanil. (Persian '¿'ext), Publications 
Iranschahr, Berlin," 1936• - ' "
107. Kagira ul Islâm-i-Kirraanl, târlkh-l-bldari-l-Trânian (Persian text), 
Tehran, 1953. (Second edlti-n).
108. Muhammad al MakhaSmI’s khâtirât Jamâl ad Bln al Afghani, matba*at
al*‘ ilmlyah, Beirut, 19HT---------B--------------------------------
109. Abd al_Qadir al HaghrilZ, Jamal ad Din ¿1 Afghani. Iqra*, Ho, 68, dâr 
al ma*ârif, (? Caire),
110. Mu^ nnaad 3 i l l  am îiadkûr, Jamâl « I  pin al Afélünl. bi* 1th al nahffat* al 
flkrlvah fl*sh sharq. Cairo, 1937.
111. Muhammad 1Abd a l Fattâh’s ashhar mashâhlr Udaba* ash sharq. al maktabat 
al miprlyah, Vol. I I ,  Cairo (no date).
112. A. M, Goichon*a introduction to Refutation deg matérialistes. Librairie 
Orientaliste, Haris, 1942.
y» mm mm
113. Murtadâ Muddarisï Châbârdahï. alndigânl i.1tia»*I va alvâal* i* aavM <5*vvtil
ad dîn Af «hânl (Persian text ;,  i^ïS l, Tehran, 1955,"“ ■
114. Jamal ad Din al ÇusainI al Afghani and Muhammad * Abduh, al urwat* al 
wuthoa va*I thawrat* al tahrlrirat* al kutra. Caire, 1957.
Muhammad 4 Abduh and Muhammad Raehld Rida
See above Nos. 65, 76,
115. . Mujjfiaaad Rashïd Ri$â, târlkh al uatâdh al iasai. matba* at al manâr,
1931.
116. The issues of al munir (Cairo, 1893-1936.)
*Abd ar Rafrmân al Kawâkibl
117. ‘ Abd ar Rahman al KavakibI, tabâ*l* al lstibdàd va masari* al iati*bàd
maJba* at* al ma*arif, Cairo Î9&4* " ................
113, —— ta» al aianL ns print, no date.
119. Dr, Sâml ad Dahhan, *Abd ar RabaSn al ^avaklbl.dâr al ma‘â r if  bi mipr, 
Caire, 1955.
1X5. Muhammad Khalaf Allah, al KswakibI, bayâtuhu va ârauhu, œaktàbat* al 
*arab, Caire, 1956. ----------------  -----------------------
121. Norbert Tapiero, Les Ideea Reforaistes d*Al Kawâkibl. Les Editions 
Arabes, 1956.
See also above Nos. 14, 47.
* All *Abd ar f&zlq.
122. 1 All 1 Abd ar Raziq, al islam *wa usui al hukro. Second Edition, 
ma$ba*8h mipr, Cairo, 1925.
123. ^ ——  hukm hai* ah klbar al ‘ ulama* f l  kltab al laiiw Va
usai si ftuka. aajaba1 ah salafiyah, Cairo, 1925.
124. Shaikh Muhammad Bakhlt, baoloat* al is Ima *wa usui al hukm. majba* at 
*as salafiyah, Cairo, 1926,
125. iàziq, al lisa1 fi*ah aharl*at* al lalànlyah. dar al fikr al ‘ arabi, 
Cairo, 1947.
See also above no, 65.
Musjaf'à Kamil
126. Moustafa .Kamel Pacha, Egyptian» et Angioli (with «si introduction 
bjr Julitto Adam), Perrin et Ole., Pari», 1906.
127. 'Abd ar Rahman ar R3fi*l, Mugjafa Kirill, bà*lth al barakat* al
wa^anlvah. ®atba‘ at* ash sharq, tfalra, I^W. ' ' '
123. Jacob Landau, ^
(1866-1924), (thesiay, ' miver3liy of L o n ^  1 ^ .
129. Fritz Steppat, Nationalisms und IsIam bel Mnatifa Kamil. dii. We.lt 
dea Islama. IV,' Leiden, 1I 56. '
Adlb Iahàc
130. — - ad dtnrar. maktabat* al *arab, Beirut, 1909.
Nailb figuri
131. The issues of ^Independence Arab. Paris, April 1907 to September 1908, 
(Library of the School of Oriental Studios),
132. Eugene Jung, La Revolts Arab0 . Libraire Colbert, Purls 1924.
133. Kampffmeyer, wDocumente som Kampf der Araber urn ihre t&ihabhangigk6it.w 
in Die Welt dea.îslaa». 'v n i r i 9 ^ l 9 C  B. 99. ' '..... .....
S'iti* al Buffi
134. Bafci* al Çusrl, dlfi* c«a al ‘ urübah. dar al *ilm 1*11 maïS*în,
Beirut, I956.
417.
135. Sa$i* al Bu§rT, al * rirubah bain du*atlha va mu* arldlha. dar al ‘ 11m 
1*11 mala*In, Beirut, 1957.
136. ——  ara* wa ahadlth f i * l  aawmlyat* al ‘ arablyah. dar al ‘ 11m
Til mala* In, B e i r u t , 1 9 5 9 . •
137. - —-  al M
dar al ‘ 11a 1*11 mala
al * ar ably ah wa*l dawlat* al uthmanlyah.
Beirut, I960.
133. A^ anad ash Shalbanl, al usua ath thawarawlyah 1*11 gawalyat* al 
‘ arablyah. ®a$ba*at a l'' jumhu^riyah, Damascus, 1953.
. i r .  ‘ Abdul Malik ‘ fJdah
139. ‘ Abdul Malik ‘ Udah, muhadarat ajyaflyah. maktahat* al anJllo*l 
mijrlyah, Cairo, 1953.
140, Sylvia Halm,'"Islam and Arab Nationalism" In Die Walt das Islam«. 
N. 5, 3, 1953-54.
141. HunXf ar Raazaa, »a*Slim al bayat* al * arablyat* al ladllah. dar al 
‘ 11m 11*1 aall*ln, Beirut, 1959.
142. Muhammad Daravzah, ad dustur al our*anl f l  shu*un al hayat. dir ihya* 
al kutub al * arablyah, Cairo, i956." ^  '
143. ——  al wafrdat* al ‘ arablyah. maktabat* al tljiriC,
Beirut.
144. — tarlkh al Jlna al * arabT. al maktabat* al ‘ asrivah. 
Beirut, (three v o lS a )7 H ^ 7
Nablh Amin Faria
145. Nablh Amin Faria, iln  as zwlyat* al arablyah. dar bairut, Beirut, 1953. 




146. m m  *Aflaq, ma* rakat* al mapîr al wâfotd. dlr al âdab, Beirut, 1953.
147. . *•—  f l  gatül al ba*th al *arabî. dir at t a l i 'ah (? Beirut), 
1959.
Jurl ffannâ
148. Dr. Jurj Çannâ, want* al *âl«m al * arabî. dâr al *ilm 11*1 aalâ'în, 
Beirut, 1952.
Jaail *Ahd an *€slr
149. The issues of al ahria. Caire, from 1952 te 1959.
150. The Philosophy of the Revalution. Public Affairs Press, Washington, 
1955, P.
151. Anwar el Sadat, Revolt e» the Nile. Allan Wingate, London, 1957.
152. Jaha *Abd al Baql Surûr, Jamil *abd an tfisir. raiul-feayyara walh at 
tlrïkh« al maktabat* al * iSoyah, Caire, 1957.
153. George Voucher, Gainai Abdul Kaiser et son Équine, oub-titlet Les 
années d'humiliation et la conquête du pouvoir. Julliard, Paris, 1959.
154* Gamal Abdul îfâfir, "Where I stand and Why?*,
17 August 1959.
155. Wilton Wynn, Nasser ef Egret. The Search for Dignity. Arlington Books, 
Cambridge, 1959.
156. Keith Whseleék, Nasser*a Hew Egypt. Stevens and Sons, London, 19éG,
157. Joachim Joesten, Nasser» The Hiss te Power. Odhams Press, London, 19fâ.
